Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items

Core TopicImportantConcise

OpinionsGS Papers II & III

01Anaemia & Double-Fortified Salt — Why Iron Alone Is Not Enough02BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership — From MoU to Common Rulebook

OpinionsSigned Op-Eds · The Hindu, 5 November 2026

01

Anaemia Burden: Can Double-Fortified Salt Deliver What a Multi-Causal Problem Needs?

Core TopicOpinionGS-II · Health, Nutrition, Welfare SchemesGS-III · Food Processing, Food SecurityPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Op-Ed · 05 Nov 2026

The op-ed questions the case for a nationwide rollout of double-fortified salt (DFS). Its argument is that anaemia has many causes, iron is not risk-free, and salt is the wrong vehicle at a time when India wants people to eat less of it.

◈ From the Basics: Anaemia and Fortification

Anaemia is a condition in which the blood's haemoglobin concentration — the iron-containing protein in red blood cells that carries oxygen — falls below a set cut-off. It causes fatigue, lower productivity, impaired cognitive development in children and higher risks in pregnancy.

• Food fortification: deliberately adding micronutrients to commonly eaten foods. India regulates it under the FSSAI's Food Safety and Standards (Fortification of Foods) Regulations, 2018; fortified products carry the "+F" logo.
• Double-fortified salt (DFS): salt fortified with both iodine and iron, developed by the ICMR–National Institute of Nutrition (NIN), Hyderabad.
• Static anchor — iodised salt: India's salt-fortification history begins with the National Goitre Control Programme (1962), renamed the National Iodine Deficiency Disorders Control Programme (1992). Iodised salt is widely cited as a public-health success, and it is the model DFS builds on.
• Haem vs non-haem iron: haem iron (meat, fish) is absorbed far more efficiently; non-haem iron (plant foods and fortificants such as the iron in DFS) is absorbed poorly and depends heavily on the rest of the meal.

The Scale of the Problem

Anaemia in India is widespread and, on the National Family Health Survey data, it rose between the fourth and fifth rounds despite long-running programmes.

Figure 1 — Anaemia prevalence, NFHS-4 (2015–16) vs NFHS-5 (2019–21), %

58.667.1Children6–59 months54.159.1Adolescent girls15–19 years53.157.0Women15–49 years22.725.0Men15–49 yearsNFHS-4 (2015–16)NFHS-5 (2019–21)Source: NFHS-4 and NFHS-5, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare

Prevalence rose across every group between the two rounds — the sharpest increase was among young children.

The Author's Argument, in Brief

1. Salt policy pulls the other way. Indians already consume roughly twice the WHO-recommended 5 g of salt a day, and about one in three adults has hypertension. India's NCD action plan targets a 30% relative reduction in salt intake.

• DFS works only if people keep eating a steady, generous amount of salt — the opposite of the public-health message.
• Households that cut salt would also cut iron; a "double fortified" label may encourage the belief that more salt is healthier.
• Salt intake varies by age, sex and region. Adult men tend to eat the most, while young children and women — the groups most affected by anaemia — eat the least.

2. Iron is not a harmless nutrient. The body has no regulated pathway to excrete iron; excess can accumulate and cause oxidative stress.

• Pemba trial (Tanzania, 2006): iron and folic acid supplements given to children in a malaria-endemic area were linked to more hospital admissions and deaths.
• Kenya study (2015): iron-fortified foods shifted infants' gut microbiota towards harmful bacteria and increased diarrhoea. Much unabsorbed iron reaches the colon and can feed pathogens.
• Haemoglobinopathies: India has millions of beta-thalassaemia carriers and a high burden of sickle cell disease in tribal belts. People with thalassaemia who receive regular transfusions are already prone to iron overload.
• Universal screening before fortification, through a PDS reaching around 800 million people, is unrealistic.

3. Stacking. Iron already reaches people through several channels. Adding DFS could mean a child or adolescent receives iron through three or four government programmes at once, without any published assessment of cumulative intake.

Figure 2 — The "stacking" problem: multiple iron channels converging on one child

Fortified ricevia PDSFortified ricevia PM POSHAN (schools)Fortified ricevia ICDS (anganwadis)IFA tabletsAnaemia Mukt BharatProposed DFSiron + iodine saltOne childcumulative ironexposure unmeasured

Each channel was designed separately; nobody tracks the total iron a single beneficiary receives.

4. Absorption is uncertain. Iron in DFS is non-haem iron, and the typical Indian meal works against it.

• Inhibitors: phytates in cereals, millets and pulses; polyphenols in tea and coffee; calcium in milk.
• Enhancer: vitamin C taken with the meal improves absorption.
• Cooking losses and uneven dosing are not captured by efficacy trials run under supervision.
• Hepcidin, a liver hormone, blocks iron uptake during infection or inflammation — so fortification works least well exactly where infection burdens are highest.

5. Iron deficiency explains only part of anaemia. Globally, roughly half of anaemia cases are attributed to iron deficiency. India's Comprehensive National Nutrition Survey (CNNS, 2016–18), which measured biomarkers, found that iron deficiency explained only part of anaemia in children and adolescents.

▤ Causes of Anaemia Beyond Iron

• Other nutrients: folate and vitamin B12 deficiency (common in vegetarian diets), low protein and vitamin A.
• Infection and inflammation: hookworm, malaria, chronic or recurrent infections linked to poor sanitation.
• Inherited blood disorders: thalassaemia, sickle cell disease.
• Social determinants: early marriage and pregnancy, adolescent undernutrition, menstrual blood loss.
• Measurement issues: capillary (finger-prick) readings tend to differ from venous blood tests, and the haemoglobin cut-offs used to define anaemia remain debated — the WHO updated its cut-off guidance in 2024.

Static Anchor: India's Policy Architecture on Anaemia

• National Nutritional Anaemia Prophylaxis Programme (1970) — the first national iron-folic acid programme for mothers and children.
• Weekly Iron and Folic Acid Supplementation (WIFS, 2012) for adolescents.
• Anaemia Mukt Bharat (2018), under POSHAN Abhiyaan — the "6×6×6" strategy: 6 target groups, 6 interventions and 6 institutional mechanisms. The op-ed refers to a revised "7×7×7" approach that adds measures, and credits it for doing so.
• Rice fortification (iron, folic acid, vitamin B12) phased into PDS, PM POSHAN and ICDS; universal coverage of government-supplied rice was achieved by March 2024 and the scheme extended to December 2028.
• National Sickle Cell Anaemia Elimination Mission (2023) — aims to eliminate sickle cell disease as a public health problem by 2047; relevant because iron programmes and haemoglobinopathies overlap.
• Eat Right India (FSSAI, 2018) — a behaviour-change campaign that, the op-ed notes, cannot by itself address the affordability of diverse diets.

Gaps in the Current Approach (as the Author Sees Them)

• Continued reliance on IFA tablets despite known compliance problems and gastrointestinal side-effects.
• Haemoglobin-only testing cannot identify the cause of anaemia; ferritin (the iron-store marker), B12 and inflammation markers are rarely tested.
• Digital dashboards tend to count tests and tablets distributed rather than health outcomes.
• Deworming, malaria control, water, sanitation and hygiene remain on the margins.

International Experience

• Peru: cut child anaemia by double digits in the early 2010s by making it a political priority. It tracked children by name through health contacts, combined iron supplements and micronutrient powders with cash transfers, and held regions accountable. Progress reversed when COVID-19 disrupted services, showing that outcomes depend on sustained delivery.
• Vietnam: lowered anaemia among women through weekly iron-folic acid, deworming, sanitation and fish sauce fortified with NaFeEDTA — a form of iron that is better absorbed in phytate-rich diets. Fortification was chosen to fit local food habits and worked alongside rising incomes and dietary diversity.
• Takeaway: no single fortified food has solved anaemia on its own.

The Other Side: The Case for DFS

• Salt is consumed by almost everyone, cheaply and daily, and needs no behaviour change — the reason iodised salt succeeded.
• Fortification is among the most cost-effective nutrition interventions and reaches people outside government feeding programmes.
• DFS is already distributed in some States through the PDS and mid-day meals, and supporters argue the iron dose in salt is modest.
• A balanced view: DFS may have a role as one component, but the evidence on safety, cumulative exposure and real-world absorption needs to come first.

Way Forward

• Pilot before scale-up: monitored district-level pilots that measure ferritin, haemoglobin and inflammation, and track possible harm in malaria-endemic and haemoglobinopathy-prone areas.
• Assess cumulative exposure across PDS, PM POSHAN, ICDS, IFA and DFS before adding a new channel.
• Targeted rather than universal fortification, with better-absorbed iron forms.
• Invest in diagnostics, deworming, WASH and affordable diverse diets (eggs, dairy, greens, millets).
• Measure success by health outcomes, not by tablets distributed.

✎ Mains Practice Question

Anaemia in India is a multi-causal problem that a single nutrient-centred intervention cannot solve. Critically examine this statement in the context of proposals to scale up double-fortified salt, and suggest a more comprehensive strategy. 15 marks · 250 words

02

BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership: Building a Common Rulebook Before a Common Market

Core TopicOpinionGS-III · Environment — Climate Finance, Carbon MarketsGS-II · IR — BRICS, GroupingsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Op-Ed · 05 Nov 2026

The New Delhi Declaration of the 18th BRICS Summit (12 September 2026) reaffirmed the BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership. The op-ed argues that as India's chairship ends, the useful next step is not a joint trading platform but a common rulebook for measuring and recognising emission reductions.

◈ From the Basics: How Carbon Markets Work

A carbon market puts a price on greenhouse-gas emissions by letting entities trade units that each represent one tonne of CO₂-equivalent. Firms that cut emissions cheaply can sell units to those for whom cuts are costly, so a target is met at lower overall cost.

• Compliance vs voluntary markets: compliance markets are created by law and binding on covered entities; voluntary markets let companies buy credits to meet self-declared goals.
• Cap-and-trade: the government sets an absolute cap on total emissions and issues allowances (e.g. EU ETS, 2005).
• Intensity-based (output-based) system: targets are set as emissions per unit of output; total emissions can still rise as output grows. China and India use this model.
• Offset / carbon credit: a unit generated by a project that reduces or removes emissions (e.g. renewable energy, afforestation), which can sometimes be used for compliance.
• MRV: Measurement, Reporting and Verification — the accounting backbone that makes a tonne in one country comparable with a tonne in another.

Static Anchor: From Kyoto to Paris Article 6

• Kyoto Protocol (1997): created three market mechanisms — the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation and international emissions trading. India was among the largest hosts of CDM projects.
• Paris Agreement (2015), Article 6: Art. 6.2 allows countries to transfer mitigation outcomes bilaterally as ITMOs (Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes); Art. 6.4 sets up a UN-supervised crediting mechanism (the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism); Art. 6.8 covers non-market approaches. The rulebook was largely completed at COP29, Baku (2024).
• Corresponding adjustment: when a country sells a reduction abroad, it must subtract it from its own NDC accounting so the same tonne is not counted twice.
• Share of proceeds: a portion of credits issued under the Article 6.4 mechanism goes to the Adaptation Fund.

▤ BRICS: Quick Facts

• Origin: BRIC held its first summit in 2009 (Yekaterinburg); South Africa joined in 2010.
• Expansion: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE joined from 2024; Indonesia from 2025.
• New Development Bank (NDB): agreed at the Fortaleza summit (2014), headquartered in Shanghai.
• Carbon Markets Partnership: a Memorandum of Understanding acknowledged at the 17th Summit, Rio de Janeiro (2025) and reaffirmed at New Delhi (2026) — focused on capacity-building and experience-sharing, with no trading framework, targets or timeline.
• Weight in carbon markets: eight members run voluntary markets; Brazil, China, India and Indonesia together host more than one-third of carbon-credit projects registered worldwide.

Three Markets, Three Rulebooks

Compliance systems in the largest BRICS economies are maturing, but they are designed differently and none is linked to another. The same tonne of abatement is therefore a different legal instrument in each jurisdiction.

Figure 3 — How the three major BRICS compliance systems differ

China — National ETSIndia — CCTSBrazil — SBCEDesignIntensity-based(output benchmarks)Intensity-based(GHG-intensity targets)Cap-and-trade(absolute cap planned)CoveragePower; steel, cement,aluminium added (2024–25)490 entitiesacross 9 sectorsSet up by lawin 2024OffsetsDomestic CCERsonlyRecent projects only;exclusivity requiredMethodologies via abody yet to be set upLegal statusState-run national systemCertificates traded onpower exchanges (CERC)Overseen by thesecurities regulatorDifferent design, eligibility and legal character → no BRICS system is currently linked to another

Divergent design, offset rules and legal status mean that a BRICS tonne is not yet a common currency.

India's Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) — Prelims Hooks

• Legal basis: the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022, which empowered the Centre to specify a carbon credit trading scheme; the CCTS was notified in 2023.
• Predecessors: the Perform, Achieve and Trade (PAT) scheme (2012), which traded Energy Saving Certificates (ESCerts), and Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) — the CCTS shifts the unit from energy saved to emissions reduced.
• Two components: a compliance mechanism (GHG emission-intensity targets for obligated entities) and an offset mechanism (voluntary projects).
• Institutions: the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) administers the scheme; the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) regulates trading on power exchanges.

Why the Urgency: Carbon Border Adjustments

The pressure is external. A Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) charges importers for the carbon embedded in certain goods, so that domestic producers paying a carbon price are not undercut by imports from places without one.

• EU CBAM entered its definitive phase in January 2026; the UK's CBAM is due in January 2027.
• Both cover carbon-intensive imports such as iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers and hydrogen — important export lines for several BRICS members.
• A carbon price paid at origin is credited only if supported by verified evidence. Without a credible, verifiable standard, exporters face default values, which are usually set conservatively high.
• The UK's recognition of India's CCTS (August 2026) shows the pattern: relief depends on paperwork completed by an ISO 14065-accredited verifier, and each exporting country has negotiated on its own.
• The New Delhi Declaration describes CBAM as unilateral and discriminatory; the op-ed's point is that objections carry more weight when backed by a credible accounting standard.

What a BRICS Rulebook Should Do

• Common monitoring rules consistent with ISO 14064 (the standard for quantifying and reporting greenhouse gases) for sectors exposed to border adjustments.
• Mutual recognition of verifiers accredited by national accreditation bodies — similar to what BRICS customs authorities are pursuing for authorised economic operators.
• Harmonised registry data fields, so that credits can be tracked across systems.
• This builds on the BRICS 2025 Principles for Fair, Inclusive and Transparent Carbon Accounting, which already call for comparable producer data, granular default values and interoperable systems.

Figure 4 — A step-by-step pathway proposed for the partnership

Step 1Common MRV rules(ISO 14064) forCBAM sectorsStep 2Mutual recognitionof verifiers;common registry dataStep 3Small Article 6.2pilot among2–3 membersStep 4NDB-hosted sharedregistry / purchasingfacilityInteroperability first, linkage later (if ever) — the op-ed treats full market linkage as neither likely nor desirable

The proposal moves from shared accounting to a limited pilot, and only then to shared institutions.

The Pilot and Its Frictions

The second proposal is a small Article 6.2 pilot: two or three members would recognise one another's methodologies where each has approved methods, and accept a capped volume of partner-registry units within their domestic offset limits. India already has a Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) with Japan under Article 6.2.

• NDC trade-off: with corresponding adjustments, the host country cannot count the sold reduction towards its own NDC — a real cost for developing countries with ambitious targets.
• Settlement: cross-border payments raise capital-account questions and touch the BRICS Payment Task Force's work.
• Registry integrity: registries must exchange serial numbers and retirement data to prevent double issuance.
• The pilot's real value lies less in the volume traded than in turning each friction into a concrete drafting question with an institutional owner.

Using Existing Institutions

• The New Development Bank could host a shared registry or a purchasing facility for pilot units.
• The BRICS dialogue on aligning carbon markets with adaptation could channel part of intra-BRICS transfer proceeds to adaptation, as Article 6.4 already does.

The Critical View: Limits to Cooperation

• Asymmetry: China's scale would make it the price-setter in any linked market — a concern for smaller members and for India.
• Sanctions on some members complicate financial settlement and could deter private participants.
• Export competition: several members compete in the same steel and aluminium markets, which limits willingness to share data or align benchmarks.
• Design incompatibility: intensity-based and cap-based systems are hard to link without one side diluting its design.
• Credibility: voluntary carbon markets globally have faced criticism over over-crediting and weak additionality; a BRICS standard must be robust enough to be accepted by CBAM authorities.
• Hence the op-ed's conclusion: full linkage is neither likely nor desirable, but common MRV and a methodology-level pilot are low-cost and preserve regulatory autonomy.

Significance for India

• Strengthens India's hand in CBAM negotiations through collective, verifiable standards rather than one-by-one bargaining.
• Supports India's updated NDC goals and net-zero by 2070 pledge by building market infrastructure.
• Positions India as a rule-shaper for the Global South in climate finance, consistent with the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR-RC).

✎ Mains Practice Question

The spread of carbon border adjustment mechanisms has made interoperable carbon accounting a trade necessity for emerging economies. In this context, examine the prospects and limitations of the BRICS Carbon Markets Partnership. 15 marks · 250 words