In-Depth PIB Analysis2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGS Paper II 01Swachh Survekshan 2025-26 & Swachh Shehar Jodi EconomyGS Paper III 02National Entrepreneurship Day & India’s Startup Ecosystem Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGeneral Studies Paper II 01 Swachh Survekshan 2025-26: The 10th Edition of India’s Urban Cleanliness Survey and the ‘Swachh Shehar Jodi’ Mentorship Model Core TopicGS-II · Governance — Govt Policies, Urban Local BodiesGS-I · UrbanisationPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs · Release ID 2334316 The President of India will confer the Swachh Survekshan 2025-26 awards at Vigyan Bhawan on 11 November 2026. A decade after its launch, the survey is now as much a test of whether ranking-driven competition can sustain urban sanitation as it is a contest among cities. ◈ From the Basics — What Is Swachh Survekshan? Swachh Survekshan (SS) is an annual ranking survey of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) on sanitation and solid waste management. It is the flagship assessment tool of the Swachh Bharat Mission–Urban (SBM-U), run by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) since 2016. The idea is simple: measure, rank, publicise and reward. Public ranking creates pressure on municipal leadership and administrators to improve services. The approach is often described as competitive federalism applied at the city level. Swachh Bharat Mission was launched on 2 October 2014. It has two arms: SBM-Urban under MoHUA and SBM-Gramin under the Department of Drinking Water & Sanitation, Ministry of Jal Shakti. SBM-U 2.0 was launched on 1 October 2021 for 2021-22 to 2025-26, with an outlay of ₹1,41,600 crore. Its stated goal is “Garbage Free Cities”. Constitutional base: “Public health and sanitation” is Entry 6 of the State List. The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 lists “public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management” in the Twelfth Schedule (read with Article 243W) as a municipal function. Statutory base: the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016, framed under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, made segregation at source a legal duty of waste generators. ▤ Survey at a Glance — SS 2025-26 Edition: 10th (first held in 2016). Theme: ‘Swachhata Ki Nayi Pehel – Badhayein Haath, Karein Safai Saath’. Nodal Ministry: Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (under SBM-U). Conferring authority: the President of India, on 11 November 2026, at Vigyan Bhawan, New Delhi. Coverage: from 73 ULBs in 2016 to over 4,751 cities in the latest edition. Framework: 43 indicators across 10 assessment areas. Assessment: 3,000+ trained assessors, GPS-enabled real-time monitoring, and a fully digital chain from evidence submission to verification. New emphasis this edition: greater weight to citizen feedback; urban river fronts, coastlines and water bodies; prevention of open defecation and open urination; cleanliness of tourist and heritage hotspots; behaviour change in schools. 73 → 4,751+Cities assessed, 2016 → 2025-26 43Indicators 10Assessment areas 3,000+Field assessors The 10 Assessment Areas Waste chain: segregation, collection and transportation; solid waste processing and management. What citizens see: visible cleanliness; access to sanitation. Faecal and wastewater management: mechanisation of desludging services; used water management. Systems and people: ecosystem strengthening and institutional parameters; advocacy for Swachhata; welfare of sanitation workers; citizen feedback and grievance redressal. Swachh Shehar Jodi — City-to-City Mentorship Swachh Shehar Jodi was launched on 27 September 2025 by the Union Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs. It is described as the first urban waste-management mentorship and peer-learning programme. A high-performing mentor city is paired with a lagging mentee city, and every pair signed an MoU at launch. Scale: 70 mentor cities and 191 mentee cities across 33 States/UTs. Logic: knowledge moves horizontally, from city to city. Practices that already work locally (route planning, segregation drives, material recovery) are transferred, not just top-down guidelines. Recognition: top-performing pairs will be honoured alongside the cleanest cities in SS 2025-26. Figure 1 — Mentee Cities: Score Gains, SS 2024 vs SS 2025-26 SS 2024SS 2025-26Visible Cleanliness48%70%Door-to-Door Collection52%74%Source Segregation16%30%Access to Sanitation11%38%Used Water Management32%53%Advocacy for Swachhata48%66%Cumulative score of mentee cities on each parameter (%), as reported by MoHUA Access to sanitation shows the largest jump (11% → 38%). Source segregation remains the weakest link at 30%, even after a year of mentorship. Figures are Government-reported. Lineage — How the Survey Has Evolved 2016: the first survey covered 73 cities; Mysuru was ranked cleanest. 2017–2023: coverage expanded rapidly to thousands of towns. Indore topped seven consecutive editions, sharing the top spot with Surat in SS 2023. Parallel certifications: ODF / ODF+ / ODF++ / Water+ protocols and the Garbage Free City (GFC) star rating (launched 2018) now feed into SS scores. SS 2024-25: introduced the Super Swachh League for consistently top-ranked cities (Indore, Surat, Navi Mumbai), so that other cities compete on a fresh field. Cities were also ranked within population categories. SS 2025-26: adds Swachh Shehar Jodi recognition and widens scope to water bodies, coastlines and heritage sites. Why It Matters Public health: poor sanitation drives diarrhoeal and vector-borne disease, which in turn are linked to child undernutrition and stunting. Urban governance: rankings create measurable accountability for ULBs, which are often weak on data and performance tracking. Circular economy: the focus on segregation and processing supports “waste to wealth”: composting, material recovery and waste-to-energy. Dignity of sanitation workers: indicators on mechanised desludging and worker welfare align with the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013 and the NAMASTE scheme (2023). Jan Andolan: citizen feedback and school campaigns aim at behaviour change, the hardest and most durable part of sanitation. The Critical View “Survey-season” cleanliness: rankings can reward visible cleanliness during the assessment window more than year-round systems. Collection ≠ processing: door-to-door collection has risen faster than scientific processing. Many cities still carry legacy dumpsites. Segregation lag: even mentee cities score only 30% on source segregation. This is the stage on which the entire downstream chain depends. Fiscal and capacity gaps: devolution under the 74th Amendment remains incomplete. Small ULBs depend on transfers and lack engineers and planners, so the ranking compares unequal starting points. Informal workers: mechanisation and formal contracts can displace informal waste pickers unless they are integrated into the system. Data integrity: self-submitted evidence and online citizen feedback can be gamed. The shift to GPS-tracked, digitally verified assessment is a response to this. ◈ Terms to Know (Prelims Hooks) ODF: no open defecation. ODF+: ODF, with community and public toilets functional and maintained. ODF++: ODF+, with faecal sludge and septage also safely managed. Water+: ODF++, with used water treated before discharge. GFC Star Rating: a 1-, 3-, 5- and 7-star certification of cities on solid waste management, under MoHUA. NAMASTE: National Action for Mechanised Sanitation Ecosystem, a scheme of the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment and MoHUA for the safety of sewer and septic-tank workers. Safaimitra Suraksha Challenge (2020): pushed cities towards mechanised cleaning of sewers and septic tanks. Way Forward Give more weight to processing outcomes and dumpsite remediation than to visible cleanliness. Tie Finance Commission and State Finance Commission grants to verified sanitation outcomes, and strengthen own-source revenue of ULBs (user charges, property tax). Make Swachh Shehar Jodi a permanent cluster model, with an independent audit of mentee gains. Integrate waste pickers through ID cards, cooperatives and contracts for material recovery facilities. ✎ Mains Practice Question “Competitive rankings have changed how Indian cities manage sanitation, but they cannot substitute for municipal capacity.” Critically examine this statement in the context of a decade of Swachh Survekshan. 15 marks · 250 words EconomyGeneral Studies Paper III 02 National Entrepreneurship Day (9 November): India’s Startup and Self-Employment Ecosystem — Schemes, Scale and Gaps Core TopicGS-III · Economy — Employment, Inclusive Growth, InvestmentPrelims + MainsPIB Backgrounder · Ministry of Commerce & Industry / MSDE · Release ID 2334411 National Entrepreneurship Day is observed on 9 November, the date on which the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE) was set up in 2014. The occasion is a useful point to take stock of a support architecture that now runs from ₹50,000 micro-loans to ₹10,000 crore venture funds. ◈ From the Basics — Entrepreneur, Startup, MSME An entrepreneur organises capital, labour and ideas to create a new enterprise and bears its risk. The economist Joseph Schumpeter saw the entrepreneur as an innovator whose “creative destruction” replaces old products and methods with new ones. Startup: a young, innovation-driven firm aiming to scale fast. In India, a startup is formally one recognised by DPIIT (Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade) on criteria of age, turnover and innovation. Recognition unlocks tax, IPR and procurement benefits. MSME: defined by investment and turnover under the MSMED Act, 2006 (criteria revised in 2020). Most MSMEs are not startups, and most startups begin as micro or small firms. Self-employment / micro-enterprise: livelihood ventures such as a street stall, dairy unit or tailoring shop. These are served by credit schemes rather than venture capital. Why the State intervenes: early-stage firms have no collateral and no track record, so banks avoid them. This is a classic market failure caused by information asymmetry. Public funds, guarantees and incubators try to correct it. ◈ Key Financial Terms, Explained Venture capital (VC): equity investment in young, high-risk firms in return for ownership, not interest. Alternative Investment Fund (AIF): a privately pooled fund registered with SEBI under the AIF Regulations, 2012. VC funds are a category of AIF. Fund of Funds: the Government does not invest in startups directly. It invests in AIFs, which then pick startups. This keeps selection with professional investors. Credit guarantee: the Government promises to repay a share of a loan if the borrower defaults. This lets banks lend without collateral. Incubator: an institution, usually in a university or research lab, that gives early founders space, mentoring and seed money. IPO (Initial Public Offering): a company’s first sale of shares to the public on a stock exchange. This is a common route for startup investors to exit. Unicorn: a privately held startup valued at US$1 billion or more. <500 → 2.62 lakhDPIIT-recognised startups, 2014 → Nov 2026 25.36 lakhJobs reported (Oct 2026) 51.6%Rise in recognitions, FY26 over FY25 52%Startups from non-metro cities The Ecosystem in Numbers Ranking: the Government describes India as the 3rd-largest startup ecosystem in the world. Growth: recognitions rose by 51.6% and direct jobs by 36.1% in FY 2025-26 over FY 2024-25. Geography: startups exist in every State and UT. Maharashtra, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Delhi and Gujarat lead on recognitions and jobs (as of 31 March 2026). Gender: over 1.07 lakh startups (~48%) have at least one woman director or partner. Demography: the Government cites that nearly 65% of India’s population is under 35. This is the demographic dividend the policy aims to harness. Figure 1 — India’s Startup Ecosystem at a Glance Five States account for the largest share of recognised startups and jobs, a pattern that the push towards non-metro entrepreneurship seeks to change. Image courtesy PIB Backgrounder (source: Ministry of Commerce & Industry); reproduced with credit for educational use. ▤ Scheme at a Glance — Startup Finance & Innovation Startup India (16 January 2016): nodal body DPIIT, Ministry of Commerce & Industry. It has grown from an action plan into a platform covering funding, mentorship and scaling. Fund of Funds for Startups (FFS): corpus ₹10,000 crore, managed by SIDBI, invests through SEBI-registered AIFs. SIDBI has committed ₹12,623 crore to 166 AIFs, which have invested ₹28,254 crore in 1,475 startups (Oct 2026). FFS 2.0 (notified April 2026): a separate ₹10,000 crore corpus aimed at deep-tech, innovative manufacturing and early-growth startups. Credit Guarantee Scheme for Startups (CGSS, April 2023): provides collateral-free loans. Cover per borrower was raised from ₹10 crore to ₹20 crore in FY 2025-26, and the guarantee fee is 1% for 27 Champion Sectors. So far, 532 loans worth ₹1,662.71 crore have been guaranteed. Startup India Seed Fund Scheme (SISFS): corpus ₹945 crore for proof of concept, prototypes and market entry, routed through incubators. ₹775.67 crore has been approved for 4,194 startups via 244 incubators, including 2,147 women-led startups. Atal Innovation Mission (AIM, 2016, NITI Aayog): runs Atal Tinkering Labs in schools and Atal Incubation Centres. AIM 2.0 (approved Nov 2024) has an outlay of ₹2,750 crore up to March 2028. NIDHI (2016, DST): an umbrella programme for Technology Business Incubators. It has supported 12,000+ startups and 200+ TBIs. MeitY Startup Hub (2016), TIDE 2.0 (2019) with 51 incubators, and GENESIS (2022) with ₹490 crore over five years: these are tech-startup support schemes under MeitY, with a focus on Tier-II/III cities. Platforms: Startup India Hub (2017), MAARG (national mentorship portal), and the Investor Connect Portal (2023, with SIDBI). ▤ Scheme at a Glance — Micro-Enterprise & Livelihood Track PM MUDRA Yojana (2015): provides collateral-free loans up to ₹20 lakh for non-corporate, non-farm micro-units, in four tiers: Shishu (up to ₹50,000), Kishore (₹50,000–₹5 lakh), Tarun (₹5–10 lakh) and Tarun Plus (₹10–20 lakh). Over 2.44 crore loans worth ₹3.3 lakh crore have been sanctioned in FY 2026-27 so far. PMEGP (2008): a margin-money subsidy on bank loans for new micro-enterprises. It is implemented by the KVIC under the Ministry of MSME, with project caps of ₹50 lakh (manufacturing) and ₹20 lakh (services). PM SVANidhi (June 2020, MoHUA): working-capital loans for street vendors in a ladder of ₹15,000 → ₹25,000 → ₹50,000. Vendors who repay the second loan become eligible for a UPI-linked RuPay credit card (₹30,000 limit). The scheme has reached 80.7 lakh+ beneficiaries. SVEP (under DAY-NRLM): has supported 4.32 lakh rural enterprises, with about 86% of entrepreneurs from SC, ST, Minority and OBC communities. ASPIRE (Ministry of MSME): 109 Livelihood Business Incubators approved, with 1 lakh+ people skilled. Swavalambini (2025, MSDE): 21 weeks of mentorship to help young women move from a business idea to an enterprise. Figure 2 — Where Each Scheme Sits in the Enterprise Life-Cycle 1 · Idea & Prototype2 · Seed & Validation3 · Early-stage Equity4 · Debt & Scale-upAtal Innovation MissionNIDHI (DST) – TBIsGENESIS EIR (MeitY)Swavalambini (women)Startup India Seed Fund₹945 cr, via incubatorsTIDE 2.0 incubatorsMeitY Startup HubFund of Funds 1.0FFS 2.0 – deep-techSIDBI → SEBI AIFs → firmsInvestor Connect PortalCredit Guarantee (CGSS)up to ₹20 cr per borrowerMAARG mentorshipStartup India HubCross-cutting: DPIIT recognition · tax & IPR benefits · public procurement relaxationsParallel micro-enterprise & livelihood track (credit, not equity)MUDRA · PMEGP (KVIC) · PM SVANidhi · SVEP / DAY-NRLM · ASPIRE Public support is designed in layers. Grants and incubators cover the riskiest early stage. Equity is channelled indirectly through AIFs. Guarantees unlock bank debt later. Livelihood ventures run on a separate credit track. Lineage — Predecessors & Successors PMRY (1993) + REGP (1995) → PMEGP (2008): two self-employment schemes were merged into one, with the subsidy routed through banks. NRLM / Aajeevika (2011) → DAY-NRLM (2016): SVEP was added as its rural enterprise arm. The National Campaign on Entrepreneurship-II (Aug–21 Nov 2026) is linked to the stated goal of 6 crore Lakhpati Didis. FFS 1.0 (2016) → FFS 2.0 (2026): the focus has shifted from general venture capital to deep-tech and manufacturing. AIM (2016) → AIM 2.0 (2024); TIDE → TIDE 2.0 (2019). MUDRA: the Tarun Plus tier (₹10–20 lakh) followed the Union Budget 2024-25 decision to double the loan ceiling from ₹10 lakh. PM SVANidhi: the loan ladder was raised from ₹10k/₹20k/₹50k to ₹15k/₹25k/₹50k, and a credit card was added for good repayers. Angel tax (Section 56(2)(viib), Income-tax Act), a long-standing startup grievance, was abolished in the Union Budget 2024-25. Why It Matters Jobs: India’s large young workforce needs more job creators, because formal salaried jobs alone cannot absorb new entrants. Innovation and productivity: startups carry new technology into sectors such as fintech, agritech, healthtech and defence. Inclusion: 52% of recognised startups come from non-metro cities, and rural schemes reach SC/ST/OBC and women entrepreneurs. Strategic autonomy: the deep-tech focus of FFS 2.0 and the 27 Champion Sectors under CGSS (aerospace, defence, biotech) ties entrepreneurship to self-reliance. The Critical View Recognitions ≠ active firms: the 2.62 lakh figure is a cumulative count of recognitions, not of surviving businesses. Job numbers are self-reported to DPIIT. Thin credit uptake: only 532 CGSS loans in three years, against a base of 2.62 lakh startups (about 0.2%). Collateral-free debt has barely reached startups. Leverage works, but at small scale: FFS-backed AIFs invested about 2.2 times the amount SIDBI committed. Still, only 1,475 startups have benefited. Concentration: capital, unicorns and exits cluster in a few metros, even though recognitions are spreading. Weak R&D base: India’s gross expenditure on R&D is about 0.64% of GDP, which limits deep-tech pipelines. Necessity vs opportunity entrepreneurship: small-ticket MUDRA and vendor loans often support subsistence self-employment, which can mask under-employment rather than create growth firms. Gender: having a woman director is not the same as women-founded or women-controlled ownership. Way Forward Publish survival and employment data for recognised startups, verified through EPFO/GST records. Raise R&D spending and patient capital for deep-tech, including through the ₹1 lakh crore Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) Scheme approved in 2025, and through public procurement. Use State startup policies and DPIIT’s States’ Startup Ranking to build Tier-II/III clusters around local industry. Build a graduation path from MUDRA borrower to MSME to startup, with skilling under MSDE. ✎ Mains Practice Question India’s startup ecosystem has expanded rapidly in numbers but remains concentrated in capital, geography and sectors. Examine the role of public policy in building an entrepreneurial ecosystem beyond the metros, and suggest measures to turn startup growth into quality employment. 15 marks · 250 words

Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise OpinionsGS Papers I · II · III 01Climate Litigation: Can Nepal Sue Major Emitters for Floods?02Global Uprisings & Polanyi’s ‘Double Movement’ OpinionsSigned Op-Eds & Ideas Columns 01 Suing Carbon Majors for Himalayan Floods: The Case for Climate Litigation by Nepal’s Flood Victims Core TopicOpinionGS-III · Environment — Climate Change, Disaster ManagementGS-II · International Law & InstitutionsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Op-Ed (Manoj Kumar Sinha & Anwar Sadat) After the August 2026 floods in Nepal, which the authors attribute largely to climate change, the article argues that victims in the Tibet–Nepal border districts could follow plaintiffs in Europe and the U.S. and sue large private greenhouse-gas emitters in their home courts. ◈ From the Basics — What Is Climate Litigation? Climate litigation means using courts to compel action on climate change, or to obtain compensation for its harms. Cases fall into two broad types: suits against States for weak climate policy, and suits against corporations (“Carbon Majors”) for their contribution to emissions. Tort law: the branch of civil law on wrongs causing harm (negligence, nuisance). The remedy is usually damages (money) or an injunction (an order to act or stop acting). Duty of care: a legal obligation to avoid conduct that foreseeably harms others. Causation: the plaintiff must link the defendant’s act to the harm. Courts traditionally require a “direct and proximate” link, the hurdle the authors flag. Locus standi (standing): the right to bring a case. Here it requires showing that the plaintiff faces a risk distinct from the general population. Attribution science: a field of climate science, sometimes called extreme event attribution, that estimates how much climate change increased the likelihood or intensity of a specific flood, heatwave or drought. The Authors’ Argument The causation problem: an emitter’s failure to cut emissions only adds to global cumulative GHGs. Harm therefore reaches victims diffusely and through other factors such as exposure, vulnerability and resilience. Identifying a specific victim group: people in the Trishuli and Bhote Koshi basins have faced Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs) for three decades. This sets them apart from the general population and gives them standing. Imminence of risk: research on the Tibet Autonomous Region shows glacial lakes growing in area and number since 2010. This, the authors suggest, may meet the legal threshold of an imminent catastrophe. Judicial trend: although there is no binding precedent, courts are increasingly aware of the duties of large emitters. Litigation is therefore worth pursuing even if victory is uncertain. ▤ Landmark Cases Cited — and Their Holdings Lliuya v. RWE (Germany): Saúl Luciano Lliuya, a farmer from Huaraz, Peru, sued the German energy company RWE under German private nuisance law over a GLOF risk from Lake Palcacocha. He claimed that RWE’s coal-power emissions had destabilised Andean glaciers about 5,000 miles away. On 28 May 2025, the Higher Regional Court, Hamm held that a large emitter can, in principle, be liable in proportion to its contribution and that German civil law can reach transboundary climate harm. The specific claim was dismissed because the flood risk to his property was not shown to be sufficiently imminent. Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell (Netherlands): in 2021, the Hague District Court ordered Shell to cut emissions by 45% by 2030 (from 2019 levels). In November 2024, the Court of Appeal set aside the specific 45% target. It nonetheless confirmed that, under Dutch tort law’s unwritten standard of care and human rights norms, major emitters have an obligation to limit emissions. Asmania et al. v. Holcim (Switzerland): four residents of Pari Island, Indonesia, sued the Swiss cement major Holcim in the Cantonal Court of Zug (filed 2023). They seek compensation for current and future damage, funding for adaptation, and emission reductions. Figure 1 — The Chain of Causation, and the Legal Hurdle at Each Link Emitter’sGHG emissionsCumulativeglobal warmingGlacier retreat,lake expansionGLOF / floodrisk risesHarm toidentified victimsShare of blameProportionalcontribution(accepted at Hamm)Diffuse harmEmissions mixglobally — no“direct” linkAttributionScience must linkwarming to thisglacier & lakeImminenceIs the riskconcrete enough?(Lliuya failed here)StandingVictims distinctfrom generalpopulationCross-cutting hurdles: forum & jurisdiction · enforcement of foreign judgments ·cost and duration of litigation · access to evidence Each link in the chain must survive judicial scrutiny. Recent European rulings have eased the first link (proportional responsibility) but kept the bar high on imminence of risk. Static Background — The Himalayan Hazard GLOF: a sudden release of water when a moraine- or ice-dammed glacial lake breaches its dam. It may be triggered by an avalanche, landslide, earthquake or heavy rain. Trishuli and Bhote Koshi rivers originate in Tibet and cross into Nepal. Both are tributaries of the larger Gandaki (Narayani) and Koshi systems that flow into the Ganga. A GLOF upstream in Tibet can strike Nepali valleys with very little warning. ICIMOD’s 2023 HI-WISE assessment found that Hindu Kush Himalaya glaciers lost mass about 65% faster in 2011–2020 than in the previous decade. It projected losses of up to 80% of volume by 2100 under high-emission pathways. Indian parallels: the Kedarnath disaster (2013), the Chamoli (Rishiganga) flood (2021), and the South Lhonak GLOF in Sikkim (October 2023), which breached the Teesta-III dam. Static Background — Where the Law Stands Inter-State regime: the UNFCCC (1992) rests on Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC). Article 8 of the Paris Agreement (2015) recognises loss and damage, but the accompanying COP decision (Decision 1/CP.21, para 51) states that it provides no basis for liability or compensation. Loss and damage finance: the Warsaw International Mechanism (COP19, 2013) was followed by the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, agreed at COP27 (2022) and operationalised at COP28 (2023). It is voluntary and makes no admission of fault. Customary principles: the no-harm principle (Trail Smelter arbitration, 1941; Stockholm Principle 21; Rio Principle 2) and the polluter-pays principle (Rio Principle 16). Advisory opinions: ITLOS (May 2024) held that GHG emissions are marine pollution under UNCLOS. The International Court of Justice (23 July 2025) advised that States have binding climate obligations under treaties and customary law, and that breach may engage State responsibility. Rights-based rulings: Urgenda v. Netherlands (2019); KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland (ECtHR, April 2024) under Article 8 ECHR; and in India, M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India (April 2024), in which the Supreme Court recognised a right against the adverse effects of climate change under Articles 14 and 21. Nepal: Article 30 of the Constitution of Nepal (2015) guarantees a right to a clean environment, including the victim’s right to compensation from the polluter. In Shrestha v. Office of the Prime Minister (2018), Nepal’s Supreme Court directed the Government to enact a climate change law. Why the Argument Matters Climate justice: Nepal’s own emissions are negligible, yet it bears severe cryosphere risks. Litigation targets the historical responsibility of high emitters. Filling a gap: because the inter-State regime excludes liability, private-law suits against corporations become one of the few routes to compensation. Norm-building: even lost cases (like Lliuya) shift legal doctrine. Hamm’s acceptance of proportional liability for distant harm is itself a precedent-in-making. Corporate accountability: these cases raise the legal and reputational cost of emissions, and they shape disclosure and transition plans. The Critical View Imminence is the binding constraint: Lliuya failed on this point despite favourable principles. Nepal’s plaintiffs would need site-specific hazard modelling, not general glacier trends. Small shares, small awards: proportional liability means each emitter pays only its fractional share, so many suits against many defendants would be needed. Forum and enforcement: the friendly forums are in Europe. Suing state-owned emitters raises sovereign immunity issues, and enforcing foreign judgments is slow. Capacity and cost: poor mountain communities need legal aid, expert evidence and transnational NGO support. Without these, the right remains theoretical. Adaptation cannot wait: litigation is slow. Early-warning systems, lake-lowering and hazard zoning must proceed regardless. A double-edged sword for South Asia: a broad doctrine of emitter liability could, in time, also be invoked against large emitters from developing countries. Way Forward Build attribution and hazard-mapping capacity for transboundary glacial lakes, including joint monitoring with China and data-sharing through ICIMOD. Pursue parallel tracks: litigation, the Loss and Damage Fund, and reliance on the ICJ advisory opinion in diplomacy. Domestic legal reforms: strengthen Nepal’s climate change and environment laws, and provide legal aid to affected communities. Regional learning: India’s NDMA GLOF guidelines (2020) and GLOF risk-mitigation work offer a template for South Asian cooperation. ✎ Mains Practice Question The international climate regime recognises loss and damage but rejects liability. In this context, examine whether private climate litigation against major emitters can offer climate justice to vulnerable Himalayan communities. What are its limitations? 15 marks · 250 words 02 Behind the Global Wave of Protests: Commodification, Precarity and Polanyi’s ‘Double Movement’ Core TopicOpinionGS-I · Society — Effects of Globalisation, Social MovementsGS-II · Developments in Other CountriesGS-IV · Thinkers & Ethics of MarketsMains-orientedThe Indian Express · Op-Ed (Amit Julka) From France and Albania to Brazil and the U.S., protests are often explained away as youth frustration or anger at corruption. The author argues that a deeper, structural cause links them: the marketisation of every part of life, which leaves millions of people economically precarious. ◈ From the Basics — Karl Polanyi and The Great Transformation (1944) Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) was a Hungarian-Austrian economic historian. In The Great Transformation (1944), he argued that the 19th-century attempt to build a self-regulating market was a historical exception. It tore social life apart and helped produce the crises that led to fascism and the World Wars. Embeddedness: in most of history, the economy was embedded in social relations such as kinship, religion and community. Market society reverses this, so that society comes to be run as an adjunct to the market. Fictitious commodities: land, labour and money are treated as commodities, though they were never produced for sale. Subjecting them fully to market prices destroys nature, people and livelihoods. Double movement: every push to expand markets (first movement) provokes a counter-movement in which society protects itself through unions, labour laws, welfare and regulation. The counter-movement can be democratic (welfare state, social protection) or authoritarian. Polanyi read the rise of fascism as a destructive form of it. ◈ Key Concepts, Explained Neoliberalism: the policy paradigm since the 1980s that favours deregulation, privatisation, free trade and fiscal restraint. It was codified for developing countries in the Washington Consensus (1989). Commodification: turning something previously outside the market (water, housing, beaches, public spaces) into a good that is bought and sold. Rentier economy: an economy in which income comes increasingly from owning assets (property, platforms, IP) and charging rent for access, rather than from producing goods. The author’s line that people now “rent” rather than own captures this. Precariat: a term popularised by Guy Standing (2011) for workers without job security, stable incomes or social protection, such as gig and contract workers. Financialisation: the growing weight of financial markets and motives in the economy. It makes governments sensitive to bond markets and to capital flight. Collective action problem: when one country acting alone (e.g., by taxing capital) risks losing investment, no country acts, even if all would gain from acting together. The Author’s Argument Routine explanations are inadequate: labels such as “disorder”, frustrated youth or anti-corruption anger describe the protests but do not explain them. France: protests grew out of accumulated frustration, including rent pressure, rising bills and alienation. Officials blamed foreign interference or schools. The unrest at first lacked a clear ideology, until trade unions gave it organised form. Albania: opposition to a seaside resort project linked to the U.S. President’s family grew into a national movement against privatising the coastline. The author reads “corruption” and “cost of living” as masks for a structural problem: the commodification of land and public space. Brazil: the author attributes the incumbent’s electoral success to a mass campaign for a 40-hour work week. In his reading, the promise that markets would build a middle class has worn thin. United States: the November 2026 midterms are read as a revolt against inflation and the administration. However, the author notes that the challenge for progressive candidates comes as much from their own party establishment as from rivals. The coming risk: a possible global financial crash driven by over-investment in AI could deepen precarity. Governments are constrained by international finance, so national solutions may not be enough. The author argues that popular movements must therefore become internationalist. Figure 1 — Polanyi’s Double Movement Applied to Today’s Protests 1 · Market expansionPrivatisation of land,housing & coastlinesLabour flexibilisationFinancialisation2 · Social dislocationRent & cost-of-living squeezeJob insecurity (precariat)Shrinking middle classLoss of public spaces3 · Counter-movementStreet protests (France)Anti-privatisation (Albania)Work-hour demands (Brazil)Electoral revolt (U.S.)Democratic re-embeddingSocial protection, labour rights,regulation of rent & public goodsDisorderly / authoritarian turnScapegoating, polarisation,erosion of democratic normsPolanyi’s warning: which path a counter-movement takes depends on how institutions respond The author’s cases fit the first three boxes. The policy question is whether governments steer the counter-movement towards re-embedding markets in social protection, or leave it to disorder. Static Background — Earlier Waves of Protest Arab Spring (2010–11): began in Tunisia and was driven by unemployment, food prices and authoritarian rule. Occupy Wall Street (2011): followed the 2008 global financial crisis; its slogan of the “99%” drew attention to inequality. Gilets jaunes, France (2018): triggered by a fuel tax, it grew into a wider revolt over the cost of living. South Asia: Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya (2022) amid an economic collapse; Bangladesh (2024), starting from protests over job quotas; and Nepal’s youth-led protests (September 2025), triggered by a social-media ban. In each case, government change followed. Common thread: a young population, scarce secure jobs, rising living costs and digital mobilisation. Why It Matters for India Demographic pressure: India’s young workforce makes quality job creation and affordable urban housing central to social stability. Platform and gig work: the Code on Social Security, 2020 (in force since 21 November 2025) recognises gig and platform workers, a policy response of the kind Polanyi described. Welfare architecture: food security under the NFSA, 2013, DBT and housing schemes act as social buffers. Their design and fiscal sustainability matter. Neighbourhood instability: unrest in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal has had direct security and diplomatic consequences for India. The Critical View Markets have also delivered: by World Bank estimates, extreme poverty fell from over a third of the world’s population in 1990 to under a tenth by 2019, largely through market-led growth in Asia. Corruption is not merely a mask: rent-seeking and crony privatisation are themselves part of the problem. Governance reform and market reform can go together. Multiple causes: identity politics, social-media dynamics, demographic bulges and local triggers also shape protests. A single economic lens risks over-generalising. The AI-crash forecast is speculative: it is a scenario, not an established trend. The adjustment may instead be gradual. Internationalism faces sovereignty limits: Dani Rodrik’s trilemma holds that a country cannot have full hyper-globalisation, national sovereignty and democracy at once. Coordinated responses, such as the OECD/G20 global minimum corporate tax (15%), have been slow and partial. ◈ GS-IV Angle — The Moral Limits of Markets The philosopher Michael Sandel, in What Money Can’t Buy (2012), argues that when markets enter areas such as health, education and civic life, they can crowd out non-market values, including fairness, dignity and common goods. This complements Polanyi’s concern and is useful for answers on ethics in public policy. Way Forward Treat housing, water, health and public spaces as public goods that need regulation, not as pure commodities. Build portable social security for informal and gig workers. Strengthen institutional channels such as unions, local bodies and grievance redressal, so that discontent finds democratic expression. Pursue international cooperation on tax, financial regulation and AI-related risks to reduce the collective action problem. ✎ Mains Practice Question “The rising cost of living and the commodification of basic needs, rather than corruption alone, lie at the root of recent mass protests across the world.” Examine this statement in the light of Karl Polanyi’s idea of the ‘double movement’, and discuss its relevance for India. 15 marks · 250 words

In-Depth News Analysis8 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGS Paper II 01Voter IDs for Welfare Delivery — Why Contentious02Punjab’s River-Water Disputes Revived Economy & AgricultureGS Paper III 0310 Years of Demonetisation — Cash Still King04VAJRA-SAT — Preparing for FMD Serotype SAT-1 Science & TechnologyGS Paper III 05Samudrayaan — First Human Deep-Sea Mission by 2028 Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 06Delhi’s Deepavali Air-Pollution Spike & Missing Data Society, Culture & HistoryGS Paper I 07Liuyang — China’s Fireworks Capital (and Sivakasi)08India Reaches 100 Chess Grandmasters Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGeneral Studies Paper II 01 Voter ID as the Basis for Welfare Delivery: Identity, Entitlement and the Risk of Double Exclusion Core TopicGS-II · Governance — Welfare Schemes, Mechanisms for Protection of Vulnerable SectionsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu On 3 November 2026, the Union Minister for Panchayati Raj announced that voter ID cards (EPIC), combined with biometric authentication, would replace Aadhaar for identifying beneficiaries and processing welfare payments. The stated reason was that Aadhaar is prone to fraudulent enrolment. After pushback, he clarified on 6 November that EPIC would be used alongside Aadhaar and that no rightful beneficiary would be excluded. ◈ From the Basics — Identity Documents vs Entitlement Documents Welfare delivery involves three steps: identifying who a person is, verifying that they are eligible, and paying them. An identity document (such as Aadhaar or EPIC) proves who you are. An entitlement document (such as a ration card or job card) proves what you are owed. EPIC (Electors Photo Identity Card): issued by the Election Commission of India (ECI) since 1993 to persons on the electoral roll. Eligibility requires Indian citizenship and an age of 18+ (Article 326; Representation of the People Act, 1950). EPIC carries no biometric data. Aadhaar: a 12-digit number issued by UIDAI under the Aadhaar Act, 2016 to residents (citizenship is not required) and linked to biometrics. Section 7 allows it to be required for subsidies and benefits paid from the Consolidated Fund of India. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar) judgment, 2018: a five-judge Bench upheld Section 7, holding that welfare delivery is a legitimate State aim. It struck down private-sector use of Aadhaar (Section 57). EPIC–Aadhaar linkage: the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021 permitted voluntary linking of the two. Have Voter IDs Been Used for Welfare Before? As an entry document: commonly called pehchaan patra, EPIC has long been one of the accepted documents for obtaining other entitlements, such as the MGNREGA job card. State-level use: some States, such as Delhi, require EPIC for certain pension schemes, and enrolment needs endorsement by the local councillor or legislator. Never the sole basis nationally: EPIC has not so far been the exclusive identifier for welfare delivery anywhere in India. Family cards: starting with Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, 10 States have introduced family cards. These recognise that many schemes target households, not individuals. West Bengal: on 4 June 2026, the State’s Food and Supplies Department issued an order linking State-run welfare schemes, including PDS ration cards, to the electoral rolls. Figure 1 — Aadhaar vs Voter ID as a Welfare Identifier ParameterAadhaarVoter ID (EPIC)Issuing bodyUIDAI (statutory, Aadhaar Act 2016)Election Commission (Art. 324)Who can hold itAny resident, any ageCitizens aged 18+ on the rollBiometricsFingerprints, iris, facePhotograph onlyBank linkageAadhaar Payment Bridge (DBT)NonePrimary purposeIdentity & benefit deliveryExercise of the franchiseRisk if made sole keyAuthentication failuresRoll deletions → loss of benefitsBiometric authentication for EPIC holders would, in practice, rely on the Aadhaar database The two documents were built for different purposes. Using a franchise document as a welfare key ties entitlement to electoral-roll status. The Concerns Link with the SIR: Opposition parties connect the proposal to the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, during which more than 13 crore electors have reportedly been removed. Their concern is that disenfranchisement could be followed by exclusion from welfare. Pending appeals: civil society group Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) points out that in West Bengal, 22 lakh people appealed against deletion from the rolls and about 21 lakh still await tribunal decisions. “Two-level exclusion”: first from the vote, then from benefits. Voting is a political right, while food, pension and work entitlements flow from socio-economic rights (Article 21, read with DPSPs, Articles 39, 41 and 47). Purpose mismatch: Aadhaar works as a “financial address” because it is linked to bank accounts through DBT. EPIC adds no payment function. Groups who may lack a valid EPIC: those under 18 (relevant for child-focused schemes), internal migrants registered elsewhere, and people whose names were wrongly deleted. Portability: schemes such as One Nation One Ration Card rely on Aadhaar-based portability. A roll-based key, tied to a constituency, may undermine this. ▤ The Ministry’s Role & Key Numbers The Ministry of Panchayati Raj does not run individual-beneficiary schemes. It works through gram sabhas, and so indirectly shapes rural welfare delivery. Sixteenth Finance Commission (award period 2026–31): grants of ₹4,35,236 crore recommended for 2.55 lakh panchayats and traditional local bodies. Their distribution lies within the Ministry’s domain. The Government has not yet clarified whether the proposed identification formula will extend to all welfare schemes. The Other Side of the Debate Leakage is real: fake and duplicate beneficiaries drain public money. Verifying identity through more than one source can improve targeting. Aadhaar’s own limits: Aadhaar does not establish citizenship, and enrolment-integrity issues have been reported. This is the stated rationale for an additional check. The revised position (EPIC together with Aadhaar) is a narrower measure than outright replacement. Way Forward Follow the Puttaswamy standard: any new identity requirement should pass the tests of legality, legitimate aim, proportionality and procedural safeguards. Do not deny benefits to people whose roll deletion is under appeal, and keep alternative documents as fall-backs, as the NFSA and MGNREGA frameworks already permit. Use social audits and gram sabha verification for targeting, rather than a single-document gate. Wider adoption of family cards could reflect household-based entitlements more accurately. ✎ Mains Practice Question “Identification technologies meant to curb leakages in welfare delivery can themselves become instruments of exclusion.” Examine this statement in the context of proposals to use voter IDs for identifying welfare beneficiaries. 15 marks · 250 words 02 Punjab Reopens Ravi–Beas and Yamuna Water Disputes: Five Assembly Resolutions and Their Legal Limits Core TopicGS-II · Federalism — Inter-State Relations, Water DisputesGS-I · Geography — River SystemsPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express As Punjab marks 60 years since its reorganisation (1 November 1966), its Assembly passed five resolutions on 27 October 2026 to reopen water-sharing arrangements. The resolutions followed a 7 September assurance by the State government to protesting farmers. ◈ From the Basics — How the Constitution Handles River Waters Entry 17, State List: water (supply, irrigation, canals, drainage, storage) is a State subject. It is subject to Entry 56, Union List, which covers the regulation and development of inter-State rivers where Parliament declares it to be in the public interest. Article 262: Parliament may provide for adjudication of inter-State water disputes and may bar the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and other courts over them. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: provides for tribunals whose awards have the force of a Supreme Court decree. Under Section 7, a State cannot levy a seigniorage, fee or rate on another State merely because river works lie in its territory. Riparian principle vs equitable apportionment: Punjab argues that, as the riparian State (the one the rivers flow through), it should control the waters. Indian adjudication generally follows equitable apportionment, which weighs need, basin area, past use and alternative sources. Indus Waters Treaty (1960): gave India the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas, Ravi) and Pakistan the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab). India placed the Treaty in abeyance in April 2025. ▤ The Five Resolutions (27 October 2026) An equitable share in Yamuna waters. ₹1.44 lakh crore in royalty from Rajasthan for use of Sutlej, Ravi and Beas waters. Control over key headworks. Repeal of the Dam Safety Act, 2021. Projects to use Ravi waters currently flowing to Pakistan. Separately, the State has sought review or repeal of Sections 78, 79 and 80 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. Timeline — How the Dispute Unfolded January 1955: 15.85 MAF of surplus Ravi–Beas water was allocated: Rajasthan 8, undivided Punjab (including PEPSU) 7.2, and J&K 0.65. According to the experts cited, Rajasthan’s large share was meant to demonstrate India’s use of the eastern rivers ahead of the Indus Waters Treaty talks. 1966: Haryana was created. Section 78 gave the States two years to agree on sharing, failing which the Centre would decide. Sections 79–80 dealt with the Bhakra Management Board (now the Bhakra Beas Management Board) and the Beas Project. 1976 Central order: 3.5 MAF each to Punjab and Haryana, and 0.08 MAF to Delhi. 1981 Tripartite Agreement (Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan): 17.17 MAF was re-divided, and the Sutlej–Yamuna Link (SYL) canal was to carry Haryana’s share. The agreement was opposed by the Nehar Roko Morcha at Kapuri (1982), which later became part of the Dharam Yudh Morcha. Punjab Accord (1985) → Eradi Tribunal (April 1986), headed by former Supreme Court judge V. Balakrishna Eradi. Its January 1987 report raised Punjab’s share to 5 MAF and Haryana’s to 3.83 MAF. The SYL canal remains unfinished. 2004: Punjab enacted the Punjab Termination of Agreements Act. In its Presidential Reference opinion (10 November 2016) under Article 143, the Supreme Court held the Act unconstitutional: a State cannot unilaterally end an inter-State agreement or nullify the Court’s SYL decree. Figure 1 — Ravi–Beas Allocations Over Time (MAF) PunjabHaryanaRajasthan024687.2*8.019553.53.51976 order4.223.58.61981 accord5.03.838.6Eradi 1987* Undivided Punjab incl. PEPSU, before Haryana’s creation. J&K (0.65) and Delhi allocations not shown. Rajasthan’s allocation has remained the largest throughout. Punjab’s share rose only under the Eradi Tribunal, whose report has not been implemented in full. How Far Can Punjab’s Claims Go? Repealing Sections 78–80: the Punjab Reorganisation Act is a Central law. Punjab can only ask Parliament to amend it, or challenge it in court on constitutional grounds. An Assembly resolution has no binding force. Experts note that even the 2004 law was struck down. Royalty from Rajasthan: the claim rests on a 1920 arrangement under which the princely state of Bikaner paid for Sutlej water carried by the Gang (Bikaner) Canal from the Ferozepur headworks. However, Section 7 of the 1956 Act bars such levies, and no constitutional provision allows inter-State royalty. The claim is therefore legally weak. Yamuna share: Punjab argues that the Yamuna flowed through undivided Punjab, citing a 12 March 1954 agreement with Uttar Pradesh and the 1972 Irrigation Commission. It was not a signatory to the 12 May 1994 Yamuna MoU among the basin States. Haryana now draws nearly 6 MAF of Yamuna water. In April 2025, Punjab asked the Jal Shakti Ministry for a tribunal. Experts quoted consider this claim the more tenable one. Basin-share argument: Punjab holds 16% of India’s Indus drainage area, against 3% for Haryana and 5% for Rajasthan, but its allocation does not reflect this. Ravi flows to Pakistan: the Shahpur Kandi dam (completed 2024) and the planned Ujh project aim to retain eastern-river water within India. The Federal Dimension Dam Safety Act, 2021: enacted under Entry 56, the Act creates national and State dam-safety authorities. Punjab views it as Central intrusion into a State subject. Water and identity: river water has been tied to agrarian distress and regional identity in Punjab since the 1980s. Groundwater depletion (most of Punjab’s blocks are over-exploited) raises the stakes further. Structural weaknesses: tribunal delays, non-implementation of awards, and the lack of a permanent dispute-resolution mechanism. The Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2019, which proposed a single permanent tribunal, has not been enacted. Way Forward Seek a fresh assessment of water availability: flows have changed since the 1950s estimates. Pursue negotiated settlement through the Centre and Zonal Councils, alongside time-bound tribunal adjudication. Pair any reallocation with demand-side reform: crop diversification away from paddy, and micro-irrigation. ✎ Mains Practice Question Inter-State river water disputes in India remain unresolved for decades despite constitutional and statutory mechanisms. Examine this with reference to the Ravi–Beas dispute, and suggest institutional reforms. 15 marks · 250 words Economy & AgricultureGeneral Studies Paper III 03 Ten Years After Demonetisation: Digital Payments Have Boomed, but Cash Has Returned to Pre-2016 Levels Core TopicGS-III · Economy — Money & Banking, Monetary Policy, FormalisationPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express A decade after the 8 November 2016 withdrawal of ₹500 and ₹1,000 notes, currency with the public stands at ₹42.55 lakh crore (15 October 2026). This is about 137% above its pre-demonetisation level, and the currency-to-GDP ratio is back near where it was in 2016. ◈ From the Basics — Demonetisation and Money Measures Demonetisation means withdrawing the legal-tender status of a currency unit. Legal tender is money that must be accepted in settlement of a debt. In 2016, this was done by a Government notification under Section 26(2) of the RBI Act, 1934, on the recommendation of the RBI’s Central Board. Currency in Circulation (CIC): all notes and coins issued by the RBI. Currency with the public: CIC minus cash held by banks. This is the measure of cash actually in people’s hands. CIC-to-GDP ratio: currency relative to the size of the economy. It is a better gauge of cash dependence than absolute values, which naturally rise with nominal GDP. Earlier demonetisations: 1946 (₹1,000 and ₹10,000 notes) and 1978 (₹1,000, ₹5,000 and ₹10,000), the latter under the High Denomination Bank Notes (Demonetisation) Act, 1978. Legal closure: the Specified Bank Notes (Cessation of Liabilities) Act, 2017 ended the RBI’s liability on the old notes. In Vivek Narayan Sharma v. Union of India (January 2023), the Supreme Court upheld the decision by a 4:1 majority. What Happened in 2016 The demonetised notes made up about 86% of the currency in circulation, which caused a severe cash crunch for households, traders and the informal sector. Stated objectives: curbing black money, counterfeit currency and terror financing, and later, promoting digital payments, formalisation and a less-cash economy. Immediate effects: currency with the public fell from ₹17.97 lakh crore (4 Nov 2016) to ₹7.8 lakh crore (January 2017). Demand slumped, and GDP growth fell by nearly 1.5 percentage points. Returns: the RBI later reported that about 99.3% of the demonetised value had come back to banks, which weakened the black-money rationale. Remonetisation: new ₹500 and ₹2,000 notes were issued. The ₹2,000 note was withdrawn from circulation in 2023. Figure 1 — India’s Currency-in-Circulation to GDP Ratio (%) 0481212.22015-168.72016-1710.72017-1811.32018-1912.22019-2014.42020-2113.32021-2212.92022-2312.12023-2411.72024-2512.12025-26Gold: pre-demonetisation · Maroon: demonetisation year · Blue: COVID-19 year (precautionary cash hoarding) · Source: RBI The ratio fell sharply in 2016-17, peaked at 14.4% during the pandemic, and stood at 12.1% in FY26, almost the same as March 2016 (12.2%). ▤ The Numbers Currency with the public: ₹17.97 lakh crore (Nov 2016) → ₹42.55 lakh crore (Oct 2026). In calendar year 2026 (to 16 October), it rose by ₹5.26 lakh crore, or 14.1%. CIC/GDP: 12.2% (March 2016) → 8.7% (2016-17) → 14.4% (2020-21) → 12.1% (FY26). International comparison: above 16% in Japan, 10.2% in China, and 7.3% in the US, where the dollar also circulates abroad. GDP growth: the economy has grown at 6–7% in several years, touching 7.8% in a recent quarter. Why Cash Persists Despite the Digital Boom Digital and cash are complements: UPI (launched by NPCI in 2016) now dominates payment volumes, but cash remains the main store of value for many households. Precautionary demand: shocks such as the COVID-19 lockdown push people to hold cash. Informality: a large informal sector, and rural and elderly users with limited digital access, keep cash in use. Low opportunity cost: in periods of lower interest rates, holding cash costs less in forgone interest. Trust and privacy: concerns about digital fraud and transaction traceability sustain the preference for cash. Assessment — Gains and Costs Gains claimed: a sharp rise in digital payments, wider tax-base expansion, and a push to formalisation. It is debated how much of this was due to demonetisation itself, as opposed to GST (2017), JAM and smartphone diffusion. Costs: output and job losses in the informal sector, an MSME liquidity stress, and the expense of printing new currency. Black money: nearly all the money came back to banks. This suggests that illicit wealth was largely held in non-cash assets (property, gold, offshore holdings). Policy lesson: behavioural change in payments comes from convenience and trust rather than from shock withdrawal of cash. ✎ Mains Practice Question A decade after demonetisation, India has become a global leader in digital payments, yet the currency-to-GDP ratio has returned to its pre-2016 level. Analyse the reasons and evaluate the long-term impact of demonetisation on India’s economy. 15 marks · 250 words 04 ‘VAJRA-SAT’: India’s First National Tabletop Exercise on Foot-and-Mouth Disease Serotype SAT-1 ImportantGS-III · Agriculture — Animal Husbandry, Livestock Economy; Disaster PreparednessPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry & Dairying The Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying (DAHD) and ICAR-NIVEDI, Bengaluru, held a two-day national tabletop exercise, ‘VAJRA-SAT’, on 4–5 November 2026. The exercise prepared for FMD serotype SAT-1, which has never been reported in India, but which has spread from Africa to parts of West Asia. ◈ From the Basics — Foot-and-Mouth Disease FMD is a highly contagious viral disease of cloven-hoofed animals (cattle, buffalo, sheep, goats, pigs). It is caused by an Aphthovirus of the family Picornaviridae. Symptoms: fever, and blisters in the mouth and on the feet and teats, leading to a sharp fall in milk yield and draught power. Mortality in adult animals is low, but economic losses are high. FMD is not a public-health threat to humans. Seven serotypes: O, A, C, Asia-1, SAT-1, SAT-2, SAT-3 (“SAT” stands for Southern African Territories). Immunity to one serotype does not protect against another, so a new serotype would need a new vaccine strain. In India, serotypes O, A and Asia-1 are prevalent. The vaccines under the national programme target these. Transboundary animal disease: FMD is listed by WOAH (World Organisation for Animal Health, formerly OIE), which grants FMD-free status to countries, zones or compartments. ▤ The Exercise at a Glance Theme: “Detect Early, Confirm Fast, Contain Together”. Participants: 83 from 25 States, 3 UTs and national institutions: State animal husbandry departments, ICAR institutes, diagnostic labs, veterinary universities, vaccine makers, and defence and border-guarding agencies. The National Security Council Secretariat was also represented. Simulated scenarios: early detection, laboratory confirmation, epidemiological investigation, animal movement control, emergency vaccination, and risk communication. Technical meeting (5 Nov): on FMD-free compartmentalisation of semen stations and semen banks, to protect elite genetics and enable safe livestock trade. Key institutions: ICAR-NIVEDI (Bengaluru; disease epidemiology and informatics); ICAR-NIFMD (Bhubaneswar; the national FMD reference lab); Regional Disease Diagnostic Laboratories. Why It Matters Livestock economy: India is the world’s largest milk producer, and livestock supports the livelihoods of crores of small and marginal farmers. FMD is among the costliest livestock diseases. Trade: FMD status determines access to meat and dairy export markets. Compartmentalisation lets FMD-free units trade even when the country as a whole is not free of the disease. Biosecurity and borders: the involvement of the NSCS and border agencies reflects the treatment of animal disease as a national-security and One Health issue. Ongoing programme: the National Animal Disease Control Programme (NADCP, 2019) provides free mass vaccination against FMD and brucellosis, with the goal of controlling FMD through vaccination and eventually eradicating it. A new serotype would test this programme. Gaps to Address Build SAT-1 diagnostic capacity and a vaccine bank (antigen reserve) before any incursion. Address weak animal movement tracking. The INAPH/Bharat Pashudhan ear-tag database can support this. Strengthen veterinary manpower and timely reporting at the village level. ✎ Mains Practice Question Transboundary animal diseases pose a threat to rural livelihoods as well as to national biosecurity. Discuss India’s preparedness against such diseases, with reference to foot-and-mouth disease. 10 marks · 150 words Science & TechnologyGeneral Studies Paper III 05 Samudrayaan: India Targets Its First Crewed Dive to 6,000 Metres by 2028 Under the Deep Ocean Mission ImportantGS-III · S&T — Indigenisation of Technology; Blue EconomyPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · PIB Speaking at the Indo-Pacific Regional Dialogue (IPRD) 2026, the Union Minister of State (Independent Charge) for Science & Technology and Earth Sciences said India aims to send its first human deep-sea mission to a depth of up to 6,000 m by 2028, using the Matsya submersible. ◈ From the Basics — Why the Deep Ocean? The deep sea (below about 1,000 m, where no sunlight reaches) holds mineral deposits, unique biodiversity and energy potential. Only a handful of countries can send humans there, because the pressure at 6,000 m is about 600 times that at the surface. Polymetallic nodules: potato-sized lumps on the abyssal seabed rich in manganese, nickel, cobalt and copper, which are critical for batteries. Hydrothermal (polymetallic) sulphides: deposits formed near volcanic vents on mid-ocean ridges, rich in copper, zinc, gold and silver. International Seabed Authority (ISA): set up under UNCLOS (1982) and headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica. It regulates mining in “the Area” (the seabed beyond national jurisdiction), which UNCLOS treats as the common heritage of mankind. India’s ISA contracts: India was the first country to receive Pioneer Investor status (1987), for nodules in the Central Indian Ocean Basin (CIOB). It also holds a contract for polymetallic sulphides on the Indian Ocean ridges. ▤ Mission at a Glance Deep Ocean Mission (DOM): approved in 2021, with nodal ministry the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES). It is one of the Blue Economy initiatives. Samudrayaan is DOM’s crewed-submersible component. Matsya carries three aquanauts to 5,000–6,000 m. It was developed by the National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT), Chennai, which can now run trials at these depths in the CIOB. Ocean Mineral Explorer: a high-resolution survey system for hydrothermal sulphides, several deposits of which have been identified. Other DOM strands: renewable energy from solar, offshore wind and ocean thermal gradients (OTEC); low-temperature thermal desalination (LTTD) in Lakshadweep; and BARC-supported nuclear desalination at Kalpakkam. Funding ecosystem: the Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF) and the ₹1 lakh crore Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) Fund, which uses a 50:50 equity-based approach to draw in private capital. Significance Strategic capability: crewed deep-sea dives have so far been achieved by the US, Russia, France, Japan and China. With Matsya, India would join this group. The Government presents this as a deep-sea counterpart to Gaganyaan. Critical minerals: secure supplies of cobalt and nickel are needed for the energy transition and electric vehicles. Ocean observation and climate: satellite data on ocean colour, sea-surface temperature and winds improves forecasting of cyclones and marine heatwaves for coasts and islands. Ocean diplomacy: India proposed joint missions, shared facilities and data-sharing under the principle “One Ocean, Shared Knowledge and Equitable Prosperity”, linked to SAGAR/MAHASAGAR and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. Clean maritime energy: private participation in nuclear power is now enabled under the SHANTI Act, and India targets 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047. Concerns Ecological risk: deep-sea mining can destroy slow-recovering habitats. Many countries back a precautionary pause until the ISA Mining Code is finalised. Safety: crewed dives at these depths need fail-safe life-support and pressure-hull integrity, and timelines have slipped in the past. Commercial viability: extraction costs and metal prices remain uncertain. ✎ Mains Practice Question Discuss the strategic and economic significance of India’s Deep Ocean Mission. How can India balance deep-sea resource exploration with the protection of marine ecosystems? 15 marks · 250 words Environment & EcologyGeneral Studies Paper III 06 Delhi’s Deepavali Night: PM2.5 Reaches 200 Times the WHO Limit as Monitoring Data Go Missing Core TopicGS-III · Environment — Pollution, Conservation; Environmental GovernancePrelims + MainsThe Hindu Firecrackers were burst well past the Supreme Court’s 10 p.m. deadline on 8 November, and PM2.5 at some Delhi stations rose to 150–200 times the WHO limit. At the same time, data were missing from several monitoring stations at the peak, which, experts say, makes recorded air quality look better than it was. ◈ From the Basics — Particulate Matter, Standards and the AQI PM2.5: particles of 2.5 micrometres or less, about 1/30th the width of a human hair. They penetrate deep into the lungs and bloodstream, causing respiratory, cardiovascular and other diseases. WHO Air Quality Guidelines (2021): PM2.5 of 15 µg/m³ (24-hour) and 5 µg/m³ (annual). India’s NAAQS (2009): PM2.5 of 60 µg/m³ (24-hour) and 40 µg/m³ (annual). These are notified by the CPCB under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. National AQI (2014): covers 8 pollutants and 6 categories, from Good (0–50) to Severe (401–500). The figure for the day is the CPCB’s 4 p.m. bulletin, a 24-hour average. Green crackers: developed by CSIR-NEERI, they cut emissions by about 30% using alternative chemistry and dust suppressants, but they still pollute. Figure 1 — Peak PM2.5 on Deepavali Night vs Standards (µg/m³) NSUT West (5 a.m.)3,008.4Patparganj (1 a.m.)2,597India NAAQS (24-hr)60WHO guideline (24-hr)15Peaks are hourly readings (DPCC); standards are 24-hour averages, shown only for scale. The peak at NSUT West was about 200 times the WHO guideline and 50 times India’s own standard. Missing peak-hour data would understate exposure on such nights. ▤ The Numbers Patparganj: 2,597 µg/m³ at 1 a.m. (about 173× WHO). NSUT West Campus: 3,008.4 µg/m³ at 5 a.m. (about 200×). Delhi AQI: 376 on Deepavali day and 344 the next day, both “very poor”. Stubble fires in Punjab: 1,152 on Sunday (the season’s highest), 198 on Monday, and 4,657 for the season, the second lowest since 2020 (IARI bulletin). Stubble’s share of Delhi’s PM2.5 on Sunday was 5.1% (MoES data). Why the Spike Faded Quickly According to SAFAR (System of Air Quality and Weather Forecasting And Research, under MoES), the wind shifted from north-westerly (carrying stubble smoke) to easterly/south-easterly on Sunday afternoon, and wind speed picked up. This dispersed pollutants by morning. Winter meteorology normally does the opposite. Low wind speeds, falling temperatures and a low mixing height trap pollutants over the Indo-Gangetic Plain, adding to emissions from vehicles, dust, industry and seasonal stubble burning. Governance Issues Data integrity: gaps in CAAQMS (Continuous Ambient Air Quality Monitoring Stations) data at peak hours undermine public trust and GRAP decisions. Missing peaks lower the computed averages. Enforcement gap: the Supreme Court permitted only green crackers in fixed time windows on 7–8 November, yet traditional crackers were sold openly. Politicisation: political parties traded charges over the missing data and stubble burning, which diverts attention from airshed-level solutions. Institutions: the Commission for Air Quality Management (CAQM) (statutory under the CAQM Act, 2021) coordinates across NCR and adjoining States. The National Clean Air Programme (NCAP, 2019) funds city action plans. Way Forward Mandatory public disclosure of station downtime, and independent audits of monitoring networks. Stricter control of cracker supply chains (manufacture, transport, sale) rather than end-use policing alone. Year-round action on vehicles, construction dust and industry. Episodic festival bans address only the peaks. Regional airshed governance across the Indo-Gangetic Plain, with stubble management through in-situ machinery, ex-situ use (biomass pellets, ethanol) and crop diversification. ✎ Mains Practice Question Episodic pollution peaks in Delhi expose deeper weaknesses in air-quality governance, from enforcement to data integrity. Critically examine, and suggest an airshed-based approach for the Indo-Gangetic Plain. 15 marks · 250 words Society, Culture & HistoryGeneral Studies Paper I 07 How Liuyang Became the World’s Fireworks Factory, and What It Means for Sivakasi ConciseGS-I · World History; Location of IndustriesGS-III · Industrial Safety & PollutionPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express Most of the fireworks burst in India at Deepavali come from Sivakasi, Tamil Nadu. Globally, however, China makes about 90% of all fireworks, and one city dominates the trade: Liuyang in Hunan province. ◈ Static Background — Gunpowder and Fireworks Gunpowder (black powder) is a mixture of saltpetre (potassium nitrate, which supplies oxygen), charcoal and sulphur (the fuels). It was discovered by Chinese alchemists searching for an elixir of immortality. Early fireworks were powder packed into bamboo, and are linked to the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE). Gunpowder is one of China’s “Four Great Inventions”, with paper, printing and the compass. Cultural root: according to folklore, firecrackers were meant to scare away ‘Nian’, a mythical beast that attacked people and livestock at the turn of the year and feared loud noises. This is why they are central to the Lunar New Year. Why Liuyang Leads Scale: Liuyang accounts for about 60% of China’s fireworks market and about 70% of its exports. From cottage industry to factories: for centuries, families mixed powder and filled shells by hand. Production revived strongly after the 1972 US presidential visit to China reopened trade and know-how. Factor advantages: cheap and abundant labour, lax regulation of hazardous work, low capital needs, and strong domestic demand during festivals. Rebranding: fireworks are now marketed as part of an “emotional economy” of year-round shows. Liuyang has hosted 142 major displays since 2023, drawing over 7 million visitors. Safety and pollution: a May 2026 factory explosion killed 26 people. The city has adopted AI-enabled cameras and centralised risk warnings. Bans have been imposed for air-quality reasons (e.g., Beijing, 2018) and sometimes reversed in the face of public opposition (Henan, 2017). ▤ India Parallel — Sivakasi Sivakasi (Virudhunagar district, Tamil Nadu) supplies the bulk of India’s fireworks. The cluster grew there because of its dry climate and low rainfall, which suit drying chemicals. Regulation: the Explosives Act, 1884 and Explosives Rules, 2008, administered by PESO (Petroleum and Explosives Safety Organisation, Nagpur). Fireworks imports are restricted under the foreign trade policy. Common challenges: recurring factory explosions, past use of child labour, the shift to green crackers, and court-imposed limits on cracker use. ✎ Mains Practice Question Discuss the factors that lead to the concentration of hazardous small-scale industries in specific clusters, with reference to fireworks manufacturing in Sivakasi and Liuyang. What measures can reconcile livelihoods with safety and clean air? 10 marks · 150 words 08 India’s Century of Grandmasters: What the Numbers Say About a Chess Powerhouse ImportantGS-I · Indian Culture (Origin of Chess); Sports & SocietyPrelims-orientedThe Hindu · Data Point Anuj Shrivatri, 22, of Katni, Madhya Pradesh, became India’s 100th Grandmaster after winning the 7th ASEAN+ Individual Open Chess Championship in Ozamiz City, the Philippines, with 7/9 points. He is also Madhya Pradesh’s first GM. ◈ Static Background — Chess and Its Titles Origin in India: chess traces back to chaturanga (c. 6th century CE, Gupta era). The name refers to the four divisions of an army: infantry, cavalry, elephants and chariots. The game spread through Persia (as shatranj) to the Arab world and Europe. FIDE (Fédération Internationale des Échecs), the world governing body, was founded in 1924 in Paris and is now based in Lausanne. It awards titles such as Grandmaster (GM), the game’s highest lifetime title. GM norms: broadly, a player needs three GM norms (performance benchmarks in strong tournaments) and a rating of at least 2500. Some championships confer the title directly. Milestones: Viswanathan Anand became India’s first GM in 1988. India hosted the 44th Chess Olympiad (Chennai, 2022), won both Olympiad golds (Open and Women, Budapest 2024), and D. Gukesh became the youngest undisputed world champion in December 2024. 100Indian GMs (97 on FIDE register) 38From Tamil Nadu 4thMost GMs by federation 2,706Top-10 avg rating (2nd) Figure 1 — State-wise Spread, Growth and Global Standing of India’s Grandmasters The tally rose from one GM in 1988 to 100 in 2026, with 56 added in the last decade alone. Image courtesy The Hindu, 10 November 2026; reproduced with credit for educational use. Reading the Numbers Geography: Tamil Nadu (38), Maharashtra (14), West Bengal (12), Delhi (8) and Andhra Pradesh (7). The concentration reflects coaching ecosystems and early role models, Chennai’s in particular. Growth: it took 14 years to produce the first five GMs. The count was 23 in 2010 and 67 in 2020, and 56 were added between 2016 and 2026. Annual additions vary, for example only 2 in 2020 (COVID-19) but 10 in 2026. Average age of new GMs was 19.9 in 2026. Because some years produce a single GM, annual averages fluctuate sharply and indicate a trend rather than a steady decline. Global standing: India is 4th by number of registered GMs (97), behind Russia (184), the US (115) and Germany (103). It is 2nd by the top-10 average rating (2,706), just behind the US (2,719) and ahead of China (2,663). ✎ Mains Practice Question India’s rise in chess shows how institutional ecosystems and role models can create regional clusters of sporting excellence. Discuss, and suggest how such success can be spread more evenly across States. 10 marks · 150 words