In-Depth PIB Analysis2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGS Paper II 0111th Ayurveda Day & Mainstreaming of Ayush Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 02Legacy Dumpsite Remediation under SBM-U 2.0 Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGeneral Studies Paper II · Health 01 11th Ayurveda Day: Mainstreaming Ayurveda into India’s Public Health System GS-II · Health — Government Policies & InterventionsGS-I · Indian Culture — Science & Knowledge TraditionsPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Ayush · 22 Sep 2026 India observes the 11th Ayurveda Day on 23 September 2026 under the theme “Ayurveda for a Healthier Tomorrow”. The occasion is a useful moment to take stock of how a classical knowledge system is being built into public clinics, insurance, global coding standards and drug regulation — and where the evidence gaps still lie. ◈ Static Background — Ayurveda from the Basics Ayurveda joins two Sanskrit words — Ayu (life) and Veda (knowledge or science). It is traditionally described as an Upaveda (subsidiary Veda) linked to the Atharvaveda, with healing references reaching back to the Rigveda. Its stated twin aim is “Swasthasya swasthya rakshanam, aturasya vikara prashamanam” — to protect the health of the healthy and to relieve the disease of the sick. Prevention, therefore, sits at the centre of the system, not at its margins. Classical texts (Brihat Trayi): the Charaka Samhita (internal medicine), the Sushruta Samhita (surgery, including early descriptions of rhinoplasty) and Vagbhata’s Ashtanga Hridaya (a later synthesis). Ashtanga Ayurveda: the eight classical branches — among them internal medicine (Kaya Chikitsa), surgery (Shalya Tantra), paediatrics (Kaumarabhritya), rejuvenation (Rasayana) and reproductive health (Vajikarana). Tridosha: three bio-energies — Vata (movement), Pitta (transformation or metabolism) and Kapha (structure and stability); their balance defines health, their imbalance disease. Other core terms: Agni (metabolic or digestive fire), Dhatus (seven bodily tissues), Malas (waste products), along with a balanced Atma (soul), Manas (mind) and Indriyas (senses). Materia medica: draws on plant, animal and mineral sources; Panchakarma is its signature five-fold bio-purification therapy. ◈ Static Background — The Ayush Institutional Architecture AYUSH stands for Ayurveda, Yoga & Naturopathy, Unani, Siddha and Homoeopathy; Sowa-Rigpa (the Himalayan system) is also a recognised system. Governance of these systems evolved in three steps before reaching ministry status. 1995: a Department of Indian Systems of Medicine & Homoeopathy (ISM&H) was created under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW). 2003: the department was renamed the Department of AYUSH; November 2014: it became a separate Ministry of AYUSH. Regulators: the National Commission for Indian System of Medicine (NCISM) Act, 2020 replaced the Central Council of Indian Medicine (CCIM); Homoeopathy has its own National Commission for Homoeopathy (NCH). Research councils: five autonomous bodies — CCRAS (Ayurveda), CCRYN (Yoga & Naturopathy), CCRUM (Unani), CCRS (Siddha) and CCRH (Homoeopathy). Apex institutions: the All India Institute of Ayurveda (AIIA), New Delhi (inaugurated 2017), and the Institute of Teaching and Research in Ayurveda (ITRA), Jamnagar — an Institute of National Importance by a 2020 Act. Ayurveda Day — how the date was fixed Origin: first observed in 2016 on Dhanvantari Jayanti (Dhanteras), the festival associated with Dhanvantari, regarded as the divine propagator of Ayurveda. Problem: Dhanteras follows the lunar calendar and shifts between mid-October and mid-November, complicating national and international planning. Change: a Gazette Notification of 23 March 2025 fixed 23 September — near the autumnal equinox, when day and night are nearly equal — as Ayurveda Day every year. Symbolism: the Ministry linked the equinox to Ayurveda’s idea of balance; a fixed, non-religious date also suits global observance. 2025 was the first year on the new date. ▤ Scheme at a Glance — National Ayush Mission (NAM) Type: Centrally Sponsored Scheme launched in 2014; continuation approved by the Union Cabinet (July 2021) for 2021-22 to 2025-26. Nodal Ministry: Ministry of Ayush; implemented through State/UT Ayush societies. Central releases: over ₹6,406.99 crore to States/UTs between 2014-15 and 2025-26. Funding pattern: 60:40 (Centre:State); 90:10 for North-Eastern and Himalayan States; 100% central for UTs without legislature. Components: Ayush health services, upgrading and building clinics and integrated 10/30/50-bed hospitals, free essential medicines, education, and quality control of drugs. Ayush Ayushman Arogya Mandirs (AAMs): 12,260 functional (as on 19 September 2026) against a target of 12,500. Convergence partner: National Health Mission (NHM, MoHFW) funds and trains Ayush personnel and co-locates Ayush services. Figure 1 — How NAM and NHM converge to deliver Ayush care National Ayush MissionMinistry of AyushInfrastructure · equipment · medicinesNational Health MissionMinistry of Health & Family WelfareAyush HR · training · co-locationAyush AAMs + co-located Ayush services12,260 AAMs functional · Ayush in 13,249 public facilitiesCo-location: 6,302 PHCs · 3,191 CHCs · 475 District Hospitals · 3,281 others Ayush delivery rests on two missions: NAM builds and supplies; NHM staffs and co-locates. Facility data as on 30 December 2025; AAM count as on 19 September 2026. Key Dimensions — 1. Public health infrastructure & human resources Co-location: NHM supports Ayush services alongside allopathic care in 13,249 public facilities, so patients can access both systems under one roof. Workforce: salaries of 25,322 Ayush doctors and 5,666 Ayush paramedics are funded; a BAMS (Bachelor of Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery) graduate can serve as a Community Health Officer. Tertiary integration: Departments of Integrative Medicine, each with a Panchakarma unit, at VMMC & Safdarjung Hospital and Lady Hardinge Medical College; Ayush services also run at the new AIIMS. Figure 2 — National Ayush Mission: key highlights, FY 2022-23 to 2024-25 Figures are outputs (buildings, upgrades), not health outcomes. Image courtesy PIB / Ministry of Ayush, 22 September 2026; reproduced with credit for educational use. Key Dimensions — 2. Access and financing eSanjeevani: the free national telemedicine platform, reported to have served over 50 crore patients, now includes Ayush OPD consultations with Ayurveda specialists. Insurance mandate: in 2024, the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) required all insurers to offer products or add-ons covering all systems of medicine, including Ayurveda. Universal empanelment: on 10 February 2026, AIIA signed a Common Empanelment MoU with the General Insurance Council, empanelling it with all 32 general insurers — the first Ayush institution to do so for cashless treatment. Key Dimensions — 3. Global coding standard: WHO ICD-11 TM2 The International Classification of Diseases (ICD) is the World Health Organization’s global diagnostic coding system. Its 11th revision added a Traditional Medicine Module 2 (TM2) covering Ayurveda, Siddha and Unani. Timeline: TM2 was launched for country testing in New Delhi on 10 January 2024 and formally released in the ICD-11 update of 2025. Why it matters: clinicians can record Ayush diagnoses with standard codes (alongside biomedical codes — “dual coding”), enabling comparable data, insurance processing and research. TM1 vs TM2: the earlier Module 1 largely drew on traditional medicine originating in ancient China; TM2 is the first to codify South Asian systems. Key Dimensions — 4. Education and research Capacity (13 March 2026): 593 Ayurveda colleges, 45,245 undergraduate and 5,673 postgraduate seats; 17 new Ayush colleges approved under NAM, 12 of them for Ayurveda. AYURGYAN (2021-22): R&D support scheme; Ayurveda accounts for ₹9.38 crore across 17 of the 34 funded projects (₹17.79 crore in all). AYUR SWASTHYA Yojana (2021–26): supported 25 projects (22 involving Ayurveda) and created 28 Centres of Excellence, 22 of them Ayurveda-centric. CCRAS: works through 30 institutes; its SPARK studentship reached 289 colleges (2022-23 to 2024-25). In March 2026 it tied up with AICTE’s Anuvadini AI to translate research into 13 Indian languages. Key Dimensions — 5. Regulation of drugs and food Legal base: Ayurvedic, Siddha and Unani drugs are regulated under the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940 (Chapter IVA) and the Drugs Rules, 1945, which prescribe Good Manufacturing Practices and pharmacopoeial standards. Enforcement: an Ayush vertical within the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO); the e-Aushadhi portal tracks manufacturing licence applications online. Ayurveda Aahara: the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI), with the Ministry, notified a framework and a product list of classical dietary items for licensing traditional food makers. Key Dimensions — 6. Global outreach and the market Agreements: 27 country-to-country MoUs, 16 Academic Chair MoUs, 57 institute-level MoUs; in 2025-26, new country MoUs with Angola, Kazakhstan and Tanzania. Footprint: 46 Ayush Information Cells across 43 countries; 104 scholarships for foreign nationals; M-3/M-4 visas for Ayush patients and caregivers. WHO Global Traditional Medicine Centre (GCTM), Jamnagar: WHO’s first global outposted centre for traditional medicine; the Budget 2026-27 provides for its upgradation. Second WHO Global Summit on Traditional Medicine: Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, December 2025, adopting the Delhi Declaration (the first summit was held in Gandhinagar in 2023). BRICS: the 16th BRICS Health Ministers’ Meeting (Chandigarh) set up an Expert Working Group on Traditional, Complementary and Integrative Medicine. Figure 3 — Indian Ayush market valuation (US$ billion) Growth was gradual until 2023 before a sharp jump in 2024; the US$200 billion figure for 2030 is a projected target, not an achieved value. Image courtesy PIB (data: India Brand Equity Foundation), 22 September 2026; reproduced with credit for educational use. ▤ Union Budget 2026-27 — Ayush Allocation: ₹4,408 crore for the Ministry of Ayush. Announcements: three new All India Institutes of Ayurveda; upgradation of Ayush pharmacies and Drug Testing Laboratories; upgradation of WHO-GCTM, Jamnagar. Critical Analysis — Strengths Pluralistic access: co-location and telemedicine widen choice in primary care, especially where allopathic doctors are scarce and Ayush practitioners are already present. Preventive orientation: diet, lifestyle and Yoga-based approaches align with the growing burden of non-communicable diseases such as diabetes and hypertension. Standardisation: ICD-11 coding, insurance empanelment and pharmacopoeial standards move the sector from anecdote towards recordable, auditable practice. Critical Analysis — Structural Questions Evidence base: large, well-designed randomised trials remain limited for many formulations; research output under dedicated schemes (tens of publications) is modest against the sector’s ambitions. Drug safety: international studies have reported heavy-metal content in some marketed products, and pharmacovigilance reporting remains thin; testing capacity is uneven across States. Misleading claims: the Supreme Court’s scrutiny of misleading health advertisements (IMA v. Union of India, 2024) showed gaps in enforcing the Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954. Integration boundaries: “mixopathy” debates — for instance over the 2020 notification allowing Ayurveda postgraduates to perform listed surgeries — show unresolved questions of scope and patient safety. Outputs vs outcomes: counts of buildings and seats are reported; health outcomes, cost-effectiveness and patient satisfaction data are rarely published. Raw-material sustainability: a large share of medicinal plants is still wild-collected, raising concerns of over-harvesting and adulteration in supply chains. Way Forward Evidence first: fund multi-centre clinical trials on priority conditions, publish negative results, and link ICD-11 TM2 data to outcome tracking. Safety net: expand State Drug Testing Laboratories, mandate batch-level heavy-metal testing for mineral-based formulations and strengthen pharmacovigilance reporting. Clear protocols: define referral and cross-practice rules for integrative departments so each system works within its validated scope. Supply chain: scale cultivation of medicinal plants with farmer incentives and traceability to reduce wild harvesting. ▤ Prelims Pointers Ayurveda Day: 23 September (fixed by Gazette, 23 March 2025); earlier on Dhanteras since 2016. Tridosha: Vata, Pitta, Kapha; Brihat Trayi: Charaka, Sushruta, Ashtanga Hridaya. ICD-11 TM2: Ayurveda, Siddha, Unani; launched New Delhi, 10 January 2024. WHO-GCTM: Jamnagar, Gujarat; Delhi Declaration: Second WHO Global TM Summit, Dec 2025. Ayush visas: M-3 (patient), M-4 (attendant); Ayush Insurance Helpline: 1800-11-0008 (AIIA). SPARK: CCRAS studentship for undergraduate Ayurveda research; Anuvadini AI: AICTE translation platform. ✎ Mains Practice Question “Integrating Ayurveda into public health can widen access, but only rigorous evidence and regulation can sustain its credibility.” Examine the steps taken to mainstream Ayush in India’s health system and suggest measures to address the concerns that remain. 15 marks · 250 words Environment & EcologyGeneral Studies Paper III 02 Reclaiming Legacy Dumpsites: Biomining and Land Recovery under SBM-Urban 2.0 GS-III · Environment — Pollution & Waste ManagementGS-II · Governance — Urban Local BodiesPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs · 21 Sep 2026 Cities under Swachh Bharat Mission-Urban 2.0 are clearing decades-old garbage mounds and converting the land into parks, processing plants and urban forests. Four city cases — Gorakhpur, Delhi, Nagpur and Raichur — show both the method and its limits. ◈ Static Background — What is Legacy Waste? Municipal solid waste (MSW) is the everyday waste of households, markets, offices and public spaces. When it is dumped without segregation or treatment for years, it piles into mounds of mixed, partly decomposed material called legacy waste. Methane: buried organic waste decays without oxygen and releases methane, a greenhouse gas far more potent than carbon dioxide over short periods. Leachate: rainwater seeping through the heap becomes a toxic liquid that can contaminate soil and groundwater. Fires and collapses: trapped gases cause recurring dumpsite fires; in 2017, a portion of Delhi’s Ghazipur mound collapsed, killing two people. Locked land: dumpsites occupy valuable urban land and depress living conditions in surrounding, often low-income, neighbourhoods. ◈ Static Background — Constitutional & Legal Framework Constitution: the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 added the Twelfth Schedule; entry 6 lists “public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management” as municipal functions (Article 243W). Judicial push: the Supreme Court’s Almitra Patel case (1996 onwards) led to the first Municipal Solid Wastes (Management & Handling) Rules, 2000. 2016: the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016 mandated source segregation and asked cities to bio-remediate or cap old dumpsites. 2026: the SWM Rules, 2026 (notified January 2026 under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; in force from 1 April 2026) superseded them. What 2026 adds: mandatory mapping of all legacy dumpsites with time-bound biomining, a centralised online monitoring portal, landfills limited to inert and non-recoverable waste, and ‘polluter pays’ environmental compensation. ◈ Static Background — The Swachh Bharat Mission-Urban Journey SBM-U (2 October 2014): launched by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) with a first focus on making cities Open Defecation Free (ODF). Swachh Survekshan (from 2016): the annual cleanliness survey ranking cities, which creates competitive pressure on Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). Garbage Free City star rating (2018): a certification protocol for cities’ waste management performance. SBM-U 2.0 (1 October 2021, till 2026): vision of “Garbage Free Cities”, with an outlay of about ₹1.41 lakh crore; remediation of all legacy dumpsites is a core component. ▤ Scheme at a Glance — Legacy Dumpsite Remediation Parent mission: Swachh Bharat Mission-Urban 2.0; nodal Ministry: MoHUA; implementers: States and ULBs. Lakshya Zero Dumpsite: structured, time-bound drive to scientifically remediate all dumpsites. Dumpsite Remediation Accelerator Programme (DRAP): launched November 2025 to fast-track remaining dumpsites in mission mode. Progress (Jan–Dec 2025): 3.66 crore metric tonnes of legacy waste remediated; 459 ULBs across 29 States achieved complete remediation. Monitoring: City Solid Waste Action Plans, progress tracking on the SBM-U portal and Swachh Survekshan rankings. How biomining works Biomining is the scientific excavation and processing of old waste. The heap is dug out, stabilised with microbial cultures and drying, then screened through rotating drum sieves (trommels) that separate it into usable fractions. Bioremediation refers to using microbes to break down the organic matter. Figure 4 — From waste mound to reclaimed land: the biomining chain Legacywaste moundExcavation +stabilisationTrommelscreeningRefuse-derived fuel→ cement kiln co-processingBio-soil (black soil)→ filling low-lying areasRecyclables→ recycling value chainInerts→ construction use / landfillOutcome: reclaimed land → parks · plants · forests Each fraction needs a buyer or a safe destination; remediation works only if RDF, soil and inerts actually leave the site. Key Dimensions — Four city models of land reuse Gorakhpur (Uttar Pradesh) — eco-park: a 40-acre site used for seven years was biomined at about 400 tonnes a day and turned into the Kachre Se Kanchan Rapti Eco Park, with a restaurant run by the women’s self-help group Shakti Ki Rasoi. Bhalswa (Delhi) — accelerated remediation: about 70 acres; biomining since July 2022; the Swachhata Hi Seva campaign was launched from here in September 2025. By 31 July 2026, 99.07 lakh MT was remediated and over half the site reclaimed. Bhandewadi (Nagpur, Maharashtra) — processing hub: over 10 lakh MT treated; the yard is now an Integrated Municipal Solid Waste Processing Facility with composting, waste-derived fuel, CCTV monitoring and leachate treatment. Yakalaspura (Raichur, Karnataka) — urban forest: about 62,252 MT processed on a 35-acre site, reclaiming nearly 22 acres; a Miyawaki forest of about 5–7 acres began on World Environment Day, 5 June 2026. Figure 5 — Remediation at a glance 3.66 cr MT Legacy waste remediated nationally, Jan–Dec 2025 459 ULBs in 29 States with complete remediation 99.07 lakh MT Remediated at Bhalswa, Delhi (to 31 Jul 2026) 40 acres Gorakhpur dumpsite turned eco-park 10 lakh+ MT Treated at Bhandewadi, Nagpur ~22 acres Land reclaimed at Yakalaspura, Raichur Figures as reported by the Government; national totals and city data refer to different periods. ◈ Concept Corner — Miyawaki Forests Developed by Japanese botanist Akira Miyawaki, the method plants native species very densely in layers on prepared soil. Proponents say such patches grow much faster than conventional plantations; ecologists caution that they are small and cannot replace natural forests. Critical Analysis — Strengths Land value: reclaimed urban land is scarce and valuable; reuse as parks, forests or processing hubs gives visible public returns. Circular economy: RDF substitutes fossil fuel in cement kilns, and recyclables re-enter the value chain rather than staying buried. Health and climate co-benefits: removing heaps cuts fire risk, methane release and leachate flows into groundwater. Livelihoods: self-help groups and local workers gain employment in parks and processing units. Critical Analysis — Structural Questions Fresh-waste inflow: if daily waste continues to arrive unsegregated, new mounds form as old ones are cleared — the release itself notes the need to process fresh waste at Bhalswa. Fraction quality: RDF from old waste is often wet or contaminated, limiting cement-kiln uptake; fine soil may carry heavy metals, so its use for land filling needs testing. Measuring “remediated”: tonnage cleared is reported, but independent verification of final disposal of each fraction is less visible. ULB capacity: biomining is costly and contract-driven; smaller municipalities with weak finances depend heavily on central and State grants. Informal workers: waste pickers who depended on dumpsites risk losing livelihoods unless integrated into formal recovery chains. Way Forward Stop the inflow: enforce source segregation and decentralised wet-waste processing under the SWM Rules, 2026, so cleared sites stay clear. Assured offtake: binding RDF supply arrangements with cement plants and quality standards for bio-soil and inerts. Transparency: publish site-wise, third-party-verified data on waste excavated, fractions disposed and land reused. Inclusion: register waste pickers and absorb them into material recovery facilities with social security. ▤ Prelims Pointers Biomining: excavation + stabilisation + screening of old waste into RDF, bio-soil, recyclables and inerts. DRAP: Dumpsite Remediation Accelerator Programme, launched November 2025 under SBM-U 2.0. SWM Rules, 2026: under Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; in force from 1 April 2026; supersede the 2016 Rules. Twelfth Schedule, entry 6: solid waste management as a municipal function. City sites: Kachre Se Kanchan Rapti Eco Park (Gorakhpur); Bhalswa (Delhi); Bhandewadi (Nagpur); Yakalaspura (Raichur). ✎ Mains Practice Question Legacy dumpsites are both an environmental hazard and an urban land opportunity. Discuss the role of biomining in their remediation under Swachh Bharat Mission-Urban 2.0, and examine why remediation may not be sustainable without reforms in daily waste management. 

Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise EditorialsGS Paper II & III 01Weapons in Orbit & Space Governance OpinionsGS Paper II · IR 02Malacca-Singapore Model for the Strait of Hormuz EditorialsThe newspaper’s own arguments 01 Unsafe Space: Deployment of Orbital Weapons and the Case for Multilateral Space Governance Core TopicEditorialGS-II · IR — International Treaties & Global CommonsGS-III · Security & Space TechnologyPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Editorial The United States has acknowledged deploying “on-orbit space control weapons”. The editorial argues that the absence of clarity on what these systems can do, and when they may be used, exposes the inadequacy of a space law regime designed in the 1960s–70s. 1. Issue in Brief The development: on 14 September 2026, the U.S. Air Force Secretary stated — and the Space Force chief confirmed — that the U.S. has deployed on-orbit weapons to “defend against hostile adversary action”. The concern: the editorial notes that U.S. doctrine defines “space control” as covering both offensive and defensive operations, so a “defensive” label does not settle what the systems can do. The editorial’s prescription: disclosure of the weapons’ particulars by the U.S., and a multilateral arrangement defining thresholds of action and escalation, using the UN Open-Ended Working Group on preventing an arms race in outer space. ◈ 2. Static Background — Why Space Became a Security Domain Satellites now underpin navigation, communication, weather forecasting, power-grid timing and banking transactions. Because the same satellites often serve civilian and military users, they are described as dual-use assets — and therefore as potential military targets. Counter-space capabilities are means to deny, degrade or destroy an adversary’s space assets. They range from kinetic (missiles, co-orbital interceptors) to non-kinetic (lasers, jamming, spoofing and cyber-attacks). Direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) tests: the U.S. (2008), China (2007), India (Mission Shakti, 27 March 2019, DRDO) and Russia (2021) have destroyed their own satellites with ground-launched missiles. Debris risk: kinetic strikes create debris clouds; the Kessler syndrome describes a cascade of collisions that could make some orbits unusable for decades. Co-orbital systems: manoeuvrable satellites that approach others for inspection or servicing (“rendezvous and proximity operations”) are hard to distinguish from weapons — the core ambiguity the editorial highlights. Institutional shift: the U.S. created a separate Space Force in December 2019; India set up a tri-service Defence Space Agency in 2019. ◈ 2. Static Background — The International Law of Outer Space Space law was negotiated largely under the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), set up in 1959. Five UN treaties form its core; India is a party to the first four and has signed, but not ratified, the Moon Agreement. Outer Space Treaty (OST), 1967 — the “constitution” of space law: space is free for exploration by all and not subject to national appropriation. OST Article IV: bans placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in orbit; the Moon and celestial bodies are for exclusively peaceful purposes. It does not ban conventional weapons in orbit. OST Article III: space activities must conform to international law, including the UN Charter; Article VI makes States responsible for national activities, including those of private companies. Rescue Agreement (1968), Liability Convention (1972), Registration Convention (1975) and Moon Agreement (1979) complete the set. Liability Convention: absolute liability for damage caused on Earth’s surface or to aircraft, but fault-based liability for damage caused in space; its only formal invocation followed the Soviet Kosmos 954 crash in Canada (1978). Figure 1 — Space law was written before space warfare became plausible Treaty-making (1967–1979)Weaponisation & response (2007–2028)1967Outer Space Treaty1968 Rescue1972Liability Conv.1975 Registration1979Moon Agreement2007 ChinaASAT test2008 U.S.2019 IndiaMission Shakti2021 Russia2024–28PAROS OEWG All five UN space treaties predate the ASAT tests and today’s dual-use satellite economy — the gap the editorial calls “too coarse”. 3. Key Dimensions Doctrinal ambiguity: when two steerable satellites approach each other without knowing each other’s intent, the editorial argues that misreading can trigger escalation — a risk that grows as satellites run onboard artificial intelligence. Undefined triggers: neither “hostile action” nor the weapon’s capability has been publicly defined, leaving other States to plan for the worst case. A “fluid line” under Article IV: the editorial points out that conventional weapons can cause mass disruption by disabling networks society depends on, blurring the treaty’s WMD distinction. Humanitarian law strain: the principle of distinction in international humanitarian law (IHL) protects civilian objects, but a commercial satellite also serving militaries may lose that protection — endangering civilian services. Accountability gap: if an autonomous, dual-use satellite run by a private company initiates an unwanted strike, the editorial notes that the Liability Convention cannot readily assign responsibility or prove “fault”. Multilateral forum: the UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) in all its aspects (2024–2028, Geneva) is the venue the editorial proposes. ◈ Two Rival Approaches to Space Arms Control Legally binding treaty approach: China and Russia tabled a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space (PPWT) at the Conference on Disarmament in 2008 and updated it in 2014; critics note it does not cover ground-based ASAT missiles and lacks verification. Norms-of-behaviour approach: Western States have favoured political commitments on responsible behaviour, such as the U.S.-initiated moratorium on destructive direct-ascent ASAT tests (2022). Convergence: the 2024–2028 OEWG merged two earlier working groups reflecting these approaches, which is why the editorial sees it as the natural forum. 4. Critical Analysis — In favour of the editorial’s position Transparency reduces misperception: declared thresholds and capabilities, like nuclear-era hotlines, lower the risk of accidental escalation between manoeuvring satellites. Shared vulnerability: debris does not respect borders; a conflict in orbit would harm all space users, including developing States with fewer assets. Legal modernisation is overdue: the treaty framework did not anticipate private constellations, dual-use assets or autonomous decision-making. 4. Critical Analysis — Against, or complicating factors Security dilemma: States argue that detailed disclosure would reveal vulnerabilities; the U.S. frames its systems as a response to rivals’ existing counter-space programmes. Verification problem: a satellite’s intent cannot be inspected; a robotic arm for servicing can also disable a satellite, making binding definitions difficult. Consensus deficit: the Conference on Disarmament has been largely deadlocked for decades, and major powers remain divided over binding versus voluntary instruments. Dual-use dependence: militaries increasingly rely on commercial satellites, so restricting targeting of such assets conflicts with operational practice. 5. Way Forward Confidence-building measures: advance notification of manoeuvres near other States’ satellites, keep-out zones and crisis communication channels. Layered instruments: pair political norms (no destructive tests, no first placement) with gradually binding commitments negotiated at the OEWG. Clarify liability: update interpretation of Article VI of the OST and the Liability Convention for private and autonomous operators. India’s role: as a demonstrated ASAT power and a major user of space for development, India can bridge the binding-treaty and norms camps. ▤ 6. Data & Key Facts 1959: COPUOS set up; 1967: Outer Space Treaty opened for signature. 27 March 2019: Mission Shakti — India became the fourth country to test a direct-ascent ASAT, at a low altitude of about 300 km. 2024–2028: PAROS OEWG, created by UNGA decision 79/512, meeting in Geneva. 2008 / 2014: Sino-Russian PPWT draft and its updated version. ▤ 7. Prelims Pointers OST Art. IV bans nuclear/WMD in orbit — not conventional weapons. OST Art. VI: State responsibility covers private space actors. Liability Convention: absolute liability on Earth; fault liability in space. Kessler syndrome: cascading collisions from orbital debris. PPWT: China–Russia draft treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. Defence Space Agency (2019): India’s tri-service space body. ✎ 8. Mains Practice Question “The existing international space law regime is ill-equipped for an era of dual-use satellites and on-orbit weapons.” Critically examine this statement and suggest a governance framework to prevent an arms race in outer space. 15 marks · 250 words Introduction: the 2026 U.S. disclosure and the dependence of civilian life on satellites. Body: the OST, Liability Convention and IHL gaps; dual-use and autonomy; counter-arguments on security and verification. Conclusion: layered norms plus binding measures through the PAROS OEWG, with a role for India. OpinionsSigned op-eds 02 A Malacca-Singapore Model for Resolving the Strait of Hormuz Crisis Core TopicOpinionGS-II · IR — Law of the Sea, West AsiaGS-I · Geography — Straits & ChokepointsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Opinion With shipping through the Strait of Hormuz disrupted, the author asks whether the way Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore settled the status of the Malacca-Singapore Straits during the drafting of the law of the sea can guide a solution in the Gulf. 1. Issue in Brief Context: since the conflict involving the U.S., Israel and Iran began on 28 February 2026, Iran has exercised de facto control over traffic through Hormuz, while the U.S. has maintained a naval blockade of Iranian ports. Latest position: Iran and Oman reported in September 2026 an agreement on new entry and exit routes, but the Strait has not reopened and, as the author notes, the U.S. has not accepted the arrangement. The author’s argument: the two cases share technical features — overlapping territorial seas — but differ in context; Malacca turned on navigational safety, Hormuz turns on Iran’s security. Figure 2 — Location of the Strait of Hormuz The red box marks the Strait of Hormuz, linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, with Iran to the north and Oman’s Musandam peninsula to the south. ◈ 2. Static Background — Maritime Zones under UNCLOS The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted in 1982 at Montego Bay and entered into force in 1994; India ratified it in 1995. It divides the sea into zones measured from a coastal baseline, each with different rights for the coastal State and for foreign ships. Territorial sea (up to 12 nautical miles): full sovereignty of the coastal State, subject to foreign ships’ right of innocent passage. Contiguous zone (up to 24 nm): limited control for customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ, up to 200 nm): sovereign rights over resources; other States keep freedom of navigation. High seas: beyond national jurisdiction, open to all. Key geometry: where a strait is narrower than 24 nm, the 12-nm territorial seas of the two shores meet, leaving no high-seas corridor — the situation in both Malacca-Singapore and Hormuz. Figure 3 — Why narrow straits become territorial waters Strait wider than 24 nm12 nm TSHigh seas /EEZ corridor12 nm TSShips use the free corridorStrait narrower than 24 nmState AState BSeas meet at a median line — no free corridor Once both shores claim 12-nm territorial seas, the two zones meet at a median line and a narrow strait becomes entirely territorial water — the problem that transit passage was designed to solve. ◈ 2. Static Background — Three Passage Regimes Innocent passage (Articles 17–19): passage that is not prejudicial to the coastal State’s peace, good order or security; submarines must surface and show their flag, and the coastal State may temporarily suspend it for security. Transit passage (Part III, Articles 37–44): for straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas or EEZs; ships and aircraft, including warships and submerged submarines, may pass “continuously and expeditiously”. It cannot be suspended. Archipelagic sea lanes passage (Part IV): through designated lanes in the waters of an archipelagic State such as Indonesia or the Philippines. Earlier precedent: the International Court of Justice’s Corfu Channel case (1949) recognised peacetime passage of warships through international straits. Article 43: encourages user States and strait States to cooperate on navigational aids and pollution control — the legal basis for the Malacca Cooperative Mechanism. 3. Key Dimensions — How the Malacca-Singapore question was settled Geography: the Strait of Malacca runs about 800 km between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra; the Strait of Singapore (about 105 km) connects it to the South China Sea. Archipelagic claim (1957): Indonesia’s Djuanda Declaration treated all waters between its islands as Indonesian waters, reflecting post-colonial security concerns. 1971 joint statement: Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore rejected treating the Straits as “international”, while Singapore — a trade-dependent State — focused on navigational safety. Great-power position: the U.S. and the Soviet Union, otherwise rivals, both sought unimpeded transit; Japan chose cooperation through the Japan-funded Malacca Strait Council. The UNCLOS bargain: the United Kingdom’s transit passage proposal was accepted; Indonesia traded acceptance for recognition of the archipelagic regime, and Malaysia focused on environmental safety and vessel draught. 2007 Cooperative Mechanism: littoral and user States, with industry, jointly fund safety measures through an Aids to Navigation Fund; the littoral States levy no tolls or fees on transit. 3. Key Dimensions — Why Hormuz is different Geography: Hormuz links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman; at its narrowest it is about 21 nautical miles, so the territorial seas of Iran and Oman overlap. Treaty status: Iran has signed but not ratified UNCLOS, and its 1993 maritime law requires foreign warships to seek prior authorisation — which the author calls a continuing sore point. Oman has ratified; the U.S. is not a party but treats the navigation rules as customary law. Nature of the dispute: Malacca was about safety of navigation and the marine environment; Hormuz, the author argues, is about Iran’s security amid active conflict. Timing: the Malacca settlement was part of the package deals that made UNCLOS possible; no comparable global negotiation now exists to absorb trade-offs. Regional diplomacy: Qatar has supported the Iran-Oman talks and, the author notes, suggested the Malacca-Singapore model; the U.S. position remains decisive. 4. Critical Analysis — In favour of the Malacca model Proven cooperative design: littoral-led management with user-State funding has kept one of the world’s busiest waterways open for decades without tolls. Balances sovereignty and access: coastal States gain a formal role while user States retain non-suspendable transit. Technical fit: traffic separation schemes, hydrographic surveys and navigational aids are directly transferable to Hormuz. 4. Critical Analysis — Against, or limits of the analogy Security, not safety: an arrangement built on navigational cooperation cannot by itself resolve a dispute rooted in war, sanctions and blockades. Legal asymmetry: Iran’s non-ratification of UNCLOS weakens a transit-passage framework, since Iran contests that non-parties can claim its benefits. Control vs cooperation: the reported Iran-Oman routes place the entry lane within Iranian territorial waters, which user States may read as control rather than joint stewardship. Great-power acceptance: the Malacca model worked because major powers endorsed it; the author notes the U.S. may not accept even a Gulf-wide framework. 5. Way Forward Separate tracks: pair a technical navigation arrangement for Hormuz with a political track on sanctions, blockade and security guarantees. Include user States: a Malacca-style forum where major importers such as India, China, Japan and the EU fund safety without tolls could widen legitimacy. Anchor in UNCLOS principles: keep passage non-discriminatory and non-suspendable, whatever the institutional form. India’s interest: India, a large importer of Gulf crude and LNG with a large diaspora in the region, has a stake in any durable regime; its Navy has run Operation Sankalp since 2019 to escort Indian-flagged ships in the Gulf. ▤ 6. Data & Key Facts Malacca: about 800 km long; Singapore Strait: about 105 km. Hormuz: about 21 nautical miles at its narrowest; commonly estimated to carry around one-fifth of global oil consumption in normal times. UNCLOS: adopted 1982, in force 1994; Iran signed, not ratified; Oman ratified; U.S. not a party. 1971: Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore joint statement; 2007: Cooperative Mechanism. ▤ 7. Prelims Pointers Transit passage: cannot be suspended; applies to warships and submerged submarines. Innocent passage: may be temporarily suspended; submarines must surface. Djuanda Declaration (1957): Indonesia’s archipelagic waters claim. Corfu Channel case (1949): first ICJ judgment; passage through straits. Aids to Navigation Fund: voluntary contributions, not tolls. Musandam peninsula: Omani exclave on the southern shore of Hormuz. ✎ 8. Mains Practice Question Examine the relevance of the Malacca-Singapore Straits cooperative arrangement as a model for managing the Strait of Hormuz. What are its limitations in the present geopolitical context, and what are the implications for India? 15 marks · 250 words Introduction: overlapping territorial seas in both straits and the current disruption at Hormuz. Body: UNCLOS passage regimes; the Malacca settlement and 2007 mechanism; differences in legal status and nature of dispute. Conclusion: a technical framework linked to a political settlement, with India’s energy-security stake.

In-Depth News Analysis8 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity & GovernanceGS Paper II 01Article 371K for Ladakh & the Article 371 Family02SC Strikes Down Maharashtra Methanol Rules International RelationsGS Paper II 03India–New Zealand FTA Enters into Force04SLINEX-26: India–Sri Lanka Naval Exercise EconomyGS Paper III 05UPI Tap & Pay: Towards Code-less Payments Science & TechnologyGS Paper III 06Gaganyaan Crew Module Parachute System Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 07India’s Transition to Alternative-Fuel Vehicles08Rhesus Macaque Delisting & Human–Wildlife Conflict Polity & GovernanceGeneral Studies Paper II 01 Proposed Article 371K for Ladakh: Understanding India’s “Special Provisions” for States GS-II · Polity — Federalism, Special Provisions, Union TerritoriesPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express The Centre has proposed inserting a new Article 371K into the Constitution to give Ladakh special safeguards, following an “in-principle understanding” between the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and Ladakh’s two representative platforms. The proposal extends a long tradition of region-specific constitutional arrangements. ◈ Static Background — Where Article 371 Comes From Part XXI of the Constitution is titled “Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions”; Articles 371 to 371J sit in it, alongside provisions such as Article 370. Original Article 371 (1950): placed the governments of the former princely Part B States (such as Hyderabad and Mysore) under the President’s general control for ten years — a transitional supervision clause. 1956 reset: the States Reorganisation Act and the 7th Constitutional Amendment abolished the Part A/B/C classification; Article 371 was rewritten to provide for regional development boards in Maharashtra and Gujarat. Nature: each special provision is a negotiated, region-specific settlement — some protect customary law and land, some address regional backwardness, some manage integration. Mode of insertion: new sub-articles are added by constitutional amendment under Article 368, requiring a special majority in both Houses of Parliament. Figure 1 — States with special provisions under Article 371 Eleven States carry special provisions, clustered in the North-East and the Deccan. Image courtesy The Indian Express, 22 September 2026; reproduced with credit for educational use. The Article 371 family — three broad purposes Protecting identity, customary law and land: 371A Nagaland (13th Amendment, 1962, following the 16-Point Agreement of 1960) and 371G Mizoram (53rd Amendment, 1986, after the Mizo Peace Accord) — Parliament’s laws on religious and social practices, customary law and land ownership apply only if the State Assembly so resolves. Voice for hill and tribal areas: 371B Assam (22nd Amendment, 1969) and 371C Manipur (27th Amendment, 1971) allow special committees of the Assembly for tribal or hill-area members; in Manipur the Governor reports annually to the President on the hill areas. Regional equity: Article 371 (Maharashtra and Gujarat — Vidarbha, Marathwada, Saurashtra, Kutch), 371D (Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, 32nd Amendment, 1973, from the Six-Point Formula) and 371J (Kalyana Karnataka, 98th Amendment, 2012) provide development boards and local reservation in education and jobs. Integration and administration: 371F Sikkim (36th Amendment, 1975) managed Sikkim’s entry as the 22nd State; 371H Arunachal Pradesh (55th Amendment, 1986) gives the Governor special responsibility for law and order; 371I Goa (56th Amendment, 1987) only fixes a minimum Assembly size of 30. Often missed: 371E (32nd Amendment, 1973) enabled Parliament to establish a central university in Andhra Pradesh. ◈ Static Background — Ladakh’s Constitutional Position UT without legislature: the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 created Ladakh as a separate Union Territory from 31 October 2019, administered by a Lieutenant Governor under Article 239. Article 240: lets the President make regulations for certain UTs, including Ladakh, with the force of an Act of Parliament. Existing local bodies: the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils of Leh (1995) and Kargil (2003) handle local development but have no legislative power. Demands since 2019: the Apex Body, Leh (ABL) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) have sought statehood or a legislature, inclusion under the Sixth Schedule, job protections and safeguards for land and culture. Sixth Schedule contrast: it provides Autonomous District Councils only in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram (Articles 244(2) and 275(1)); Ladakh’s predominantly tribal population made it a recurrent demand. What the proposed Article 371K envisages Institution: a directly elected UT-level body with legislative, executive, financial, budgetary and planning powers. Subjects (as stated by the MHA): land, culture and language, forests, environment and natural resources, and other matters reserved for the UT under Article 240. Novelty: it would be the first Article 371 provision for a Union Territory without a legislature, rather than a State. Open questions: Ladakh’s leaders also seek control over law and order — the reverse of 371H, where the Governor holds that responsibility — and land protections resembling 371A and 371G. Analysis — how strong will the safeguard be? Design decides value: a body that merely lists legislative subjects would offer limited protection; control over land, resources, recruitment and administration would be considerably stronger. Lessons from Manipur: hill tribes have argued that Article 371C has not delivered meaningful autonomy — a caution that a committee-based or advisory model can remain symbolic. Federal balance: Ladakh is a strategically sensitive border region; placing policing and the bureaucracy under an elected executive would make its head of government more powerful than the Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir. Asymmetric federalism: the proposal reflects the Constitution’s capacity to accommodate diversity through bespoke arrangements rather than uniform rules. Way Forward Clarity in text: define the elected body’s powers, fiscal autonomy and its relationship with the LG and the Hill Councils precisely in the amendment. Continued dialogue: keep the ABL, KDA and the MHA engaged so that the settlement is seen as legitimate in both Leh and Kargil. Ecological safeguards: give the body clear authority over land use in a fragile, high-altitude ecosystem. ▤ Prelims Pointers 371A (Nagaland) and 371G (Mizoram): the strongest protections — central laws on customary law and land need the State Assembly’s consent. 371H (Arunachal): Governor’s special responsibility for law and order. 371I (Goa): only a minimum Assembly size of 30 members. 371J (Karnataka): the latest provision, 98th Amendment, 2012, for Kalyana Karnataka. Article 240: the President’s regulation-making power for specified UTs, including Ladakh. ✎ Mains Practice Question Article 371 has evolved from a transitional provision into an instrument of asymmetric federalism. Discuss with examples, and examine the challenges in extending such a provision to a Union Territory like Ladakh. 15 marks · 250 words 02 Supreme Court Strikes Down Maharashtra’s Methanol Rules as Disproportionate GS-II · Polity — Fundamental Rights, JudiciaryPrelims + MainsThe Hindu On 18 September 2026, a Bench of Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran struck down Rules 18A and 18B of the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972, holding that they failed the proportionality test under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g). ◈ Static Background — Methanol and Hooch Tragedies Methanol (methyl alcohol, CH₃OH): a toxic industrial solvent used for formaldehyde, resins, paints and chemicals; the body converts it into formic acid, which can cause blindness, metabolic acidosis and death. Ethanol vs methanol: potable liquor contains ethanol; spurious liquor becomes lethal when cheap methanol is mixed in. Maharashtra’s trigger: a 1991 Mumbai hooch tragedy killed around 93 people; the P.R. Parthasarthy committee recommended stricter controls, and Rules 18A and 18B were inserted in 2011. Legal base: the Poisons Act, 1919 allows State governments to regulate possession and sale of poisons; “intoxicating liquors” fall under the State List (Entry 8). ◈ Static Background — The Proportionality Test Indian courts test restrictions on fundamental rights through a four-part proportionality standard, articulated in Modern Dental College v. State of M.P. (2016) and K.S. Puttaswamy (2017). Legitimate aim: the measure must pursue a proper purpose. Rational connection: the measure must actually advance that purpose. Necessity: no less restrictive but equally effective alternative should exist. Balancing: the benefit must outweigh the harm to the right. What the Court held Rule 18A(1) — verifying a purchaser’s Form A licence before sale — was a disproportionate burden, since the licence check revealed nothing about how methanol would actually be used. Rule 18A(2) — mandatory colourant and bitterant for sale to non-drug manufacturers — lacked a “reasonable and proximate nexus” with preventing illicit liquor, which is made in the unregulated sector. Rule 18B — confiscation of methanol held without a Form A licence — conflicted with lawful possession under a Form B permit, rendering that permit redundant. Industry impact: the Court accepted that additives could contaminate paints and pharmaceuticals and affect catalysts and laboratory uses — a continuing burden for no demonstrated benefit. Guidelines issued to States Coordinated enforcement: prohibition, excise, police, transport, industries and health departments, with NGOs, to act against illicit liquor at borders, transit points and production sites. Tighter licensing: licences only after verification, with periodic review; industrial users must maintain stock records and return excess methanol, on pain of suspension or cancellation. Secure transport: dedicated, tamper-proof sealed tankers under excise supervision. Social measures: more de-addiction centres, local counselling and support for affected families. Significance Regulation vs outcome: the ruling reinforces that the State’s power to regulate is not in doubt — but a rule must be shown to work, not merely look protective. Ease of doing business: it affirms Article 19(1)(g) protection against blanket burdens on legitimate industry. Enforcement gap: the Court itself noted that directions matter only if police and excise machinery implement them. ✎ Mains Practice Question Explain the doctrine of proportionality as applied by the Supreme Court to regulatory restrictions on trade. How can States prevent hooch tragedies without imposing disproportionate burdens on legitimate industry? 10 marks · 150 words International RelationsGeneral Studies Paper II 03 India–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement to Enter into Force on 20 October 2026 GS-II · IR — Bilateral AgreementsGS-III · Economy — External TradePrelims + MainsThe Hindu Both countries have completed ratification of the India–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which will take effect on 20 October 2026. Union Commerce and Industry Minister Piyush Goyal said the pact aims to double bilateral trade in four to five years, while India’s dairy and sensitive farm products stay protected. ◈ Static Background — FTAs and India’s Trade Policy Free Trade Agreement: a treaty under which partners eliminate or cut tariffs on “substantially all trade” between them, permitted under Article XXIV of the GATT as an exception to the WTO’s most-favoured-nation rule. Modern FTAs go beyond tariffs — covering services, investment, mobility of professionals, intellectual property, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards and technical barriers to trade (TBT). The RCEP decision: India withdrew from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) talks in November 2019, partly over fears of dairy and farm imports from Australia and New Zealand and of Chinese goods. Recent pivot: since 2022, India has signed trade pacts with the UAE, Australia, the EFTA bloc and the United Kingdom, among others. With New Zealand, India now has trade agreements with every RCEP member except China. Figure 2 — New Zealand at a glance A two-island nation in the South-West Pacific; Wellington is the capital and Auckland the largest city. Image courtesy BBC News; reproduced with credit for educational use. ▤ The Agreement at a Glance Timeline: negotiations first launched in 2010 but stalled; relaunched on 16 March 2025, concluded in December 2025, signed on 27 April 2026, and in force from 20 October 2026. New Zealand’s offer: duty-free access for 100% of Indian exports from entry into force. India’s offer: about 70% of tariff lines liberalised, covering around 95% of New Zealand’s exports by value — either duty-free or at sharply reduced rates, some phased in. Excluded for India: dairy and sensitive farm items such as onions, almonds, chickpeas, peas, artificial honey and sugar. Investment: New Zealand has committed to facilitate around $20 billion of investment in India over 15 years. Mobility: a Temporary Employment Entry visa pathway for skilled Indians, capped at 5,000 at any time, for up to three years. Trade base: bilateral merchandise trade of about $1.3 billion in 2024-25; India is New Zealand’s ninth-largest export market. Why it matters Export gains: labour-intensive sectors such as textiles, engineering goods and pharmaceuticals, as well as MSMEs, handloom artisans and weavers, get zero-duty access. Farm-sector red lines held: keeping dairy out addresses the concern that shaped India’s RCEP exit, given dairy’s role in rural livelihoods. Indo-Pacific and Pacific gateway: the agreement deepens India’s presence in Oceania and can support engagement with Pacific Island countries. Services and people: mobility provisions support India’s strength in skilled services, including Ayush practitioners, yoga instructors and IT professionals. Concerns and limits Small trade base: at around $1.3 billion, trade is modest; gains depend on actual utilisation of preferences, which has historically been low in Indian FTAs. Asymmetric tariffs: New Zealand’s tariffs were already low, so India’s tariff cuts are proportionately larger than what it receives. Non-tariff barriers: New Zealand’s strict biosecurity and SPS standards may limit Indian agricultural and processed-food exports. Investment is a commitment, not a guarantee: the $20 billion figure depends on business decisions over 15 years. ✎ Mains Practice Question India’s recent FTAs mark a shift from its reluctance after exiting RCEP. With reference to the India–New Zealand FTA, discuss how India is balancing export ambitions with the protection of sensitive sectors. 15 marks · 250 words 04 SLINEX-26: 13th India–Sri Lanka Bilateral Maritime Exercise at Visakhapatnam GS-II · IR — India and its NeighbourhoodPrelims-orientedPIB · Ministry of Defence The 13th edition of the Sri Lanka–India Exercise (SLINEX) is being held at Visakhapatnam from 17 to 21 September 2026, with a Harbour Phase followed by a Sea Phase focused on interoperability. ◈ Static Background SLINEX: conceptualised in 2005 as the bilateral naval exercise between the two navies; the Harbour Phase is under the Eastern Naval Command, headquartered at Visakhapatnam. Participants: INS Kavaratti, an indigenous anti-submarine warfare corvette, and INS Jyoti, a fleet tanker, from India; SLNS Sindurala from Sri Lanka. MAHASAGAR: “Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions”, announced in March 2025 as an expansion of the 2015 SAGAR vision (Security and Growth for All in the Region). Wider framework: the Colombo Security Conclave brings together India, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and Bangladesh on maritime security. Significance: Sri Lanka sits astride major Indian Ocean sea lanes; regular exercises build trust and interoperability as extra-regional navies expand their presence in the region. ✎ Mains Practice Question How does the MAHASAGAR vision build upon SAGAR? Discuss the role of bilateral naval exercises such as SLINEX in advancing India’s maritime diplomacy in the Indian Ocean Region. 10 marks · 150 words EconomyGeneral Studies Paper III 05 A Decade of UPI: ‘Tap & Pay’ Signals a Move Towards Code-less, OTP-free Payments GS-III · Economy — Banking, Digital PaymentsPrelims + MainsNews reports · NPCI At the Global Fintech Fest 2026 in Mumbai, RBI Governor Sanjay Malhotra launched UPI ‘Tap & Pay’ on point-of-sale (PoS) terminals, built by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), allowing payments without scanning QR codes or entering OTPs. ◈ Static Background — UPI and NPCI Unified Payments Interface (UPI): launched by NPCI in 2016; it links multiple bank accounts to one mobile app and enables instant, 24×7 account-to-account transfers using a virtual payment address. NPCI: set up in 2008 by banks under RBI guidance as a not-for-profit company, under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007; it also runs RuPay, IMPS and FASTag. Growth driver: adoption accelerated after the November 2016 demonetisation; UPI now accounts for about 85% of digital payment transactions in India. Earlier add-ons: RuPay credit cards linked to UPI (2022), UPI Lite for small-value payments, and UPI 123PAY for feature phones. What is new How it works: the user unlocks an NFC-enabled phone and taps it on an NFC-enabled PoS terminal; Near Field Communication (NFC) is short-range wireless data exchange. Offline-friendly: the transaction uses the PoS terminal’s internet connection, so it works even without mobile data on the user’s phone. Limits: PIN-less payments up to ₹5,000; above that, the UPI PIN must be entered on the terminal. It supports multiple account types, including RuPay credit cards on UPI. Security context: RBI directions requiring two-factor authentication for digital payments took effect from 1 April 2026, prompting alternatives to OTPs such as passkeys and device biometrics. Analysis Convenience vs security: removing OTPs reduces fraud through stolen or shared codes, but PIN-less limits shift risk to lost or stolen unlocked devices. Infrastructure gap: benefits depend on NFC-enabled phones and PoS terminals, which are less common among small merchants who rely on printed QR codes. Market concentration: a few apps dominate UPI volumes; new features may deepen the dominance of large players. Digital public infrastructure: UPI remains the model for India’s approach of building open, interoperable public platforms. ✎ Mains Practice Question UPI has transformed retail payments in India within a decade. Discuss the challenges of balancing convenience, security and inclusion as digital payments move beyond OTPs and QR codes. 10 marks · 150 words Science & TechnologyGeneral Studies Paper III 06 Gaganyaan: Why the Crew Module Needs a Multi-stage Parachute System GS-III · S&T — Space TechnologyPrelims + MainsThe Hindu Safe recovery of astronauts is the final — and least forgiving — phase of a human spaceflight. The Gaganyaan crew module relies on a redundant, staged parachute system to slow from high speed to a gentle splashdown. ◈ Static Background — Gaganyaan and Re-entry Gaganyaan: India’s human spaceflight programme, led by ISRO’s Human Space Flight Centre (HSFC), aims to send a crew to low-earth orbit and return them safely. Re-entry physics: a returning spacecraft sheds most of its speed through atmospheric drag; parachutes then decelerate it further for landing on land or sea. Developer: the parachute system is developed by the Aerial Delivery Research and Development Establishment (ADRDE), Agra, a DRDO laboratory. Earlier tests: the Test Vehicle mission TV-D1 (October 2023) tested crew escape, and the Integrated Air Drop Test (August 2025) dropped a crew-module mock-up from a helicopter to test parachutes. Figure 3 — Staged parachute deployment of the Gaganyaan crew module Re-entryDrag slowsmodule tosubsonic2 DroguesMortar-fired;stabilise andfirst slow3 Pilot chutesMortar-ejected;pull out themain chutes3 Main chutesOpen partly(reefed), thenfully bloomSplashdownPyro cuttersrelease chutesso wind cannot drag itRedundancy: if one main chute fails, the other two can still land the module safelyModule speed in the lower atmosphere: about 170 m/s Canopy size grows in stages so that each opening shock stays within what the fabric and the crew can tolerate. Key concepts Three chute types: a small pilot chute pulls out larger chutes; the drogue stabilises the module and cuts speed early; the wide main chute brings it to a soft landing. Why stages: opening a full main chute at about 170 m/s would create a huge opening shock, tearing the fabric or subjecting the crew to dangerous deceleration. Reefing: a cord around the canopy limits how wide it opens; a timed cutter severs it once the module has slowed, letting the chute bloom fully. Wake problem: the module’s blunt shape creates turbulence behind it, so mortars must eject chutes fast enough to clear the wake. Materials and testing Kevlar: high tensile strength for suspension lines, risers and reinforcement tapes. Nomex: heat resistance for areas exposed to hot mortar gases and aerothermal heating. Nylon: elastic canopy fabric that absorbs shock loads and packs compactly. Test methods: the Rail Track Rocket Sled at the Terminal Ballistics Research Laboratory, Chandigarh, drops from helicopters or aircraft, and small rocket-powered test vehicles. ✎ Mains Practice Question Crew safety during recovery is a critical challenge for India’s human spaceflight programme. Explain the engineering principles behind the Gaganyaan crew module’s parachute system and the importance of redundancy and testing. 10 marks · 150 words Environment & EcologyGeneral Studies Paper III 07 Alternative-Fuel Vehicles Overtake Petrol in Car Sales: Decoding India’s Mobility Transition GS-III · Environment — Pollution, Clean Energy; Economy — InfrastructurePrelims + MainsThe Hindu In August 2026, data from the Federation of Automobile Dealers Associations (FADA) showed that alternative-fuel vehicles — CNG, hybrid and electric combined — made up 41.95% of new passenger-vehicle sales, overtaking petrol (40.85%) for the first time. A closer look at registration data shows the transition is uneven across segments. ◈ Static Background — Why the Fuel Mix Matters Transport emissions: road transport is a major source of carbon dioxide, particulate matter and nitrogen oxides in Indian cities, and drives oil imports. Fuel categories: battery electric vehicles (EVs) have no tailpipe emissions; hybrids combine an engine with a battery; CNG and LPG are fossil fuels with lower emissions than petrol or diesel. Policy support: the FAME scheme (Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles, 2015 and 2019), the PM E-DRIVE scheme (2024, outlay ₹10,900 crore), Production-Linked Incentives for autos and battery cells, and 5% GST on EVs. Climate goals: India targets net-zero emissions by 2070; decarbonising transport is central to its Nationally Determined Contributions. Data source: the Vahan portal of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways is the national database of vehicle registrations. Figure 4 — Fuel-wise share of registrations: two-wheelers, three-wheelers and cars (2021–2026) Three-wheelers have largely electrified; two-wheelers are moving steadily; in cars, CNG/LPG — not EVs — is replacing petrol and diesel. 2026 data up to August. Image courtesy The Hindu, 22 September 2026; reproduced with credit for educational use. Segment-wise picture Overall: petrol and diesel accounted for 83.5% of about 82 lakh vehicles registered in January–March 2026, down 11.5 percentage points from 2021, when they formed over 95% of 57 lakh registrations. EVs made up 10.6%. Two-wheelers (over 70% of new vehicles): EV share rose from 6.4% in 2025 to 9.1% in 2026 (till August); petrol’s share fell to about the 90% mark for the first time. Three-wheelers (about 4% of vehicles): EVs formed 60.5% of the roughly 9.8 lakh registered till August; petrol and diesel share halved from nearly 30% in 2021 to under 15%. Cars: petrol and diesel share fell from 86% in 2021 to 61.6% in 2026, but mainly because of vehicles running on petrol with CNG or LPG; EVs formed about 6.2%, and hybrids have stayed near 8% since 2023. Analysis — why cars lag Upfront cost: electric cars remain costlier than comparable petrol or CNG models, despite lower running costs. Charging anxiety: public charging networks are thin outside metros and highways, which matters more for cars used on longer trips. CNG as a bridge: an expanding city gas distribution network makes CNG a cheaper, familiar alternative — lowering emissions but prolonging fossil-fuel dependence. Where electrification works: three-wheelers electrified fastest because of short, predictable routes, low running costs for commercial operators and cheaper batteries. Headline vs detail: grouping CNG, hybrids and EVs as “alternative fuels” can overstate progress towards zero-emission mobility. Way Forward Charging infrastructure: faster rollout of public and residential charging, including standardised connectors and interoperable payments. Battery ecosystem: domestic cell manufacturing and recycling to reduce costs and import dependence on critical minerals. Clean power: EV benefits depend on the grid’s energy mix, so renewable expansion must keep pace. Targeted incentives: focus support on segments with the largest pollution impact, such as urban fleets, taxis and buses. ▤ Prelims Pointers FADA: Federation of Automobile Dealers Associations — publishes monthly retail sales data. Vahan: MoRTH’s national vehicle registration database. PM E-DRIVE: successor to FAME-II for EV demand incentives and charging infrastructure. CNG/LPG: cleaner-burning, but still fossil fuels — not zero-emission. ✎ Mains Practice Question India’s shift away from petrol and diesel vehicles is uneven across segments. Analyse the factors behind rapid electrification of three-wheelers and slower adoption in cars, and suggest measures to accelerate the transition to zero-emission mobility. 15 marks · 250 words 08 Himachal’s Monkey Menace: Human–Wildlife Conflict after the Rhesus Macaque Lost Legal Protection GS-III · Environment — Conservation, Human–Wildlife ConflictPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express The death of a 63-year-old woman in Shimla after an attack by rhesus macaques has revived debate on who is responsible for managing the animal since it was removed from the protected list in 2022 — and whether victims can be compensated. ◈ Static Background — The Law Rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta): a widespread, adaptable primate of South and South-East Asia, classified as Least Concern by the IUCN. Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972: earlier listed the rhesus macaque under Part I of Schedule II, making it a protected species. 2022 Amendment: rationalised the schedules from six to four and removed the rhesus macaque from protection, and the separate vermin schedule was dropped. Vermin power: under Section 62, the Centre can declare a wild animal vermin for an area and period; the rhesus macaque had earlier been declared vermin in parts of Himachal Pradesh for limited periods. Constitutional duties: Article 48A (State to protect wildlife) and Article 51A(g) (citizens’ duty of compassion for living creatures). Figure 5 — Estimated rhesus macaque population in Himachal Pradesh 3,17,5122,26,0861,36,443200420132019-20 The State forest department attributes much of the fall to sterilisation — 1,86,448 monkeys sterilised between 2006 and March 2024. What changed after 2022 Shift of responsibility: Himachal’s Chief Wildlife Warden, Alok Prem Nagar, said monkeys are now treated like stray animals under civic bodies rather than the forest department. Capacity gap: urban local bodies such as the Shimla Municipal Corporation lack funds, trained staff and expertise to capture and sterilise monkeys. Funding loss: central funds that forest departments received for monkey control are no longer available for an unprotected species. Cost shift: the forest department now charges civic bodies about ₹700 per sterilisation. Scale: Shimla records 50–55 monkey attacks a month, according to civic officials. The compensation gap State policy: Himachal’s wildlife compensation provides ₹75,000 for severe injury, ₹1 lakh for permanent disability and ₹4 lakh for death. The catch: since the rhesus macaque is no longer covered by the Act, officials indicate victims’ families may not qualify — an unintended consequence of delisting. Analysis and Way Forward Root cause: public feeding and easy access to food waste draw monkeys out of forests; enforcing anti-feeding rules and waste management addresses the source. Institutional clarity: a clear division of roles between forest departments and civic bodies, with dedicated funding, is needed. Humane population control: sterilisation has shown results and should be sustained rather than relying on culling. Victim relief: compensation policies should cover conflict with species regardless of their schedule status. ✎ Mains Practice Question The removal of the rhesus macaque from legal protection has created gaps in responsibility and compensation. Examine the challenges in managing urban human–wildlife conflict in India and suggest an institutional framework to address them. 10 marks · 150 words