In-Depth PIB Analysis3 Items Core TopicImportantConcise International Relations & EconomyGS Paper II / III 01India–MERCOSUR: First Additional Protocol on e-Certificates of Origin Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 02GIB Conservation, Grassland Restoration & Project Cheetah Review at Bhuj03World Circular Economy Forum 2026, Gandhinagar International Relations & EconomyTrade Agreements & Economic Diplomacy 01 India and MERCOSUR Sign First Additional Protocol to Facilitate Electronic Certificates of Origin GS-II · IR — Trade Agreements & GroupingsGS-III · Economy — External TradePrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Commerce & Industry India and the MERCOSUR bloc have amended their 2004 Preferential Trade Agreement to let electronically issued Certificates of Origin carry the same legal validity as paper ones, a incremental but concrete step in trade-facilitation reform. ◆ Background & Context The India–MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) was signed on 25 January 2004 and entered into force on 1 June 2009. It offers preferential tariff concessions on 450 tariff lines from the Indian side and 452 from MERCOSUR. The First Additional Protocol amends Article 16 of Annex III (Rules of Origin), recognising electronically issued and signed Certificates of Origin as legally equivalent to paper certificates, per each party's domestic law. ▦ Protocol at a Glance Parent agreement: India–MERCOSUR PTA, signed 25 Jan 2004; in force since 1 Jun 2009 What it amends: Article 16 of Annex III (Rules of Origin) Signed by: Commerce Secretary Rajesh Agarwal (India), with the Ambassadors of Uruguay and Paraguay, in the presence of Uruguay's Foreign Minister (holding MERCOSUR's rotating Pro Tempore Presidency) Coverage: 450 tariff lines (India) / 452 tariff lines (MERCOSUR) Entry into force: On completion of internal procedures by India and MERCOSUR parties, and mutual notification — not yet in effect Institutional route: Cleared by the PTA's Joint Administrative Committee — discussed at its 4th meeting (27 Nov 2025), adopted at the 5th (9 Apr 2026) Figure 1 — MERCOSUR membership tiers Schematic of MERCOSUR's membership tiers — member, accessing member, associate member and observer. Current status (Sep 2026): full members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Bolivia (acceded 2024); Venezuela's membership has been suspended since 2016 — the map predates these changes. Why it matters Paper-based Certificates of Origin are a recurring friction point in claiming preferential tariffs — issuance delays, verification lag and physical document loss raise transaction costs. Electronic Certificates of Origin are already part of India's trade-facilitation push under other agreements (e.g. ASEAN, India–UAE CEPA); this extends the approach to MERCOSUR. The critical view The Protocol only fixes documentation format — it does not expand tariff coverage, which has stayed static at 450–452 lines since 2009 despite repeated talk of expanding the India–MERCOSUR PTA into a fuller trade agreement. Utilisation of the existing PTA by Indian exporters has also historically been modest, so the gain from paperless certificates is likely to be efficiency-linked rather than volume-linked in the near term. Institutions & terms to know MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del Sur): South American customs union, HQ Montevideo, founded by the 1991 Treaty of Asunción. Certificate of Origin: document certifying a good's country of manufacture, used to claim preferential tariff treatment under a PTA/FTA. Joint Administrative Committee: the PTA's institutional mechanism for reviewing and amending its provisions. ✎ Mains Practice Question Preferential Trade Agreements are often updated through protocols rather than renegotiated afresh. Discuss this practice with reference to the India–MERCOSUR PTA, and examine why India's engagement with MERCOSUR has remained limited in scope compared to its other trade partnerships. 15 marks · 250 words Environment & EcologyBiodiversity, Conservation & Sustainable Development 02 Gujarat Action Plan for GIB Conservation Released; Grassland Restoration and Project Cheetah Reviewed at Bhuj GS-III · Environment — Biodiversity & ConservationPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change The Union Environment Minister reviewed three linked conservation efforts at Bhuj, Kachchh — the Critically Endangered Great Indian Bustard, national grassland restoration, and Project Cheetah — releasing a Gujarat-specific GIB action plan and inaugurating a Soft Release Centre for captive-bred birds. Figure 1 — The Great Indian Bustard (Ardeotis nigriceps) Representative photograph of the Great Indian Bustard, IUCN Critically Endangered, the subject of the Gujarat Action Plan released at this review. ▦ Conservation Effort at a Glance Species: Great Indian Bustard (GIB) — IUCN Critically Endangered Plan released: Gujarat Action Plan for GIB Conservation, prepared by the Wildlife Institute of India with the Gujarat Forest Department Target: a minimum viable population of 30+ birds over 200–500 sq. km of contiguous habitat (government target) Priority landscape: Lala–Rawa (~200 sq. km), Kachchh On-ground action so far: ~11 sq. km of Prosopis juliflora-infested grassland restored at Naliya; 30 km of predator-proof fencing over 15 sq. km; a GIB Soft Release Centre established near Naliya for captive-bred birds from Rajasthan Breeding intervention: a ‘jump-start’ technique — infertile wild-laid eggs replaced with viable eggs from the conservation-breeding programme; the second such chick has survived past its critical first three months Grassland restoration — the wider frame Grasslands cover nearly 24% of India's land area but remain among its most degraded and least-protected ecosystem types (government figure). A proposed five-year national assessment (Wildlife Institute of India, ICFRE, Forest Survey of India, National CAMPA-supported) is meant to build a national grassland-management framework, covering Gujarat's Banni Grassland among others. Figure 2 — Project Cheetah population trajectory 29Founder cheetahsNamibia & S. Africa, 2022–2352Current populationas of September 202649Cubs born in IndiacumulativeCub survival rate in Kuno: approximately 68% India's cheetah population has grown from 29 founders (translocated from Namibia and South Africa) to 52, with cub survival at Kuno around 68% — figures as stated at the Bhuj review. Lineage — Project Cheetah India's original Asiatic cheetah population was declared extinct in 1952; a translocation of African cheetahs (a related subspecies) began in September 2022 at Kuno National Park under Project Cheetah. The protected habitat has since expanded to 3,428 sq. km through integrated management of Kuno and Gandhi Sagar, with Banni Grasslands (Gujarat) and Nauradehi Wildlife Sanctuary (Madhya Pradesh) identified as future release sites. The critical view Project Cheetah faced early criticism over high mortality among translocated adults and habitat-carrying-capacity concerns; a 68% cub survival rate and population growth to 52 suggest stabilisation, though the programme remains dependent on continual habitat expansion beyond Kuno's original limits. For GIB, isolated small populations (as in Kachchh) face inbreeding and stochastic extinction risk even where habitat is secured — the plan's 200–500 sq. km target reflects this concern, but power-line collision (a major historical cause of GIB mortality elsewhere in Rajasthan) is not detailed in this release's account of Kachchh-specific mitigation. Institutions & terms to know Wildlife Institute of India (WII): Dehradun-based autonomous institute under MoEFCC, the technical author of both the GIB plan and the grassland assessment proposal. National CAMPA: the Compensatory Afforestation Fund body that would support the national grassland assessment. MISHTI: Mangrove Initiative for Shoreline Habitats & Tangible Incomes, referenced alongside the Bhuj visit's mangrove review at Jakhau. ✎ Mains Practice Question "Conservation succeeds when whole landscapes are restored, not isolated species." Examine this statement with reference to India's Great Indian Bustard and Project Cheetah conservation efforts. 15 marks · 250 words 03 India to Host World Circular Economy Forum 2026 at Gandhinagar GS-III · Environment/Economy — Sustainable DevelopmentPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change India hosts the World Circular Economy Forum (WCEF) 2026 at Gandhinagar from 15–18 September — the first time the event, co-founded by Finland's Sitra, has been held in South Asia. ▦ Forum at a Glance Dates & venue: 15–18 September 2026, Gandhinagar, Gujarat Theme: ‘Circular Economy: Transition for People and Prosperity’ Organisers: Central Pollution Control Board, Finnish Innovation Fund Sitra, Government of Finland, MoEFCC, Government of Gujarat, Gujarat Pollution Control Board Scale: 2,000+ stakeholders from 65+ countries; 125+ exhibitors (organiser projection) Structure: 4 plenaries and 16 thematic sessions (15–16 Sep); 80 accelerator sessions, online/hybrid and in-person, worldwide (17–18 Sep) Side event: in-person Board meeting of the 10-Year Framework of Programmes on Sustainable Consumption and Production (10YFP), which India currently co-chairs Figure 3 — The circular economy loop Circularity keeps materials in use through reuse, remanufacturing and recycling, and slows the flow through longer/intensified use, rather than routing everything to disposal and waste. Why it matters A linear "take-make-dispose" economy depletes virgin resources and generates waste and emissions at the disposal stage; circularity aims to decouple economic growth from material and energy consumption. Hosting WCEF gives India a platform to showcase domestic circularity initiatives (e.g. extended producer responsibility rules, the National Resource Efficiency Policy process) to a global audience and to mobilise circular finance. The critical view India's actual material-recycling and reuse rates remain well below the aspirations typically voiced at such forums, and enforcement of existing rules (plastic waste management, e-waste, EPR) has been uneven. A hosting role signals diplomatic and policy intent but is not itself a measure of domestic circularity performance. Institutions & terms to know Sitra: Finnish Innovation Fund, a public fund under the Finnish Parliament that co-founded WCEF in 2017. 10YFP: UN-linked framework on Sustainable Consumption and Production Patterns, under UNEP. Circular economy: an economic model prioritising reuse, refurbishment, remanufacturing and recycling over single-use consumption and disposal. ✎ Mains Practice Question What is meant by a ‘circular economy’? Discuss its relevance to India's resource-security and climate goals, and the gap between policy intent and implementation in this area. 10 marks · 150 words

Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise OpinionsGS Paper II & III 01Aadhaar-Linked Verification of Electoral Rolls02Legacy of the Global War on Terror OpinionsSigned Op-Ed Columns 01 Government Trusts Aadhaar for Welfare; Should It Trust It for Voter Rolls Too? Core TopicOpinionGS-II · Polity — Election Commission, Citizenship, Aadhaar ActPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · Opinion (R S Sharma) The author, a former Secretary to the Government of India and founding Director-General of UIDAI, argues that the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls should shift from door-to-door paper verification to a voluntary Aadhaar-linked face-authentication mechanism, reserving the Ministry of Home Affairs' citizenship-determination role for the few flagged exceptions. ◆ Static Anchor — the constitutional and statutory architecture Preparation of electoral rolls is a Constitutional function of the Election Commission under Article 324, operationalised through the Representation of the People Act, 1950. UIDAI was established in 2009 (statutorily backed by the Aadhaar Act, 2016), which under Section 9 explicitly bars Aadhaar from being treated as proof of citizenship or domicile — it establishes identity and residence only. SIR has been rolling out in phases since June 2025 and has deleted over 13 crore names nationally. On 27 May, the Supreme Court upheld the SIR exercise but held that final citizenship determination rests with the MHA under the Citizenship Act, 1955 — not with the Election Commission. The case the author makes for Aadhaar-linked verification Scale and cost: SIR mobilises roughly 10 lakh public servants (mostly schoolteachers) and recurs at a cost of thousands of crores every cycle. Design logic: Aadhaar was created as a bare identity credential carrying no entitlement at enrolment, so the author argues there was no incentive to misstate age or address at the time of registration. Demonstrated scale of trust already extended: over 10 crore face-authentication transactions via DigiYatra across 100+ airports; 1.47 crore pensioners authenticate annually through Jeevan Pramaan; a cumulative 500 crore Aadhaar face authentications government-wide. Prior welfare use: Aadhaar-based de-duplication is credited with removing ghost beneficiaries and saving an estimated ₹2.7 lakh crore in leakages. Age inference without a birth date: since biometrics are not captured below age five, anyone enrolled before roughly 2013 was at least five then, hence at least 18 now — sufficient to establish voting eligibility. Figure 1 — Current SIR process versus the proposed Aadhaar-linked alternative Current SIR methodDoor-to-doorenumerationPaper documentverificationDeletion ofunverified namesAppeals &grievance redressEC finalises roll(recurs each cycle)Proposed Aadhaar-linked alternativeVoluntaryAadhaar–EPIClinkingFaceauthentication(mobile/web)Automatedde-duplication &ghost removalAnalytics flagsgenuineoutliers onlyMHA determinescitizenship(flagged cases only)Those who decline linkage continue on the ordinary manual route — a residual share, given near-universal Aadhaar coverage.Citizenship determination stays with the MHA under the Citizenship Act, 1955 (per the SC's 27 May ruling)— that step is unchanged across both flows.Illustrative process comparison drawn from the arguments made in the source column; not an official EC or UIDAI diagram. The author's proposal keeps MHA's citizenship-determination role intact but confines it to analytics-flagged outliers, rather than a universal paper check. Constraints the author concedes Aadhaar cannot, by statute, prove citizenship — a passport (held by under 8% of Indians) was itself clarified by the MEA in June as a travel document, not proof of citizenship. Precedents caution against overreach: the multipurpose National Identity Card pilot was abandoned; the Assam NRC excluded 19 lakh people amid enormous distress; the National Population Register settled for enumerating "usual residents" rather than attempting a citizenship test in the field. Linkage is proposed as voluntary, with a manual route retained for those who decline. The critical view The argument is a strong efficiency case, but it understates two structural questions. First, the Justice K S Puttaswamy (2018) verdict restricted mandatory Aadhaar use to welfare subsidies under Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act; extending it, even voluntarily, into the electoral domain may require fresh legislative clarity rather than executive practice alone. Second, "voluntary" linkage at scale has historically produced de facto compulsion through administrative convenience, and biometric authentication failure rates — well documented in welfare delivery among manual labourers and the elderly — could replicate the very exclusion the author seeks to avoid, only through a different mechanism. Institutions & terms to know SIR (Special Intensive Revision): a more rigorous, document-based revision of electoral rolls than the routine annual summary revision. Puttaswamy judgment (2017 & 2018): established privacy as a fundamental right and restricted Aadhaar's mandatory scope to Section 7 welfare purposes. NPR vs NRC: the National Population Register enumerates all "usual residents"; the National Register of Citizens (piloted in Assam) attempts to identify citizens specifically. ✎ Mains Practice Question Examine the constitutional and statutory constraints on using Aadhaar-based authentication for the revision of electoral rolls in India. Would a voluntary Aadhaar-EPIC linkage address the concerns raised by the Supreme Court on the Special Intensive Revision exercise? 15 marks · 250 words 02 War on Terror Is Over, But Its Legacy Continues to Haunt Core TopicOpinionGS-III · Internal Security — Terrorism, External LinkagesGS-II · IR — India's Neighbourhood, Afghanistan-PakistanPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · Opinion (Anju Gupta) The author, a security analyst and former Director-General of Police, traces two decades of the US-led War on Terror (WoT) from the 11 September 2001 attacks to its effective doctrinal end, arguing that while the global "war" framing has receded, the Af-Pak-origin threat to India has neither ended nor changed character. ◆ Static Anchor — origins of the network Al Qaeda (AQ) was founded by Osama bin Laden in Peshawar around May 1988, with roots in the globalisation of the Afghan jihad against Soviet occupation (1979–89) — a mobilisation of foreign fighters facilitated in part by a fatwa issued by Abdullah Azzam after his move to Islamabad in 1981. The 11 September 2001 attacks killed roughly 3,000 people, including 2,600 Americans, using hijacked aircraft as improvised weapons against the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon, and a fourth target thwarted over Pennsylvania. Earlier AQ-linked attacks included the 1993 WTC bombing, the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 2000 USS Cole attack off Yemen. Figure 2 — Timeline of the War on Terror and its South Asian aftermath 1988AQ founded,Peshawar20019/11; US invadesAfghanistan2003US invades Iraq;Saddam removed2011Bin Laden killed,Abbottabad2013–19AQI → ISIS;caliphate defeated2025Pahalgam attack;India-Pakistan clashNov 2025Red Fort attack,DelhiGlobal "War on Terror" frame (2001–2021)South Asia's Pakistan-linked networks predate and outlast itDates as stated in the source column; not exhaustive of every WoT milestone. The formal "global war" framing has wound down since the 2011 killing of bin Laden and the 2019 defeat of the territorial caliphate, but the Pakistan-linked threat to India persists into 2025. Trajectory of the War on Terror 2001: US-led invasion of Afghanistan removes the first Taliban regime; around 50 countries contribute troops under US/NATO-led efforts. 2003: US invasion of Iraq removes Saddam Hussein, but draws only British, Australian and Polish troops — a narrower coalition, marking the fracturing of WoT-era consensus. 2011: Bin Laden is killed in Pakistan; the US nonetheless takes over a decade more to exit Afghanistan. 2013–2019: Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) morphs into the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), declaring a territorial "caliphate" before its defeat by a US-led coalition by March 2019. The Af-Pak Connection and India Pakistani mobilisation for the Afghan jihad produced networks whose leaders later founded groups that assumed the identities of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, which Pakistan has continued to deploy against India even as the global WoT framing recedes. The 2025 Pahalgam terror attack and the subsequent "limited" India-Pakistan conflict illustrate the persistence of this threat. The November 2025 Red Fort attack in Delhi, and continuing military friction between Afghanistan and Pakistan, indicate enduring regional instability a quarter-century after 9/11. The critical view The US has formally moved away from framing counter-terrorism as a unified "global war," even as its agencies continue targeted operations; meanwhile, AQ- and ISIS-affiliated groups persist in a decentralised form across Yemen, Somalia, the Sahel, and South Asia. For India, this poses an analytical mismatch: its principal terrorism threat is a protracted, state-linked regional phenomenon rooted in the 1980s Afghan jihad, only loosely synchronised with the rise-and-decline cycle of the global WoT narrative — meaning India's counter-terrorism posture cannot simply track shifts in US doctrine. Institutions & terms to know Al Qaeda vs ISIS/Daesh: AQ pursued a networked, clandestine model; ISIS (2014–19) briefly held and administered territory as a self-declared caliphate. Taliban 1.0 vs Taliban 2.0: the pre-2001 regime removed by the US invasion, versus the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan after the 2021 US withdrawal. UNSC Resolution 1373 (2001): mandated international cooperation on counter-terrorism financing and legal frameworks in the aftermath of 9/11. ✎ Mains Practice Question "The global 'War on Terror' has formally wound down, but South Asia's terrorism challenge has neither ended nor changed character." Critically examine this statement with reference to India's security environment. 15 marks · 250 words Legacy IAS Academy · Editorials, Opinions & Explained

In-Depth News Analysis5 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity, Governance & Modern HistoryGS Paper I / II 01Hindi Diwas & the Munshi-Ayyangar Formula EconomyGS Paper III 02UPI Charges & the MDR Question Science & TechnologyGS Paper III 03Chandrayaan-1 & the Australe Basin04Controlling Quantum Decoherence via Timing Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 05Migratory Bird Decline & the Nairobi Flyways Declaration Polity, Governance & Modern HistoryConstitutional Provisions & Constituent Assembly 01 Hindi Diwas: How the Constituent Assembly Resolved India's Language Question GS-I · Modern History — Constituent Assembly DebatesGS-II · Polity — Articles 343–351, Eighth SchedulePrelims + MainsThe Indian Express On 14 September 1949, the Constituent Assembly adopted the Munshi-Ayyangar formula, designating Hindi as the 'official language of the Union' rather than a national language — a compromise now commemorated annually as Hindi Diwas. ◆ Background & Context At Independence, most Indians spoke one of roughly a dozen major regional languages; Hindi was the most widely spoken, while English, the language of colonial administration, was spoken by under 1% of Indians. Two Assembly factions emerged: Hindi-speaking representatives (mostly north-central India) sought Hindi's immediate declaration as national language; representatives from non-Hindi regions and moderate Congress leaders (including Jawaharlal Nehru) resisted linguistic uniformity. A procedural dispute ran alongside the substantive one: Hindi proponents wanted the question settled by simple majority vote; opponents insisted on consensus, preferably unanimity. The compromise The Munshi-Ayyangar formula (named for K M Munshi and N Gopalaswamy Ayyangar of the Drafting Committee, chaired by B R Ambedkar) was approved in 1950 and incorporated as Articles 343–351 in Part XVII of the Constitution. English was permitted for all official purposes for 15 years after the Constitution's commencement — a transition period, not a permanent arrangement. The Constitution additionally recognised 14 other languages for official use, listed in the Eighth Schedule; provincial governments could choose a regional language or English for internal affairs, with English retained for inter-provincial communication. Figure 1 — From the Constituent Assembly debate to Hindi Diwas 1946–49ConstituentAssembly debates14 Sep 1949Munshi-Ayyangarformula adopted1950Constitution commences;Arts 343–351 in force1963Official LanguagesAct passed1965Transition ends;anti-Hindi agitationsTodayHindi & Englishboth officialHindi designated 'official language of the Union' — never a 'national language'.Eighth Schedule expanded from 14 languages (1950) to 22 today, via later constitutional amendments. The 1965 transition deadline triggered anti-Hindi agitations, after which Parliament renounced the goal of a single national language altogether. What happened when the transition period ended When the 15-year period lapsed in 1965, Hindi was still not widely used in government business. Violent agitation in non-Hindi-speaking states followed, and Parliament backed away from displacing English. The Official Languages Act, 1963 was subsequently understood to mean English would continue alongside Hindi indefinitely, not merely for a transition. The critical view The outcome is frequently misread in public discourse as a Hindi "victory," since Article 343 names it the Union's official language. Academic analysis (Sujit Choudhry, cited in the source) instead reads the provisions as a genuine multidimensional compromise: Hindi gained formal primacy on paper, but English retained practical parity, and the Eighth Schedule's protection of other languages — since expanded from 14 to 22 via later amendments — constitutionalised linguistic plurality rather than uniformity. Institutions & terms to know Official language vs national language: India's Constitution names an official language of the Union; it does not declare any language "national." Eighth Schedule: lists languages given constitutional recognition — 14 originally, 22 today, following the 21st, 71st and 92nd Amendments. Three-language formula (1968): the subsequent policy compromise on languages taught in schools, building on the same debate. ✎ Mains Practice Question "The Munshi-Ayyangar formula reflects a multidimensional compromise rather than a decisive victory for any single position." Examine this statement with reference to the constitutional provisions on language in Part XVII. 15 marks · 250 words EconomyDigital Payments & Financial Regulation 02 No Bank Charge on UPI Payments Up to ₹2,000; Groundwork Laid for Fees on Larger Transactions GS-III · Economy — Digital Payments, Financial InclusionPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express The Ministry of Finance has notified that banks and system providers cannot charge for UPI transactions up to ₹2,000 or for RuPay debit card payments, while leaving the door open for a Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) on larger person-to-merchant UPI transactions. ◆ Background & Context Since January 2020, the government has mandated zero-MDR on RuPay debit cards and UPI person-to-merchant transactions under Section 269SU of the Income Tax Act, 1961, to promote low-cost digital payments. This zero-charge regime has now been carved out and reaffirmed specifically for transactions up to ₹2,000. The Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, passed by Parliament last month, amended Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, removing the blanket bank-charge exemption that previously covered all Section 269SU payments. This legislative change is what opens the door to a fee on higher-value transactions, which the new notification does not itself impose. ▦ The Numbers No-charge band: UPI transactions up to ₹2,000; all RuPay debit card payments Deciding body for MDR above ₹2,000: UPI and Services Steering Committee, headed by NPCI, 22 members (banks, PhonePe, Google Pay, Payments Council of India, Indian Banks' Association) Industry-estimated MDR range: 0.4–0.5% on large-merchant UPI payments (industry projection) Industry's stated annual cost of zero-MDR: ≈₹20,700 crore Scale (2025-26): 24,000+ crore UPI transactions worth ₹314 lakh crore Figure 2 — Why the ₹2,000 threshold matters By number of transactions4%above ₹2,000(96% are ₹2,000 or below)By value of transactions~67%above ₹2,000(≈1/3 from ₹2,000-or-below)2025-26 P2M UPI payments; 24,000+ crore transactions worth ₹314 lakh crore in total. Only 4% of person-to-merchant UPI payments exceed ₹2,000 by count, but they carry roughly two-thirds of total transaction value — explaining why a fee confined to this band could still be commercially significant. The critical view Zero-MDR has been credited with driving UPI's mass adoption, but payment-industry players have long argued it is fiscally unsustainable for banks and payment-service providers who bear infrastructure costs without fee income. Reintroducing MDR only above ₹2,000 attempts a middle path — preserving free access for small, high-frequency retail payments while allowing cost recovery on higher-value merchant transactions. The risk is that any eventual MDR gets passed through to merchants or consumers, or nudges larger transactions back toward cards or cash. Institutions & terms to know MDR (Merchant Discount Rate): the fee a merchant pays their bank/payment provider for processing a digital payment. NPCI: National Payments Corporation of India, the umbrella organisation operating UPI, RuPay and other retail payment systems. Section 269SU, Income Tax Act, 1961: mandates specified large businesses to offer prescribed low-cost digital payment modes to customers. ✎ Mains Practice Question Discuss the rationale behind India's zero-Merchant Discount Rate policy for UPI transactions and examine the arguments for and against reintroducing MDR on higher-value transactions. 10 marks · 150 words Science & TechnologySpace & Quantum Research 03 Chandrayaan-1 Data May Have Revealed the Moon's Oldest Impact Basin GS-III · S&T — Space ExplorationPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express Scientists at the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL), Ahmedabad, have confirmed a previously undetected lunar impact basin — the Australe Basin — using mineralogical data from Chandrayaan-1, and suggest it could predate the Moon's currently oldest known basin. ◆ Background & Context Chandrayaan-1 (2008) was India's first lunar mission, carrying 11 scientific payloads, six of them international contributions including NASA's Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M3), an imaging spectrometer operating in the 405–3,000 nanometre range used to map lunar surface minerals. Scientists estimate roughly 300 impact basins exist on the Moon; only 74 have been confirmed so far. The South Pole-Aitken (SPA) Basin is the largest and, until now, the oldest confirmed basin, formed over 4 billion years ago. What the new study found The Australe Basin, in the Moon's southeastern hemisphere, had escaped detection because erosion along its rims made it hard to identify even with modern imaging — it was confirmed instead through distinct mineralogical and gravity signatures. Its basalts are unusually low in calcium and high in magnesium, unlike most lunar basalts, and sit within a province of 248 small, circular basalt ponds rather than the smooth lava plains typical of known basins. PRL scientists believe the basin could be older than the South Pole-Aitken Basin (researchers' inference, not yet definitively settled). Figure 3 — The lunar South Polar region Base image: south-polar mosaic of the Moon showing the South Pole–Aitken (SPA) Basin and the South Pole/Shackleton crater rim; reproduced with credit for educational use. Australe Basin and Shiv Shakti Point are marked by Legacy IAS from published coordinates; the mosaic is not a precision georeferenced map, so the Australe Basin mark shows approximate direction only, not an exact boundary. Why it matters The finding refines the chronology of the Moon's earliest bombardment history and offers a framework for interpreting data from planned South Polar missions, including NASA's proposed Moon Base and India's Chandrayaan-4 lunar sample-return mission. Institutions & terms to know PRL, Ahmedabad: premier Indian space and planetary sciences research institute. Shiv Shakti Point: the official name of the Chandrayaan-3 landing site (2023) in the lunar South Polar region. Impact basin vs crater: basins are exceptionally large, multi-ring craters, often hundreds of kilometres across. ✎ Mains Practice Question Discuss the significance of India's Chandrayaan missions in advancing the scientific understanding of the Moon's South Polar region. 10 marks · 150 words 04 RRI Team Shows Timing Itself Can Help Control Quantum Decoherence GS-III · S&T — Quantum TechnologiesPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express A team led by Urbasi Sinha at the Raman Research Institute (RRI), Bengaluru, has shown that a single, precisely timed operation — rather than repeated corrective interventions — can delay quantum decoherence and avoid "entanglement sudden death." ◆ Background & Context Quantum computers exploit superposition and entanglement to perform certain computations far more efficiently than classical computers. But these quantum states are fragile: decoherence — loss of quantum behaviour from interaction with the environment — sets in quickly, and entanglement can vanish abruptly even before ordinary decoherence, a phenomenon called "entanglement sudden death." The standard mitigation, repeated corrective interventions (a form of quantum error correction), is itself costly and can introduce fresh errors. The RRI result A carefully timed "single-shot operation" can, depending on when it is applied, either delay decoherence and avoid sudden death, or (undesirably) hasten decoherence — showing that timing itself is a control resource, alongside materials, gates and error-correction protocols. The team describes this as a proof of concept, not a complete solution, requiring testing across different quantum computing platforms. Results are published in the American Physical Society's Physical Review A. The critical view The researchers explicitly do not claim to have solved decoherence or replaced quantum error correction; the result adds one new lever rather than a fix. Translating a single-platform proof of concept into a generalisable technique for fault-tolerant quantum computers remains a separate, longer engineering challenge, relevant to India's efforts under the National Quantum Mission. Institutions & terms to know Raman Research Institute (RRI), Bengaluru: autonomous research institute specialising in physics, including quantum optics and quantum information. National Quantum Mission (2023): India's mission-mode programme for quantum computing, communication, sensing and materials, approved with an outlay of ₹6,003.65 crore. ✎ Mains Practice Question What is quantum decoherence, and why does it pose a challenge for building practical quantum computers? 10 marks · 150 words Environment & EcologyMigratory Species & International Cooperation 05 Almost Half of Migratory Bird Species Now in Decline: State of the World's Birds GS-III · Environment — Biodiversity, International CooperationPrelims + MainsDown To Earth BirdLife International's latest State of the World's Birds report — its first edition devoted to flyways — finds that 45% of migratory bird species are declining and one in nine faces extinction, even as a newly signed declaration commits governments and financiers to cross-border conservation. ◆ Background & Context A flyway is the migratory route linking a species' breeding and non-breeding ranges, typically crossing many national borders. BirdLife International, a global partnership of national conservation bodies, publishes the State of the World's Birds report every four years; this is its first flyways-focused edition, launched on 11 September 2026 at the Global Flyways Summit in Nairobi. Figure 4 — Key findings 45%of migratory birdspecies declining1 in 9species threatenedwith extinctionSlender-billedCurlewdeclared extinct, 2025(last seen Morocco, 1995)6 more migratory species confirmed or suspected lost in the last 150 years.Seabirds and shorebirds are among the worst-affected groups.BirdLife International, State of the World's Birds (flyways edition), September 2026. The 2025 extinction of the Slender-billed Curlew is the first confirmed mainland Eurasia/Africa bird extinction in recent centuries. Drivers and a counter-example Declines stem from well-understood, human-caused pressures: invasive species, agricultural intensification, climate change and unsustainable hunting; seabirds and shorebirds are worst affected. Coordinated, whole-flyway action can reverse trends: multi-country intervention for the Egyptian Vulture has halted the decline of its Balkan breeding population. The Nairobi Flyways Declaration Signed by governments, scientists, NGOs and financial institutions, the declaration commits signatories to cross-border, flyway-scale cooperation, alongside over $6 billion in conservation finance mobilised by development banks since 2021. The critical view The report frames the causes of decline as "well-understood," implying the binding constraint is coordination and finance rather than science — but the Declaration itself is a non-binding political commitment, not a treaty. Its record will depend on implementation, much like the CMS Gandhinagar Declaration (2020), adopted when India hosted CMS COP13. Notably, India sits on the Central Asian Flyway, which — unlike the African-Eurasian Waterbird Agreement or the East Asian-Australasian Flyway Partnership — still lacks a binding multilateral instrument, a recurring Prelims/Mains gap. Institutions & terms to know CMS (Convention on Migratory Species / Bonn Convention): UN treaty on conserving migratory species; India ratified it in 1983 and hosted COP13 in Gandhinagar (2020). Central Asian Flyway (CAF): the migratory bird corridor covering India, lacking a binding cooperative framework unlike some other flyways. ✎ Mains Practice Question "Migratory species conservation requires cooperation across entire flyways, not isolated national efforts." Discuss with reference to India's position on the Central Asian Flyway. 15 marks · 250 words