PIB Analysis 16 June 2026 Contents01 Ease of Living: Twelve Years of Saturation-Based Welfare (2014–2026) Government of India 12-Year Review · Housing, Amenities, Energy, Finance, Transport & Governance GS 1GS 2GS 3 02 Panchayats at the Grassroots: 12 Years of Decentralisation Reforms Ministry of Panchayati Raj · Capacity, SVAMITVA, Fiscal Devolution & AI Governance GS 2GS 3 03 New WPI & Producer Price Index Series (Base Year 2022–23) Office of the Economic Adviser, DPIIT · Transition from WPI to PPI GS 3 Article 01 Article 01 Ease of Living: Twelve Years of Saturation-Based Welfare (2014–2026) Government of India — "Ease of Living: India's Journey of Inclusive Progress" · 15 June 2026 Relevance: GS 2 (governance, welfare schemes for vulnerable sections, social justice) · GS 3 (inclusive growth, infrastructure, energy security) · GS 1 (society, urbanisation). GS 1GS 2GS 3 Key Data at a Glance 98 lakhPMAY-Urban houses completed (vs 8 lakh during 2005–14) 3.05 crPMAY-Gramin houses completed; 75% women-owned or joint 81.94%rural tap-water coverage, June 2026 (16.72% at JJM launch, 2019) 532 GWinstalled power capacity, March 2026 (248 GW in 2014) 58 crPMJDY bank accounts; over ₹3 lakh cr in deposits 1,46,572 kmNational Highways, March 2026 (+61% since FY14) Issue in Brief A government note marks 12 years (2014–2026) of governance, framing a shift from scheme-by-scheme delivery to saturation-based "Ease of Living" across housing, water, energy, finance and transport. The unifying frame is Antyodaya within Viksit Bharat@2047 — measuring progress by household-level access to amenities rather than aggregate growth alone. Static Background "Ease of Living" is the citizen-welfare counterpart to "Ease of Doing Business" — it tracks quality-of-life access (shelter, water, power, mobility) rather than GDP alone. Constitutional anchor: the Directive Principles — Articles 38, 39 and 47 (welfare, equitable resources, standard of living) — though non-justiciable, guide such welfare delivery. The JAM Trinity (Jan Dhan + Aadhaar + Mobile) is the digital backbone enabling leakage-free Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT), now spanning 327 schemes. Launch anchors for revision: SBM & PMJDY 2014, PMAY-U & AMRUT & PMMY 2015, PMAY-G & PMUY 2016, SAUBHAGYA 2017, JJM 2019. Key Dimensions — Housing & Basic Amenities PMAY: pucca homes for EWS/LIG/MIG; PMAY-U 2.0 (2024) gives up to ₹2.5 lakh under Beneficiary-Led Construction, with mandatory female ownership or co-ownership. Jal Jeevan Mission (Har Ghar Jal): rural tap connections rose from 3.23 cr (16.72%) in 2019 to 15.86 cr (81.94%) by June 2026; extended to Dec 2028 under JJM 2.0. Swachh Bharat Mission: rural sanitation 39% (2014) to 100% ODF (2019); WHO estimated ~3 lakh fewer diarrhoeal deaths in 2019 versus 2014. AMRUT 2.0 (2021): expanded from 500 cities to all 4,800 statutory towns with a ₹2.99 lakh cr outlay. Key Dimensions — Energy Access & Clean Power Installed capacity doubled from 248 GW (2014) to 532 GW (2026); renewables 274.69 GW (over 50%) — India is 3rd globally in clean-energy capacity. Rural supply rose from 12.5 to 22.6 hours/day; the national energy shortage fell 4.2% to 0.03% — reliability, not just access. SAUBHAGYA (2017): free last-mile connections to ~2.86 cr homes. PM Surya Ghar (2024): rooftop solar, 300 free units/month, ~40 lakh homes by May 2026. PMUY: 10.57 cr LPG connections; UJALA: 37 cr LED bulbs saving ₹19,153 cr annually for households. Key Dimensions — Financial Inclusion PMJDY (2014): the world's largest inclusion drive — 58 cr accounts, over ₹3 lakh cr deposits, and 40.60 cr RuPay cards with accident insurance. DBT transferred ₹6.9 lakh cr in FY 2024–25 across 327 schemes, routed through Jan Dhan accounts. PMMY (2015): collateral-free micro-credit — 57.7 cr loans worth ₹40 lakh cr; 66% to women; the Tarun Plus ceiling rose to ₹20 lakh (FY25). Key Dimensions — Connectivity & Governance Transport: NH grew 91,287 km to 1,46,572 km; metro 248 km to 1,155 km (26 cities, 3rd-largest globally); rail electrification 20% to 99.6%; Kavach train-protection deployed. UDAN (2016): operational airports rose from 74 (2014) to 165 (2026), carrying 1.64 cr passengers on regional routes. Jan Vishwas Acts (2023, 2026): decriminalise minor offences — the 2026 Act covers 784 provisions across 79 Acts, decriminalising 717. PM GatiShakti (2021): GIS-based integrated infrastructure planning, 58 Ministries onboarded; MyGov — 60 mn users for participatory governance. Critical Analysis — Strengths The saturation model backed by JAM-enabled DBT reduces leakage and shifts welfare from targeted discretion toward near-universal entitlement. Gendered design — female ownership in PMAY, 66% of MUDRA loans to women, and 9 cr women freed from water-fetching — embeds equity into delivery, not just rhetoric. Convergence of physical (roads, power, water) and financial (Jan Dhan, MUDRA) infrastructure produces compounding ease-of-living gains. Critical Analysis — Structural Questions The note is a government self-assessment reporting mainly output/coverage metrics (houses, connections, km) rather than independently audited outcomes. Figures like LPG coverage at 107.2% reflect connections issued (a ratio exceeding 100%), not sustained refill usage — affordability needs separate verification. Asset durability and O&M — working tap connections, toilet usage, road and metro upkeep — remain the binding constraint beyond one-time creation. Headline saturation can mask quality-of-service gaps (supply reliability, peri-urban service deficits) that persist for end users. Way Forward Institute third-party / CAG outcome audits and publish functionality-based dashboards (working tap connections, not just installations). Shift budgeting from asset creation to lifecycle operation and maintenance for water, sanitation, roads and metros. Strengthen affordability for sustained use (LPG refills, electricity bills) so access converts to actual consumption. Deepen municipal finance and ULB capacity to sustain urban ease-of-living investments. Prelims Pointers JAM Trinity: Jan Dhan + Aadhaar + Mobile; enables DBT, which covers 327 schemes (₹6.9 lakh cr in FY25). PMAY-U 2.0 (2024): up to ₹2.5 lakh under Beneficiary-Led Construction; female ownership/co-ownership mandatory. JJM: goal "Har Ghar Jal"; launched 2019; JJM 2.0 extends coverage to December 2028. SAUBHAGYA (2017): last-mile electrification; PM Surya Ghar (2024) — rooftop solar, up to 300 free units/month. Jan Vishwas Act, 2026: decriminalises minor offences — 784 provisions across 79 central Acts. PM GatiShakti (2021): GIS-based National Master Plan for integrated infrastructure; 58 Ministries onboarded. Practice Mains Question "Ease of Living" has emerged as the citizen-facing counterpart to "Ease of Doing Business" in India's governance model. Examine how saturation-based welfare delivery has reshaped quality of life since 2014, and assess the challenges in sustaining these gains. GS Paper 2 · 250 words · 15 marks Practice MCQs Q1. Consider the following statements: (1) The JAM Trinity comprises Jan Dhan, Aadhaar and Mobile. (2) PMAY-U 2.0 mandates that a female member be the owner or co-owner of the house. (3) The Jal Jeevan Mission was launched in 2014. Which are correct? A) 1 and 2 onlyB) 2 and 3 onlyC) 1 and 3 onlyD) 1, 2 and 3 Q2. Match List I (Scheme) with List II (Focus): A. SAUBHAGYA · B. PM Surya Ghar · C. PMUY // 1. Rooftop solar (2024) · 2. Last-mile electricity connections (2017) · 3. Clean LPG connections (2016). Choose the correct match: A) A-2, B-1, C-3B) A-1, B-2, C-3C) A-3, B-1, C-2D) A-2, B-3, C-1 Q3. (Assertion–Reasoning) Assertion (A): Renewable energy now forms more than half of India's installed power capacity. Reason (R): Rapid solar and wind additions have made India the 3rd-largest clean-energy producer globally. A) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of AB) Both A and R are true, but R is NOT the correct explanation of AC) A is true, R is falseD) A is false, R is true Article 02 Article 02 Panchayats at the Grassroots: 12 Years of Decentralisation Reforms Ministry of Panchayati Raj — "Building Viksit Bharat from Ground Up" · 15 June 2026 Relevance: GS 2 (devolution of powers and finances to local levels, local self-government, Finance Commission) · GS 3 (rural development, e-governance, technology in governance). GS 2GS 3 Key Data at a Glance 3.18 crSVAMITVA property cards issued across 1.92 lakh villages 4.10 crPanchayat representatives & functionaries trained (RGSA) ₹4.35 lakh cr16th Finance Commission grant to RLBs (≈84% jump) ₹2.82 lakh cr15th FC grants released (94.98% of allocation) 33.55 lakhwomen elected representatives trained (FY23–FY26) ₹3.16 lakh cronline transactions via e-GramSwaraj–PFMS integration Issue in Brief A government review marks 12 years of strengthening Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) as units of self-government — spanning capacity, digital governance, fiscal devolution and inclusion. Headline markers: ~3.18 cr SVAMITVA property cards, 4.10 cr representatives trained, and an ~84% jump in Rural Local Body grants under the 16th Finance Commission. Static Background — The Constitutional Frame The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 gave PRIs constitutional status, creating a three-tier system (village, intermediate, district) for states above 20 lakh population. Part IX and the Eleventh Schedule list 29 subjects for devolution; Article 243G empowers states to devolve the "3 Fs" — funds, functions and functionaries. Article 243-I mandates a State Finance Commission every five years; Article 280 tasks the Union Finance Commission with recommending local-body grants. The PESA Act, 1996 extends Panchayat provisions to Fifth Schedule (Scheduled) areas, vesting Gram Sabhas with control over local resources and customs. Key Dimensions — Capacity Building (RGSA) Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan (2018–19; revamped 2022–23): trained 4.10 cr elected reps and functionaries across 2.70 lakh PRIs — an unparalleled outreach. It is the backbone for women leaders (33.55 lakh trained, FY23–FY26), PESA training and governance skilling. Infrastructure: 25,100+ Gram Panchayat buildings and 61,000+ computers; Gram Panchayat Development Plans institutionalised across 2.55 lakh GPs. Key Dimensions — Digital Governance SVAMITVA (2020): drone-based survey of inhabited (abadi) land — 3.18 cr property cards reduce disputes, unlock institutional credit and raise Panchayat revenue. e-GramSwaraj: digitised planning, budgeting and accounting; 2.59 lakh Panchayats onboarded; PFMS integration enabled ₹3.16 lakh cr in online transactions. Meri Panchayat App: 1 cr+ downloads, giving residents access to works, meetings and public-asset information. Key Dimensions — Fiscal Devolution & AI 15th Finance Commission (2020–26): ₹2.82 lakh cr (94.98%) released to RLBs — the highest-ever release rate; 16th FC recommends ₹4,35,236 cr (~84% higher). SAMARTH Panchayat Portal and the Atmanirbhar Panchayat Program build Own Source Revenue (OSR) tools — assessment, demand and collection — for fiscal autonomy. Panchayat Advancement Index (2025): benchmarks 2.59 lakh GPs against the 9 Localised SDG themes; SabhaSaar (2025) auto-generates Gram Sabha minutes in 23 languages. Key Dimensions — Tribal, Women & Youth PESA implementation strengthened via tribal-language manuals, a PESA-GPDP Portal, a Centre of Excellence and the country's first PESA Ranking framework. Sashakt Panchayat-Netri Abhiyan (2025) and 744 Model Women-Friendly GPs advance women-led local governance and safety. Model Youth Gram Sabha (Oct 2025): simulated proceedings in schools, engaging ~29,000 students across 819 residential schools, aligned with NEP 2020. Critical Analysis — Strengths SVAMITVA converts informal occupancy into bankable titles — a structural fix linking property formalisation to rural credit and Panchayat revenue. The 16th FC's ~84% grant jump signals genuine fiscal deepening, easing PRIs' chronic dependence on tied transfers. AI and digital tools (SabhaSaar, PAI, Meri Panchayat) embed transparency and multilingual accessibility into grassroots proceedings. Critical Analysis — Structural Questions Training scale (4.10 cr) measures reach, not capability uptake; functional devolution of the "3 Fs" remains uneven across states. Finance Commission grants are largely tied/conditional; Own Source Revenue stays weak, keeping PRIs transfer-dependent. Functionary vacancies, irregular State Finance Commissions and incomplete activity mapping blur accountability for self-governance. Digital and AI tools help only where Gram Sabha vitality is real — minutes generation does not by itself ensure deliberative participation. Way Forward Operationalise OSR via SAMARTH and property-tax reform so SVAMITVA titles translate into recurring local revenue. Mandate timely, empowered State Finance Commissions and complete activity mapping of the 29 Eleventh-Schedule subjects. Move from training volume to certified competency with continuous handholding of functionaries. Strengthen the Gram Sabha as the genuine accountability forum, not merely a record-keeping exercise. Prelims Pointers 73rd CAA (1992): constitutional status to PRIs; Eleventh Schedule lists 29 subjects; Article 243G enables devolution. Finance Commissions: State FC every 5 years (Art. 243-I); Union FC recommends local-body grants (Art. 280). SVAMITVA (2020): drone survey of inhabited rural land; issues property cards; Ministry of Panchayati Raj with Survey of India. PESA Act, 1996: Panchayat provisions for Fifth Schedule areas; empowers Gram Sabhas over local resources. RGSA: capacity-building of PRIs; e-GramSwaraj is the Panchayat planning, accounting and finance portal. PAI: assesses GPs against 9 Localised SDG themes; SabhaSaar — AI-generated Gram Sabha minutes in 23 languages. Practice Mains Question Genuine devolution to Panchayati Raj Institutions requires functions, funds and functionaries to move together. In light of recent reforms, examine the progress made and the gaps that remain in making Panchayats effective institutions of self-government. GS Paper 2 · 250 words · 15 marks Practice MCQs Q1. Consider the following statements regarding SVAMITVA: (1) It uses drone-based surveys of inhabited rural areas. (2) It is implemented by the Ministry of Rural Development. (3) Property cards under it can improve access to institutional credit. Which are correct? A) 1 and 2 onlyB) 1 and 3 onlyC) 2 and 3 onlyD) 1, 2 and 3 Q2. Match List I (Initiative) with List II (Function): A. e-GramSwaraj · B. SabhaSaar · C. PAI // 1. AI-generated Gram Sabha minutes · 2. Panchayat planning & accounting platform · 3. Performance index against Localised SDGs. Choose the correct match: A) A-2, B-1, C-3B) A-1, B-3, C-2C) A-3, B-1, C-2D) A-2, B-3, C-1 Q3. (Assertion–Reasoning) Assertion (A): The 73rd Amendment alone has not guaranteed effective self-governance by Panchayats. Reason (R): The actual devolution of funds, functions and functionaries to PRIs varies significantly across States. A) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of AB) Both A and R are true, but R is NOT the correct explanation of AC) A is true, R is falseD) A is false, R is true Article 03 Article 03 New WPI & Producer Price Index Series (Base Year 2022–23) Office of the Economic Adviser, DPIIT · Ministry of Commerce & Industry · 15 June 2026 Relevance: GS 3 (Indian economy — inflation, price indices, mobilisation of resources, government statistics and economic indicators). GS 3 Key Data at a Glance 2022–23new WPI base year (replaces 2011–12) 957items in the new WPI basket (up from 697) 9.68%WPI inflation (YoY), May 2026 (8.26% in April) 7services covered by the new Service PPI (Phase I) 30.33%Fuel & Power inflation, May 2026 (key driver) 24.99%weight of the WPI Food Index Issue in Brief DPIIT's Office of the Economic Adviser released a revised Wholesale Price Index (WPI) with base year 2022–23, replacing the 2011–12 series, alongside new Producer Price Indices (PPI). This begins India's transition from WPI to PPI — aligned with IMF advice and advanced-economy practice; WPI will run only five more years before discontinuation. Static Background — What is the WPI? WPI measures average change in wholesale (bulk, pre-retail) prices of goods; it excludes services and is compiled by the Office of the Economic Adviser, DPIIT. It differs from the Consumer Price Index (CPI) — compiled by NSO/MoSPI, tracking retail prices — which is the RBI's headline anchor for monetary policy. A base-year revision (here 2011–12 to 2022–23) periodically updates the basket and weights to reflect the current structure of the economy. A Producer Price Index (PPI) measures price change from the producer's/seller's perspective, covers services, and is the global standard used by most advanced economies. Key Dimensions — New WPI Features Items expanded 697 to 957, widening commodity coverage of the index. Energy realignment: Solar, Wind and Nuclear electricity added; Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas moved from "Primary Articles" to "Fuel & Power" for coherent energy-price tracking. Weighting shift: weights now use Gross Value of Output (GVO) instead of Net Traded Value — better reflecting domestic production over trade flows. Methodology upgrades: short-term price formulation, and Targeted Mean Imputation replacing the Carry Forward method for missing data. Key Dimensions — Producer Price Indices Three PPIs introduced (base 2022–23): Output PPI, a trial Input PPI (manufacturing only, experimental from March 2026), and a Service PPI for seven services. The seven Service PPIs: Banking, Securities Transaction, Insurance, Pension Fund Management, Railways, Air (Passenger) and Telecom. Output and Input PPI together show how input-cost inflation passes through to output prices; weights are drawn from the Supply & Use Table (SUT) of National Accounts. WPI, Output PPI and Service PPI use Basic Price; the trial Input PPI uses Purchaser's Price (since industries buy inputs from the market). Key Dimensions — May 2026 Print & Transition WPI inflation rose to 9.68% (May 2026) from 8.26% (April), led by Fuel & Power (30.33%), Mineral Oils, Crude, Chemicals and Basic Metals. WPI Food Index inflation was 4.49% (May) versus 3.11% (April). WPI will be released for five years alongside PPI, then discontinued — giving users of price-escalation clauses time to migrate to PPI. Linking factors connect old and new series but are unreliable at granular levels owing to basket changes — users are advised caution. Critical Analysis — Strengths Aligns India with IMF guidance and global practice; PPI's services coverage fixes the WPI's key blind spot of excluding services. GVO-based weights plus added renewable and nuclear electricity make the index a more accurate mirror of the current production economy. A parallel five-year run of WPI and PPI gives contractual and analytical users an orderly transition rather than a disruptive switch. Critical Analysis — Structural Questions The Service PPI covers only seven services with no assigned overall weights, so it does not yet represent the full services sector as a headline measure. The trial Input PPI is experimental (manufacturing only); data quality and stakeholder feedback are still being tested. The 2022–23 base year may carry some pandemic-recovery distortions, requiring care when interpreting trends across the break. Index discontinuation and unreliable granular linking factors complicate long-run time-series comparisons. Way Forward Expand Service PPI coverage toward a comprehensive, weighted services index over successive phases. Stabilise and validate the trial Input PPI before formal adoption, using stakeholder feedback. Issue clear user guidance on linking and continuity to protect contracts and research dependent on the old series. Coordinate WPI/PPI, CPI and National Accounts deflators into a coherent national price-statistics architecture. Prelims Pointers WPI: wholesale price changes; compiled by the Office of the Economic Adviser, DPIIT (M/o Commerce & Industry); excludes services. Base year: revised to 2022–23 from 2011–12; items increased from 697 to 957. CPI vs WPI: CPI (retail, NSO/MoSPI) is the RBI's policy anchor; WPI is wholesale, by DPIIT. PPI: producer-side price index; covers services; global best practice; backed by IMF. Service PPI (7): Banking, Securities, Insurance, Pension Funds, Railways, Air (Passenger), Telecom. Weights: now from Gross Value of Output (GVO) and the Supply & Use Table (SUT) of National Accounts. Practice Mains Question India is transitioning from the Wholesale Price Index to a Producer Price Index in line with global practice. Examine the rationale behind this shift and the challenges in adopting the PPI as a primary measure of producer-level inflation. GS Paper 3 · 250 words · 15 marks Practice MCQs Q1. Consider the following statements regarding the Wholesale Price Index (WPI): (1) It is compiled by the National Statistical Office. (2) It excludes services from its scope. (3) The new series has shifted the base year to 2022–23. Which are correct? A) 1 and 2 onlyB) 2 and 3 onlyC) 1 and 3 onlyD) 1, 2 and 3 Q2. Match List I (Index) with List II (Feature): A. CPI · B. WPI · C. Service PPI // 1. Covers seven services (Banking, Telecom, etc.) · 2. Retail prices; RBI's policy anchor · 3. Wholesale prices; excludes services. Choose the correct match: A) A-2, B-3, C-1B) A-1, B-3, C-2C) A-3, B-2, C-1D) A-2, B-1, C-3 Q3. (Odd one out) Which of the following services is NOT among the seven covered by the new Service Producer Price Index? A) BankingB) InsuranceC) HealthcareD) Telecom

Editorial Analysis - 16 June 2026 Contents01 Technology Drives India-France Strategic Convergence Mohan Kumar, Former Indian Ambassador to France · India-France ties, technology, multipolarity GS 2 — International RelationsGS 3 — Sci-Tech & DefenceEssay 02 Peace with Peace The Hindu Editorial · Preventive detention, personal liberty, executive accountability GS 2 — Fundamental RightsGS 2 — GovernanceEssay Data-sourcing note: Constitutional, statutory and bilateral facts in this digest — Article 21/22, the 44th Amendment (1978), the National Security Act (1980), BNSS Sections 126 & 170, the India-France Strategic Partnership (1998), the Horizon 2047 Roadmap, the Rafale/Scorpene/Jaitapur details and the International Solar Alliance — are search-verified. Case-specific and event-specific details (the Chander Pal Singh ruling and the ~2,500 Ghaziabad figure; the G-7 Evian meeting, "Bharat Innovates" and VivaTech) are carried as reported by The Hindu. Editorial 01 of 02 Article 01 Technology Drives India-France Strategic Convergence Mohan Kumar — Former Indian Ambassador to France; Dean/Professor, O.P. Jindal Global University · The Hindu Relevance: GS 2 (India and the world — bilateral relations, groupings and agreements involving India, effect of policies of developed countries on India's interests), GS 3 (science & technology, indigenisation, defence) and Essay (strategic autonomy in a multipolar world) — using the Modi-Macron meeting on the G-7 sidelines to map the technology-and-innovation turn in India-France ties. GS 2 — International RelationsGS 3 — Sci-Tech & DefenceEssay — Strategic Autonomy 1 — Issue in Brief PM Modi and President Macron are meeting again on the sidelines of the G-7 Summit in Evian (June 15-17, 2026), only months after Macron's February 2026 visit for the India AI Impact Summit — signalling an unusually high-tempo, leader-driven engagement between the two countries. The relationship's traditional core — defence, nuclear and space — is now being overlaid with a new technology-and-innovation pillar spanning AI, cyberspace, health care, the creative economy and research, marking a qualitative shift in the partnership's substance. The author frames India and France as two "middle powers" that set great store by strategic autonomy, and therefore share a structural interest in steering a stable transition to a multipolar world — giving the relationship a systemic, not merely bilateral, significance. Twin tech summits — "Bharat Innovates" in Nice and VivaTech in Paris — are positioned as the mechanism to convert leaders' political intent into concrete private-sector and start-up collaboration, which the editorial treats as the real test of the new pillar. 2 — Static Background India and France established diplomatic relations in 1947 and launched a Strategic Partnership on 26 January 1998 — India's first with a Western power and France's first outside the EU — anchoring decades of cooperation insulated from third-country pressure. On the partnership's 25th anniversary in 2023, the two adopted the Horizon 2047 Roadmap, a long-term blueprint built on three pillars — partnership for security and sovereignty, for the planet, and for the people — aligned to India's 2047 independence centenary. In February 2026, during Macron's visit for the AI Impact Summit, ties were elevated to a "Special Global Strategic Partnership", and an annual Foreign Ministers' Comprehensive Dialogue was created to review progress — the immediate institutional backdrop to this meeting. Defence is the ballast: France is India's second-largest arms supplier; India has inducted 36 Rafale jets and finalised a contract for 26 Rafale-Marine for the Navy, while six Scorpene (P-75) submarines were built with French technology transfer. Civil nuclear cooperation (agreement signed 2008) centres on the Jaitapur project in Maharashtra — envisaged as six European Pressurized Reactors (EPRs) with EDF — supplemented by a 2025 Declaration of Intent on Small and Advanced Modular Reactors (SMRs/AMRs). The two countries co-founded the International Solar Alliance (ISA) at the 2015 Paris COP21, and conduct the Varuna (Navy), Shakti (Army) and Garuda (Air Force) joint exercises — a dense web of defence, energy and Indo-Pacific cooperation. 3 — Key Dimensions The new tech pillar: France offers state-of-the-art capacity in aerospace, AI, robotics, biotech, green tech and the digital economy; India brings frugal innovation, a start-up ecosystem, digital public infrastructure and biotech scale — a genuinely complementary, two-way value proposition. Defence co-design and co-production: the editorial urges moving beyond off-the-shelf purchases to jointly designing and producing platforms, aligning with India's "Aatmanirbharta" push and deepening the partnership from buyer-seller to co-developer. Emerging frontiers: progress is sought in small modular reactors, joint satellite development and human spaceflight — extending cooperation into next-generation strategic technologies rather than legacy hardware alone. The Africa opportunity: Franco-Indian cooperation in Africa remains under-exploited, made more salient by the postponement of the India-Africa Forum Summit (May 2026) owing to an Ebola crisis — an opening for coordinated development engagement in the Global South. The G-7 / "D10" question: with the G-20 having lost momentum, there is renewed talk of expanding the G-7 into a "D10" of ten major democracies (the G-7 plus India, Australia and South Korea) — a development with direct stakes for India's global positioning. Strategic autonomy as common ground: both states resist bloc alignment; their convergence is presented as a stabilising force amid conflicts in Ukraine and Iran that have disproportionately affected the Global South — situating the partnership within a contested geopolitical moment. 4 — Critical Analysis In Favour — Complementarity is real, not rhetorical: pairing French deep-tech with Indian frugal innovation, DPI and scale creates mutual dependence with low strategic risk, making this one of India's few partnerships that advances autonomy rather than constraining it. In Favour — A reliable, autonomy-respecting partner: France has consistently shielded sensitive cooperation from third-party pressure (defence, nuclear) and treats India as a partner "between equals," offering technology with fewer political conditionalities than several other Western suppliers. In Favour — Systemic, multipolar value: as two middle powers committed to strategic autonomy, India and France can help anchor a rules-based, multipolar order and a credible balancing pole between the US and China, amplifying both countries' diplomatic weight. In Favour — Diversifies the technology basket: deepening ties in AI, space and nuclear gives India alternative sources of frontier technology, reducing over-reliance on any single power and strengthening supply-chain and critical-mineral resilience. Against — The implementation gap: flagship projects show chronic slippage — Jaitapur has stalled for over a decade on cost, civil-liability and financing questions — so leaders' announcements risk outpacing actual delivery on the ground. Against — Persistent trade imbalance and market friction: the economic relationship remains modest relative to its strategic billing, and converting summit enthusiasm into durable private-sector deals will require resolving market-access and regulatory frictions on both sides. Against — Divergence on hard geopolitics: India and France do not fully align on Russia and the Ukraine war, and France's positions are partly bound by EU and NATO frameworks, limiting how far "strategic autonomy" can be jointly operationalised. Against — The D10's anti-China framing carries risks: any move into a "D10" explicitly aimed at countering China could dilute India's autonomy and complicate its BRICS, SCO and Global South commitments — a balance the author signals India must "watch closely." 5 — Way Forward Convert summits into contracts: use Bharat Innovates and VivaTech to catalyse concrete start-up, venture-capital and corporate tie-ups, ensuring the tech pillar produces tangible collaborative arrangements rather than declaratory momentum. Expedite defence co-production: fast-track co-design and co-manufacture of platforms under the Aatmanirbharta framework, deepening technology transfer and industrial partnership beyond the Rafale and Scorpene baseline. Unblock and broaden nuclear cooperation: resolve Jaitapur's liability and financing impasse and operationalise the SMR/AMR Declaration of Intent, making nuclear a working pillar of India's 100 GW-by-2047 clean-energy goal. Activate the Africa and Global South agenda: build joint development, connectivity and health initiatives in Africa, using the postponed India-Africa Forum Summit as a prompt rather than a setback. Engage the G-7/D10 selectively: participate in expanded democratic formats to help shape technology standards and resilient supply chains, while preserving strategic autonomy and avoiding lock-in to any single bloc's geopolitical posture. 6 — Data & Key Facts 1998India-France Strategic Partnership launched (26 Jan 1998); India's first with a Western nation 2023Horizon 2047 Roadmap adopted on the 25th anniversary; three pillars to 2047 36 + 26Rafale jets inducted into the IAF + Rafale-Marine on contract for the Navy 6 EPREuropean Pressurized Reactors planned at Jaitapur, Maharashtra (with EDF) 6Scorpene (P-75) submarines built with French (Naval Group) technology transfer 2ndFrance is India's second-largest arms supplier Special Global Strategic Partnership (Feb 2026): elevated during Macron's visit for the India AI Impact Summit 2026; an annual Foreign Ministers' Comprehensive Dialogue was established to review progress, including under the Horizon 2047 Roadmap. International Solar Alliance (ISA): co-founded by India and France at the 2015 Paris COP21 to promote global solar deployment; complemented by the joint exercises Varuna (Navy), Shakti (Army) and Garuda (Air Force). 7 — Prelims Pointers India-France Strategic Partnership — launched 26 January 1998; India's first with a Western power and France's first outside the EU; diplomatic relations since 1947 Horizon 2047 Roadmap — adopted 2023 (25th anniversary); three pillars — security & sovereignty, the planet, the people; aligned to India's 2047 centenary Special Global Strategic Partnership — elevation announced February 2026 during the India AI Impact Summit; annual Foreign Ministers' Comprehensive Dialogue created Jaitapur — Maharashtra; six EPRs with France's EDF; civil nuclear agreement signed 2008; SMR/AMR Declaration of Intent 2025 D10 — proposed expansion of the G-7 (UK, US, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan) to add India, Australia and South Korea; focus on 5G, supply chains, tech Exercises & ISA — Varuna (Navy), Shakti (Army), Garuda (Air Force); International Solar Alliance co-founded by India and France (2015, Paris) Exam note: Do not confuse the Strategic Partnership (1998) with the recent "Special Global Strategic Partnership" (2026). Recall that the ISA — not the G-7 — is the India-France co-founded body, and that the D10 is a proposal, not an existing organisation. 8 — Practice Mains Question "India and France, as two middle powers committed to strategic autonomy, are well placed to shape a stable multipolar order." Examine the evolving India-France partnership, with particular reference to its new technology-and-innovation pillar.GS 2 · 15 marks · ~250 words · International Relations Intro: Note the high-tempo Modi-Macron engagement (G-7 Evian sidelines, the February AI Impact Summit) and the 1998 Strategic Partnership's elevation to a Special Global Strategic Partnership as context. Body 1 — Pillars and complementarity: defence (Rafale, Scorpene, co-production), nuclear (Jaitapur, SMRs), space, and the new tech pillar (AI, DPI, frugal innovation) — a two-way, autonomy-respecting partnership. Body 2 — Constraints: Jaitapur and procurement delays, trade imbalance, divergence on Russia/Ukraine, EU constraints on France, and the risks of an anti-China D10 framing for India's autonomy. Avoid a one-sided account. Conclusion: With reliable cooperation and shared strategic-autonomy instincts, the partnership can anchor multipolarity — provided announcements translate into delivery and India calibrates its multi-alignment. 9 — Practice MCQ With reference to India-France relations, consider the following statements: 1. India and France launched their Strategic Partnership in 1998, India's first such partnership with a Western country. 2. The Horizon 2047 Roadmap was adopted to mark the 25th anniversary of the partnership. 3. India and France are co-founders of the International Solar Alliance. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only(b) 2 and 3 only(c) 1 and 3 only(d) 1, 2 and 3 Editorial 02 of 02 Article 02 Peace with Peace The Hindu — Editorial · "Preventive detentions are misused by the state in the name of order" Relevance: GS 2 (Indian Constitution — fundamental rights, Articles 21 and 22; functioning of the executive and the judiciary; mechanisms for the protection of vulnerable sections) and Essay (liberty vs security, the rule of law) — built around the Allahabad High Court's ruling in Chander Pal Singh on the misuse of preventive detention. GS 2 — Fundamental Rights & PolityGS 2 — Governance & AccountabilityEssay — Liberty vs Security 1 — Issue in Brief In Chander Pal Singh, the Allahabad High Court held that preventive powers — designed to avert disturbances — have gradually become instruments to deprive people of liberty, terming the deprivation of personal liberty in Uttar Pradesh "highly irresponsible." The State's legitimate power to intervene before a crime occurs (where there is reasonable apprehension to public order) has hardened into a routine practice, producing detentions without any substantive criminal charge against the person. The petitioner — a physically challenged Dalit advocate — had been arrested over a petty dispute with a neighbour; the Court noted that around 2,500 people faced preventive proceedings in Ghaziabad between May 2025 and April 2026, despite a 2021 State policy meant to guide such powers. The editorial's core principle is that the state must maintain "peace with peace" — it cannot invoke the goal of order to silence dissent or jail people on minor apprehensions, and the Court's fresh guidelines aim to restore that balance. 2 — Static Background Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except by procedure established by law; Article 22 lays down the specific safeguards governing arrest and, exceptionally, permits preventive detention. Article 22(3)(b) allows preventive detention, but Article 22(4) caps it at three months unless an Advisory Board of High Court-qualified judges finds sufficient cause; Article 22(5) requires that grounds be communicated and a representation allowed. The 44th Amendment Act, 1978 sought to reduce the no-Advisory-Board ceiling from three months to two, but the relevant provision was never brought into force — so the three-month limit still operates. Preventive detention has a long statutory lineage: the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (lapsed 1969), the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), 1971 (repealed 1978 after Emergency-era misuse), and the National Security Act (NSA), 1980 (maximum detention 12 months). Within the ordinary criminal law, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 carries the everyday preventive tools: Section 126 (security for keeping peace; equivalent to old CrPC Section 107) and Section 170 (police arrest to prevent a cognizable offence; equivalent to CrPC Section 151). The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that preventive jurisdiction is "preventive justice, not punishment" — in Madhu Limaye v. SDM Monghyr (1970) and Rajender Singh Pathania v. State of NCT Delhi (2011) — and must rest on objective satisfaction, not mechanical action. 3 — Key Dimensions Routine misuse over exceptional use: powers meant for genuine threats to public order are being deployed in neighbourhood and property disputes — the Ghaziabad figure of ~2,500 proceedings illustrates scale, not stray error, even after a 2021 State policy. Targeting of the vulnerable: that a disabled Dalit advocate was jailed over a petty quarrel highlights how preventive detention can fall hardest on those least able to contest it, widening the gap between formal rights and lived liberty. The "communal tensions" pretext: magistrates citing unspecified "communal tensions" to jail protesters, and imposing prohibitively unaffordable bonds, convert a public-order tool into a means of pre-emptive silencing that bypasses ordinary trial safeguards. Dissent and the NSA: though the ruling does not directly affect activist Sonam Wangchuk's detention under the NSA, it critiques using the excuse of "peace" to suppress dissent — reminding the state that order must be secured through lawful, proportionate means. The accountability vacuum: the Court's remedy — recovering compensation for unlawful detention from the salary of the magistrate or police officer after a disciplinary hearing — confronts a long-standing executive reluctance to penalise its own personnel. A structural conflict of interest: executive magistrates are part of the State administration, so their careers may depend on maintaining "peace" as the State defines it — a built-in incentive the new guidelines must overcome to be effective. 4 — Critical Analysis In Favour — Reasoned orders and judicial discipline: requiring executive magistrates to justify their decisions and inviting appellate scrutiny could curb mechanical detentions in petty disputes, embedding the Court's "objective satisfaction" standard in everyday practice. In Favour — Accountability with teeth: allowing compensation to be recovered from the official's salary attaches a personal cost to unlawful detention, a stronger deterrent than the impunity that usually follows wrongful preventive action. In Favour — Protects dissent and liberty: by rejecting the misuse of "peace" to silence protest and discouraging unaffordable bonds, the ruling reinforces Articles 21 and 22 and the principle that the state must keep "peace with peace." In Favour — Catalyses constitutional challenge: the guidelines encourage constitutional challenges to unlawful preventive detention and appellate review of the compensation framework, potentially generating a corrective body of case law beyond a single State. Against — Executive reluctance to penalise its own: the compensation-from-salary mechanism depends on disciplinary action against state personnel, which the executive has historically been unwilling to pursue, blunting the ruling's central deterrent. Against — Misaligned incentives for magistrates: because executive magistrates' careers hinge on delivering "order" as defined by the administration, guidelines alone may not shift behaviour without structural separation of preventive and administrative functions. Against — Limited direct reach: the ruling does not directly free high-profile detainees like Sonam Wangchuk under the NSA; preventive-detention statutes such as the NSA operate on a separate constitutional track (Article 22) less amenable to the BNSS guidelines. Against — Implementation is the hard part: the editorial itself concedes that enforcing the order will be difficult; without genuine disciplinary follow-through and data transparency on detentions, the guidelines risk remaining paper safeguards. 5 — Way Forward Insist on reasoned, recorded satisfaction: every preventive order under BNSS Sections 126/170 should document objective grounds and the apprehension to public order, enabling meaningful judicial and appellate review. Make accountability real: operationalise compensation recovery and disciplinary action against officials for unlawful detention, so the deterrent is not defeated by the executive's reluctance to penalise its own. Insulate the preventive function: reduce the conflict of interest by separating, as far as possible, the executive magistracy's preventive role from career incentives tied to "order", backed by clear, binding State guidance. Guard against pretextual detention: bar reliance on vague "communal tensions" and unaffordable bonds, and require proportionality so preventive powers are not used to silence protest or settle petty disputes. Improve transparency and review NSA practice: maintain public data on preventive detentions (currently sparse, as no FIRs are filed under the NSA) and subject NSA invocations to rigorous Advisory Board and judicial scrutiny. 6 — Data & Key Facts ~2,500People reportedly under preventive proceedings in Ghaziabad, May 2025–April 2026 2021State policy meant to guide preventive powers (predates the misuse the HC flagged) 3 monthsArticle 22(4) cap on preventive detention without an Advisory Board 12 monthsMaximum detention under the National Security Act, 1980 197844th Amendment sought a 2-month cap — never notified; the 3-month limit stays 126 / 170BNSS sections — security for peace / arrest to prevent a cognizable offence Article 22 framework: preventive detention is permitted under Article 22(3)(b); beyond three months it needs an Advisory Board of High Court-qualified judges; grounds must be communicated and a representation allowed under Article 22(5), though some facts may be withheld in the public interest. NSA, 1980: allows detention up to 12 months to prevent acts prejudicial to security, public order or essential supplies; grounds conveyed within 5 days (up to 10 in exceptional cases); no right to a lawyer before the Advisory Board; the NCRB records no NSA figures as no FIRs are filed. 7 — Prelims Pointers Article 22 — safeguards on arrest; 22(3)(b) permits preventive detention; 22(4) = 3-month cap without an Advisory Board; 22(5) = grounds + representation 44th Amendment Act, 1978 — sought to cut the no-Advisory-Board period to 2 months; the provision was never notified, so 3 months continues NSA, 1980 — preventive detention up to 12 months; detention beyond 3 months needs an Advisory Board of High Court-qualified judges; replaced MISA Preventive-detention lineage — Preventive Detention Act 1950 (lapsed 1969) → MISA 1971 (repealed 1978) → NSA 1980 BNSS Sections 126 & 170 — 126: security for keeping peace (≈ CrPC 107); 170: police arrest to prevent a cognizable offence (≈ CrPC 151); often invoked together Key cases — Madhu Limaye v. SDM Monghyr (1970) and Rajender Singh Pathania v. State of NCT Delhi (2011): preventive jurisdiction is preventive justice, not punishment Exam note: Preventive detention provisions sit in Article 22, not Article 21; and the 44th Amendment's two-month cap was never brought into force — the operative ceiling is still three months. BNSS Sections 126/170 replace the old CrPC Sections 107/151. 8 — Practice Mains Question "Mechanisms designed to maintain public order have gradually become instruments to deprive people of liberty." In light of recent judicial concern, critically examine the misuse of preventive detention in India and the safeguards against it.GS 2 · 15 marks · ~250 words · Polity + Fundamental Rights + Governance Intro: Use the Allahabad HC's Chander Pal Singh ruling and the "peace with peace" principle to frame the tension between public order and personal liberty (Articles 21–22). Body 1 — The misuse: routine preventive proceedings in petty disputes (Ghaziabad), targeting of the vulnerable, the "communal tensions" pretext, unaffordable bonds, and use against dissent. Body 2 — Safeguards and gaps: Article 22 limits, Advisory Boards, BNSS 126/170 discipline and Madhu Limaye's "objective satisfaction" — weakened by executive reluctance to penalise its own and magistrates' incentives. Conclusion: Reasoned orders, real accountability, an insulated magistracy and transparency can ensure the state secures order lawfully — keeping "peace with peace." 9 — Practice MCQ With reference to preventive detention in India, consider the following statements: 1. Article 22 of the Constitution permits preventive detention and provides certain safeguards in respect of it. 2. Under the constitutional provisions, a person can ordinarily be detained for more than three months only on the report of an Advisory Board. 3. The National Security Act, 1980 permits preventive detention for a maximum period of two years. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only(b) 2 and 3 only(c) 1 and 3 only(d) 1, 2 and 3

Contents 16 June 2026 India's Health Transformation — Towards Universal Health CoverageGS2 Nicobarese Tribal Councils — Draft Electoral Rules, 2026GS2 Artemis III — NASA Names Crew, Restructures as Earth-Orbit TestGS3 Project Kusha — Extended Range Air Defence System (ERADS)GS3 India–Slovakia Elevate Ties to a Comprehensive PartnershipGS2 The Drone Revolution and Modern WarfareGS3 US–Iran Agreement to End War and Reopen the Strait of HormuzGS2 Heatwaves and Surface Ozone — Rising Cardiac and Respiratory RiskGS3 NCERT Restores the Original 'Dancing Girl' ImageGS1 Article 01 India's Health Transformation — Towards Universal Health Coverage GS Paper 2 — Governance | Health | Social Sector | Government Schemes Why in News India's march towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is back in focus after the National Statistical Office (NSO), under MoSPI, released its 2025 survey of over 1.39 lakh households. It found more Indians than ever using public facilities, with outpatient care often free and about half of hospitalised patients paying below Rs 1,100 — a measure of renewed trust driven by Ayushman Bharat and the National Health Mission. Ayushman Bharat — The Four Pillars Pillar Thrust Key Data AB-PMJAY (2018) World's largest public health assurance — Rs 5 lakh/family/year to ~12 crore poorest families (~40% of population) 44.14 cr Ayushman Cards; 12.03 cr hospitalisations; 36,218 hospitals empanelled (19,659 public, 16,559 private). Vay Vandana (Oct 2024) covers all 70+ citizens Ayushman Arogya Mandirs Comprehensive primary care — 12 free services beyond maternal-child health 1.86 lakh+ functional; cumulative footfall over 540 crore PM-ABHIM (Oct 2021) Resilient, pandemic-ready public health infrastructure (outlay Rs 64,180 cr) 744 integrated public health labs; 631 critical-care hospital blocks ABDM (Sept 2021) Citizen-owned digital health records via the 14-digit ABHA ID 20.49 cr ABHA registrations; 27,328 facilities onboarded National Health Mission — Disease Elimination Immunisation: Mission Indradhanush (2014) vaccinated 5.46 crore previously unimmunised children; zero-dose children fell from 0.11% (2023) to 0.06% (2024). India was WHO-certified for maternal and neonatal tetanus elimination in May 2015. Tuberculosis: NTEP plus PM TB Mukt Bharat Abhiyaan (2022); over 3.78 lakh Nik-shay Mitras support patients with nutrition baskets. Malaria: National Framework for Malaria Elimination (2016) targets elimination by 2027; a 'test, treat and track' strategy under the 2023–27 plan. HIV: mother-to-child transmission down about 74.5% (2010–2024), outpacing the global decline. Tackling Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) NCDs now account for 60% of all deaths in India. AAMs have driven mass screening — 41.5 crore for hypertension, 41.3 crore for diabetes, over 60 crore combined for oral, breast and cervical cancers. PM National Dialysis Programme (2016) delivered over 4 crore free haemodialysis sessions. India won the Bloomberg Philanthropies Award (2025) for a 17.3% reduction in tobacco use; Eat Right India and Fit India target lifestyle risk factors. Digital and Last-Mile Delivery eSanjeevani (Nov 2019): over 47 crore teleconsultations; Tele-MANAS (Oct 2022): mental-health support in 20 languages. i-DRONE (ICMR, 2021) delivered medicines across difficult terrain; AI tools — Cough Against TB (12–16% additional cases detected) and MadhuNetrAI (diabetic retinopathy) — extend specialist reach. Challenges Fiscal shortfall: the NHP 2017 target of 2.5% of GDP by 2025 is unmet; Union health spending fell from 0.37% (2020-21) to 0.29% of GDP (2025-26), and the Union share of CSS health transfers dropped from 75.9% (2014-15) to 43% (2024-25). Hidden out-of-pocket costs: a NITI Aayog evaluation found 65% of PMJAY beneficiaries in private hospitals still incurred OOP expenditure. Structural gaps: no statutory Right to Health Act; 'public health and sanitation' sits under Entry 6 of the State List, limiting uniform national standards. Low per-capita spend: among the lowest globally — lower than Bhutan and Sri Lanka. Way Forward Legislate a fiscal roadmap to 2.5–3% of GDP and reverse the post-pandemic Union spending decline. Scale AI diagnostics (MadhuNetrAI, Cough Against TB) and the i-DRONE network to all rural AAMs. Enact a justiciable Right to Health framework and ensure 100% ABHA/U-WIN portability across public and private hospitals. Sustained investment in infrastructure, digital health and financial protection through Ayushman Bharat has measurably advanced UHC and reduced health inequalities — feeding directly into SDG 3 and the vision of a healthier Viksit Bharat @ 2047. The next frontier is fiscal: protecting public spending so that access depends on need, not the ability to pay. Prelims Pointers AB-PMJAY (2018): launched under NHP 2017; Rs 5 lakh/family/year to ~12 crore families. Ayushman Bharat Vay Vandana (Oct 2024): extends cover to all citizens above 70, irrespective of income. ABHA: a unique 14-digit health identity under ABDM. PM-ABHIM (2021): outlay Rs 64,180 crore for health infrastructure and pandemic preparedness. Mission Indradhanush (2014): catch-up immunisation; UIP gives free vaccines against 12 diseases. MNT elimination: India WHO-certified in May 2015. Tele-MANAS = national tele-mental-health service (helpline 14416); eSanjeevani = national telemedicine platform. NSO functions under the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI). Health is in the State List (Entry 6) of the Seventh Schedule — there is no national Right to Health Act. Practice Mains Question "India has expanded health coverage even as public health expenditure has stagnated." Critically examine the achievements of Ayushman Bharat and the structural funding constraints that threaten the sustainability of Universal Health Coverage in India. GS Paper 2  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Match the following health initiatives with their year of launch: Initiative — A. AB-PMJAY   B. ABDM   C. PM-ABHIM   D. Tele-MANAS Year — 1. 2018   2. 2021 (September)   3. 2021 (October)   4. 2022 Select the correct match: (a)A-1, B-2, C-3, D-4 (b)A-1, B-3, C-2, D-4 (c)A-2, B-1, C-3, D-4 (d)A-1, B-2, C-4, D-3 Correct Answer: (a) AB-PMJAY was launched in 2018; the Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission (ABDM) in September 2021; PM-ABHIM in October 2021; and Tele-MANAS in October 2022. Hence A-1, B-2, C-3, D-4. Article 02 Nicobarese Tribal Councils — Draft Electoral Rules, 2026 GS Paper 2 — Governance | Tribal Rights | GS Paper 1 — Society & Tribes Why in News The Andaman and Nicobar Islands administration has notified the Draft A&NI Tribal Councils (Preparation of Electoral Rolls and Conduct of Elections) Rules, 2026, introducing a formal, mainland-style electoral framework for Nicobarese tribal councils. With a June 15, 2026 deadline for objections, the move has alarmed the community, which fears erosion of its consensus-based self-governance — amid the backdrop of the Rs 91,000-crore Great Nicobar Development Project. Who Are the Nicobarese A Scheduled Tribe of about 30,000 people across the Nicobar group, represented by seven Tribal Councils (Car Nicobar, Nancowry, Kamorta, Teressa, Little Nicobar, Great Nicobar, and others). The 'captaincy' system dates to the 16th century (locals dealing with passing ships) and was formalised by the British in the late 19th century; the higher Tribal Council tier emerged only in the 1990s to access Central welfare schemes. Legal recognition flows from the A&N Islands (Protection of Aboriginal Tribes) Regulation, 1956 and the Nicobar Islands Tribal Council Regulation, 2009. How the Traditional System Works Governance is consensus-based — elections are held only when the community feels the need, not on a fixed calendar; villagers nominate, prepare their own ballots and elect Captains by majority. The Tuhet (extended kinship group) is the social foundation; Captains act as facilitators, not unilateral lawmakers. Valued leadership traits include education, Hindi fluency and the ability to engage officialdom — but the system suffers from poor documentation and unclear tenure. What the Draft Rules Propose Feature Proposed Change Fixed tenure A legally binding five-year term, replacing the fluid customary cycle Mainland machinery Delimitation of constituencies, formal electoral rolls, candidate nomination and scrutiny Restructured hierarchy Villagers elect 5–9 Captains per village and directly vote for the Chief Captain; First Captains elect the Vice-Chief Captain Gender mainstreaming Institutional reservation of seats for women in village and island councils Administrative veto Retains the 2009 Regulation's clause giving the Deputy/Assistant Commissioner an absolute veto over council decisions deemed a threat to public order Concerns Bureaucratisation of a living, consensus tradition into a procedure-driven structure. Non-recognition of the Tuhet system and a consultation deficit. Mega-project subtext: the Great Nicobar Tribal Council has opposed the Rs 91,000-crore project (port, international airport, township); analysts suspect the rules were fast-tracked to weaken resistance. Legal nuance: as a UT, A&NI sits outside the Fifth Schedule, leaving a gap in formal tribal self-rule despite ST protections. Way Forward Anchor reform in Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in deep consultation with the Tuhets and existing councils. Explore a PESA-1996-style hybrid — adding women's reservation and accountability while legally recognising the Tuhet structure. Decouple governance reform from the mega-project so that legitimate indigenous dissent is not structurally suppressed. Genuine self-rule cannot be delivered through a standardised electoral template designed for mainland India. When a community has governed itself organically for generations, formalisation without consultation is not reform — it is substitution. The test is whether modernisation strengthens customary self-governance or merely reduces it to administrative compliance. Prelims Pointers Nicobarese: a Scheduled Tribe of ~30,000; seven Tribal Councils in the Nicobar group. Tuhet = the traditional extended-kinship (joint family) unit that anchors Nicobarese society. Key Regulations: A&N (Protection of Aboriginal Tribes) Regulation, 1956; Nicobar Islands Tribal Council Regulation, 2009 (a Presidential regulation). Fifth Schedule nuance: A&N Islands, being a Union Territory, fall outside the Fifth Schedule framework that covers Scheduled Areas. PESA, 1996 extends panchayat self-rule to Fifth Schedule areas (not applicable to A&N). Great Nicobar Project: Rs 91,000 crore — transhipment port, international airport and township. FPIC = Free, Prior and Informed Consent — a key principle in indigenous-rights governance. Practice Mains Question "Electoral formalisation of tribal councils risks bureaucratising indigenous self-governance." In the light of the draft Nicobarese electoral rules, discuss how customary and democratic governance systems can be harmonised without eroding cultural autonomy. GS Paper 2  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Consider the following two statements: Assertion (A): The Andaman and Nicobar Islands fall outside the Fifth Schedule framework of the Constitution. Reason (R): The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are a Union Territory. Select the correct option: (a)Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A (b)Both A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A (c)A is true, but R is false (d)A is false, but R is true Correct Answer: (a) The Fifth Schedule applies to Scheduled Areas in States (not UTs). Because A&N is a Union Territory, it lies outside the Fifth Schedule framework — so R correctly explains A. (Tribal protection in A&N flows instead from regulations such as the 1956 and 2009 Regulations.) Article 03 Artemis III — NASA Names Crew, Restructures as Earth-Orbit Test GS Paper 3 — Science & Technology | Space Why in News NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman named the four-member crew for Artemis III, now restructured as a complex Earth-orbit docking demonstration in 2027 that will test the SpaceX Starship and Blue Origin Blue Moon landers in space for the first time. The actual crewed lunar landing has shifted to Artemis IV (2028). The Crew Astronaut Role Agency Randy Bresnik Commander (veteran of three spaceflights) NASA Luca Parmitano Pilot — first ESA astronaut on an Artemis mission ESA (Italy) Frank Rubio Mission Specialist (US single-flight endurance record-holder) NASA Andre Douglas Mission Specialist (first-time flyer) NASA Mission Profile A two-week mission in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) — it will not approach the Moon. Orion (launched atop the Space Launch System, SLS) will dock first with Blue Moon (~2 days), then with Starship (~1 day), testing docking mechanisms, life support and software. First to launch is Blue Moon, then Orion with the crew; the spacecraft rendezvous and hover before returning to Earth. Programme Context Artemis I (2022) was uncrewed; Artemis II flew a crewed lunar flyby in April 2026 (three US astronauts and Canada's Jeremy Hansen). NASA cancelled the Gateway lunar-orbit station, pivoting to a lunar-surface base; a fresh NASA–Italy agreement supports the base — explaining Parmitano's inclusion. Lander delays: Blue Origin's New Glenn exploded on its pad while preparing an Amazon-satellite launch, grounding it for months; NASA still expects it ready for Artemis III. Strategic Significance Testing docking and life-support hardware in Earth orbit de-risks later deep-space operations. It is central to US leadership in space amid competition from China's 2030 crewed-landing target, and a foundational step toward eventual human missions to Mars. Artemis III's reinvention as a LEO docking rehearsal reflects a pragmatic, risk-managed approach to returning humans to the Moon 'to stay'. Success hinges on two commercial landers maturing in parallel — making industrial readiness, not just rocketry, the decisive variable. Prelims Pointers Artemis = NASA's programme to return humans to the Moon for a sustained presence. SLS launches the Orion crew capsule; the two human landing systems are Starship (SpaceX) and Blue Moon (Blue Origin). Luca Parmitano (ESA, Italy) is the first ESA astronaut assigned to Artemis; Jeremy Hansen (Canada) flew on Artemis II. Low Earth Orbit (LEO): generally up to about 2,000 km altitude. Gateway = the planned lunar-orbit station, now cancelled in favour of a surface base. Artemis IV (2028) is slated to land crew near the lunar South Pole. China targets its own crewed lunar landing by 2030. Practice Mains Question Discuss how testing critical spacecraft systems in Earth orbit before lunar missions reflects a risk-managed approach to human spaceflight. What lessons does the Artemis programme hold for India's human spaceflight ambitions? GS Paper 3  |  150 words  |  10 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Match the following spacecraft with their developers: Spacecraft — A. Orion   B. Starship   C. Blue Moon   D. Space Launch System (SLS) Developer — 1. SpaceX   2. Blue Origin   3. NASA Select the correct match: (a)A-3, B-1, C-2, D-3 (b)A-1, B-2, C-3, D-1 (c)A-3, B-2, C-1, D-3 (d)A-2, B-1, C-3, D-2 Correct Answer: (a) Orion and the SLS are NASA systems; Starship is built by SpaceX; Blue Moon by Blue Origin. Hence A-3, B-1, C-2, D-3. Article 04 Project Kusha — Extended Range Air Defence System (ERADS) GS Paper 3 — Defence | Science & Technology | Internal Security Why in News Defence Minister Rajnath Singh described Project Kusha as a "game changer" for India's security architecture while inaugurating the Advanced Weapon System Complex at DRDO's Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam Missile Complex in Hyderabad. In February 2026 the Defence Secretary had announced the success of the system's initial tests. About Project Kusha An indigenous long-range surface-to-air missile (LR-SAM) system — earlier called XRSAM — developed by DRDO for the IAF (lead agency) and the Navy. It bridges the gap between the MR-SAM (~80 km) and the S-400 (400 km), and supplements Barak-8 and the Ballistic Missile Defence programme. It is one element of Mission Sudarshan Chakra (as stated in the source material). Three Interceptor Variants Variant Range Primary Targets M1 150 km Cruise missiles, drones, aircraft M2 250 km Stealth fighters and cruise missiles at ~250 km M3 350–400 km Larger assets such as AEW&C at ~350 km All three share a common kill vehicle but use different boosters; the system features advanced long-range surveillance and fire-control radars. Approvals, Timeline and Industry Cleared by the Cabinet Committee on Security in May 2022; Acceptance of Necessity (AoN) granted in September 2023 for five IAF squadrons at Rs 21,700 crore. Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) is the development and integration partner; phased induction is expected between 2028 and 2030. Development was requested to be fast-tracked after Operation Sindoor. Operational Role and Significance Batteries will plug into the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) — the IAF's automated network fusing military and civil radars — enabling coordinated firing and automated threat prioritisation. A naval version against anti-ship ballistic missiles (up to Mach 7, range over 250 km) is under development. It strengthens indigenous capability, reduces dependence on the S-400, and complements QRSAM, VSHORADS and BMD in a multi-layered shield. Project Kusha represents a decisive step towards a self-reliant, layered air-and-missile defence. Its value lies not only in interceptor range but in network-centric integration through the IACCS — turning dispersed sensors and shooters into a single, responsive grid. Prelims Pointers Project Kusha = Extended Range Air Defence System (ERADS), formerly XRSAM, by DRDO. Variants: M1 = 150 km, M2 = 250 km, M3 = 350–400 km; common kill vehicle, different boosters. Lead agency: the Indian Air Force; the system supplements Barak-8 and the S-400 (400 km). IACCS = Integrated Air Command and Control System — the IAF's automated air-defence network integrating military and civil radars. BEL is DRDO's development and integration partner; AoN granted Sept 2023 (Rs 21,700 cr, 5 squadrons). QRSAM / VSHORADS = Quick-Reaction / Very-Short-Range air-defence systems (shorter-range complements). Practice Mains Question "Indigenous long-range air defence is central to India's strategic autonomy." Examine the significance of Project Kusha in building a multi-layered air and missile defence architecture and reducing dependence on foreign platforms. GS Paper 3  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Project Kusha's interceptor variants are designed for tiered interception. What is the approximate range of the M2 variant? (a)80 km (b)150 km (c)250 km (d)400 km Correct Answer: (c) The three variants have ranges of M1 ~150 km, M2 ~250 km and M3 ~350–400 km. The ~80 km figure is the MR-SAM, and 400 km is the S-400 — both systems that Project Kusha is meant to bridge or supplement. Article 05 India–Slovakia Elevate Ties to a Comprehensive Partnership GS Paper 2 — International Relations Why in News Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico held talks in Bratislava, branding the relationship a 'Comprehensive Partnership' and signing MoUs across defence, labour mobility, education and digital technology. It is the first visit by an Indian PM since Slovakia's founding in 1993. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico during bilateral talks in Bratislava. (Representative image) Key Outcomes Trade and investment: commitments across automobiles, railways, advanced manufacturing and green technology, with the India–EU Free Trade Agreement expected to add momentum. Labour mobility: an MoU to ease migration and information exchange, with agreement to conclude a social security agreement. Education: a higher-education MoU promoting mobility of students and researchers, especially in STEM and humanities. Counter-Terrorism and Multilateralism Agreed to form a Joint Working Group on Terrorism and 'strongly' condemned the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack. Called for adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN and action against terrorists, including those on the UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee list. Reaffirmed support for multilateralism and UN/UNSC reform, including expansion of permanent and non-permanent seats. The visit deepens India's footprint in Central Europe and aligns a manufacturing-heavy Slovak economy with India's automotive and green-tech ambitions. Riding the prospective India–EU FTA, the partnership signals India's intent to diversify European engagement beyond its traditional large-economy partners. Prelims Pointers Slovakia: capital Bratislava (on the Danube); independent since 1993 (split of Czechoslovakia); an EU and Eurozone member. CCIT = Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism — proposed by India (1996) and still pending at the UN. UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee targets individuals/entities linked to ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaeda. India–EU FTA negotiations underpin the trade dimension of India's Europe outreach. A 'Comprehensive Partnership' is the framing used to upgrade the bilateral relationship. Practice Mains Question Examine the strategic and economic rationale behind India's deepening engagement with Central European states such as Slovakia, and the role of the prospective India–EU Free Trade Agreement in this outreach. GS Paper 2  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ With reference to Slovakia and India–Slovakia relations, which one of the following statements is NOT correct? (a)Slovakia became an independent state in 1993 following the split of Czechoslovakia. (b)Bratislava, its capital, lies on the river Danube. (c)Slovakia is not a member of the European Union. (d)The Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) was originally proposed by India at the UN. Correct Answer: (c) Statement (c) is incorrect — Slovakia is a member of the European Union (and the Eurozone). The other three statements are accurate: it became independent in 1993, Bratislava sits on the Danube, and the CCIT is an India-proposed convention. Article 06 The Drone Revolution and Modern Warfare GS Paper 3 — Security & Defence | Science & Technology | GS Paper 2 — International Relations Why in News An analytical commentary argues that the wars in Ukraine and Lebanon and the wider US–Israel–Iran theatre have made cheap, mass-produced drones (Unmanned Aerial Systems, UAS) central to modern warfare — shifting military power from expensive platforms towards industrial scale and technological adaptation. The Paradigm Shift For decades, superiority belonged to armies with advanced aircraft, tanks, artillery and large budgets; smaller actors relied on asymmetric tactics. Commercially derived drones — performing ISR, target acquisition, precision strike, artillery spotting, electronic warfare and logistics — have moved from auxiliary tools to central instruments. The result is a continuous, interconnected battlespace of persistent visibility, where no rear area is safe and detection is rapidly followed by engagement. Three Models of Drone Warfare Ukraine: rapid adaptation of commercial drones into improvised reconnaissance and strike systems — the first industrial-scale, drone-intensive war. Hezbollah: reliance on Iranian platforms — Ababil, Mohajer-4, Shahed-129 for tiered ISR and the Shahed-136 loitering munition for one-way strikes; increasingly jamming-resistant fibre-optic FPV drones. Iran/IRGC: drones embedded in a strategy of deterrence, coercion and power projection, supplied to proxies across Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. Counter-Drone Response Israel's IDF fields a layered counter-drone architecture — EW systems, specialised radars and the AI-enabled Iron Drone Raider (net capture or collision instead of costly missiles), alongside Heron ISR drones and loitering munitions. Why It Matters The revolution is as much about economics as technology: cheap mass production shifts advantage to the scale, speed and production capacity of UAS ecosystems. Warfare becomes a test of industrial endurance and relentless adaptation — drones are now the very infrastructure of war. For India: the lessons reinforce the push for indigenous drone and counter-drone ecosystems and a domestic UAS manufacturing base. Drones have collapsed the old distinction between front and rear and between great and small powers. The decisive military edge increasingly lies in the capacity to build, deploy and counter fast-evolving unmanned systems at scale — a contest of factories as much as of forces. Prelims Pointers UAS / UAV = Unmanned Aerial System / Vehicle; ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Loitering munition (e.g., Shahed-136) = a one-way 'kamikaze' drone that loiters before striking. FPV drone = first-person-view drone; fibre-optic FPV drones resist jamming and electronic warfare. Heron is an Israeli (IAI) Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance ISR drone. IRGC = Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Iran). Electronic Warfare (EW) contests the electromagnetic spectrum — jamming, spoofing and counter-measures. Practice Mains Question "Drones have become the infrastructure of modern warfare rather than merely its weapons." Examine how unmanned systems are reshaping military doctrine, and assess the implications for India's defence preparedness. GS Paper 3  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ The Shahed-136, widely used across recent West Asian conflicts, is best described as which of the following? (a)A medium-altitude long-endurance ISR drone (b)A loitering munition (one-way attack drone) (c)A manned electronic-warfare aircraft (d)A fibre-optic counter-drone interceptor Correct Answer: (b) The Shahed-136 is a loitering munition — a one-way 'kamikaze' drone that loiters over an area before diving onto a target. ISR roles in that family are filled by platforms like the Mohajer-4 and Shahed-129. Article 07 US–Iran Agreement to End War and Reopen the Strait of Hormuz GS Paper 2 — International Relations | GS Paper 3 — Energy Security Why in News The United States and Iran announced a preliminary agreement to end the war, lift blockades in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, and begin negotiations on Tehran's nuclear programme and Western sanctions. Signed digitally, an in-person signing is set for Geneva on June 19; US President Donald Trump authorised a toll-free reopening of the Strait. The Strait of Hormuz — the narrow chokepoint linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, through which about a fifth of the world's oil transits. (Representative image) Contours of the Deal An end to hostilities, reopening of the Strait, and substantive talks on the nuclear file and sanctions relief. US Vice-President J.D. Vance said the deal was signed digitally on Sunday; Iran said it would not collect tolls but would charge navigation-service and environmental fees. Iran's Foreign Ministry called the release of frozen assets and war reparations 'essential' parts of the deal; the US side indicated it would not withdraw troops. Despite the announcement, vessel traffic through the Strait remained cautious. Why the Strait of Hormuz Matters A narrow chokepoint linking the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman (and onward to the Arabian Sea), bordered by Iran and Oman. Roughly a fifth of the world's petroleum liquids transit Hormuz, with limited bypass-pipeline capacity — making it the world's most critical oil chokepoint. India's Interest Energy security: a large share of India's crude and LNG imports pass through Hormuz; disruption spikes prices and freight/insurance costs. Diaspora and trade: millions of Indians work in the Gulf; India also has stakes via Chabahar port (in Iran, on the Gulf of Oman, outside Hormuz). Prime Minister Narendra Modi welcomed the deal and expressed hope it would restore stability and ensure freedom of navigation. If it holds, the agreement removes a major tail risk to global energy markets and to India's import bill. But with reparations, asset releases and the nuclear file still to be negotiated, the durability of the truce — not just the reopening of Hormuz — will determine its strategic significance. Prelims Pointers Strait of Hormuz connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman; it is bordered by Iran and Oman (Musandam peninsula). It is the world's most important oil chokepoint — about one-fifth of global petroleum liquids pass through it. The Gulf of Oman opens into the Arabian Sea (Indian Ocean). Chabahar port (Iran) lies on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz — a strategic India-developed gateway to Central Asia. The talks revive the broader nuclear and sanctions agenda associated with the JCPOA framework. Practice Mains Question "The security of the Strait of Hormuz is inseparable from India's energy security." Discuss India's strategic and economic stakes in stability in the Persian Gulf and the policy options available to safeguard its energy imports. GS Paper 2  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ With reference to the Strait of Hormuz, which one of the following statements is correct? (a)It connects the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. (b)It connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman. (c)It connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea. (d)It connects the Arabian Sea with the Bay of Bengal. Correct Answer: (b) The Strait of Hormuz links the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, bordered by Iran and Oman. Option (a) describes the Bab-el-Mandeb; (c) describes the Suez Canal region; (d) is incorrect geographically. Article 08 Heatwaves and Surface Ozone — Rising Cardiac and Respiratory Risk GS Paper 3 — Environment & Ecology | Public Health Why in News A peer-reviewed study in the Nature Portfolio journal npj Clean Air (June 12, 2026) finds that heatwaves push surface ozone to 85–110 micrograms per cubic metre in northern India — above the 70 µg/m³ reference level used in the study and exceeding WHO guidance in every region — adding to a far larger seasonal toll of cardiac and respiratory deaths. Key Findings Ozone spikes during heatwaves and falls back within 3–4 days of a heatwave ending. On 2024 heatwave days, the study links about 26,500 deaths from ischaemic heart disease (IHD) and COPD to ozone exposure; the heatwave's marginal contribution was roughly 830 deaths (about 490 cardiac + 342 COPD). It counted 188 heatwave events over two decades; the most severe years — 2010, 2016, 2019 and 2024 — broadly coincided with El Niño conditions, and the Western Himalayas saw the steepest long-term rise. The Science of Surface Ozone Surface (tropospheric) ozone is a secondary pollutant — not emitted directly, but formed when sunlight drives reactions among precursors such as nitrogen oxides (NOx) and volatile organic compounds (VOCs); the process speeds up in heat. The authors note that NO2 and formaldehyde (HCHO) directly damage the respiratory system. Method Caveat Mortality figures are modelled, not directly counted — continuous ground-level ozone data were unavailable for specific heatwave days. A small per-person risk applied across India's population of over a billion, for two leading causes of death, produces large absolute totals. Way Forward Target ozone precursors (NOx and VOCs) through vehicular, industrial and power-sector controls. Integrate ozone into Heat Action Plans and expand ground-level monitoring. Protect vulnerable groups — the elderly and those with heart or lung disease — during heatwaves. The study reframes heatwaves as not just a temperature hazard but a pollution-amplifying one, with ozone quietly raising cardiac and respiratory deaths. Cutting NOx and VOC emissions therefore yields a double dividend — cleaner air and greater heat resilience. Prelims Pointers Surface (tropospheric) ozone is a secondary pollutant — formed in situ, not directly emitted. Precursors: NOx + VOCs + sunlight; heat accelerates formation. WHO 2021 Air Quality Guideline for ozone: peak-season mean of 60 µg/m³ and an 8-hour daily maximum of 100 µg/m³ (the study uses a 70 µg/m³ reference). Good vs bad ozone: stratospheric ozone shields against UV; ground-level ozone harms health and crops and is a greenhouse gas. IHD = ischaemic heart disease; COPD = chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. El Niño phases are linked to more severe Indian heatwaves. Practice Mains Question Examine the linkages between heatwaves, surface ozone and public health in India. Suggest measures to address ground-level ozone pollution as part of an integrated heat- and air-quality response. GS Paper 3  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Consider the following statements about ozone: 1. Surface ozone is directly emitted by motor vehicles and industries. 2. Surface ozone forms when sunlight drives reactions among nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds. 3. Stratospheric ozone protects the Earth's surface from harmful ultraviolet radiation. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a)1 and 2 only (b)2 and 3 only (c)1 and 3 only (d)1, 2 and 3 Correct Answer: (b) Statement 1 is incorrect — surface ozone is a secondary pollutant, not emitted directly. Statement 2 is correct — it forms via sunlight-driven reactions among NOx and VOCs. Statement 3 is correct — stratospheric ozone absorbs harmful UV radiation. Article 09 NCERT Restores the Original 'Dancing Girl' Image GS Paper 1 — Art & Culture | Indus Valley Civilisation Why in News The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) has decided to restore the original image of the Harappan-era bronze 'Dancing Girl' in the new Class 9 Arts Education textbook, after the Education Ministry sought an explanation over a version in which the figurine's bare torso had been shaded. The change is immediate in the digital edition and will reflect in print from next year. The 'Dancing Girl' of Mohenjo-daro — a bronze figurine cast using the lost-wax technique, housed at the National Museum, New Delhi. (Representative image) About the Artefact A small bronze figurine (about 10.5 cm) from Mohenjo-daro, dated to roughly 2500 BCE. Cast using the lost-wax (cire perdue) technique — evidence of advanced Harappan metallurgy and naturalistic art. It is displayed at the National Museum, New Delhi, and is routinely taught in schools. The Controversy In the Class 9 Arts textbook the figurine's torso was shaded/covered; NCERT defended this as inviting students to use their 'imagination'. The same image already appears in a Class 6 Social Science textbook. Historian Michel Danino, who headed that committee, had earlier resisted objections that the nude figurine could be 'controversial', agreeing only to move it to an inside page at reduced size while keeping it in the book. Following the Ministry's query, NCERT was nudged to reverse the retouching for consistency across grades. Significance The 'Dancing Girl' is among the most recognisable symbols of Indus art and craftsmanship. The episode reflects the wider debate on the faithful depiction of cultural heritage in school education. Restoring the original image affirms the principle that heritage artefacts should be taught as they are — the 'Dancing Girl' stands as testament to the Indus Valley's mastery of bronze casting, and her unaltered form is part of that historical record. Prelims Pointers 'Dancing Girl': a bronze figurine from Mohenjo-daro (~2500 BCE), made by the lost-wax (cire perdue) technique; housed at the National Museum, New Delhi. Mohenjo-daro lies on the Indus (Larkana district, Sindh, in present-day Pakistan); a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The 'Priest-King' is a famous steatite sculpture, also from Mohenjo-daro. Lost-wax casting = a metal-casting method using a wax model later melted out — known to Harappans. NCERT is an autonomous body under the Ministry of Education. Practice Mains Question Cultural heritage artefacts in school textbooks are part of a society's historical record. Discuss, with reference to the 'Dancing Girl', the importance of faithful representation of cultural heritage in education. GS Paper 1  |  150 words  |  10 marks Prelims Practice MCQ With reference to the Harappan 'Dancing Girl' figurine, which one of the following is correct? (a)It is a steatite sculpture discovered at Harappa. (b)It is a terracotta figurine from Lothal. (c)It is a bronze figurine from Mohenjo-daro, made by the lost-wax technique. (d)It is a copper seal from Dholavira.