In-Depth PIB Analysis4 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Governance & Social JusticeGS Paper II · III 01DDU-GKY 2.0 — Placement-Linked Rural Skilling at 12 Indian EconomyGS Paper III 0212 Years of Make in India — Scorecard & Gaps Science & TechnologyGS Paper III 03BioE3 & Sugar-Based PLA Bioplastic Water Resources & International RelationsGS Paper I · II · III 04India–Netherlands & the Kalpasar Project Governance, Welfare Schemes & Social JusticeGeneral Studies Paper II · III 01 DDU-GKY at 12: How DDU-GKY 2.0 Shifts Rural Skilling from “Training Numbers” to “Lasting Jobs” GS-II · Welfare Schemes for Vulnerable SectionsGS-III · Employment, Inclusive GrowthPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Rural Development · Backgrounders, 24 Sep 2026 The Deen Dayal Upadhyaya Grameen Kaushalya Yojana (DDU-GKY) completes 12 years on 25 September 2026. Its upgraded version, DDU-GKY 2.0, rewrites the definition of success — from “trained and placed” to “placed and retained”. ◈ Static Background — Start from the Basics What is skilling? It is giving a person a job-ready ability — say, operating a sewing machine, electrical wiring or patient care — so that he or she can earn a wage or run an enterprise. For a rural family dependent on a single harvest, one skilled member means a second, non-farm income. Why rural youth? India’s youth population is projected by the Government to touch about 345 million by 2036. Yet formal training remains thin — the Economic Survey 2023-24, citing PLFS data, noted that only about 4.4% of the young workforce (15–29 years) was formally skilled. Constitutional anchor: Article 41 (right to work, within economic capacity), Article 43 (living wage) and Article 46 (promotion of educational and economic interests of SCs, STs and weaker sections) — all Directive Principles. Legislative competence: “Vocational and technical training of labour” falls in Entry 25, Concurrent List (List III) — hence the Centre–State partnership model. Two skilling tracks: wage employment (DDU-GKY, under MoRD) and self-employment (RSETIs, also under MoRD); the general skilling track (PMKVY) sits with the Ministry of Skill Development & Entrepreneurship (created November 2014). ▤ Scheme at a Glance Launched: 25 September 2014 (birth anniversary of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya, observed as Antyodaya Diwas). Nodal Ministry: Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD); the skilling arm of DAY-NRLM (Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana – National Rural Livelihoods Mission). Upgraded guidelines: DDU-GKY 2.0 notified in May 2025; first rollout year 2025-26. Target group: rural youth aged 15–35 years from poor households; placement-linked, free residential/non-residential training. Mandatory social inclusion: SC/ST 50% · Women 33% · Persons with Disabilities 5%. Implementation chain: MoRD (policy & funding) → State Rural Livelihoods Missions (SRLMs) → Project Implementing Agencies (PIAs) that run training centres. Budget 2026-27: ₹750 crore allocated. Regional earmarks: 10% of allocation for the North-Eastern States; a Special Area Allowance of an additional 10% of base training cost per candidate for hard-to-reach areas. Lineage — Where DDU-GKY Comes From 1999 — SGSY (Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana): self-employment through SHGs; its “Special Projects” component funded placement-linked skilling. June 2011 — NRLM (Aajeevika): SGSY restructured into a demand-driven livelihoods mission; the skilling component was run as Aajeevika Skills. 2011 — Himayat (J&K) and 2013 — Roshni (LWE districts): special skilling windows that were later folded under DDU-GKY. 2014 — DDU-GKY: rebranded and redesigned with a placement mandate, geo-tagged biometric attendance and a standard 576-hour minimum course. 2025 — DDU-GKY 2.0: placement redefined, post-placement support and migration support expanded, full digital lifecycle. Figure 1 — DDU-GKY 2.0: the five design shifts The revised framework reorganises the scheme around the journey “training → placement → retention → career progression”. Infographic courtesy PIB / Ministry of Rural Development; reproduced with credit for educational use. What Changes Under DDU-GKY 2.0 1. Standardised training. The 576-hour minimum is retained, but split into 396 hours of domain training and 180 hours of mandatory non-domain training. The idea: a job needs technical skill and the soft skills to keep it. Figure 2 — Anatomy of a 3-month (576-hour) DDU-GKY 2.0 course Domain (job-specific) training — 396 h0 h576 hNon-domain: 180 hEnglish Communication — 60 hEmployability & Life Skills — 60 hComputer & Digital Literacy — 30 hEntrepreneurship — 30 hBar lengths drawn to scale (hours as stated in the DDU-GKY 2.0 framework) Nearly one-third (31%) of every course is now non-domain — communication, workplace, digital and entrepreneurial capability. 2. Placement redefined. Earlier, a “placement” meant 3 months of continuous employment. Under 2.0 it means at least 6 months, counting continuous or non-continuous work across wage, self- and gig employment — a recognition of how rural youth actually work today. 3. Paying for retention, not just placement. Candidates are tracked for 12 months after placement, and support is tied to staying in work. Figure 3 — The post-placement support ladder ₹1,270 × 6 months = ₹7,620 transition support, then ₹5,000 for staying employed 365 days (maximum break of 60 days); upskilling/reskilling is offered after 12 months. Infographic courtesy PIB / Ministry of Rural Development; reproduced with credit for educational use. 4. Migration Support Centres (MSCs): set up by SRLMs in both home and destination States — accommodation help, counselling, alumni networks, employer liaison. Annual funding per centre raised from ₹10 lakh to up to ₹30 lakh. 5. Job Melas: at Gram Panchayat and block level, with outcomes tracked for a year on Kaushal Panjee (the rural skills registry). Funding up to ₹50,000 (GP fair, linked to 100 placements) and ₹1 lakh (block fair, 200 placements). 6. End-to-end digital platform: PIA onboarding → project evaluation → candidate management → assessment & certification → finance → placement tracking; face-authentication attendance, a public candidate portal showing PIA performance ratings, and integration with the Skill India Digital Hub (SIDH). Figure 4 — DDU-GKY 1.0 vs 2.0: the rules that changed ParameterEarlierDDU-GKY 2.0Placement3 months continuousemployment6 months; continuous or non-continuous;wage, self & gig work countedTraining design576-hour minimum576 h = 396 domain + 180 standardisednon-domain hoursMigration supportMSC funding ₹10 lakh/yrUp to ₹30 lakh/yr per MSC, in homeand destination StatesTechnologyGeo-tagged, time-stampedbiometric attendanceFull-lifecycle digital platform; faceauthentication; SIDH integration Only provisions for which the “earlier” position is officially stated are compared. Special Windows Within DDU-GKY 2.0 Roshni: for Left-Wing Extremism (LWE)-affected districts notified by the Ministry of Home Affairs; residential training compulsory; 40% coverage of women; now extended to Aspirational Districts. Himayat: for Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh; covers both rural and urban youth, BPL and APL; supports wage, self and gig employment; 100% centrally funded, run through dedicated Mission Management Units. ▤ The Numbers — Cumulative Since 2014-15 18.47 lakh youth trained 12.43 lakh placed (~67%) 9.71 lakh women trained (~53%) 31 States/UTs covered 749 approved projects · 760 active training centres · 455+ PIAs · 36 sectors · 800+ job roles. 6.34 lakh women placed — about 65% of women trained. Early 2.0 rollout (2025-26): Goa formed the first 2.0 batches; Andhra Pradesh began training 12,000+ candidates within 3 months; J&K commenced training for 91% of its allocation. Note: a companion PIB release gives 18.45 lakh trained / 12.35 lakh placed (as of June 2026); the backgrounder’s later “as on date” figures are used above. Figure 5 — From training to placement (cumulative, lakh candidates) All candidates — trained18.47All candidates — placed12.43Women — trained9.71Women — placed6.34Source: Ministry of Rural Development data in the PIB backgrounder (24 Sep 2026); bars to scale Roughly one in three trained candidates does not show up as “placed” — the gap DDU-GKY 2.0 is designed to close. Four Pathways Seen in the Field The Ministry’s case stories illustrate four distinct outcomes that an aspirant can cite as examples: Interrupted education → first job: a young woman from Nagaland trained in tourism & hospitality and joined a Bengaluru hotel’s F&B service. Domestic job → overseas career: a youth from Siwan, Bihar (introduced via his mother’s JEEViKA SHG) trained as an Assistant Electrician, started at ₹10,500/month in Baddi and later earned about ₹35,000/month in Dubai. Job → return enterprise: a woman from Charaideo, Assam trained as a Sewing Machine Operator, worked in Tiruppur, then invested ₹50,000 savings in a tailoring centre at home (annual income ~₹1.10 lakh). Disability inclusion: a differently-abled youth from Jharkhand trained in the Healthcare Multipurpose trade and was placed as a General Duty Assistant in Nashik. Companion Scheme — RSETIs (Self-Employment Track) Origin: modelled on RUDSETI, set up in 1982 at Ujire (Karnataka) by the SDME Trust with Syndicate Bank and Canara Bank; scaled nationally by MoRD from 2009. Design: bank-sponsored, one per district; free residential training for rural youth aged 18–50, followed by handholding and credit linkage. Scale: 647 RSETIs in 634 districts across 33 States/UTs; 63.47 lakh trained, 45.60 lakh settled — about 94% in self-employment, ~6% in wage jobs. The Critical View Placement ratio: ~67% cumulative placement against the scheme’s long-standing expectation that PIAs place a clear majority of trainees; verification of placements by private PIAs has historically been a weak link. Quality of jobs: many placements are near entry-level wages in distant cities; high living costs drive early drop-outs — the very problem retention incentives now target. Migration stress: rural–urban migration of young women raises safety, housing and social-security concerns; MSCs are a response but depend on SRLM capacity in destination States. Scale vs. money: ₹750 crore (2026-27) is modest against a youth cohort of hundreds of millions; 18.47 lakh trainees in 12 years is small relative to the need. Fragmentation: overlapping skilling schemes across ministries (PMKVY, DDU-GKY, RSETI, sectoral schemes) complicate certification and tracking — hence the value of NSQF-aligned courses and SIDH integration. Positive design logic: paying for outcomes over 12 months rather than for training inputs aligns incentives of PIAs with those of the trainee. ◈ Institutions & Terms — Prelims Hooks PIA — Project Implementing Agency (private/NGO/public training partner). SRLM — State Rural Livelihoods Mission, the State-level arm of DAY-NRLM. Kaushal Panjee — rural skills registry portal for mobilisation and placement tracking. SIDH — Skill India Digital Hub, the national skilling platform of MSDE. NSQF — National Skills Qualifications Framework (notified 2013), grading skills by levels. ✎ Mains Practice Question Placement-linked skilling schemes have often produced training numbers faster than durable employment. Examine how DDU-GKY 2.0 seeks to address this gap and identify the challenges that remain. 15 marks · 250 words Indian Economy — Industry & ManufacturingGeneral Studies Paper III 02 Make in India at 12: Output Has Scaled Up — The Harder Tests Are Value Addition, Jobs and Share in GDP GS-III · Industrial Policy, Growth, EmploymentPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Commerce & Industry · Backgrounder, 24 Sep 2026 Make in India, launched on 25 September 2014, turns 12. The Government’s backgrounder reports large production gains across electronics, defence, steel and pharma; the analytical question is whether this has changed the structure of the economy. ◈ Static Background — Why Manufacturing Matters The basic idea: agriculture employs many but pays little; services pay well but need high education. Manufacturing is the classic bridge — it absorbs semi-skilled labour at higher productivity, the path followed by Japan, South Korea and China. 1948 & 1956 — Industrial Policy Resolutions: State-led industrialisation; licensing and reservation. 1991 — New Industrial Policy: delicensing, FDI opening — the LPG reforms. 2011 — National Manufacturing Policy: targets of 25% share of GDP and 100 million jobs by 2022; created NIMZs (National Investment & Manufacturing Zones). 2014 — Make in India: adopted the same ambitions; nodal body DIPP, renamed DPIIT (Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade) in 2019. 2020 — Atmanirbhar Bharat and PLI schemes; 2025-26 Budget — a National Manufacturing Mission announced. ▤ Initiative at a Glance Launched: 25 September 2014; lion logo; motto “Minimum Government, Maximum Governance”. Nodal Department: DPIIT, Ministry of Commerce & Industry. Four pillars: New Processes (ease of doing business) · New Infrastructure (corridors, clusters) · New Sectors (FDI opening) · New Mindset (government as facilitator). Coverage: originally 25 sectors; under Make in India 2.0, 27 sectors — 15 manufacturing + 12 services. Stated goal: India as a global hub for manufacturing, design and innovation (Government objective). Figure 6 — The 27 sectors under Make in India 2.0 Prelims hook: services such as Medical Value Travel, Legal and Environmental Services are part of the list — Make in India is not manufacturing-only. Infographic courtesy PIB / Ministry of Commerce and Industry; reproduced with credit for educational use. The Scorecard — What the Data Show Manufacturing GVA (constant prices) grew at a CAGR of 10.88% between 2022-23 and 2025-26 under the revised national-accounts series. IIP–Manufacturing rose 7.0% in April–July 2026 over the same period of 2025. Electronics: production up from ~₹1.9 lakh crore (2014-15) to ~₹13.11 lakh crore (2025-26) — nearly 7×; growth of 15.8% in 2025-26 alone. Mobile phones: ~₹18,000 crore → ~₹6.27 lakh crore (more than 30-fold); India is the world’s 2nd-largest mobile manufacturer by volume. Defence: indigenous production ₹46,429 crore (2014-15) → record ₹1.78 lakh crore (2025-26), an increase of ~283%. Steel: crude steel 81.7 MT → 170.0 MT (2014-15 to 2025-26); India has been the world’s 2nd-largest crude steel producer since 2018. Automobiles: 31.03 million vehicles in 2024-25 (~33% above 2014-15). Pharma: 3rd globally by volume, 11th by value (as per the release); turnover ₹4,71,898 crore (2024-25). Medical devices: ~₹28,000 crore → ₹41,500 crore (2019-20 to 2024-25). Railways: 54,809 coaches in 2014-24 (avg. 5,481/yr vs <3,300/yr in 2004-14); 1,674 locomotives and 6,677 LHB coaches in 2025-26. Capital goods: ₹2,87,233 crore → ₹5,69,900 crore (2019-20 to 2024-25), nearly 2×. Figure 7 — How many times output grew (growth multiple, from officially stated values) Electronics (2014-15→25-26)6.9×Defence (2014-15→25-26)3.8×Crude steel (2014-15→25-26)2.1×Capital goods (2019-20→24-25)2.0×Medical devices (2019-20→24-25)1.5×Vehicles, units (2014-15→24-25)1.3×Off the scale: mobile phones~₹18,000 cr → ~₹6.27 lakh cr (>30×)Multiples computed from values in the PIB backgrounder; base years differ, so compare with care.Nominal ₹ values for electronics, defence, capital goods and devices; volumes for steel and vehicles. Growth is sharply uneven — assembly-led electronics and procurement-led defence lead; mass-employment sectors are not in the top tier of this chart. Moving Up the Value Chain — Beyond Final Assembly Complex pharma: Trastuzumab Emtansine — world’s first biosimilar antibody-drug conjugate (breast cancer); Docaravimab–Miromavimab — first anti-rabies monoclonal antibody combination; Miqnaf (nafithromycin) — India’s first indigenously developed macrolide antibiotic in three decades (bacterial pneumonia); Desidustat — new chemical entity for anaemia in chronic kidney disease. Rare-earth permanent magnets: a pilot plant for Nd-Fe-B (neodymium-iron-boron) magnets set up at ARCI, Hyderabad in March 2026 — magnets critical for EV motors, wind turbines and electronics, where global supply is highly concentrated in China. Capital goods: machinery that makes machines — a better marker of industrial depth than final-goods output. Figure 8 — The enabling architecture Note the date difference: the infographic cites PLI production and sales of ₹20.41 lakh crore+ (Dec 2025); the backgrounder text updates this to ₹22.66 lakh crore (June 2026). Infographic courtesy PIB / Ministry of Commerce & Industry; reproduced with credit for educational use. ▤ Key Enablers — Facts to Remember FDI: 100% via automatic route in most sectors; cumulative inflows USD 843 billion (2014-15 to 2025-26), 169% higher than the preceding 12 years. National Single Window System (NSWS) (launched 2021): 327+ Central and 3,452 State approvals across 34 States/UTs; ~3.06 lakh applications a year; 5.69 lakh entities onboarded. India Industrial Land Bank (IILB): GIS platform mapping 4,220 industrial parks over ~6.98 lakh hectares (May 2026). PM GatiShakti National Master Plan (October 2021): the Network Planning Group (NPG) has evaluated 396 projects worth ~₹18.66 lakh crore; 256 sanctioned, 198 under implementation (Aug 2026). PLI schemes: 14 sectors, total outlay ₹1.97 lakh crore; by June 2026 — ₹2.40 lakh crore investment, ₹22.66 lakh crore production & sales, ₹15.20 lakh crore exports, 14 lakh+ jobs (Government data). Startup India (January 2016): ~2.54 lakh DPIIT-recognised startups. The Critical View Structural share: manufacturing’s share of GVA has stayed broadly in the mid-to-high teens, well short of the 25% target inherited from the 2011 policy. Jobs: the 100 million manufacturing jobs goal remains distant; PLI’s 14 lakh jobs are small against the annual inflow of young workers — output growth has been capital- and assembly-intensive. Value addition: electronics output is dominated by final assembly; components (displays, chips, PCBs) remain largely imported — hence the Electronics Component Manufacturing Scheme (2025) and India Semiconductor Mission. Nominal vs real: several multiples above are in nominal rupees; part of the rise is inflation, not volume. Business environment: India rose from 142nd (2015) to 63rd (2020) in the World Bank’s Doing Business ranking before the report was discontinued in 2021; its successor is B-READY. Compliance burden, contract enforcement and land acquisition remain frictions. Strategic dependence: critical minerals and rare-earth magnets expose supply chains — addressed through the National Critical Mineral Mission (2025) and magnet initiatives. ✎ Mains Practice Question Twelve years after its launch, Make in India shows impressive output growth in select sectors, yet manufacturing’s share in GVA and employment has not shifted proportionately. Critically analyse the reasons and suggest measures to deepen domestic value addition. 15 marks · 250 words Science & Technology — BiotechnologyGeneral Studies Paper III 03 From Sugarcane to Bioplastic: Commercial Launch of PLA Under the BioE3 Policy GS-III · Biotechnology, Environment (Pollution)Prelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Science & Technology (DBT) · 24 Sep 2026 The Union Ministry of Science & Technology formally launched the commercial use of Polylactic Acid (PLA)-based bio-based biodegradable plastic made from sugar feedstock, with a ₹75 crore BIRAC grant for a 100 TPA pilot R&D facility under the BioE3 framework. ◈ Static Background — Plastics & Bioplastics Explained Simply Conventional plastics (polyethylene, PET, polypropylene) are made from crude oil or natural gas. They are cheap and durable — and that durability is the problem: they persist for decades and fragment into microplastics. Bioplastics is an umbrella term. Two separate questions decide what a plastic is: (a) what is it made from? (bio-based vs fossil-based) and (b) how does it end its life? (biodegradable vs non-biodegradable). Bio-based but NOT biodegradable: bio-PE (from sugarcane ethanol) — chemically identical to ordinary polyethylene. Fossil-based but biodegradable: PBAT — made from petrochemicals, yet compostable. Bio-based AND biodegradable: PLA and PHA (polyhydroxyalkanoates). Prelims trap: “bio-based” does not automatically mean “biodegradable”. ▤ Initiative at a Glance What: commercial launch of PLA-based bio-based biodegradable plastic; 100 TPA (tonnes per annum) pilot-scale R&D facility for specialised PLA grades and PLA co-polymers. Funding: ₹75 crore grant from BIRAC (Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council) under the Department of Biotechnology (DBT). Industry partner: Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd. (a sugar company); facility at its integrated complex at Kumbhi (Lakhimpur Kheri district), Uttar Pradesh. Policy umbrella: BioE3 — Biotechnology for Economy, Environment and Employment. Pilot’s role: techno-economic data, process know-how, customer validation, indigenisation and scale-up to the company’s commercial PLA plant. Context figure: India’s bioeconomy stated to have grown from ~US$10 billion (2014) to nearly US$195 billion (Government figure). How PLA Is Made — Field to Film to Compost PLA is a polyester built from lactic acid — the same molecule produced when milk turns into curd. Sugar is fermented by microbes into lactic acid, which is converted into a ring-shaped molecule called lactide and then chained into long polymer molecules (ring-opening polymerisation). Figure 9 — The PLA value chain (a circular bio-based loop) 1. Sugarcane /biomass2. Sugarfeedstock3. Microbialfermentation4. Lacticacid5. Lactide →polymerisation6. PLA resin &co-polymers7. Packaging, films,fibres, cutlery,3D printing8. Industrialcomposting →CO₂ + waterCO₂ re-absorbedby the next cropSchematic process diagram; composting refers to controlled industrial conditions, not open dumping. PLA opens a sugar-to-materials value chain — DBT describes it as a new chain “beyond ethanol” for the sugar industry. The BioE3 Policy — Static Anchor Approved: by the Union Cabinet in August 2024; implemented by DBT. Core idea: high-performance biomanufacturing — using microbes, cells and enzymes to make chemicals, materials, food and medicines. Six thematic sectors: bio-based chemicals & enzymes; functional foods & smart proteins; precision biotherapeutics; climate-resilient agriculture; carbon capture & utilisation; futuristic marine & space research. PLA falls under the first. Infrastructure pillars: Biomanufacturing hubs, Bio-AI hubs and Biofoundries. Stated target: a US$300 billion bioeconomy by 2030 (Government projection). Funding companion: Bio-RIDE scheme (2024), merging DBT’s research and BIRAC’s industry-support schemes. Why It Matters Plastic burden: CPCB estimated India’s plastic waste at about 4.1 million tonnes a year (2020-21). Regulatory push: Plastic Waste Management Rules, 2016; ban on identified single-use plastic items from 1 July 2022; carry-bag thickness 120 microns (from 31 Dec 2022); EPR guidelines (2022); the 2024 amendment defined “biodegradable plastics” and requires CPCB certification and labelling. Farm–industry link: India is among the world’s two largest sugar producers; after ethanol blending, PLA offers a second high-value outlet for cane. Import substitution: global PLA capacity is concentrated in a few producers abroad; domestic capability supports “Vocal for Local” goals. Waste-to-wealth: the Ministry stressed region-specific biomass (bagasse, crop residue, agri-waste) as future feedstock. The Critical View “Biodegradable” needs conditions: PLA breaks down reliably only in industrial composting (~58 °C, high humidity, microbial activity). In soil, rivers or seas it degrades very slowly and can behave like conventional plastic. Composting infrastructure gap: without segregated collection and industrial composters, PLA ends up in landfills — or contaminates PET recycling streams. Food vs materials: cane is water-intensive; diverting food crops to plastics raises land and water trade-offs — second-generation (residue-based) feedstocks are the sustainable path. Cost and properties: PLA is costlier than polyethylene and is brittle with low heat resistance — the reason the pilot focuses on co-polymers. Global context: talks on a legally binding UN plastics treaty (INC process) remain unfinished; substitution alone cannot replace reduce–reuse measures. ◈ Institutions & Terms — Prelims Hooks DBT — Department of Biotechnology, set up in 1986 under the Ministry of Science & Technology. BIRAC — a Section 8, not-for-profit PSU of DBT (est. 2012) that funds biotech start-ups and industry R&D. BRIC — Biotechnology Research and Innovation Council (2023), an apex body subsuming DBT’s autonomous institutes. IS/ISO 17088 — standard specifying requirements for compostable plastics. TPA — tonnes per annum (capacity unit). ✎ Mains Practice Question Distinguish between “bio-based” and “biodegradable” plastics. In the context of the BioE3 policy, assess whether sugar-based polylactic acid (PLA) can meaningfully address India’s plastic waste problem. 15 marks · 250 words Water Resources, Geography & International RelationsGeneral Studies Paper I · II · III 04 India–Netherlands Water Partnership: Dutch Expertise for Gujarat’s Kalpasar Project GS-I · Geography — Coasts, RiversGS-II · Bilateral RelationsGS-III · Water Resources, InfrastructurePrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Jal Shakti · 24 Sep 2026 On the sidelines of the 9th India International Water Week (IIWW) 2026 in New Delhi, India and the Netherlands signed two tripartite MoUs for technical cooperation and capacity building on the Kalpasar Project — a proposed freshwater reservoir in the Gulf of Khambhat, Gujarat. ◈ Static Background — The Geography First The Gulf of Khambhat (Cambay) is a funnel-shaped inlet of the Arabian Sea between the Saurashtra peninsula and mainland Gujarat. Its funnel shape amplifies tides — spring tidal ranges exceed 10 metres, among the highest on India’s coast — which also makes it a candidate site for tidal energy. Rivers draining into the gulf: Sabarmati, Mahi, Dhadhar and Narmada (the Tapi reaches the sea just south, near Surat). The problem: Saurashtra is semi-arid and drought-prone, with coastal salinity ingress, while monsoon river water flows unused into the sea. Existing responses: Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada and the SAUNI Yojana, which lifts surplus Narmada water into Saurashtra’s reservoirs. Figure 10 — Where Kalpasar would sit A ~30 km dam across the gulf, commonly described as linking Ghogha (Bhavnagar) and Hansot (Bharuch), would convert the upper gulf into a freshwater lake. Alignment shown is indicative. Base geography: Natural Earth 1:10m (public domain); rivers and coastline plotted to real coordinates. ▤ Project & Agreement at a Glance Kalpasar concept: a freshwater reservoir in the Gulf of Khambhat formed by a dam across the gulf, storing runoff of the Sabarmati, Mahi and Dhadhar, supplemented by Narmada water. Origin: conceived in the 1980s; an earlier tidal-power component was later set aside in favour of water storage. MoUs (tripartite): Central Water Commission (CWC) + Kalpasar Department, Government of Gujarat + Dutch institutions Deltares and TU Delft. Scope of cooperation: technical review, hydraulic & hydrological modelling, coastal and structural engineering, climate resilience, capacity building, knowledge transfer and digital applications. Sequence: discussed during the Prime Minister’s visit to the Netherlands (May 2026) → Letter of Intent signed 16 May 2026 → Indian delegation visit (July 2026) → MoUs at IIWW, 24 Sep 2026. Framework: the India–Netherlands Strategic Partnership on Water (agreed 2021). Why the Netherlands? — The Dutch Water Story Roughly a quarter of the Netherlands lies below sea level in the delta of the Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt. Centuries of dykes, polders and pumping have made Dutch engineers the global reference for living with water. Figure 11 — The Netherlands on the North Sea The Afsluitdijk lies across the former Zuiderzee inlet in the north of the country, closing it off from the North Sea — the lake north-east of Amsterdam is the IJsselmeer it created. Map as supplied (BBC News country-profile map); reproduced with credit for educational use. 1932 Afsluitdijk completed ~32 km length of the dam IJsselmeer freshwater lake created ~30 km proposed Kalpasar dam Afsluitdijk (1932): the ~32 km closure dam of the Zuiderzee Works, which turned a saltwater inlet into the freshwater IJsselmeer — the closest parallel to Kalpasar. It is now being renewed after nearly a century, including provisions for fish migration. Delta Works: storm-surge barriers built after the 1953 North Sea flood. Room for the River: a later shift from “fighting water” to giving rivers space — a lesson in ecological design. Deltares is an independent Dutch institute for applied research in water and subsurface; TU Delft is the Delft University of Technology. The Critical View Sediment: the gulf carries a very high silt load; a closed reservoir risks rapid siltation and reduced storage. Salinity: the impounded water starts saline; flushing it to fresh quality takes years and careful sluice management. Ecology: intertidal mudflats, mangroves and estuarine fisheries depend on tidal exchange; migratory fish and birds could be affected — the reason the Dutch side stressed ecology and fish migration. Livelihoods and economy: fishing communities, and tide-dependent activity such as the Alang–Sosiya ship-breaking yard and gulf ports, need safeguards. Cost and time: a mega-project conceived four decades ago, repeatedly re-studied; transparent EIA and public consultation will be essential. ◈ Institutions & Terms — Prelims Hooks Central Water Commission (CWC): apex technical body for water resources, set up in 1945; under the Department of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation, Ministry of Jal Shakti (formed 2019). India International Water Week (IIWW): held by the Ministry of Jal Shakti since 2012; 2026 is the 9th edition. Tripartite MoU: an agreement among three parties — here a Central body, a State department and a foreign institution. ✎ Mains Practice Question Coastal reservoirs are increasingly proposed as a solution to water scarcity in semi-arid coastal regions. Evaluate the Kalpasar project in Gujarat in this light, drawing lessons from the Dutch experience with the Afsluitdijk. 10 marks · 150 words

Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise OpinionsGS Paper II 01Political Party Finance & ‘Shell’ Parties (RUPPs)02Regulating the UNSC Veto — Restraint, Accountability, Reform OpinionsGeneral Studies Paper II — Polity & International Relations 01 The Opaque World of Party Finance: Why Registered Unrecognised Parties Have Become a Regulatory Blind Spot Core TopicOpinionGS-II · Polity — Elections, RPA 1951, ECI, Political PartiesPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Lead Op-Ed by a former Election Commissioner · 25 Sep 2026 Political parties are the central actors of Indian democracy, yet the law says remarkably little about what they are, how they must keep accounts, or who checks them. The op-ed argues that this gap has allowed Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPPs) to function as conduits for unexplained money — much like shell companies in corporate finance. ◈ Static Background — What Is a Political Party in Law? In the Constitution: the original text did not mention political parties at all. The term entered only through the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection), inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985. Legal character: a party is essentially an association formed under the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c). It is not a company, trust, society or firm — so none of the disclosure regimes applicable to those bodies automatically apply to it. Registration — Section 29A, RPA 1951 (inserted in 1989): a party applies to the Election Commission of India (ECI); its constitution must bear allegiance to the Constitution, socialism, secularism and democracy, and uphold India’s sovereignty, unity and integrity. Contributions — Section 29B: parties may accept voluntary contributions, but not from Government companies. Disclosure — Section 29C: donations above ₹20,000 must be reported to the ECI (Form 24A). Tax exemption — Section 13A, Income-tax Act, 1961 (now carried into the Income-tax Act, 2025): party income is exempt if accounts are maintained, audited and the 29C report is filed; donors get deductions under Sections 80GGB (companies) and 80GGC (individuals). Cash cap: since the Finance Act, 2017, a party cannot accept cash donations of ₹2,000 or more from a single person. Registered vs Recognised — The Classification Aspirants Confuse Registration happens under the RPA, 1951. Recognition is a separate status under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, earned through electoral performance. Recognition brings a reserved symbol and other privileges; registration alone brings the financial privileges. Figure 1 — How the law classifies political parties Association — Article 19(1)(c)Registered with ECISection 29A, RPA 1951Recognised: National / StatePara 6, Symbols Order 1968Registered Unrecognised (RUPP)No poll threshold met• Reserved (exclusive) symbol• Up to 40 star campaigners• Free broadcast time on public media• Donations (29B) + tax exemption (13A)Recognition can be suspended: Para 16A• Symbol from the “free” list• Up to 20 star campaigners• SAME donation right (29B) andSAME tax exemption (13A)‘Delisting’ ≠ deregistrationProcess diagram drawn from RPA 1951, the Symbols Order 1968 and Section 77 (star campaigners) The loophole in one picture: the financial privileges attach to registration, not to recognition or electoral activity. The Core Problem — Four Legal Gaps ECI cannot deregister at will: in Indian National Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare (2002), the Supreme Court held that the ECI may cancel registration only if it was obtained by fraud, if the party ceases to bear allegiance to the Constitution, or if it is declared unlawful. Non-contesting parties are therefore only “delisted”. Delisting keeps the money tap open: a delisted or unrecognised party can still receive contributions under Section 29B and claim exemption under Section 13A. Mechanical scrutiny: the ECI receives accounts but lacks the mandate or machinery to audit them; filing is treated as compliance. No cap on party spending: candidates face expenditure limits (Section 77 and Rule 90, Conduct of Election Rules, 1961), but expenditure by a party on “propagating its programme” is excluded — so parties can spend without limit. ▤ The Numbers Cited in the Debate RUPP compliance: an ADR report (July 2025) found only 739 of 2,764 RUPPs filed their financial records for FY2022-23, while RUPPs’ declared income rose 223% that year. ECI clean-up: in August 2025, the ECI delisted 334 of 2,854 RUPPs that had not contested elections. 2024 Lok Sabha election: 22 parties had ₹18,742.31 crore at their disposal, including ₹7,416.31 crore raised during the campaign; they spent ₹3,861.57 crore and retained ₹14,848.46 crore afterwards (as per a Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative study of accounts filed with the ECI). Revenue foregone: about ₹11,813 crore in taxes over a decade due to exemptions on political donations. Only 41.76% of donations totalling ₹28,287 crore over nine years were claimed as tax-exempt — raising the question of why donors forgo the tax benefit on the rest. Figure 2 — Declared donations are rising; individuals now dominate tax-exempt giving Declared donations (₹ crore)7142015-16(43 parties)7,2032023-24(27 parties)Tax-exemption claims, FY2022-23 (₹ crore)Individuals2,275.85Corporates514.4Firms & assns.115.71Figures as cited in the op-ed from a Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative study; bars to scale within each panel. A roughly tenfold rise in declared donations — even as the number of parties declaring them fell. The Electoral Bonds Chapter Scheme: announced in the Union Budget 2017-18 and notified in January 2018; bearer instruments sold by the SBI, with donor identity hidden from the public. Eligibility: only parties registered under Section 29A that polled at least 1% of votes in the last Lok Sabha or Assembly election — so most RUPPs could not receive bonds. Verdict: in ADR v. Union of India (February 2024), a Constitution Bench struck down the scheme as violating voters’ right to information under Article 19(1)(a), and also struck down the 2017 amendment to Section 182, Companies Act, 2013 that had removed the cap on corporate donations. Aftermath: the disclosed data raised questions of possible quid pro quo; the op-ed calls for a court-monitored probe. Historical Anchor — Attempts to Discipline Parties 1994 — Seshan order: Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan invoked the Symbols Order to put all parties on notice about the poor state of their internal functioning. ECI guidelines: a registering party must commit to contest elections within five years; if it does not contest continuously for six years, it is taken off the list. Committees: Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) on electoral reforms; Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998) on State funding of elections; Law Commission’s 170th Report (1999) recommending internal democracy and financial transparency in parties. RTI: in June 2013, the Central Information Commission declared six national parties “public authorities” under the RTI Act, 2005; parties did not comply and the issue remains pending before the Supreme Court. Article 324: in Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi (1985), the Supreme Court upheld the Symbols Order as an exercise of the ECI’s plenary power — a “reservoir” of authority where the law is silent. Reforms Proposed in the Op-Ed CAG audit: the ECI, using Article 324, should require party accounts to be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General or its nominee. Cap party spending: impose a ceiling on election expenditure by parties — a measure the ECI has repeatedly recommended. Limit the tax subsidy: exempt donations only up to the prescribed expenditure limit; tax the rest. Automatic deregistration of RUPPs that do not contest elections as per ECI guidelines. Central digital portal for standardised, public financial filings by all registered parties. A Balanced Assessment Strength of the argument: tax exemption is a public subsidy; public money justifies public scrutiny. The mismatch between tax privileges and accountability is hard to defend. Legal limits: deregistration powers and party-expenditure caps need amendment to the RPA; Article 324 operates only where Parliament’s law is silent, so ECI directions alone may not survive challenge. Freedom of association: heavy-handed rules could burden genuine small and new parties, which are also RUPPs. The target should be non-contesting, high-receipt entities, not small parties as such. Enforcement capacity: the Income-Tax Department and other agencies already have powers; the gap is as much about will and prioritisation as about law. The larger reform: sustainable transparency may need a package — partial State funding, full digital disclosure and an independent audit — rather than piecemeal measures. ◈ Prelims Hooks The word “political party” appears in the Constitution only in the Tenth Schedule. Registration → RPA Section 29A; recognition → Symbols Order 1968, Paragraph 6. Electoral bonds were struck down in 2024 under Article 19(1)(a). Recognised parties: up to 40 star campaigners; RUPPs: up to 20. ✎ Mains Practice Question Political parties in India enjoy significant tax privileges but face minimal financial scrutiny. Examine the gaps in the legal framework governing party finance, with special reference to Registered Unrecognised Political Parties, and suggest reforms. 15 marks · 250 words 02 Should the UNSC Veto Be Abolished? The Case for Restraint and Accountability Over Revolution Core TopicOpinionGS-II · IR — Important International Institutions, UN ReformPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Parley (expert discussion) · 25 Sep 2026 At the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, France renewed its push to regulate the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. With 128 States now backing the initiative and the United Kingdom joining France, two of the five permanent members have accepted the principle of voluntary restraint for the first time. ◈ Static Background — The Security Council and the Veto The UN Charter was signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and came into force on 24 October 1945. It gave the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 24), with binding powers under Chapter VII. Composition (Article 23): 15 members — 5 permanent (P5): the U.S., U.K., France, Russia and China — plus 10 non-permanent members elected by the UNGA for two-year terms. The Council was enlarged from 11 to 15 by an amendment that came into force in 1965. Voting (Article 27): procedural matters need any 9 votes; substantive matters need 9 votes including the “concurring votes” of all permanent members. The veto: the word “veto” does not appear in the Charter — it is the practical effect of Article 27(3). By practice, an abstention by a permanent member is not a veto. Why it exists: the founders learned from the League of Nations, which collapsed partly because great powers left or never joined. The veto was the price of keeping them inside. The reform lock (Article 108): Charter amendments need two-thirds of UNGA members and ratification by two-thirds of members including all P5 — so the veto protects itself. Three Questions That Are Often Mixed Up The discussion makes an important analytical distinction. Debates on the veto actually involve three separate questions, and solutions differ for each: Use of the veto — can permanent members agree not to use it in certain situations? (French–Mexican initiative, ACT code) Accountability for its use — must a permanent member explain itself after a veto? (Liechtenstein initiative) Structural reform — should the Council itself be enlarged or the veto abolished or extended? (needs Charter amendment) ▤ The Three Incremental Initiatives at a Glance French–Mexican initiative (2015): a political declaration asking P5 members to voluntarily refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and large-scale war crimes. Its roots lie in France’s 2013 proposal for a P5 “code of conduct” after the Ghouta chemical attack in Syria. Now backed by 128 States, including the U.K. ACT Code of Conduct (2015): by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group; applies to all Council members, permanent and non-permanent — they pledge not to vote against credible action to prevent or halt mass atrocities. Liechtenstein “veto initiative” (UNGA Resolution 76/262, April 2022): whenever a veto is cast, the General Assembly meets within 10 working days to debate it; the vetoing member is invited to explain its vote. Common feature: all three are political and moral commitments, not legally binding, and none amends the Charter. Figure 3 — From Charter to restraint: a timeline of the veto debate 1945UN Charter;Art. 27(3)1950Uniting forPeace, Res. 3771965UNSC enlarged11 → 152005R2P at WorldSummit2013Ghouta; Frenchcode proposal2015French–Mexican+ ACT code2022LiechtensteinRes. 76/2622026128 States;U.K. joinsSelected milestones; spacing is not to scale.Also relevant: IGN on UNSC reform (from 2009) and the Pact for the Future (2024). The trend is clear: since formal amendment is blocked, reformers have shifted to norms, pledges and procedures. The Spectrum of Options Figure 4 — Five ways to deal with the veto, from least to most difficult Easier — no Charter changeHarder — Charter amendment (Art. 108)Status quoVeto usedfreely by P5AccountabilityExplain vetobefore UNGALiechtenstein(adopted 2022)RestraintNo veto inmass atrocitiesFrench–Mexican,ACT codeExtensionVeto for newpermanentmembersEqualityargumentAbolitionRemove vetoaltogetherNeeds P5’s ownratificationAnalytical framework drawn from the Parley discussion. The French proposal sits in the middle of the spectrum — reformist, not revolutionary. Two Perspectives From the Discussion The pragmatic view: the initiative matters precisely because it is modest. It seeks to change the behaviour of the P5 without the near-impossible task of rewriting the Charter. Accountability through the UNGA may not stop a determined veto but makes its use more costly. The realist view: the world may believe in sovereign equality, but power is unequally distributed; no international organisation can survive if it acts against the fundamental interests of major powers. It is easier for France and the U.K. — the lighter members of the P5 — to adopt principled positions than for the U.S., Russia or China. The selectivity problem: States interpret conflicts differently; words like “genocide” or “war crimes” are themselves contested, which weakens voluntary restraint. India’s Stake Membership record: India has served eight terms as a non-permanent member, most recently in 2021-22, and is a candidate for 2028-29. Group diplomacy: India seeks a permanent seat through the G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan); opposed by the Uniting for Consensus group; Africa’s demand is the Ezulwini Consensus (2005). On the veto: India’s long-standing position is that new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and privileges as existing ones, while the G4 has shown flexibility on deferring veto use pending a review. Process: reform talks run through the UNGA’s Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) since 2009; the Pact for the Future (2024) committed members to intensify efforts, including on the veto. Dilemma: supporting restraint on the veto is consistent with India’s multilateral values, but abolition would also dilute the privilege India hopes to share one day. Assessment Positive: momentum (128 States, two P5 members) builds a norm; norms can shape behaviour even without law, as the growth of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) shows. Limits: the three most frequent veto users have not joined; voluntary pledges have no enforcement. Structural question unresolved: the Council still reflects the 1945 power order, with no permanent member from Africa, Latin America or India — its legitimacy deficit remains. Way forward: combine procedural accountability (the Liechtenstein model), greater use of the UNGA (Uniting for Peace) and continued pressure for expansion, rather than waiting for abolition. ◈ Prelims Hooks The word “veto” is not in the UN Charter; the power flows from Article 27(3). Charter amendment: Article 108 — needs ratification by all P5. Resolution 76/262 (2022): UNGA debate within 10 working days of a veto. Uniting for Peace, Resolution 377(V) (1950): UNGA can act when the Council is deadlocked. ✎ Mains Practice Question “The veto in the UN Security Council cannot be abolished, but it can be restrained.” Discuss the recent initiatives to regulate the use of the veto and examine their implications for India’s pursuit of permanent membership. 15 marks · 250 words

In-Depth News Analysis8 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity & GovernanceGS Paper II 01Removal of the Chief Election Commissioner — The Process International RelationsGS Paper II 02U.S.–Denmark–Greenland Defence Deal & the Arctic03UN Charter ‘Enemy State’ Clauses — Japan’s Demand Indian EconomyGS Paper III 04Make in India at 12 — An Independent Scorecard05Tripling India’s GDP — Rupee vs Dollar Arithmetic06Alternatives to SWIFT — CIPS, SPFS, mBridge & India07RBI VRRR & OMO Sales — Absorbing Surplus Liquidity Science & TechnologyGS Paper III 08AI Agent Breach of an Australian Government Portal Polity & GovernanceGeneral Studies Paper II 01 How Can a Chief Election Commissioner Be Removed? The Constitutional Safeguards Behind ECI Independence GS-II · Polity — Constitutional Bodies, Elections (Art. 324)Prelims + MainsThe Indian Express · 25 Sep 2026 Following reports of internal dissent within the Election Commission of India (ECI), the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha has demanded the Chief Election Commissioner’s (CEC) resignation, and Opposition parties have said they will move a removal motion in both Houses. The episode brings the constitutional machinery for removing the CEC into focus. ◈ Static Background — The Election Commission From Basics Why an independent election body? In a democracy, the government of the day is itself a contestant in elections. The umpire must therefore be insulated from it. The Constitution does this through Part XV (Articles 324–329), with Article 324 vesting the “superintendence, direction and control” of elections in the ECI. Established: 25 January 1950 — observed as National Voters’ Day since 2011. First CEC: Sukumar Sen. Scope: elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice-President. (Panchayat and municipal polls are run by State Election Commissions under Articles 243K and 243ZA.) Composition: single-member for most of its history; multi-member since 1 October 1993 — one CEC and two Election Commissioners (ECs). Decision-making: the CEC is first among equals; decisions are to be unanimous as far as possible, otherwise by majority — upheld in T.N. Seshan v. Union of India (1995). ▤ Appointment & Tenure — The 2023 Law at a Glance Law: Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 — replaced the 1991 Act. Search Committee: headed by the Union Law Minister with two Secretary-level officers; shortlists five names. Selection Committee: Prime Minister (chair), Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha (or leader of the largest Opposition party), and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM. The President appoints on its recommendation. Eligibility: persons who have held posts equivalent to Secretary to the Government of India, of integrity, with knowledge and experience of managing elections. Tenure: 6 years or till age 65, whichever is earlier; no re-appointment. Service conditions: salary and benefits equal to a Judge of the Supreme Court. Lineage — How the Appointment Law Evolved 1950–2023: Article 324(2) envisaged a parliamentary law, but none was made; the President appointed on the advice of the Union Government. March 2023 — Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India: a Constitution Bench ordered that, until Parliament legislated, appointments be made on the advice of a committee of the PM, LoP and Chief Justice of India. December 2023 — New Act: Parliament legislated, replacing the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister — giving the executive a 2:1 majority on the panel. Petitions challenging this remain before the Supreme Court. Removal — The Heart of Independence Under Article 324(5), the CEC can be removed only “in like manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court”. The same protection is repeated in Section 11(2) of the 2023 Act. His conditions of service also cannot be varied to his disadvantage after appointment. Grounds (Article 124(4)): only “proved misbehaviour or incapacity”. Misbehaviour covers corruption, abuse of office and conduct incompatible with the office; incapacity means inability to perform duties. Other ECs and Regional Commissioners: removable only on the recommendation of the CEC — a weaker protection, often criticised as making ECs dependent on the CEC. Figure 1 — The removal process (borrowed from the procedure for Supreme Court judges) 1. Notice of motion≥100 Lok Sabha MPs or≥50 Rajya Sabha MPs2. AdmissionSpeaker / Chairman mayadmit or refuse3. Inquiry CommitteeSC Judge + HC Chief Justice+ distinguished jurist(Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968)4. If found guilty:motion taken up in the HouseIf not guilty →motion ends here5. Special majorityin EACH House: majority oftotal membership AND ≥ 2/3of members present & voting(same session)6. Address tothe PresidentPresident orders removalTrack record:No CEC and no Supreme Court judge has ever been removed.The motion against SC Justice V. Ramaswami (1993) failed in the Lok Sabha; a motion to remove aCEC, submitted in March 2026, was not admitted by the presiding officers in April 2026. The deliberately high bar — admission, judicial inquiry and a special majority in both Houses — is what insulates the CEC from political pressure. ▤ The Current Episode — Key Facts March 12, 2026: Opposition MPs submitted removal notices — signed by 130 Lok Sabha and 63 Rajya Sabha members — citing the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls and alleging partisan conduct. April 2026: the Lok Sabha Speaker and Rajya Sabha Chairman declined to admit the motions, without recording reasons. September 2026: a newspaper investigation reported that the two Election Commissioners had raised internal objections to ECI decisions and processes, including some linked to the SIR; a fresh motion has been announced. Issues for Analysis Presiding officers’ discretion: the Judges (Inquiry) Act lets the Speaker/Chairman refuse a notice after “consulting such persons” as they think fit — but it does not require reasons, reducing transparency at the gatekeeping stage. Unequal protection: the CEC enjoys judge-like tenure security, but ECs can be removed on the CEC’s recommendation — the Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) and the Law Commission’s 255th Report (2015) recommended equal protection for all Commissioners. Executive-dominated appointments: the 2023 panel has two members from the ruling side; critics argue independence depends as much on appointment as on removal. Internal dissent: a multi-member body is designed to allow disagreement; recording dissent (as the Seshan judgment contemplated) can strengthen, not weaken, institutional credibility. Balance: removal must stay difficult to protect the umpire; frequent removal motions risk politicising the institution too. ✎ Mains Practice Question “The independence of the Election Commission rests as much on how its members are appointed as on how they can be removed.” Examine this statement with reference to Article 324 and the 2023 law on appointments. 15 marks · 250 words International RelationsGeneral Studies Paper II 02 U.S.–Denmark–Greenland Agreement: Permanent Basing Rights, and What It Means for the Arctic Order GS-II · IR — Effect of Policies of Developed Countries, NATO, ArcticGS-I · Geography — Polar RegionsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · 19 Sep 2026 After months of pressure — including threats of acquisition and tariffs — the United States, Denmark and Greenland have agreed on an arrangement granting the U.S. permanent access, basing and overflight rights in Greenland and a veto over “sensitive investments” by its adversaries. It is to be signed on the sidelines of the UNGA, subject to parliamentary approval in Denmark and Greenland. ◈ Static Background — Greenland From Basics Geography: the world’s largest island (~2.17 million sq km), lying north-east of Canada; more than two-thirds lies within the Arctic Circle. About 80% is covered by the Greenland Ice Sheet, the second-largest body of ice after Antarctica. People: ~56,000 inhabitants, mostly Inuit; capital Nuuk. Political status: a self-governing (autonomous) territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. Colonised from 1721; integrated into Denmark in 1953; Home Rule in 1979; Self-Government Act, 2009 recognised the Greenlandic people’s right to independence. Denmark retains foreign affairs and defence. Europe link: Greenland left the EEC in 1985 (after a 1982 referendum, mainly over fisheries) — though Denmark remains in the EU. Resources: significant rare-earth, uranium, zinc and other mineral deposits, increasingly accessible as the ice retreats. Figure 2 — Greenland’s strategic location Greenland sits on the shortest path between North America and Eurasia across the Arctic — the logic behind Pituffik’s missile-warning role. Base geography: Natural Earth 1:10m (public domain); features plotted to real coordinates. Historical Anchor — America’s Long Interest 1917: the U.S. bought the Danish West Indies (now the U.S. Virgin Islands) from Denmark — a precedent often cited. 1941–45: the U.S. occupied Greenland during World War II after Germany overran Denmark, to protect North Atlantic shipping. 1946: the U.S. offered to buy Greenland for $100 million; Denmark refused. 1951 — Defense of Greenland Agreement: gave the U.S. basing and overflight rights; led to Thule Air Base, renamed Pituffik Space Base in 2023. Updated in 2004 (Igaliku) with Greenland as a party, requiring prior notice for expansion. 2019 onwards: repeated U.S. proposals to purchase the island, rejected by Denmark and Greenland. ▤ The New Agreement — What Is Known Permanent U.S. access, basing and overflight rights, with no expiry date. No non-NATO country may establish a base in Greenland. Only the U.S. and its allies may make unspecified “sensitive investments”. The arrangement is to survive Greenlandic independence, per a U.S. official. Denmark says it recognises the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Denmark and Greenland and the right to self-determination. Pending: parliamentary approval in Copenhagen and Nuuk; operational details not disclosed. Why Greenland Matters — The Strategic Logic Missile defence: the shortest trajectory for missiles between Russia and North America crosses the Arctic; Pituffik hosts early-warning and space surveillance systems for the U.S. and NATO. GIUK Gap: the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom gap is a naval chokepoint for monitoring submarine movement into the North Atlantic. New sea routes: melting ice is opening the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route, shortening Asia–Europe shipping. Critical minerals: rare earths are central to the U.S. effort to reduce dependence on China. Great-power rivalry: China calls itself a “near-Arctic state” (2018 Arctic White Paper) and promotes a Polar Silk Road; Russia has expanded its Arctic military presence. Concerns and Criticism Coercive diplomacy within an alliance: threats of force and tariffs against Denmark — a founding NATO member (1949) — strained transatlantic trust. Self-determination: a perpetual deal binding a future independent Greenland raises questions of consent by the Greenlandic people. Economic sovereignty: a U.S. veto on “sensitive investments” limits Greenland’s ability to choose partners for mining and infrastructure. Arctic militarisation: risks eroding the Arctic’s tradition of low tension and scientific cooperation under the Arctic Council. ◈ India’s Arctic Connect Arctic Council: set up by the Ottawa Declaration (1996); 8 member States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, U.S.). India has been an Observer since 2013. Himadri — India’s Arctic research station at Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard (Norway), since 2008. India’s Arctic Policy (2022) — six pillars: science and research, climate and environmental protection, economic and human development, transportation and connectivity, governance and international cooperation, and national capacity building. Why it matters to India: Arctic warming is linked to changes in the Indian monsoon and to sea-level rise along India’s coastline. ✎ Mains Practice Question The Arctic is emerging as a theatre of great-power competition. In the light of the recent U.S.–Denmark–Greenland agreement, discuss the strategic significance of Greenland and the implications of Arctic militarisation for India’s interests. 15 marks · 250 words 03 Japan Seeks Deletion of the UN Charter’s “Enemy State” Clauses: A Relic of 1945 That Refuses to Go GS-II · IR — UN Structure & Reform, Japan–China–RussiaPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · 25 Sep 2026 Addressing the UN General Assembly, Japan’s Prime Minister called for removal of the “enemy states” references in the UN Charter — clauses that China and Russia have recently invoked against Japan’s defence build-up and territorial claims. ◈ Static Background — What the Charter Says The UN Charter came into force on 24 October 1945, weeks after the end of World War II. The victorious Allies wanted a legal safeguard against the revival of militarism in the defeated Axis powers — Germany, Italy and Japan and their allies. Article 53(2): defines an “enemy state” as any State which, during World War II, was an enemy of any signatory of the Charter. Article 53(1): enforcement action by regional arrangements normally needs Security Council authorisation — but an exception is made for measures against enemy states. Article 107: nothing in the Charter invalidates action taken against enemy states by the governments responsible for such action — i.e., no prior UNSC approval needed. Article 77: territories detached from enemy states could be placed under the Trusteeship System. Why the Clauses Are Still There Declared obsolete: the UNGA recognised them as obsolete in 1995, and the 2005 World Summit Outcome resolved to delete the references. The amendment lock — Article 108: a Charter amendment needs adoption by two-thirds of UNGA members and ratification by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members — each in its own national process. Fear of a domino effect: P5 members worry that reopening the Charter’s text could open the door to demands for wider UNSC reform. Legal effect: most experts regard the clauses as moribund; Japan (a UN member since 1956) is bound by and protected under the Charter like any other member. Their value today is largely rhetorical. The Current Context — Rising Pressure on Tokyo China: tensions rose after Japan’s PM indicated in November 2025 that Japan could respond militarily if China attacked Taiwan; China has since restricted rare-earth magnet supplies to Japanese firms and held drills near Japan. Beijing calls the clauses a safeguard of the post-war order. Russia: argues the clauses invalidate Japan’s claims to the southern Kuril Islands; it has held military exercises near Japan, and its President visited the disputed islands in August. Japan’s defence shift: Japan plans to raise defence spending to about 2% of GDP, a break from post-war restraint under Article 9 of its Constitution, which renounces war. Figure 3 — The Kuril Islands between Japan and Russia Japan calls the southern four islands — Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai group — its “Northern Territories”; they have been under Moscow’s control since 1945. Map as supplied (BBC News); reproduced with credit for educational use. ▤ The Kuril Dispute — Timeline 1855 — Treaty of Shimoda: border drawn between Etorofu (Japan) and Urup (Russia). 1875 — Treaty of St Petersburg: Japan got all the Kurils in exchange for recognising Russian control of Sakhalin. 1945: Soviet forces occupied the islands at the end of World War II. 1951 — San Francisco Peace Treaty: Japan renounced claims to the Kurils, but the USSR did not sign it, and the southern islands’ status remained disputed. 1956 — Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration: restored diplomatic ties and promised Shikotan and Habomai after a peace treaty — which has never been concluded. Relevance for India G4 partners: India and Japan (with Brazil and Germany) jointly seek permanent UNSC membership; Japan’s push links Charter cleanup to broader reform. Lesson: even an issue on which the UNGA has agreed (the 2005 decision) cannot move without P5 ratification — showing how hard structural reform is. Indo-Pacific: growing China–Japan friction shapes the Quad and regional supply chains, including rare earths. ✎ Mains Practice Question The persistence of the “enemy state” clauses in the UN Charter, despite being declared obsolete, illustrates the rigidity of the UN system. Discuss, with reference to the Charter’s amendment procedure and its implications for UNSC reform. 10 marks · 150 words Indian EconomyGeneral Studies Paper III 04 Make in India at 12: Twelve Metrics Show Output Gains, but No Structural Shift in Growth, Jobs or Exports GS-III · Industrial Policy, Growth, Investment ModelsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · 25 Sep 2026 On the campaign’s 12th anniversary, an analysis of 12 metrics across growth, investment, employment and exports finds that manufacturing has not materially raised its share of India’s economy or global trade — and that incentive-scheme gains are concentrated in a handful of sectors. ◈ Static Background — Why the Share of Manufacturing Matters Structural transformation is the movement of workers from low-productivity farming to higher-productivity industry and services. East Asian economies grew rich by making manufacturing a large share of output and jobs before services took over. India’s path has been different: services grew first, and manufacturing’s share has stagnated — a pattern economist Dani Rodrik called “premature deindustrialisation” (2015). Make in India (September 2014) aimed to reverse it, adopting the National Manufacturing Policy 2011 goal of a 25% share of GDP. GVA vs GDP: Gross Value Added measures output by sector; GDP = GVA + product taxes − product subsidies. IIP: the Index of Industrial Production, a monthly volume index from MoSPI, covering mining, manufacturing and electricity. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation — spending on new machinery, buildings and infrastructure; the best proxy for investment. New series: national accounts have been revised to a new base year (2022-23), so old and new series are not directly comparable. ▤ The Scorecard — Key Findings Growth: manufacturing outgrew the overall economy in only 6 of 12 years (old series). The new series shows it ahead in all three available years (2023-24 to 2025-26), but the gap is narrowing. IIP: manufacturing beat the overall index in only 3 of 12 years (old series); in the new series it matched in 2023-24 and lagged in the next two years. Share in GVA: lower in 2025-26 than in 2014 on the old series; new series shows a rise from 14.6% (2022-23) to 15.6% (2025-26). Exports: non-petroleum goods exports rose 53%, from $253.5 bn (2014-15) to $388.3 bn (2025-26) — versus a 400%+ rise in the preceding 12 years (on a smaller base). Global share: India’s share of world merchandise exports rose from ~0.8% (2002) to 1.7% (2013) — and is still ~1.7% in 2025-26 (UNCTAD). Private investment: private-sector GFCF as a share of GDP was lower in 2023-24 than in 2014-15; in the new series, GFCF/GDP has been falling since 2022-23. FDI: manufacturing FDI grew slower than total FDI in 7 of 12 years, though its share rose from ~48% to 55%. Capacity utilisation (RBI): rising but still below the ~80% threshold that usually triggers new investment. Bank credit to industry: growing strongly, led by MSMEs — but likely for working capital rather than new capacity. PLI: 14 schemes (2020–21) drew ₹2.4 lakh crore of investment by March 2026; the top five sectors — solar modules, pharmaceuticals, automobiles & components, specialty steel and large-scale electronics — account for ~83%. Figure 4 — Exports kept the same trajectory; global share flat since 2014 The dotted line marks the launch of Make in India: neither the export curve nor India’s global share shows a break at that point. Chart courtesy The Hindu, 25 September 2026 (data: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, UNCTAD); reproduced with credit for educational use. Figure 5 — Twelve years, at a glance ImprovedFlat / marginalWeak• PLI investment ₹2.4 lakh cr• Mfg share of FDI 48% → 55%• Bank credit to industry• Non-petroleum exports$253.5 bn → $388.3 bn• Mfg share of GVA (newseries) 14.6% → 15.6%• Global export sharestuck at ~1.7%• Capacity utilisationrising, still below 80%• Mfg beat GDP growth inonly 6 of 12 years• Private GFCF / GDP down• PLI concentrated: top 5sectors ≈ 83%• Export growth slower thanthe previous 12 years Classification by Legacy IAS from figures reported in the analysis. Reading the Evidence — Why the Structural Shift Has Not Come Weak private investment: firms invest only when demand strains capacity; utilisation below 80% signals slack demand. Assembly-led growth: gains in electronics and phones depend heavily on imported components, adding less domestic value. Global headwinds: rising protectionism, tariff wars and the China+1 competition from Vietnam, Bangladesh and Mexico. Factor-market frictions: land acquisition, logistics costs, power tariffs and contract enforcement still raise costs; the four Labour Codes aim to ease labour rigidities. Jobs deficit: manufacturing’s employment share has not risen enough to absorb workers leaving agriculture. The Other Side — Where Progress Is Real Specific sectors — mobile phones, defence, pharmaceuticals, solar modules — have scaled up sharply. Infrastructure (PM GatiShakti, dedicated freight corridors) and the National Single Window System reduce future costs. The new national-accounts series shows a modest, recent rise in manufacturing’s share. ✎ Mains Practice Question “Despite incentive schemes, India’s manufacturing sector has not materially increased its share in growth, employment or global exports.” Critically analyse the reasons and suggest a strategy to achieve structural transformation. 15 marks · 250 words 05 Can India’s Economy Triple in a Decade? Why the Answer Depends on the Currency GS-III · Growth & Development, Exchange RatePrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · 25 Sep 2026 A leading global banker recently predicted that India’s economy could be three times its current size in ten years. The claim is a useful exercise in growth arithmetic: tripling in rupee terms is plausible, but tripling in dollar terms would require nearly doubling the growth rate of the past 12 years. ◈ Static Background — Four Concepts to Get Right Nominal GDP: output valued at current prices — it rises with both real growth and inflation. Real GDP: output at constant prices; nominal GDP ÷ GDP deflator. This is the “growth rate” usually quoted. Dollar GDP: nominal rupee GDP ÷ exchange rate (₹ per $). Used for international rankings (IMF, World Bank). PPP GDP: adjusts for price-level differences between countries; India is the world’s 3rd-largest economy by PPP. The key identity: dollar growth ≈ nominal rupee growth − rupee depreciation. A 10% rupee growth with 10% depreciation = zero growth in dollar terms. Rule of 70: doubling time ≈ 70 ÷ growth rate; tripling in 10 years needs ~11.6% a year (since 1.11610 ≈ 3). ▤ The Numbers $4.2 tn India’s GDP now (approx.) 6.2% $ CAGR, 2014–2026 3.2%/yr rupee depreciation vs $ 10% nominal ₹ CAGR, 2014–25 (old series) Business as usual (6.2% $ CAGR): GDP reaches only ~$7.58 tn by 2036. Tripling in dollars (~$12.46 tn by 2036): needs 11.6% a year in $ terms — about 14.7% nominal rupee growth. Tripling in rupees (₹370 trillion → ~₹1,109 trillion): needs 11.6% nominal rupee growth — above the past 10%, but far more achievable. Figure 6 — Tripling in dollars vs rupees The gap between the two curves in Chart 2 is the cost of a steadily depreciating rupee. Charts courtesy The Indian Express, 25 September 2026 (source: IMF); reproduced with credit for educational use. Official Targets — A Brief History 2018: a $5-trillion economy target, first for 2025, later advanced to 2022 — India was at ~$2.7 tn then; it is yet to be achieved. Viksit Bharat @2047: developed-nation status by the centenary of Independence, often quantified at $30–35 trillion. What Would It Take? Higher real growth — sustained 8%+ through investment, exports and productivity. A stable rupee — lower inflation differential with the U.S., a narrower current-account deficit and strong capital inflows. Why the dollar view matters: foreign investors measure returns in dollars, so depreciation directly erodes their gains. Caution: a higher nominal figure driven by inflation is not a welfare gain; per-capita real income is the better measure of development. ✎ Mains Practice Question Distinguish between nominal, real and dollar-denominated GDP. Why does exchange-rate depreciation make headline targets such as a “$5-trillion economy” harder to achieve, and what policy mix can address this? 10 marks · 150 words 06 Beyond SWIFT: How CIPS, SPFS and mBridge Are Faring, and Where India Stands GS-III · Banking, External Sector, Payment SystemsGS-II · Groupings — BRICSPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Text & Context The New Delhi Declaration of the recent BRICS Summit resolved to expand trade and settlement in national currencies. Sanctions and the use of the dollar as a policy tool have pushed many Global South economies to explore alternatives to the SWIFT network — with uneven results. ◈ Static Background — What SWIFT Actually Does SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) is a messaging network, not a payment system. When an Indian bank pays a bank in Germany, SWIFT carries the standardised instruction; the money itself moves through correspondent bank accounts. Founded: 1973; a bank-owned cooperative headquartered in Belgium, overseen by the National Bank of Belgium with G10 central banks. Scale: over 11,000 institutions in 200+ countries and territories. Weaponisation: Iranian banks were cut off in 2012; several Russian banks in 2022 after the Ukraine war. Settlement systems: dollar payments finally clear through the U.S.-based CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payments System) and Fedwire — the real source of U.S. leverage. Figure 7 — The main alternatives compared SystemCIPSSPFSmBridgeBackerPeople’s Bank ofChinaBank of Russia5 central banks; BISexited Oct 2024Launched201520142019 (MVP stagein 2024)TypeYuan clearing &settlementFinancial messaging(SWIFT substitute)Multi-CBDC platform onits own blockchainReachParticipants in 120+countries; ~¥680 bn/dayavg. (2025)440 entities (2023),100+ non-residentsChina–Gulf tradesettlement in renminbi None matches SWIFT’s network; each is tied to a single currency or bloc, which limits neutrality and trust. How the Alternatives Are Faring CIPS (China): lets banks clear yuan transactions onshore. Its appeal grew after the renminbi joined the IMF’s SDR basket in 2016. All BRICS members except India have CIPS participants. Still much smaller than CHIPS. SPFS (Russia): built in 2014 after Crimea-related sanctions; became essential after 2022. Iran’s SEPAM system is linked to it. Project mBridge: members — the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank of Thailand, Central Bank of the UAE, the PBoC’s Digital Currency Institute and the Saudi Central Bank. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) exited on 31 October 2024, amid reports of concern that it could help evade sanctions. ▤ India’s Approach Rupee trade settlement: RBI framework of July 2022 using Special Rupee Vostro Accounts (SRVAs). India–Russia: roubles and rupees now account for about 96% of bilateral trade settlements, handled by 22 Russian and 17 Indian banks. Domestic messaging: SFMS (Structured Financial Messaging System), run by IDRBT, underpins NEFT and RTGS. Fast-payment links: UPI linked with Singapore’s PayNow (2023) and others; India is part of the BIS-incubated Project Nexus for linking instant-payment systems. BRICS 2026: reports suggested India would propose linking CBDCs (India’s e₹ pilot began in 2022) for cross-border payments, but it did not feature in the Declaration. Stance: India pursues de-risking, not de-dollarisation — it has not joined CIPS, reflecting strategic caution about China-centred systems. Assessment Network effects: SWIFT’s value lies in near-universal membership; fragmented alternatives raise costs. Trust deficit: replacing dollar dependence with yuan dependence is not attractive for many, including India. Rupee surplus problem: in rupee trade, partners with large trade surpluses (like Russia) accumulate rupees they find hard to use — a limit to scaling. Opportunity: India’s digital public infrastructure (UPI) gives it a neutral, interoperable model to offer. ✎ Mains Practice Question The weaponisation of the global financial system has spurred alternatives to SWIFT. Evaluate the prospects of these alternatives and suggest how India should position itself in the emerging cross-border payments architecture. 15 marks · 250 words 07 RBI Absorbs ₹71,971 Crore via Overnight VRRR: How Liquidity Management Works GS-III · Monetary Policy, BankingPrelims-orientedRBI release · news reports With surplus liquidity in the banking system at about ₹4.92 lakh crore, the RBI absorbed ₹71,971 crore through an overnight Variable Rate Reverse Repo (VRRR) auction (notified size ₹75,000 crore) at a cut-off of 5.24%, and is selling government securities through Open Market Operations (OMOs). ◈ Static Background — Liquidity From Basics Liquidity is the spare cash banks hold. Too much drives overnight interest rates below the RBI’s policy rate, weakening monetary control; too little pushes them above. The RBI’s operating target is the Weighted Average Call Rate (WACR), kept close to the repo rate. LAF corridor: the Liquidity Adjustment Facility (introduced 2000) has a floor — the Standing Deposit Facility (SDF), repo − 25 bps (since April 2022) — and a ceiling — the Marginal Standing Facility (MSF), repo + 25 bps. VRRR: the RBI borrows surplus funds from banks for a set period at a rate set by auction, between the SDF rate and repo. OMO sale: the RBI sells government securities; banks pay cash, which is absorbed — a more durable tool than VRRR. ▤ Why Liquidity Is in Surplus — and What RBI Is Doing Sources: heavy inflows into FCNR(B) deposits (foreign-currency deposits of NRIs), which banks swap with the RBI for rupees; and month-end government spending on salaries and pensions. OMO sales: ₹50,000 crore (17 Sept) + ₹25,000 crore (21 Sept); a final ₹25,000 crore tranche due on 28 Sept — ₹1 lakh crore in all. Objective: keep overnight rates aligned with the policy rate so that monetary transmission works as intended. ✎ Mains Practice Question Explain the instruments available to the RBI for managing systemic liquidity. Why is it important to keep overnight money-market rates close to the policy repo rate? 10 marks · 150 words Science & Technology — AI & Cyber SecurityGeneral Studies Paper III 08 First Known AI-Agent Breach of a Government Website: A Warning for Public-Facing Digital Systems GS-III · S&T — AI; Internal Security — Cyber SecurityPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · 25 Sep 2026 Australia’s Prime Minister disclosed that an OpenAI AI agent, while performing a routine research task in June 2026, gained unauthorised access to the government’s Medicare Statistics Reporting Service portal — reading non-public files and writing files to an internal server. It is described as the first known case of an AI system hacking a government network. ◈ Static Background — Agentic AI and “Misalignment” A chatbot answers questions; an AI agent acts — it browses websites, runs code and completes multi-step tasks on its own. This autonomy is useful, but it means the system can take actions nobody explicitly asked for. Misalignment: when an AI pursues a goal in ways its developers or users did not intend or would not approve. Specification gaming: achieving the literal objective (“get the data”) by an undesirable route (bypassing access controls). Sandbox escape: a model breaking out of the restricted environment in which it is being tested. Loss of control: the broader concern that increasingly capable systems may act beyond meaningful human oversight. ▤ The Incident — Key Facts Target: a public-facing portal run by Services Australia, holding aggregate Medicare statistics (bulk-billing, immunisation, organ-donor register data) — no evidence of personal data being accessed. How: blocked by the website, the agent tried alternative routes instead of stopping, eventually reaching non-public files. Reporting gap: the company became aware in August and informed Australian officials on 10 September; the case was not among the cases it had just published under a new misalignment-reporting framework. Response: a forensic investigation and a new taskforce to examine whether processes for identifying and reporting AI-related cyber incidents are adequate. Security of the portal was likened to a “fence” rather than a “fortress”. Pattern: developers including OpenAI, Anthropic and Meta have disclosed cases in 2026 where models under cybersecurity evaluation accessed real-world systems — through sandbox escape or misconfigured test environments. Global stage: the heads of OpenAI and Anthropic briefed the UN Security Council on risks from advanced AI, calling for government roles and international cooperation on safety. Why It Matters Legacy systems, new threats: many government portals were built to keep out casual users, not tireless autonomous software that probes repeatedly. Liability gap: who is responsible — the developer, the deployer or the user who set the task? Existing cyber laws assume a human intruder. Disclosure norms: the two-month delay shows the need for mandatory, time-bound reporting of AI incidents. ◈ India’s Framework — Prelims Hooks IT Act, 2000: Section 43 (penalty for unauthorised access) and Section 66 (computer-related offences); Section 70A — NCIIPC for critical information infrastructure; Section 70B — CERT-In. CERT-In Directions (April 2022): cyber incidents must be reported within 6 hours. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 — obligations on data fiduciaries, including breach notification. IndiaAI Mission (2024) with the IndiaAI Safety Institute; India AI Governance Guidelines (2025); India hosted the AI Impact Summit in February 2026. Global: Bletchley Declaration (2023); EU AI Act (in force 2024); UN Scientific Panel and Global Dialogue on AI Governance (2025). Way Forward Security audits of public-facing government systems for resistance to automated, agentic access. Mandatory incident reporting by AI developers, aligned with CERT-In timelines. Guardrails in agent design: stop-on-block behaviour, human approval for sensitive actions, activity logs. Clear liability rules in the proposed Digital India Act for harms caused by autonomous systems. ✎ Mains Practice Question The rise of autonomous AI agents poses new challenges for cyber security and legal accountability. Discuss in the light of recent incidents, and suggest safeguards India should adopt for its public digital infrastructure. 15 marks · 250 words