Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items

Core TopicImportantConcise

OpinionsGS Papers I & II

01Middle Powers in a Fragmenting World Order02Zero FIR & Victim-Centric Criminal Procedure

OpinionsSigned Op-Eds · GS Papers I & II

01

The Middle-Power Moment: Agency, Reform and Risk in a Fragmenting World Order

Core TopicOpinionGS-II · IR — Global Groupings, Multilateral Institutions, India’s Foreign PolicyPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Op-Ed

As the post-1945 order weakens and great-power rivalry intensifies, a group of states that are neither superpowers nor small states — the middle powers — is being seen as a possible stabilising force in world politics.

◈ The Basics — What Is a “Middle Power”?

A middle power is a state whose capabilities and influence fall below the great powers but well above small states. It can shape outcomes in its region and on selected global issues, but it cannot set the rules of the international system alone.

• Early idea: in 1589, the Italian political thinker Giovanni Botero classified states as great, middle and small, and described middle states as stable enough to hold their own.
• Modern usage: the term entered diplomacy in the 1940s, when Canada argued at the San Francisco Conference (1945) that states contributing substantially to world order deserved a role in proportion to that contribution.
• Not a formal status: unlike the P5 of the UN Security Council, “middle power” is an analytical category, not a legal one, so no list of members is agreed.

Static Anchor — Three Ways Scholars Identify Middle Powers

• Positional (capability) approach: ranks states by measurable power — GDP, population, military strength, technology. It is simple but mechanical.
• Behavioural approach: defines middle powers by what they do — multilateralism, coalition-building, mediation and “good international citizenship”. It is associated with Cooper, Higgott and Nossal’s Relocating Middle Powers (1993).
• Identity approach: a state is a middle power if it sees and presents itself as one.
• Traditional vs emerging (Eduard Jordaan, 2003): traditional middle powers (Canada, Australia, the Nordic states) are wealthy, stable democracies that support the existing order. Emerging middle powers (Brazil, South Africa, India, Türkiye, Mexico) are regionally influential and seek to reform it.

Figure 1 — Locating middle powers: three lenses and a toolkit

GREAT POWERSRule-makersMIDDLE POWERSNorm-shapers, bridgesSMALL STATESLargely rule-takersHOW TO IDENTIFY THEM — THREE LENSESPositionGDP, population,military, technologyBehaviourMultilateralism,coalitions, mediationIdentitySelf-image anddiplomatic role claimedWHAT THEY DO — THE TOOLKITIssue coalitionsIBSA, MIKTA, G4MediationConflicts, deadlocksNorm-shapingDigital, climate, healthBridgingWest ↔ Global SouthGoal: reform institutions, not replace them — rule-shapers, not yet rule-makers

Middle powers are defined less by size than by how they use their influence. Coalition-building and bridging are their main levers.

The Author’s Argument — In Brief

• Influence through agency: middle powers draw influence from strategic location, economic weight, diplomatic skill and normative appeal, rather than from the orbit of a superpower. They often have regional pre-eminence and are willing to engage beyond their neighbourhood.
• A diverse, loose group: the author names India, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, South Africa, Japan, Indonesia, Türkiye, Mexico and Germany as examples. Others, such as South Korea, the Netherlands, the UAE, Nigeria and Qatar, could qualify on particular issues. What unites them is shared dissatisfaction with an order that does not reflect their weight, not shared size or interests.
• Reform, not rupture: the UN Security Council still reflects 1945, which erodes its legitimacy. Middle powers question whose rules govern the system, but they also recognise that dismantling institutions would remove the protections they rely on.
• From rule-takers towards norm-shapers: middle powers are no longer passive, but they are not yet full rule-makers. They seek pragmatic, multi-vector diplomacy and fairer representation, and they champion development, climate justice, equitable trade and technology access.
• Room to act: a repositioning United States and an assertive China have created both space and constraint. Middle powers can convene issue-based coalitions, mediate conflicts and shape norms in digital governance, climate finance and global health.
• Recent evidence: India’s G20 presidency (2023), Brazil’s climate stewardship, South Africa’s activism on global health and vaccine equity, and Germany’s role in stabilising Europe while engaging the Indo-Pacific.
• Limits: middle powers are exposed to economic shocks and cannot replace great powers. Their realistic role is to moderate, mediate and innovate as stabilisers.

▤ Groupings & Initiatives Referenced — Static Facts

• IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa): formed through the Brasilia Declaration, 2003; a trilateral forum of large democracies from three continents.
• MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, Korea, Türkiye, Australia): launched in 2013 on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly; a self-described middle-power grouping.
• G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan): a joint push for permanent UNSC seats.
• G20: finance-ministers’ forum from 1999, leaders’ summit from 2008. India’s 2023 presidency produced the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration and admitted the African Union as a permanent member.
• IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor): announced at the G20 New Delhi Summit, September 2023.
• INSTC (International North–South Transport Corridor): agreement signed by India, Iran and Russia in 2000; a multimodal route linking India with Russia via Iran.
• Belt and Road Initiative: China’s connectivity programme, launched in 2013.
• UNSC structure: the only expansion came in 1965, when non-permanent seats rose from 6 to 10. Charter amendment under Article 108 needs ratification by two-thirds of members, including all P5.

India’s Position — Non-Alignment to Multi-Alignment

• Lineage: Non-Alignment (NAM, Belgrade, 1961) sought autonomy from Cold War blocs. India’s current multi-alignment pursues autonomy through parallel partnerships rather than distance from all.
• In practice: India sits in the Quad and in BRICS and the SCO, backs IMEC and INSTC, and has hosted the Voice of the Global South summits since 2023.
• Differentiated threat perceptions: the author notes that Brazil or Indonesia may view China mainly as an economic partner, while India’s view is shaped by an unresolved border. This explains why middle powers rarely act as a single bloc.

A Balanced Assessment

• Conceptual elasticity: a category that holds Japan and Germany (major economies) alongside much smaller states risks becoming too broad to explain behaviour.
• Collective-action problem: middle powers have competing interests and rivalries among themselves. Coalitions tend to be issue-specific and short-lived, not durable blocs.
• Alliance constraints: several listed states are treaty allies of a great power, which limits how independently they can act.
• India’s self-image: Indian strategic discourse often frames India as an aspiring “leading power”, so the middle-power label sits uneasily with its ambitions and scale.
• Minilateral proliferation: many overlapping groupings can fragment global governance as easily as they can reform it.
• Capacity gap: moving from norm-shaper to rule-maker requires material capacity, especially finance, technology and defence, that many middle powers still lack.

✎ Mains Practice Question

“The erosion of the post-1945 international order has opened space for middle powers to act as stabilisers rather than spectators.” Examine this statement, and discuss how India’s strategy of multi-alignment positions it within this emerging role. 15 marks · 250 words

02

Beyond the Zero FIR: Making Criminal Procedure Accessible to Survivors at Every Stage

Core TopicOpinionGS-II · Polity & Governance — Criminal Justice, Vulnerable Sections, Statutory BodiesGS-I · Society — Issues Relating to Women & ChildrenPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · Opinion

The Zero FIR lets a survivor register a complaint at any police station. The op-ed argues, however, that the same principle of accessibility must extend to every procedure that follows, or the burden of the criminal process returns to the survivor.

◈ The Basics — FIR and Zero FIR

A First Information Report (FIR) is the written record of information about a cognizable offence — one in which the police may arrest without a warrant and begin investigation without a magistrate’s order. It sets the criminal process in motion.

• Legal provision: formerly Section 154, CrPC, 1973; now Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, in force from 1 July 2024.
• Zero FIR: an FIR registered at any police station, irrespective of where the offence occurred. It initially carries the number “0” and is then transferred to the police station with territorial jurisdiction, which registers it as a regular FIR and investigates.
• Codified: Section 173(1) BNSS now expressly allows information to be given “irrespective of the area” of the offence. It also permits e-FIRs through electronic communication, to be signed within three days.
• Duty to register: in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2013), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that registering an FIR is mandatory where the information discloses a cognizable offence.

Static Anchor — Lineage of the Reform

• December 2012: after the Delhi gang-rape, the Justice J.S. Verma Committee was constituted. It submitted its report on 23 January 2013, within about a month, and recommended Zero FIRs for sexual offences.
• 2013: the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 broadened definitions of sexual offences and penalised public servants who fail to record information about them. The same year saw the creation of the Nirbhaya Fund.
• MHA advisories: the Ministry of Home Affairs has repeatedly told States that refusing an FIR on jurisdictional grounds invites prosecution and disciplinary action.
• 2023–24: the BNSS gave Zero FIR statutory footing. Under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), Section 199 (formerly Section 166A, IPC) punishes a public servant who fails to record such information with 6 months to 2 years of imprisonment.

The Author’s Argument — In Brief

• Acknowledged as progressive: the National Commission for Women’s chairperson has called Zero FIR one of the new criminal laws’ most progressive provisions, because it puts accessibility before technicalities.
• Resistance persists: despite advisories, police are still reported to need repeated persuasion before registering Zero FIRs.
• The gap after registration: once the FIR is transferred, every later step takes place in the jurisdictional district. These include spot identification, panchnama, medical examination, the statement before a magistrate and production before the Child Welfare Committee.
• An illustrative case: the author describes a 15-year-old survivor from a poor Mumbai household who was assaulted in Raigad district. She and her family were made to travel repeatedly, about four hours each way, at their own cost, and her elder brother, the family’s earner, lost wages.
• Cascading harm: a hospital near her home refused a medical termination of pregnancy. Admission elsewhere was followed by roughly 20 days without clarity, and interim compensation, meant to reach survivors within seven days, had not been paid months later.
• The proposal: the State should issue enforceable directions so that the medical examination, magistrate’s statement, CWC production and shelter placement take place near the survivor’s home. Where travel is unavoidable, the State should provide transport for the survivor and a companion.
• The test: a law is only as progressive as the cost it imposes on the victim. When reporting costs a family its income, safety and stability, silence becomes the rational choice.

Figure 2 — The survivor’s procedural journey: where access stops today

TODAYZero FIRNearest police stnTransferTo jurisdictional stnEvery later step in the other districtSpot panchnama · Medical exam · Magistrate statementCWC production · Shelter · Termination of pregnancyBurden on survivor: repeated travel · lost wages · delay · re-traumatisationResult: under-reporting and withdrawal from the processPROPOSED DOORSTEP MODELSurvivor’sresidenceMedical exam nearbyS. 184 BNSSStatement nearby / videoS. 183 & S. 530 BNSSLocal CWC & shelterJJ Act, 2015State-paid transportSurvivor + companion

Zero FIR solves where to report. The op-ed’s point is that where the rest of the process happens determines whether survivors stay in the system.

▤ The Legal Toolkit Already Available — Static Provisions

• Woman officer: under the proviso to Section 173(1) BNSS, information about specified sexual offences must be recorded by a woman police officer. If the survivor is disabled, it is recorded at her residence or a place of her choice.
• Medical examination: Section 184 BNSS (formerly 164A CrPC) — examination by a registered medical practitioner, with consent, within 24 hours. The report must be forwarded to the investigating officer within seven days.
• Statement before a magistrate: Section 183 BNSS (formerly 164 CrPC), recorded by a woman magistrate wherever possible.
• Electronic mode: Section 530 BNSS allows trials, inquiries and proceedings, including recording of evidence, to be held through audio-video electronic means.
• POCSO Act, 2012: because the survivor is a minor, Section 24 requires her statement to be recorded, as far as practicable, at her residence or a place of her choice, by a woman officer not below Sub-Inspector. Section 27 governs her medical examination.
• Child Welfare Committees: set up in every district under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, they decide care and protection, including support persons for child survivors.
• Termination of pregnancy: the MTP (Amendment) Act, 2021 raised the limit to 24 weeks for special categories, including survivors of rape and minors. Delay therefore directly narrows the survivor’s options.
• Victim compensation: Section 396 BNSS (formerly 357A CrPC) requires every State to run a Victim Compensation Scheme, administered by the Legal Services Authorities, with provision for interim relief. Maharashtra’s scheme for survivors of sexual violence is known as Manodhairya.
• Support institutions: One Stop Centres (Sakhi) since 2015, financed through the Nirbhaya Fund; Fast Track Special Courts since 2019.

Why It Matters

• Access to justice is part of Article 21 (right to life with dignity) and Article 39A (equal justice and free legal aid).
• Under-reporting: the NCRB recorded over 31,000 rape cases in 2022. Researchers widely regard recorded figures as an undercount, partly because the cost of pursuing a case deters families.
• Class dimension: the burden falls hardest on daily-wage and migrant households, for whom a lost day of work is a lost day’s food.
• Secondary victimisation: repeated retelling, travel and institutional indifference can be re-traumatising, which runs against the victim-centric spirit of the post-2013 reforms.

A Balanced Assessment

• Investigative needs are real: spot inspection, scene-of-crime evidence and certain identifications must happen where the offence took place. The design question is how to collect evidence there without requiring the survivor’s physical presence each time.
• Capacity limits: many districts lack enough women officers, women magistrates, forensic staff and medical facilities, so doorstep delivery will need resources and not just directives.
• Coordination: police, health, judiciary, CWCs and legal-services authorities answer to different departments. Inter-district cases need standard operating procedures and a designated nodal officer.
• Digital options: CCTNS (Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems) allows quick electronic transfer of Zero FIRs. Section 530 BNSS allows video recording of statements. Both can reduce travel if used consistently.
• Enforcement of existing law: many of the protections listed above already exist on paper. The gap is less about new legislation and more about implementation and accountability.

✎ Mains Practice Question

“The Zero FIR has made registration accessible, but access to justice for survivors of sexual violence ends at the threshold of the police station.” Critically examine the procedural barriers survivors face after registration, and suggest measures for a genuinely victim-centric criminal process. 15 marks · 250 words