The Hindu Editorials — 11 June 2026

11 June 2026 · The Hindu

Contents01

Not just what India manufactures, but what it discovers

Shivkumar Kalyanaraman & Kishore Paknikar · Indian Express · R&D Policy, Innovation Ecosystem, ANRF

GS 3 — S&T & EconomyGS 2 — GovernanceEssay

02

Economic story is one of transition. Challenges exist, but so do strengths

Soumya Kanti Ghosh · Indian Express · Indian Economy, FDI, BIT Framework, Rupee, Forex Reserves

GS 3 — Indian EconomyEssay — Growth & Resilience

Editorial 01 of 02

Article 01

Not just what India manufactures, but what it discovers

Shivkumar Kalyanaraman & Kishore Paknikar — The Indian Express

Relevance: R&D investment, national innovation ecosystem, ANRF, CSR-research convergence — core to GS 3 (Science & Technology, Economy) and Essay; touches GS 2 (governance of public institutions and multi-stakeholder policy design).

GS 3 — Science & TechnologyGS 3 — EconomyGS 2 — GovernanceEssay — Science, Sovereignty, Development

1 — Issue in Brief

• India's R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP has historically remained low compared to technologically advanced economies — creating a strategic vulnerability where the nation consumes technology without investing sufficiently in its creation, making it dependent on external intellectual property and innovation ecosystems for critical sectors including defence, health, and digital infrastructure.
• Research and innovation are still perceived as the exclusive responsibility of government institutions — not of industry, philanthropy, or CSR ecosystems — despite India possessing one of the world's largest CSR pools and a deep philanthropic tradition, both of which remain largely disconnected from the national science mission and its long-term strategic imperatives.
• The authors argue that research is invisible national infrastructure — its returns are delayed and difficult to quantify immediately, but its eventual societal impact (health, sustainability, security, competitiveness) is enormous, and nations that under-invest risk long-term strategic and economic dependency on external innovation ecosystems and foreign intellectual property.
• The Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF) is positioned not merely as a grant distributor but as a catalytic institution designed to build multi-stakeholder partnerships among government, academia, industry, start-ups, and philanthropy — a systemic shift from isolated public funding to a co-investment ecosystem model that can compound innovation capacity over time.

2 — Static Background

• India's Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a share of GDP has hovered around 0.6–0.7% for over a decade — compared to over 2% in China, 3% in the USA, 4.5% in South Korea, and 5.4% in Israel — reflecting a fundamental structural gap in the national innovation architecture that cannot be bridged through government appropriation alone.
• The Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF) was established under the ANRF Act, 2023, replacing the SERB Act, 2008, with a proposed outlay of Rs. 50,000 crore over five years — the largest single research investment commitment in India's post-independence history, designed to seed, grow, and promote R&D across universities, colleges, research institutions, and industry alike.
• India's CSR regime under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 mandates that companies above a specified threshold spend 2% of net profit on CSR activities. Research and innovation are included under eligible CSR activities, yet the proportion of CSR funds directed toward science and technology remains negligible relative to the scale of India's national innovation deficit.
• The Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (STIP), 2020 recognised the need to increase private sector R&D participation and called for raising India's GERD to 2% of GDP — a target that requires a fundamental behavioural shift in industry and philanthropy, not just higher government appropriation, since private sector currently contributes under 40% of India's total R&D spending.
• India's research funding model has remained government-dominated, unlike in China, South Korea, or the USA where private sector contributes 65–75% of total R&D spending. This structural imbalance means that when public budgets tighten, the entire innovation pipeline suffers — there is no private-sector buffer to absorb the shock or sustain long-cycle research programmes through budget cycles.

3 — Key Dimensions

• Research as national infrastructure: The editorial makes a conceptual reframe — science is not an academic luxury but a form of invisible infrastructure comparable to roads or power grids. Just as physical infrastructure enables economic activity, research infrastructure enables technological self-reliance, industrial competitiveness, and national security over the medium and long term — a framing with direct relevance to India's sovereignty goals.
• Multiplier effect of co-investment: Every rupee strategically co-invested through ANRF-style partnerships can potentially catalyse several-fold higher internal R&D investments within participating organisations — because institutional confidence in research triggers wider industrial risk-taking, which is how innovation ecosystems compound rather than grow linearly through isolated government grants or departmental schemes.
• Entry points for non-state actors: Participation need not begin with large outlays. Companies can support translational research aligned with national priorities; philanthropic foundations can fund doctoral fellowships, advanced instrumentation, or regional innovation clusters; industry associations can design challenge-driven innovation programmes; and successful start-ups can reinvest into deep-tech ecosystems that create the next generation of innovation leaders.
• Geopolitical dimension: Scientific capability is directly linked to technological sovereignty — the ability to make independent strategic choices without depending on external IP, foreign technology licences, or allied nations' goodwill in sharing critical knowledge. In semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, defence systems, and AI, nations without foundational research capacity become structurally dependent on those that have it.
• Democratising science as a societal movement: The editorial's normative argument is that the vision of an innovation-driven India cannot be achieved by a handful of elite institutions alone. Science must become a wider societal movement — embedded in the imagination of industry, philanthropy, academia, and civil society — for ANRF's catalytic model to produce the scale of transformation India's innovation deficit requires.

4 — Critical Analysis

• In favour — Corrects the public-goods problem: Research generates positive externalities that private actors cannot fully capture, explaining market under-investment. ANRF's co-investment model uses public funding as a catalyst to correct this structural market failure — reducing risk for private investors while aligning their contributions with national priorities rather than only short-cycle commercial returns with immediate payback periods.
• In favour — Builds ecosystem, not just output: Unlike traditional grant-making that produces papers or patents in isolation, the ANRF model is designed to build institutional confidence and cross-sector linkages across academia, industry, and start-ups — creating the connective tissue of an innovation ecosystem that compound-grows over time, as demonstrated in Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan over several decades.
• In favour — CSR-research convergence is underexplored: Given the scale of India's mandatory CSR ecosystem, even a small reorientation toward research fellowships, instrumentation, and translational projects would inject significant new capital into the science pipeline without requiring additional government expenditure — an enormous opportunity the editorial rightly highlights as currently wasted due to the absence of purpose-built CSR-science linkage frameworks.
• Against — Absorptive capacity gap in institutions: ANRF's success depends on the capacity of universities and research institutions to absorb, utilise, and account for large-scale funding. Many state universities and regional institutions lack the financial management, ethics oversight, IP management, and industry-liaison infrastructure required to deliver on co-investment partnerships at scale — a systemic constraint that ANRF's design does not yet adequately address.
• Against — Short-termism in industry remains structural: Indian industry has historically favoured technology licensing over indigenous R&D because the former offers faster, lower-risk returns. Without fiscal incentives (weighted deductions, patent box regimes, R&D tax credits) and a patient capital framework, the editorial's call for voluntary industrial co-investment may not translate into sustained, long-cycle commitments at the scale required to move India's GERD meaningfully.
• Against — Measurement and accountability gap: Research returns are delayed and non-linear, making standard outcome-measurement frameworks inadequate. Without robust, independent evaluation mechanisms tracking research utilisation, translation rates, and societal impact, ANRF risks replicating the input-focused accountability weaknesses of earlier SERB and DST schemes — measuring money spent rather than knowledge created or commercialised.

5 — Way Forward

• Redesign CSR guidelines under Section 135, Companies Act to create a dedicated R&D and innovation sub-category with incentivised reporting and public recognition — making it easier and more attractive for corporates to channel CSR funds toward doctoral fellowships, regional innovation clusters, and translational research aligned with national priority sectors like semiconductors, health technology, and clean energy.
• Introduce an R&D tax incentive architecture — including weighted deductions for industrial R&D investment, a patent box regime offering lower tax on IP-derived income, and start-up-specific deep-tech R&D credits — to reduce the risk-adjusted cost of private investment in long-cycle research and make industrial co-investment commercially rational, not just patriotically aspirational.
• Build institutional capacity in regional universities through ANRF-linked capacity grants for financial management systems, IP cells, industry-liaison offices, and research ethics boards — ensuring that increased funding can be effectively absorbed and governed by a wider range of institutions beyond the IISc/IIT/AIIMS cluster that currently dominates India's research output.
• Create a public ANRF dashboard tracking co-investment ratios, research-to-product translation rates, patent filings, and start-up spin-offs — making research outcomes visible to society, demonstrating value to potential philanthropic and industrial partners, and building the institutional credibility that sustains long-term participation from non-state actors.

6 — Data & Key Facts

0.6–0.7%India's GERD as % of GDP — well below global peers

4.5%South Korea's GERD (% of GDP) — benchmark for high-innovation economies

Rs. 50,000 CrANRF 5-year outlay — largest single research investment in India's history

2023ANRF Act enacted; replaced SERB Act, 2008

2%GERD target under STIP 2020 and CSR mandatory spend threshold (net profit)

65–75%Private sector share of R&D in USA, South Korea, China — vs. under 40% in India

• ANRF Act, 2023 — replaces SERB Act, 2008; ANRF governed by a Governing Board chaired by the Prime Minister; CEO from science/technology background; designed to function with operational flexibility unavailable to traditional government departments, enabling partnership-based research co-investment at scale.
• Science, Technology and Innovation Policy (STIP), 2020 — called for decentralised research, doubling researchers per lakh population, open-access science, and private sector contributing 50% of GERD — a target requiring structural change in industrial R&D culture, fiscal incentives, and institutional linkages that have yet to materialise at policy scale.

7 — Prelims Pointers

ANRF Act 2023 — replaces SERB Act 2008; Rs. 50,000 cr over 5 years; PM chairs Governing Board; catalyses govt-academia-industry-philanthropy research partnerships; not a grant-only body

GERD — Gross Expenditure on R&D; India ~0.6–0.7% GDP; STIP 2020 target 2%; private sector under 40% vs. 65–75% in advanced economies

Section 135, Companies Act 2013 — CSR mandate; 2% of net profit; R&D eligible; actual utilisation for science remains negligible despite India's large CSR ecosystem

SERB — Science & Engineering Research Board; replaced by ANRF under ANRF Act 2023; operated under DST; funded individual research grants only

STIP 2020 — Science Technology and Innovation Policy; open science, decentralised research, doubled researcher base, 50% private GERD target; policy blueprint not yet fully implemented

Patent Box Regime — lower tax on IP-derived income; used by UK, Netherlands; not yet adopted by India — a significant gap in the fiscal incentive architecture for private R&D investment

Exam note: ANRF ≠ SERB. SERB was a grant-giving body only; ANRF is a catalytic co-investment institution designed to bring in private sector and philanthropy. Also: ANRF Act 2023 replaces SERB Act 2008 — this statutory transition is frequently tested. Do not state SERB is still operational.

8 — Practice Mains Question

"India's research and innovation ecosystem suffers not from lack of talent but from lack of institutional imagination." Critically examine, with reference to ANRF and the role of non-state actors in science funding.

GS 3 | 15 marks | ~250 words | Science & Technology + Economy + Governance

• Intro: Frame the paradox — India produces world-class scientists but ranks poorly on GERD and global innovation indices. Introduce ANRF Act, 2023 as a structural response shifting from isolated public grants to catalytic co-investment across multiple stakeholders.
• Body 1 — What ANRF attempts: Catalytic co-investment model, multi-stakeholder design (govt, academia, industry, start-ups, philanthropy), institutional flexibility over traditional departmental rigidity, PM-chaired Governing Board signalling political priority.
• Body 2 — Non-state actors: CSR under-utilisation despite scale (Section 135), private sector short-termism (technology licensing preferred over R&D), philanthropy disconnected from science — evidence and structural causes including absent fiscal incentives like patent box regime.
• Conclusion: R&D tax incentives, CSR sub-category redesign, institutional capacity building in regional universities, public ANRF dashboard — and the idea that science must become a societal movement, not just a government programme, for India to achieve true technological sovereignty.

9 — Practice MCQ

Consider the following statements about the Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF):

1. ANRF was established under the ANRF Act, 2023, replacing the Science and Engineering Research Board (SERB) Act, 2008.
2. The Prime Minister chairs the Governing Board of ANRF.
3. ANRF is designed exclusively to fund government research institutions and excludes private universities, industry, and start-ups from its partnership framework.
4. India's Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) as a percentage of GDP is among the lowest compared to major economies like South Korea, USA, and China.

Which of the statements are correct?

(a) 1 and 2 only(b) 1, 2 and 4 only(c) 2, 3 and 4 only(d) 1, 2, 3 and 4

Editorial 02 of 02

Article 02

Economic story is one of transition. Challenges exist, but so do strengths

Soumya Kanti Ghosh — The Indian Express

Relevance: India's GDP growth trajectory, FDI trends, BIT framework, rupee depreciation, forex reserves — directly relevant to GS 3 (Indian Economy, External Sector) and Prelims data questions on macroeconomic indicators and investment policy.

GS 3 — Indian EconomyGS 3 — External SectorEssay — Growth, Reforms, Resilience

1 — Issue in Brief

• The editorial is a point-by-point evidence-based rebuttal of the claim that India has lost economic momentum due to weakening reforms, declining investor confidence, and a problematic revised Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) framework — challenging the evidentiary basis of each claim with specific empirical data, UNCTAD studies, and RBI reserve figures.
• The author argues that global shocks — COVID, supply-chain disruptions, geopolitical conflicts, financial tightening — must be factored into any fair assessment of India's post-2014 growth performance, and that once crisis years are excluded, the growth rate compares favourably with the pre-2014 period rather than showing structural decline.
• The India Model BIT, 2016 — which revised India's investment treaty framework — is defended as a balanced reassessment of investor rights versus the state's legitimate regulatory authority, consistent with a global trend of BIT renegotiation seen in Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Ecuador, none of which suffered FDI collapse as a result.
• On the rupee, the author pushes back against depreciation-as-mismanagement narratives, contextualising the 10.6% FY26 depreciation within India's strong forex reserve position (~$682 billion), a manageable current account deficit (~2% of GDP in FY27), and the RBI's demonstrated consistency in long-run exchange rate management over 25 years.

2 — Static Background

• India's Model BIT, 2016 replaced an earlier framework seen as overly tilted toward investor rights. Key changes included: narrower enterprise-based definition of investment, removal of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause, mandatory domestic exhaustion of remedies before international arbitration, and exclusion of taxation and government procurement from treaty coverage — each element designed to preserve sovereign regulatory space.
• Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are international agreements between two countries to promote and protect investments made by each country's nationals or companies in the other's territory. They typically include provisions for Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) — allowing foreign investors to directly sue host governments before international arbitral tribunals, bypassing domestic courts entirely.
• FDI inflows into India have remained broadly robust: gross FDI was approximately $95 billion in 2025–26. The distinction between gross FDI (total inflows) and net FDI (gross minus repatriation and outward investment) is critical — net FDI decline reflects increased profit repatriation by established multinationals and higher outward FDI by Indian companies, both natural features of a maturing economy integrating with global markets.
• The RBI's forex reserve management has been a consistent long-run policy objective. India's reserves reached ~$682 billion by April 2026 — providing approximately 11 months of import cover, well above the conventional adequacy threshold of 3–6 months. The RBI sold ~$53 billion in FY26 to defend the rupee, yet reserves remained at this level due to prior systematic accumulation.
• Current Account Deficit (CAD): India's CAD is expected to remain around 2% of GDP in FY27 — within manageable limits. A CAD below 2.5% of GDP is generally considered sustainable for an economy at India's stage of development and investment cycle, given its high domestic savings rate and diversified, services-led export base.

3 — Key Dimensions

• Growth comparison methodology: The editorial argues that comparing average GDP growth across two political periods without controlling for extraordinary external shocks produces misleading conclusions. Once COVID and crisis years are excluded, India's growth rate during 2014–2024 (~7.4%) compares favourably with 2005–2014 (~7.2%) — suggesting structural growth capacity has been maintained rather than structurally eroded by policy choices.
• BIT and FDI — the evidence gap: A UNCTAD 2014 study across 146 economies over 27 years found no conclusive evidence that BITs significantly increase bilateral FDI inflows. The G20 Investment Report (2020) further found that investor protection ranked only 10th among decision-influencing factors — below political stability, market size, infrastructure quality, and growth prospects, where India holds competitive advantages relative to peer emerging markets.
• Global reassessment of BIT frameworks: Brazil never ratified traditional BITs with ISDS but remained Latin America's largest FDI destination. South Africa, Indonesia, Ecuador, and Bolivia also revised or terminated investment treaties over concerns about sovereign policy flexibility. India's BIT revision is therefore not an outlier but part of a considered global trend toward rebalancing investor rights with legitimate regulatory space.
• Rupee depreciation — contextualising the narrative: The rupee depreciated 10.6% in FY26 — sharper than broad dollar strength alone explains. But over 25 years, average annual depreciation has been remarkably consistent across periods, reflecting stable long-run management. The "shock absorber" argument — letting the rupee fall freely — is critiqued as allowing market players to dictate to the central bank, delinked from macro fundamentals.
• Net FDI vs. gross FDI distinction: As Indian companies invest more abroad and established MNCs repatriate higher profits, net FDI figures naturally decline in a maturing economy without reflecting reduced investor confidence. Interpreting lower net FDI as capital flight or confidence loss misreads a structural feature of economic maturation — rising Indian corporate globalisation — as a policy failure signal.

4 — Critical Analysis

• In favour — Evidence-based rebuttal models good policy discourse: The editorial is methodologically disciplined — each counter-argument is backed by specific data sources (UNCTAD 2014, G20 Investment Report 2020, RBI reserve data, FDI statistics) rather than qualitative assertion, demonstrating how evidence-grounded economic debate should proceed when aggregate numbers are selectively deployed to support pre-formed conclusions.
• In favour — Global benchmarking on BITs is empirically sound: The BIT rebalancing argument is well-supported by international precedents. Brazil's FDI leadership without ISDS-BITs is a powerful empirical counterpoint to the claim that India's revised framework deters investment — confirming that economic fundamentals, not treaty architecture, drive long-term capital flows into large, fast-growing markets.
• In favour — Net vs. gross FDI distinction is analytically important: The confusion between declining net FDI and declining investor confidence is a genuine analytical error in public commentary. Higher outward FDI by Indian firms represents Indian companies internationalising — a sign of economic maturation and global ambition — not domestic economic weakness or loss of investor trust in the home market.
• Against — Rupee depreciation explanation may be incomplete: While 25-year average depreciation consistency is a valid observation, it does not fully explain why FY26 depreciation was sharper than dollar strength alone would predict. Capital outflows, portfolio rebalancing, and carry-trade unwinding may have contributed — and dismissing market-influenced depreciation entirely as pandering to markets may oversimplify a complex exchange rate dynamic.
• Against — Domestic remedy requirement may deter small investors: Requiring exhaustion of domestic legal remedies before international arbitration is a legitimate sovereign protection. However, India's judicial delay and litigation cost reality means this requirement may effectively deter legitimate small and medium-sized foreign investors from seeking redress — undermining the BIT's investor-protection function in practice, even if defensible in principle.
• Against — Growth rate comparison ignores quality dimensions: Even if 2014–2024 average growth marginally exceeds 2005–2014, the composition of growth matters. Investment rate trends, private sector capex, credit offtake to MSMEs, and employment intensity of growth are not addressed in the editorial's rebuttal — making the growth comparison potentially incomplete without this qualitative layer of analysis.

5 — Way Forward

• India should publish a comprehensive BIT reform white paper articulating the legal and economic rationale for each element of the Model BIT 2016 — addressing specific investor concerns about the domestic exhaustion requirement, the narrowed definition of investment, and the absence of the MFN clause — to reduce perception risk without reopening substantive treaty provisions unnecessarily.
• The RBI's exchange rate management communication framework should be strengthened — publishing clearer forward guidance on intervention principles — so that market participants, foreign investors, and rating agencies understand the RBI's approach as a principled, rules-based framework rather than an opaque discretionary intervention style that creates uncertainty.
• India should proactively engage with UNCTAD and G20 investment working groups to build global legitimacy for its BIT reform model, positioning the India framework as a responsible balancing of investor rights and regulatory sovereignty — neutralising the perception-risk narrative that can deter genuine long-term investors even when macroeconomic fundamentals remain strong.
• To genuinely improve the investment climate, the focus should shift from treaty architecture to ease-of-doing-business reforms: faster commercial dispute resolution, contract enforcement efficiency, land availability, and infrastructure quality — the factors that G20 data confirms actually drive investment decisions, ranked far above investor protection provisions in treaties.

6 — Data & Key Facts

~7.4%India avg GDP growth 2014–2024 (excl. crisis years) vs ~7.2% in 2005–2014

~$95 BnGross FDI inflows into India in 2025–26

$682 BnIndia's forex reserves, April 2026 — ~11 months import cover

$53 BnRBI forex sales in FY26 to defend the rupee

10.6%Rupee depreciation in FY26 — sharper than broad dollar strength alone

~2%India's CAD as % of GDP expected in FY27 — within manageable limits

• UNCTAD Study, 2014 — covered 146 economies over 27 years; found no conclusive evidence that BITs significantly increase bilateral FDI inflows; key empirical foundation for India's BIT reform rationale and a critical data point for both Prelims and Mains answers on investment treaties.
• G20 Investment Report, 2020 — found that investor protection ranked 10th among decision-influencing factors for FDI; political stability, market size, infrastructure quality, and growth prospects ranked higher — directly supporting the argument that treaty architecture is not the primary determinant of FDI flows into large emerging markets like India.

7 — Prelims Pointers

India Model BIT 2016 — enterprise-based investment definition; no MFN clause; mandatory domestic exhaustion before ISDS; excludes taxation and government procurement from treaty coverage

ISDS — Investor-State Dispute Settlement; allows investors to directly sue host governments before international arbitral tribunals; bypasses domestic courts entirely

CAD — Current Account Deficit; India ~2% of GDP (FY27); below 2.5% considered manageable; reflects trade deficit plus net invisibles (services, remittances)

Forex reserves ~$682 Bn (April 2026) — ~11 months import cover; RBI sold ~$53 billion in FY26 to defend rupee; conventional adequacy threshold is 3–6 months import cover

UNCTAD 2014 study — 146 economies, 27 years; no conclusive BIT–FDI causal link; foundational evidence for India's BIT reform and for global BIT renegotiation trend

Gross vs. Net FDI — Net FDI = Gross FDI minus profit repatriation and outward investment; declining net FDI in a mature economy does not equal declining investor confidence

Exam note: Do not confuse BIT (Bilateral Investment Treaty — investment protection) with FTA (Free Trade Agreement — trade in goods/services). Also: India's Model BIT 2016 is a template for negotiations, not a ratified treaty — actual coverage depends on bilateral ratification. MFN clause in BITs is separate from MFN in WTO/trade agreements.

8 — Practice Mains Question

"India's revised Bilateral Investment Treaty framework reflects a responsible reassessment of investor rights versus sovereign regulatory space, not a retreat from economic openness." Do you agree? Substantiate with evidence.

GS 3 | 15 marks | ~250 words | External Sector + Economic Reforms + Investment Policy

• Intro: Contextualise India's BIT reform — the ISDS problem, the global trend of treaty renegotiation post-financial crisis, and the tension between investor rights and sovereign regulatory flexibility in a developing economy with legitimate policy goals.
• Body 1 — Case for India's BIT reform: Domestic exhaustion as a legitimate sovereign tool; UNCTAD evidence on weak BIT–FDI correlation; global peers (Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia) who revised treaties without FDI collapse; G20 data on true FDI determinants (political stability, market size over investor protection).
• Body 2 — Concerns: Judicial delay making domestic exhaustion burdensome for small investors; perception risk deterring prospective investors unfamiliar with India's BIT reform rationale; quality-of-growth questions not addressed by GDP average comparisons alone.
• Conclusion: Ease-of-doing-business reforms — contract enforcement, infrastructure, dispute resolution speed — not treaty architecture — are the real investment confidence levers. BIT white paper, UNCTAD engagement, and RBI communication reform as complementary steps.

9 — Practice MCQ

Consider the following statements about India's Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) framework and FDI:

1. India's Model BIT, 2016 requires foreign investors to exhaust domestic legal remedies for a specified period before filing international arbitration claims against the Indian state.
2. A 2014 UNCTAD study covering 146 economies over 27 years found strong conclusive evidence that BITs significantly increase bilateral FDI inflows.
3. The G20 Investment Report (2020) found that investor protection ranked only 10th among factors influencing FDI decisions, below political stability and market size.
4. Brazil, despite having no traditional BITs with ISDS provisions, remained among Latin America's largest FDI destinations.

Which of the statements are correct?

(a) 1 and 3 only(b) 2 and 4 only(c) 1, 3 and 4 only(d) 1, 2, 3 and 4