Contents01

Reclaiming Footpaths, Taking Cities Back from Cars

Chandrakant Lahariya, Preventive & Cardiometabolic Medicine Specialist · Walkability, Public Health, Urban Governance

GS 2 — Social Justice & GovernanceGS 3 — Infrastructure & Public HealthEssay

02

Political Defections and the Moral Sanctity of Democracy

Prabal Basu Roy, Sloan Fellow, London Business School · Anti-Defection, Democratic Mandate, Electoral Integrity

GS 2 — Polity & GovernanceEssay

Editorial 01 of 02

Article 01

Reclaiming Footpaths, Taking Cities Back from Cars

Chandrakant Lahariya — Practising specialist in preventive & cardiometabolic medicine; nearly 18 years with WHO and UN system · The Hindu

Relevance: GS 2 (rights of vulnerable sections, urban local bodies, social justice), GS 3 (public health, infrastructure, road safety) and Essay (dignity, democracy, built environment) — anchored in the Supreme Court's 2026 landmark declaration of the right to walk as a fundamental right.

GS 2 — Social Justice & Urban GovernanceGS 3 — Public Health & InfrastructureEssay — Rights, Dignity & Democracy

1 — Issue in Brief

• Indian cities have structurally dispossessed pedestrians — footpaths occupied by parked vehicles, vendors, debris, open drains and signboards force citizens onto roads designed exclusively for motorised traffic, reducing walking to an act of daily risk.
• In June 2026, the Supreme Court in Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan (2026 INSC 647) declared the right to walk on demarcated footpaths a fundamental right under Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution, transforming pedestrian infrastructure from a municipal housekeeping matter into an enforceable constitutional obligation.
• The article situates the footpath crisis at the intersection of three converging emergencies: a road-safety catastrophe (two-wheelers and pedestrians account for nearly 67% of road fatalities), a public-health crisis (nearly half of Indian adults do not meet WHO physical-activity norms), and a democratic-dignity question (whether Indian cities are built for people or for machines).
• The author's central prescription: a National Active Mobility Mission linking urban development, transport, health and education — with encroachment-free footpath coverage made a ward-level barometer of whether elected governments respect citizens' fundamental rights.

2 — Static Background

• Article 19(1)(d): Guarantees the right to move freely throughout India; now judicially extended to include the right to walk on safe, demarcated footpaths. Article 19(3) permits restrictions only for the general public interest or protection of Scheduled Tribe interests — not vehicle convenience.
• Article 21 — Right to Life: Progressively expanded by the SC through Olga Tellis v. BMC (1985) (livelihood), Francis Coralie Mullin (1981) (dignity), and now Maniyar Iliyaz (2026) (safe pedestrian mobility) — reflecting a living-constitution approach to fundamental rights.
• Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019: Introduced enhanced penalties for traffic violations, Good Samaritan protections for crash bystanders, and a National Road Safety Board — yet pedestrian-infrastructure standards remain unlegislated.
• National Road Safety Policy — 4 Es: Education, Engineering, Enforcement, Emergency care — the framework within which footpath reform must be embedded. iRAD (Integrated Road Accident Database), geo-tagged and real-time, is now operational in 28 States for data-driven road safety governance.
• Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 (in force 1 May 2014): Gives legal recognition to ~1 crore street vendors; mandates designated vending zones via Town Vending Committees (TVCs); prohibits arbitrary eviction; limits vendors to 2.5% of ward population in vending zones. This makes punitive anti-vendor drives both legally and morally untenable.
• 74th Constitutional Amendment, 1992: Created the constitutional basis for elected Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) and the 12th Schedule listing urban functions including regulation of land use, public health, and roads — ULBs are the primary implementing agency for footpath policy.
• SDG 3.6: Halve global road deaths and injuries by 2030 (baseline 2016); India is currently off-track. SDG 11: Safe, inclusive, accessible urban spaces — pedestrian infrastructure is central. AMRUT (Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation) includes pedestrian amenities in scope but implementation is uneven.
• S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India (W.P. 295/2012): Earlier SC case on road safety guidelines — referenced in the Maniyar Iliyaz judgment itself as precedent; shows a judicial pattern of progressively expanding road safety obligations on the State.

3 — Key Dimensions

• The constitutional shift — Maniyar Iliyaz (2026): Bench of Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice A.S. Chandurkar — case arose from the death of a five-year-old child crushed by a tanker while being walked to school on a road with no footpath or pedestrian crossing. SC: (a) declared right to walk a fundamental right under Part III; (b) directed States/UTs to frame policies; (c) re-registered the matter under Article 32 as 'Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath', impleading Ministries of Housing & Urban Affairs, Rural Development, and Road Transport; (d) held that citizens can seek restitutionary remedies for violation — independent of Motor Vehicles Act compensation.
• The physical inactivity crisis: Lancet Global Health (2024) study — approximately 45.4% of Indian adults are physically inactive (men 38.4%, women 52.6%); if the trend continues, projected to reach 55% by 2030. WHO recommends ≥150 minutes of moderate-intensity activity per week for adults. Walking — to a bus stop, school, market, or metro — is the simplest, lowest-cost pathway to meeting this norm for the majority of citizens.
• The road fatality crisis: MoRTH Road Accidents in India 2024 — ~1.77 lakh fatalities and 4.88 lakh accidents. Two-wheelers account for ~44% of deaths, pedestrians ~19% — together India's most vulnerable road users. India accounts for ~11% of global road fatalities with only ~1% of vehicles. Pedestrian deaths in India in 2021 (~29,200) exceeded the combined road fatalities of the entire EU and Japan.
• The built environment as a health determinant: A city designed for cars quietly mandates sedentary living. The author frames footpaths as 'preventive medicine laid in stone' — improving blood pressure, insulin sensitivity, weight control, mood, sleep and joint function for the widest cross-section of citizens at near-zero marginal cost.
• The vendors–walkers conflict and the legal framework: The Street Vendors Act 2014 gives vendors statutory rights; anti-encroachment drives that evict vendors without due process are illegal. The solution is planned allocation — vending zones with utilities, footpaths for walking, parking bays, utility corridors — so livelihoods and mobility coexist without endangering lives.
• Who is most hurt by unusable footpaths: Women (safety and harassment), children (school access), persons with disabilities (wheelchair access), the elderly (fall risk), and the urban poor (who cannot afford vehicles) — making footpath access a social justice issue, not merely a traffic management one.
• The active-mobility mission argument: Cities should be assessed not by length of flyovers built but by safe walking kilometres created. Municipal commissioners should publish ward-level footpath maps and annual encroachment-free audits; school zones should have traffic calming and protected crossings; employers should incentivise active commuting.

4 — Critical Analysis

• In favour — Constitutionalising walkability is transformative: Elevating pedestrian infrastructure from a municipal discretion to a fundamental right means citizens can approach courts under Articles 32 and 226 for enforcement; public authorities face not just policy guidance but enforceable constitutional duties — a qualitative shift in State accountability.
• In favour — Multi-vector framing makes the case politically resilient: The article converges three independent justifications — NCD burden, road safety fatalities, democratic dignity — all pointing to the same intervention. No government can dismiss all three simultaneously, making the reform case robust across political contexts.
• In favour — Vendors and walkers can coexist legally: The Street Vendors Act 2014 already mandates designated vending zones. The barrier is not law but implementation — constituting TVCs, creating physical zones, relocating vendors with legal security. The article rightly frames this as a planning problem, not a zero-sum conflict.
• In favour — Footpath investment is cost-effective preventive care: India's NCD burden is estimated to cost the economy over ₹3.5 lakh crore annually. Walking — the simplest preventive intervention — requires no gym, no equipment, no prescription; it requires only a usable pavement. The return on footpath investment is disproportionately high.
• Against — The implementation gap is structural: Prior SC orders on pedestrian infrastructure (S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2012) have had limited on-ground impact. A new constitutional declaration without stronger enforcement mechanisms — compliance timelines, contempt jurisdiction, monitoring committees — risks the same fate.
• Against — Urban local bodies are fiscally and administratively weak: ULBs suffer from inadequate own revenues (average own tax revenue <15% of total expenditure), thin technical cadres, and political interference. Without genuine devolution of funds and functionaries under the 74th Amendment, even mandated footpath audits risk remaining paper exercises.
• Against — Car-centric political economy of infrastructure spending: Urban capital expenditure in India consistently favours flyovers, grade separators, and road widening — which often removes footpaths to add lanes. Reversing this political economy requires sustained political will that judicial pronouncements alone cannot generate.
• Against — No national footpath census exists: India has no baseline audit of the length, quality, or accessibility compliance of its urban footpaths. Without this data, ward-level targets and audits cannot be meaningfully operationalised — the SC's re-registered Article 32 petition will need to direct a data-collection exercise as a first step.

5 — Way Forward

• Enact a National Pedestrian Rights Act (as directed by the SC in Maniyar Iliyaz) mandating minimum footpath widths, material and accessibility standards (ramps, tactile paths), continuous shade, lighting, and protected crossings near schools, hospitals, and transit nodes.
• Launch a National Active Mobility Mission (NaMiM) — a convergence mission under MoHUA, MoRTH, MoHFW and MoE — with measurable targets for safe walking kilometres added annually; integrate pedestrian performance into Smart Cities and AMRUT criteria.
• Mandate annual ward-level footpath audits published by municipal commissioners; link release of central urban grants to encroachment-free and accessibility-compliant footpath performance, creating fiscal incentives for ULB compliance.
• Implement the Street Vendors Act 2014 fully — constitute TVCs in all cities, create physical vending zones with utilities (water, electricity, waste disposal), and relocate vendors from footpaths into designated zones with legal security, ending the cycle of drive-evict-return.
• Prioritise school-zone pilots — traffic calming (speed bumps, kerb extensions), protected pedestrian crossings, and pedestrian-only zones during school hours — politically low-resistance, high-visibility, and high public health impact.
• Close the data gap: commission a National Footpath Census (length, width, surface quality, accessibility compliance, encroachment rate) by ward and city; publish results publicly so citizens and RWAs can demand accountability.
• Doctors should prescribe walking; NITI Aayog and MoHFW should co-create an 'Active India Index' tracking walking infrastructure and physical activity levels at district level — linking health outcomes to urban planning decisions.

6 — Data & Key Facts

~1.77 lakhRoad fatalities in India — MoRTH 2024 (4.88 lakh accidents)

~63–67%Share of road deaths — two-wheelers (~44%) + pedestrians (~19%)

~29,200Pedestrian deaths in India in 2021 — exceeded combined EU + Japan total

45.4%Indian adults physically inactive — Lancet Global Health 2024 (women 52.6%)

~10%Adults meeting WHO physical activity norms — national survey 2024 (~4.5 lakh sample)

2.5%Ward-population cap for Street Vendor vending zones under the 2014 Act

• Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan (2026 INSC 647): Decided 19 June 2026; Bench — Justice P.S. Narasimha + Justice A.S. Chandurkar; right to walk = fundamental right under Arts 19(1)(d) and 21; restitutionary remedy available; matter re-registered under Art 32 as Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath.
• Street Vendors Act, 2014: In force 1 May 2014; ~1 crore urban street vendors; vending zones capped at 2.5% of ward population; TVCs must include ≥40% vendor representatives (33% women sub-quota); prohibits arbitrary eviction; PM SVANidhi scheme provides micro-credit to vendors formalised under the Act.
• WHO recommendation: ≥150 minutes/week moderate-intensity physical activity for adults; 60 minutes/day for children. India's inactivity rate is projected to rise to 55% by 2030 if current trends continue (Lancet Global Health, 2024).

7 — Prelims Pointers

Maniyar Iliyaz (2026 INSC 647) — 19 June 2026; Arts 19(1)(d) + 21; right to walk = fundamental right; Article 32 petition; restitutionary remedy; Narasimha J + Chandurkar J

Article 19(1)(d) — Right to move freely; extended to safe footpaths. Art 19(3): restrictions only for general public or ST interests

MV (Amendment) Act, 2019 — Enhanced penalties; Good Samaritan protection; National Road Safety Board; hit-and-run compensation ₹2 lakh

Street Vendors Act, 2014 — in force 1 May 2014; TVCs; vending zones ≤2.5% ward population; 40% vendor TVC representation; no arbitrary eviction

4 Es of Road Safety — Education, Engineering, Enforcement, Emergency care. iRAD — Integrated Road Accident Database, 28 States

74th Amendment (1992) — Constitutional ULBs; 12th Schedule — roads, public health, land use; ULBs primary footpath implementing agency

SDG 3.6 — Halve road deaths by 2030 (2016 baseline); India off-track. SDG 11 — Safe, inclusive, sustainable cities

AMRUT — Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation; includes pedestrian amenities in scope

Exam note: The Maniyar Iliyaz judgment is a 2026 INSC — very likely to appear in Prelims 2027. Distinguish: Article 19(1)(d) = freedom of movement (horizontal right, also extended to footpaths); Article 21 = right to life including dignity and health. The Street Vendors Act TVCs are constituted by Urban Local Bodies, not State governments directly — distinguish for Prelims.

8 — Practice Mains Question

"The Supreme Court's 2026 declaration of a fundamental right to walk is not merely a road safety measure but a convergence of public health, social justice, and democratic governance." Critically examine.GS 2 + GS 3 Crossover · 15 marks · ~250 words · Urban Governance + Public Health + Rights

• Intro: Maniyar Iliyaz (2026) as the constitutional pivot — from municipal discretion to enforceable right; five-year-old's death as the trigger; SC re-registering under Article 32 signals systemic, not just compensatory, intent.
• Body 1 — Health rationale: NCD burden, ~45% adults physically inactive (Lancet 2024), inactivity projected to hit 55% by 2030; footpaths as preventive medicine; built environment as a health determinant that affects the poor most.
• Body 2 — Safety rationale: ~1.77 lakh road deaths (MoRTH 2024), ~63–67% are two-wheelers and pedestrians; India's pedestrian deaths exceed combined EU + Japan; every encroached footpath is a road-safety failure.
• Body 3 — Governance challenges: Weak ULBs (fiscal and administrative), car-centric spending bias, Street Vendors Act implementation gap, absence of national footpath data — constitutional declaration without enforcement architecture risks paper compliance.
• Conclusion: National Pedestrian Rights Act + National Active Mobility Mission + ward-level footpath audits linked to grants + full TVC constitution — the footpath as a barometer of whether Viksit Bharat is built for its citizens.

9 — Practice MCQ

With reference to the Supreme Court judgment in Maniyar Iliyaz @ Shaik Riyaz v. P. Ayyappan (2026 INSC 647), consider the following statements:

1. The Court held that the right to walk on demarcated footpaths is a fundamental right protected under Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution.
2. The Court re-registered the matter as a petition under Article 32, titled Re: Fundamental Right to Walk and Footpath.
3. The Court held that the only remedy available to citizens for violation of pedestrian rights is compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Which of the statements given above are correct?

(a) 1 and 2 only(b) 2 and 3 only(c) 1 and 3 only(d) 1, 2 and 3

Editorial 02 of 02

Article 02

Political Defections and the Moral Sanctity of Democracy

Prabal Basu Roy — Sloan Fellow, London Business School · The Hindu

Relevance: GS 2 (Parliament, political parties, anti-defection law, constitutional morality, role of Opposition, electoral reforms) and Essay (democracy, civic trust, institutional integrity) — examining how post-election floor-crossing erodes the democratic mandate and what legal-institutional safeguards exist or are needed.

GS 2 — Polity & Constitutional GovernanceEssay — Democracy, Trust & Institutional Integrity

1 — Issue in Brief

• What is political defection? When an elected legislator — who won a seat on one party's ticket — abandons that party after the election to join a rival group, usually one that is in power. The voter chose a candidate based on a party symbol, manifesto, and set of ideas; defection breaks that promise without ever going back to the voter.
• The editorial argues that defection treats the democratic mandate as the personal property of the elected member rather than as a trust reposed by the citizen — fundamentally subverting representative democracy, where citizens vote for an idea and an alternative, not merely for an individual.
• India has seen recurring post-election realignments where bitterly opposed parties merge or legislators switch sides once votes are counted — driven by perverse incentives such as avoiding legal trouble, gaining ministerial posts, or accessing political patronage, rather than by genuine ideological convergence.
• The deeper harm, the author argues, is systemic: defections weaken the Opposition (essential for democratic accountability), corrode public confidence in institutions, and reduce elections from contests of ideas into contests over access to power — a pattern that has been observed across parties and over decades.

2 — Static Background

• Why was an anti-defection law needed? Before 1985, floor-crossing was common and caused chronic political instability — governments fell because legislators switched sides for personal gain. The Tenth Schedule, popularly called the Anti-Defection Law, was added to the Constitution by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment, 1985 to bring discipline to legislative behaviour.
• What does the Tenth Schedule do? It disqualifies a member of Parliament or a State Legislature who: (a) voluntarily gives up party membership, or (b) votes against the party whip without prior permission. The Speaker (Lok Sabha/Assemblies) or Chairman (Rajya Sabha) adjudicates, and the decision is subject to judicial review on limited grounds.
• The merger exemption and its reform: A group of legislators can avoid disqualification by claiming a valid party merger — but only if at least two-thirds of the legislative party joins. The 91st Constitutional Amendment, 2003 removed the weaker one-third 'split' exemption and also capped the Council of Ministers at 15% of House strength, closing the 'defect for a ministerial post' incentive.
• The Speaker's structural conflict of interest: The Speaker — who decides defection cases — is elected by and accountable to the ruling majority. This creates a structural problem: the entity that may politically benefit from defections (as defectors usually join the ruling side) is simultaneously empowered to judge whether defection was legal — a widely criticised design flaw.
• Key Supreme Court judgments: Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) — Tenth Schedule upheld; Speaker's decision subject to judicial review on mala fides/perversity/constitutional violation. Nabam Rebia (2016) — a Speaker facing a removal motion cannot adjudicate defection petitions. Srinivas (2020) — defection petitions must be decided within a reasonable time (~3 months). Subhash Desai (2023) — Tenth Schedule gaps referred to a Constitution Bench.
• Why Opposition matters in democracy: Parliamentary democracy requires not just a ruling majority but a functioning Opposition — to scrutinise legislation, question the executive, and offer citizens a credible alternative. When defections systematically drain the Opposition of legislators, this institutional balance is disrupted, reducing accountability regardless of which party governs.

3 — Key Dimensions

• The broken principal-agent contract: In India's parliamentary system, voters cast ballots for a party's symbol and programme — not just the individual. When a legislator defects, the contract with the voter is rewritten unilaterally: the voter's mandate for one set of ideas is transformed into support for a completely different political platform, without any fresh election.
• The perverse-incentives problem: Defection is rarely driven by genuine ideological reconsideration. The most common drivers are: (a) legal/investigative pressure — legislators facing inquiries migrating to the ruling side in anticipation of reduced scrutiny; (b) access to patronage — ministerial posts, public contracts, constituency funds; (c) electoral calculation — aligning with a dominant force for future seat security.
• The weakening of democratic competition: Healthy democracy needs a credible Opposition — not as an obstacle to governance but as an institutional check and balance. Defections steadily move legislators from Opposition benches to the treasury side, leaving the government less scrutinised and less accountable — without any change in the people's electoral verdict.
• Institutional confidence and public perception: Even if investigative agencies act fully independently, the public perception that migrating to the ruling side attracts prosecutorial leniency corrodes trust in those agencies. Democratic legitimacy rests on the appearance of institutional impartiality, not just its formal existence.
• The Tenth Schedule's three structural gaps: (a) Speaker's conflict of interest — the adjudicator has a partisan stake in outcomes; (b) indefinite delay — disqualified legislators often serve full terms before a decision arrives, making punishment meaningless; (c) the organised merger loophole still incentivises mass bloc-defections disguised as party mergers.
• A multi-actor failure — not one villain: The editorial identifies four actors all complicit in normalising defection: parties (selecting candidates with negotiable convictions), media (reporting defections as 'strategic moves' rather than mandate betrayals), voters (forgiving conduct they publicly condemn at the ballot box), and institutions (failing to deter opportunism through timely, consequence-bearing adjudication).
• Cross-country lesson — a cautionary trajectory: Italy's post-war Transformismo (governments built on patronage, not programme), Brazil's transactional coalition politics, and the Philippines' endemic turncoat culture all converge on one finding: when political office becomes a tradable commodity, institutional decay deepens and citizens progressively disengage from the democratic process itself.

4 — Critical Analysis

• In favour — A vote is a trust, not a transferable asset: Aristotle's classical insight (public office as public trust, not private advantage), Kautilya's legitimacy principle (confidence of the governed), and even Machiavelli's warning (destroying independent power centres weakens the state) all converge — mandates treated as commodities undermine the state's own legitimacy over time.
• In favour — The Tenth Schedule is necessary but insufficient: It has reduced individual floor-crossing but has not stopped organised mass defections dressed as mergers. The law needs an independent enforcement authority with the ability to decide quickly and with real disqualification consequences — not just formal disqualification that arrives after the political game is won.
• In favour — Healthy democracy requires a functioning Opposition: Great democracies are distinguished not by governments that accumulate the most legislative seats but by systems confident enough to maintain a credible, vigorous Opposition. When no robust Opposition exists, legislative debate becomes ceremonial and executive accountability weakens.
• In favour — Perceived and actual institutional impartiality both matter: Even fully independent investigative agencies suffer reputational damage when public perception links political migration to prosecutorial leniency. Institutional trust, once eroded, is slow to rebuild — making prevention more important than correction.
• Against — Not all post-election realignments are betrayals: Parliamentary democracy frequently produces fragmented verdicts in a multiparty system. Post-election coalition formation — even between former rivals — is a recognised and legitimate feature of parliamentary practice. The problem is individual opportunism, not coalition-building as such.
• Against — Judicial evolution is already strengthening the law: The SC's progressive case law (Kihoto Hollohan, Nabam Rebia, Srinivas, Subhash Desai) has incrementally tightened the Tenth Schedule. Reform through judicial interpretation and targeted legislative amendment — rather than structural overhaul — may be both sufficient and more politically feasible.
• Against — The ballot remains the ultimate check: Voters can and should punish defectors at the next election. The article itself raises the uncomfortable question: why do voters forgive conduct they publicly condemn? Legal and institutional reform cannot substitute for a civically engaged electorate that treats mandate betrayal as an electoral disqualifier.
• Against — Symptom vs cause: Anti-defection law addresses the symptom. The root causes — absence of intra-party democracy, top-down candidate selection based on winnability rather than commitment, and opaque party financing — create the conditions that make defection rational. Treating causes requires a broader political reform agenda.

5 — Way Forward

• Transfer defection adjudication to an independent authority — the Election Commission of India or a dedicated Defection Tribunal — eliminating the Speaker's structural conflict of interest and depoliticising the enforcement of the Tenth Schedule.
• Mandate time-bound decisions within 90 days (in line with the SC's direction in Srinivas, 2020); bar defectors from holding ministerial office or drawing salary during the pendency of disqualification proceedings, so that the process itself carries interim consequences.
• Tighten the merger threshold by requiring that any claimed merger be ratified not just by two-thirds of the legislative party but also by a majority of the broader party organisation — preventing legislative blocs from claiming to represent a party they have effectively split from.
• Legislate intra-party democracy — regular internal elections for party positions, transparent candidate selection, and financial disclosure — reducing the top-down patronage structures that make defection materially attractive to individual legislators.
• Improve electoral financing transparency: reduce the link between access to political power and access to public contracts, discretionary grants, and other state patronage — addressing the material incentive structure that underlies most defections.
• Build a civic accountability culture: media should treat defections as mandate betrayals (not strategic coups); civil society should track post-defection voting records and policy positions; and voters should systematically punish legislators who abandon the platform on which they were elected — the ballot is ultimately the most powerful anti-defection instrument.

6 — Data & Key Facts

52nd Amdt1985 — Inserted the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law) into the Constitution

91st Amdt2003 — Removed split exemption; CoM capped at 15% of House strength (minimum 12)

2/3rdMinimum share of legislative party required for a valid 'merger' under Tenth Schedule

15%Maximum size of Council of Ministers as % of House strength — 91st Amendment, 2003

90 daysReasonable time for deciding defection petitions — SC in Srinivas v. Union of India (2020)

1990Dinesh Goswami Committee — first major recommendation for an independent defection adjudicator

• Tenth Schedule — disqualification triggers: (1) Voluntarily giving up party membership; (2) voting against or abstaining from voting contrary to party whip without prior permission. Exemption: valid merger — ≥2/3 of legislative party. Adjudicator: Speaker/Chairman. Judicial review standard: mala fides, perversity, or constitutional violation (Kihoto Hollohan, 1992).
• Key reform committees: Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) — recommended independent adjudicator; Law Commission 170th Report (1999) — pre-poll alliance disclosure, stricter defection norms; NCRWC (2002) — party discipline and anti-defection reforms.
• Historical parallels cited: Italy's Transformismo (patronage over ideology); Brazil's coalition presidentialism (transactional politics); Philippines' political turncoatism. Common lesson: political office treated as a tradable asset leads to institutional decay and civic disengagement.

7 — Prelims Pointers

Tenth Schedule — added by 52nd Amendment 1985; disqualification for voluntary party exit or whip defiance; merger valid only at ≥2/3 legislative party threshold; Speaker/Chairman adjudicates

91st Amendment (2003) — removed split exemption; CoM ≤15% of House (min 12); defectors barred from ministerial office in same term

Kihoto Hollohan (1992) — Tenth Schedule upheld; Speaker's decision subject to judicial review on mala fides / perversity / constitutional violation

Nabam Rebia (2016) — Speaker facing a removal motion cannot exercise anti-defection adjudication jurisdiction

Srinivas (2020) — defection petitions must be decided within a reasonable time (~3 months); indefinite delay impermissible

Subhash Desai (2023) — Constitution Bench reference on Tenth Schedule gaps, Speaker's role, and defector-controlled party apparatus

Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) — independent adjudicator recommended; Law Commission 170th Report (1999); NCRWC (2002)

Transformismo — Italian post-war patronage politics cited as cautionary cross-country parallel to Indian defection culture

Exam note: Prelims frequently tests — (1) which amendment inserted the Tenth Schedule (52nd, 1985); (2) which amendment removed the split exemption and capped the CoM (91st, 2003); (3) whether the Speaker's decision is final (No — subject to judicial review on limited grounds, per Kihoto Hollohan); (4) Nabam Rebia — Speaker under removal motion cannot adjudicate defection. These four points together make a near-complete MCQ toolkit on this topic.

8 — Practice Mains Question

"Political defections in India represent not merely a breach of party loyalty but a fundamental subversion of the democratic mandate." Critically examine the adequacy of the Tenth Schedule in addressing this challenge, and suggest reforms.GS 2 · 15 marks · ~250 words · Parliament & Constitutional Governance

• Intro: Define the democratic mandate in a parliamentary system — voters choose party symbol/manifesto/alternative, not just individual. Defection as a unilateral rewriting of this contract. Tenth Schedule as India's response since 1985.
• Body 1 — Why defections subvert the mandate: Principal-agent breakdown; perverse incentives (legal pressure, ministerial patronage, electoral calculation); weakening of Opposition as institutional check; cross-country parallels (Transformismo, Brazil, Philippines) showing trajectory from defection to institutional decay.
• Body 2 — Tenth Schedule: what it does and where it falls short: 52nd Amendment (Tenth Schedule, 1985); 91st Amendment (split removed, CoM cap, 2003); disqualification triggers; merger threshold (2/3). Three gaps: Speaker's conflict, delayed adjudication, organised merger loophole. Cases: Kihoto Hollohan, Nabam Rebia, Srinivas, Subhash Desai.
• Conclusion: Independent adjudicator (ECI/Defection Tribunal), mandatory 90-day decisions, tighter merger rules, intra-party democracy law, transparent party financing — and civic accountability culture where voters punish mandate betrayal at the ballot box.

9 — Practice MCQ

Consider the following statements regarding the Tenth Schedule of the Indian Constitution:

1. It was inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985.
2. Under the Tenth Schedule, a merger of a political party is recognised as valid only if at least two-thirds of the legislative party joins the merger.
3. The Speaker's decision on disqualification under the Tenth Schedule is final and not subject to judicial review.

Which of the statements given above are correct?

(a) 1 and 2 only(b) 2 and 3 only(c) 1 and 3 only(d) 1, 2 and 3