Editorials, Opinions & Explained3 Items

Core TopicImportantConcise

EditorialsGS Paper II · III

01SCO & Terrorism — Security as the Foundation of Connectivity02Added Sugar in Infant Foods — FSSAI Draft

OpinionsGS Paper II

03UN at 81 — The Case for Reform, Not Replacement

EditorialsThe newspaper’s own arguments, decoded for GS

01

Peace for Progress: Why India Insists that the SCO Cannot Separate Terrorism from Trade and Connectivity

Core TopicEditorialGS-II · IR — Regional & Global GroupingsGS-III · Security — Terrorism & Terror FinancingPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Editorial

At the SCO Council of Heads of Government meeting in Tajikistan (20 Oct 2026), India’s Defence Minister again pressed the grouping to confront cross-border terrorism — with Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister in the room. The editorial argues that the SCO’s economic agenda cannot succeed without a stable security environment.

◈ From Basics — What is the SCO?

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a Eurasian political, security and economic grouping founded in Shanghai on 15 June 2001. It grew out of the Shanghai Five (1996) — China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — formed to settle border issues and build military confidence after the Soviet collapse.

• Members (10): China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India and Pakistan (both 2017), Iran (2023) and Belarus (2024).
• Founding texts: the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (2001) — the “three evils”; the SCO Charter (signed 2002, in force 2003).
• Permanent bodies: the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) in Tashkent (operational since 2004).
• Official languages: Russian and Chinese.

▤ SCO Architecture — Prelims Hooks

• Council of Heads of State: the supreme decision-making body; meets annually.
• Council of Heads of Government: the second-highest body; deals with economic cooperation, trade and approves the organisation’s budget — the forum where India spoke this week.
• Councils of Ministers: foreign, defence and sectoral ministers — the 2025 Defence Ministers’ meeting at Qingdao, China, is where India declined to endorse the joint statement.
• India’s chairship (2023): theme “Towards a SECURE SCO” — Security, Economy & trade, Connectivity, Unity, Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and Environment.
• India’s observer status: from 2005, before full membership at the Astana Summit (2017).

Figure 1 — From Shanghai Five to an SCO of ten

1996ShanghaiFive2001SCO founded(+ Uzbekistan)2004RATS,Tashkent2017India &Pakistan join2023Iran joins;India chairs2024BelarusjoinsMembership widened from a border-security club to a ten-member Eurasian forum

Expansion brought India and Pakistan into the same room — and with them, the bilateral terrorism question.

The editorial’s argument, in brief

• Consistency of stance: since Operation Sindoor (May 2025), launched after the Pahalgam attack (22 April 2025), India has repeatedly used multilateral forums to raise cross-border terrorism.
• No selective approach: regional cooperation loses meaning if members condemn some terror groups and shield others; the ecosystem must be tackled at its source.
• The Qingdao precedent: in 2025, India refused to sign a draft that left out Pahalgam but referred to militancy in Balochistan — an imbalance India said would hurt the SCO’s credibility.
• Not either/or: India does not ask that trade or connectivity wait until every dispute is settled — only that they depend on security, predictable borders and rule of law.

Figure 2 — India’s logic: security is the foundation, not a separate track

Regional prosperity — trade, investment, people-to-people flowsTradeneeds secure routesConnectivityINSTC · ChabaharInvestmentneeds rule of lawSovereigntyterritorial integrityFOUNDATION — a stable security environment, free of terrorismTools the editorial says the SCO must operationaliseIntelligencesharingAction againstterror financingDisruptingrecruitmentDenyingsafe havens

Remove the foundation and every economic pillar above it becomes unstable — the core of India’s position at the SCO.

Static anchors — connectivity projects named in the editorial

• International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC): agreement signed in 2000 by India, Iran and Russia; a multimodal (ship–rail–road) route of about 7,200 km linking Mumbai to Russia via Iran and the Caspian region.
• Chabahar Port (Shahid Beheshti terminal), Iran: on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz; India signed a 10-year operating contract in 2024. It gives India access to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan.
• Why sovereignty matters to India: India has consistently declined to endorse the Belt and Road Initiative in SCO documents, as its flagship CPEC passes through territory India claims.

Wider counter-terrorism architecture — Prelims hooks

• CCIT: India proposed the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism at the UN in 1996; it remains stalled over the definition of terrorism.
• UNSC 1267 Sanctions Committee: lists terrorists linked to ISIL and Al-Qaida; listings have often been blocked through “technical holds”.
• FATF (set up 1989, G7 Paris Summit) sets global standards against money laundering and terror financing; India hosted the “No Money for Terror” ministerial conference in 2022.

The critical view — why consensus is hard

• Divergent threat perceptions: members define “terrorism” to suit their own security concerns; consensus-based decisions give each member a de facto veto.
• China–Pakistan alignment limits how far SCO texts will go on cross-border terrorism, even as the Tianjin Declaration (2025) of heads of state did condemn the Pahalgam attack.
• RATS under-delivers: intelligence-sharing remains shallow, as members are reluctant to share sensitive data with rivals.
• India’s balance: refusing joint statements protects principle but risks isolation; the editorial’s answer is for India to lead practical cooperation rather than only object.

✎ Mains Practice Question

“Economic integration in Eurasia cannot be pursued independently of a stable security environment.” In the light of this statement, examine the effectiveness of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in addressing cross-border terrorism and suggest how India can use the platform to advance its interests. 15 marks · 250 words

02

Bitter and Sweet: FSSAI’s Draft on Added Sugar in Infant Foods — A Good Start, but Only Half the Job

ImportantEditorialGS-II · Health, Nutrition & Statutory BodiesGS-III · Food Processing & Food SecurityPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Editorial

The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) has proposed to remove the allowance for added sucrose and fructose in foods meant for infants aged 0–6 months. The editorial welcomes the step but argues it must extend to all added sugars and to the full first 24 months.

◈ From Basics — The Regulator and the Rules

FSSAI is a statutory body created under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which consolidated eight older food laws, including the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. It was set up in 2008 and functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

• Current rule: the FSS (Foods for Infant Nutrition) Regulations, 2020 allow sucrose and fructose in products for infants aged 0–6 months, if together they stay within 20% of total carbohydrates.
• The draft: removes this allowance for the 0–6 month category.
• Marketing law: the Infant Milk Substitutes, Feeding Bottles and Infant Foods (IMS) Act, 1992 (amended 2003) restricts the promotion of foods for children up to two years; it draws on the WHO International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes (1981).
• Global benchmark: the Codex Alimentarius Commission, set up in 1963 by FAO and WHO, frames international food standards that industry often cites.

▤ The Health Guidance — What the Experts Say

• WHO: exclusive breastfeeding for the first six months, then nutritionally adequate complementary foods with no added sugars up to 24 months.
• ICMR–National Institute of Nutrition (Hyderabad), Dietary Guidelines for Indians, 2024: children under two should avoid added sugar.
• WHO Nutrient and Promotion Profile Model (2022): flagged sweet purées and products where processing releases free sugars from fruit.
• India’s baseline (NFHS-5, 2019–21): exclusive breastfeeding of infants under six months stood at about 64%; overweight among children under five rose to 3.4% from 2.1% in NFHS-4.

Figure 3 — The coverage gap: what each rule covers across the first 24 months

06121824Age (months)Breastfeeding onlyComplementary foods + continued breastfeedingWHO & ICMR-NIN:no added sugarFSSAI draft:sucrose/fructose banGAP — not covered by the draftIMS Act, 1992:marketing curbs

Health guidance and marketing law already cover 24 months; the composition rule would cover only the first six.

Why added sugar in infant food is a concern

• Taste programming: early exposure to sweetness shapes lifelong preferences; infants given sweetened liquids tend to prefer sweeter drinks later, and early flavour variety improves acceptance of bitter and neutral foods.
• Commercial logic: sugar is a cheap bulking agent, improves palatability and drives repeat purchase.
• “Nutritional dumping”: public health experts use the term for selling sweeter versions of products in poorer markets than in richer ones.
• The first 1,000 days: from conception to age two is the window that shapes growth, brain development and later risk of obesity and non-communicable diseases (NCDs).

The editorial’s demands

• Close the substitution loophole: ban all added sugars, not just sucrose and fructose, so that other sweeteners are not swapped in.
• Judge the finished product: assess both the ingredients and the final nutrient profile.
• Extend to 24 months: to align with WHO and ICMR-NIN; stopping at six months looks like a concession to industry.
• Mandatory front-of-pack labelling (FOPL): clear, interpretive labels on all packaged foods.

Static anchors — constitution and policy

• Article 47 (DPSP): duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and improve public health; the right to health has been read into Article 21 by the courts.
• Ultra-processed foods (UPFs): classified under the NOVA system developed in Brazil; India is weighing curbs on unhealthy food near schools and on FOPL.
• FOPL models: interpretive warning labels (e.g. Chile’s black octagons, 2016) versus summary ratings such as the star-rating model FSSAI has considered.

The critical view

• Industry concerns: manufacturers argue their products meet Codex standards; reformulation adds cost and may hurt acceptance.
• Enforcement capacity: State food safety departments face shortages of food safety officers and laboratories.
• Beyond packaged food: regulation alone cannot raise breastfeeding rates; it must go with counselling under programmes such as MAA (Mothers’ Absolute Affection) and Poshan Abhiyaan.

✎ Mains Practice Question

India’s regulatory response to ultra-processed foods has been described as slow and piecemeal. Examine the significance of regulating added sugars in infant and young-child foods, and suggest measures to make food regulation in India more consistent with public health evidence. 10 marks · 150 words

OpinionsSigned op-eds — arguments to weigh, not facts to memorise

03

The UN at 81: Why a Flawed Organisation Is Still Worth Rebuilding

Core TopicOpinionGS-II · IR — Important International Institutions; UN ReformPrelims + MainsOpinion · Former UN Under-Secretary-General

As the UN marks its 81st anniversary on 24 October 2026 — with the Security Council yet to agree on the next Secretary-General — the author, a former UN official of nearly three decades, argues that the world body is failing at peace and security but remains irreplaceable, and must be reformed rather than abandoned.

◈ From Basics — The UN in Brief

The UN Charter was signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945 — now observed as UN Day. The UN began with 51 original members, including India, and has 193 today.

• Six principal organs: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council (suspended since 1994), International Court of Justice (The Hague) and the Secretariat.
• UNSC composition: 15 members — 5 permanent (US, UK, France, Russia, China) and 10 non-permanent elected for two-year terms; enlarged from 11 to 15 in 1965, the only expansion so far.
• Veto: substantive decisions need nine votes and the “concurring votes” of all permanent members (Article 27(3)); decisions under Chapter VII are binding on all members (Article 25).
• Secretary-General: appointed by the General Assembly on the Security Council’s recommendation (Article 97) — which is why a Council deadlock stalls the choice. The current term ends on 31 December 2026.

The author’s ledger — what the UN got right

• Humanitarian: joint work by UNICEF and WHO helped nearly halve child deaths between 1990 and 2011; polio is near eradication; UNHCR and the World Food Programme reach millions every year.
• Development: the Millennium Development Goals (2000–2015, 8 goals) helped halve extreme poverty and paved the way for the Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030, 17 goals).
• Environment: the Montreal Protocol (1987) phased out about 99% of ozone-depleting substances; the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and Paris Agreement (2015) shaped climate responsibility.
• Social norms: the Beijing Conference on Women (1995) and the Global Compact for Migration (2018).
• Peace: roughly 170 peace settlements brokered, and support to transitions in Namibia, East Timor and Mozambique.

The author’s diagnosis — what is broken

• Representational deficit: the Council’s permanent membership reflects the power map of 1945; Africa and Latin America have no permanent seat, and major economies are outside it.
• Veto as obstruction: even the threat of a veto shields permanent members and allies during wars and humanitarian crises.
• Drift to smaller forums: states turn to the G20, regional alliances and “mini-laterals” — but none can deploy peacekeepers or claim universal legitimacy.
• The alternative is worse: without a working Council, the world slides towards “might is right” — the logic of the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides’ history of the Peloponnesian War.
• Two meanings of reform: the developed West stresses budget cuts and streamlining; developing countries stress inclusion and voice. The UN Secretariat’s UN80 Initiative (2025) sits largely in the first camp.

Figure 4 — UNSC reform: the main models on the table

Current UNSC155 permanent (veto)10 non-permanentUnchangedsince 1965G4 modelIndia, Brazil, Germany, Japan25–26+6 permanent(G4 + 2 African)+4 or 5 non-permanentVeto for new membersdeferred for reviewAfrican positionEzulwini Consensus, 20052 permanent seatsfor Africa, withall privileges incl. veto+ more non-permanentUniting forConsensusincl. Italy, PakistanNo newpermanent seatsMore elected seats,some longer-term

Talks under the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) since 2009 have stalled on these competing models — and any change needs P5 ratification.

▤ How the Charter Can Be Changed — Prelims Hooks

• Article 108: an amendment needs a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members — so each P5 member can block reform.
• Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN): the UNGA process on Council reform, running since 2009.
• Veto Initiative (UNGA Resolution 76/262, 2022): the General Assembly must meet within 10 working days of a veto to debate it.
• Pact for the Future (2024): adopted at the Summit of the Future, it commits members to reform the Council and to address the under-representation of Africa.
• India and the Council: a non-permanent member eight times, most recently 2021–22; a founding member of the G4 (formed 2004).

The author’s prescription

• Expand permanent membership to include under-represented regions and emerging powers.
• Set clear norms to limit use of the veto.
• Deepen accountability of the Security Council to the General Assembly.
• Know the limit: reform must not go so far that the most powerful states walk out. History’s warning is the League of Nations — weakened by the absence of the US, which never joined, and the exit of Germany, Japan and Italy in the 1930s.

Evaluating the argument

• Strength: it balances the UN’s real record against its failures, avoiding both nostalgia and dismissal.
• Tension: limiting the veto and keeping the P5 on board pull in opposite directions; Article 108 gives the P5 the final word on both.
• Funding reality: arrears and cuts in assessed contributions by major donors weaken the UN’s operational capacity regardless of structural reform.
• India’s stake: as a top cumulative peacekeeping contributor and the most populous country, India argues that a Council without it lacks legitimacy — the author’s “representational deficit”.

✎ Mains Practice Question

“The UN Security Council reflects the world of 1945, not the world of today.” Discuss the causes of the Council’s credibility crisis and evaluate the prospects for its reform, with particular reference to India’s position. 15 marks · 250 words