Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items

Core TopicImportantConcise

OpinionsGS Paper II

01Political Party Finance & ‘Shell’ Parties (RUPPs)02Regulating the UNSC Veto — Restraint, Accountability, Reform

OpinionsGeneral Studies Paper II — Polity & International Relations

01

The Opaque World of Party Finance: Why Registered Unrecognised Parties Have Become a Regulatory Blind Spot

Core TopicOpinionGS-II · Polity — Elections, RPA 1951, ECI, Political PartiesPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Lead Op-Ed by a former Election Commissioner · 25 Sep 2026

Political parties are the central actors of Indian democracy, yet the law says remarkably little about what they are, how they must keep accounts, or who checks them. The op-ed argues that this gap has allowed Registered Unrecognised Political Parties (RUPPs) to function as conduits for unexplained money — much like shell companies in corporate finance.

◈ Static Background — What Is a Political Party in Law?

In the Constitution: the original text did not mention political parties at all. The term entered only through the Tenth Schedule (anti-defection), inserted by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985.

Legal character: a party is essentially an association formed under the freedom guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c). It is not a company, trust, society or firm — so none of the disclosure regimes applicable to those bodies automatically apply to it.

• Registration — Section 29A, RPA 1951 (inserted in 1989): a party applies to the Election Commission of India (ECI); its constitution must bear allegiance to the Constitution, socialism, secularism and democracy, and uphold India’s sovereignty, unity and integrity.
• Contributions — Section 29B: parties may accept voluntary contributions, but not from Government companies.
• Disclosure — Section 29C: donations above ₹20,000 must be reported to the ECI (Form 24A).
• Tax exemption — Section 13A, Income-tax Act, 1961 (now carried into the Income-tax Act, 2025): party income is exempt if accounts are maintained, audited and the 29C report is filed; donors get deductions under Sections 80GGB (companies) and 80GGC (individuals).
• Cash cap: since the Finance Act, 2017, a party cannot accept cash donations of ₹2,000 or more from a single person.

Registered vs Recognised — The Classification Aspirants Confuse

Registration happens under the RPA, 1951. Recognition is a separate status under the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968, earned through electoral performance. Recognition brings a reserved symbol and other privileges; registration alone brings the financial privileges.

Figure 1 — How the law classifies political parties

Association — Article 19(1)(c)Registered with ECISection 29A, RPA 1951Recognised: National / StatePara 6, Symbols Order 1968Registered Unrecognised (RUPP)No poll threshold met• Reserved (exclusive) symbol• Up to 40 star campaigners• Free broadcast time on public media• Donations (29B) + tax exemption (13A)Recognition can be suspended: Para 16A• Symbol from the “free” list• Up to 20 star campaigners• SAME donation right (29B) andSAME tax exemption (13A)‘Delisting’ ≠ deregistrationProcess diagram drawn from RPA 1951, the Symbols Order 1968 and Section 77 (star campaigners)

The loophole in one picture: the financial privileges attach to registration, not to recognition or electoral activity.

The Core Problem — Four Legal Gaps

• ECI cannot deregister at will: in Indian National Congress v. Institute of Social Welfare (2002), the Supreme Court held that the ECI may cancel registration only if it was obtained by fraud, if the party ceases to bear allegiance to the Constitution, or if it is declared unlawful. Non-contesting parties are therefore only “delisted”.
• Delisting keeps the money tap open: a delisted or unrecognised party can still receive contributions under Section 29B and claim exemption under Section 13A.
• Mechanical scrutiny: the ECI receives accounts but lacks the mandate or machinery to audit them; filing is treated as compliance.
• No cap on party spending: candidates face expenditure limits (Section 77 and Rule 90, Conduct of Election Rules, 1961), but expenditure by a party on “propagating its programme” is excluded — so parties can spend without limit.

▤ The Numbers Cited in the Debate

• RUPP compliance: an ADR report (July 2025) found only 739 of 2,764 RUPPs filed their financial records for FY2022-23, while RUPPs’ declared income rose 223% that year.
• ECI clean-up: in August 2025, the ECI delisted 334 of 2,854 RUPPs that had not contested elections.
• 2024 Lok Sabha election: 22 parties had ₹18,742.31 crore at their disposal, including ₹7,416.31 crore raised during the campaign; they spent ₹3,861.57 crore and retained ₹14,848.46 crore afterwards (as per a Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative study of accounts filed with the ECI).
• Revenue foregone: about ₹11,813 crore in taxes over a decade due to exemptions on political donations.
• Only 41.76% of donations totalling ₹28,287 crore over nine years were claimed as tax-exempt — raising the question of why donors forgo the tax benefit on the rest.

Figure 2 — Declared donations are rising; individuals now dominate tax-exempt giving

Declared donations (₹ crore)7142015-16(43 parties)7,2032023-24(27 parties)Tax-exemption claims, FY2022-23 (₹ crore)Individuals2,275.85Corporates514.4Firms & assns.115.71Figures as cited in the op-ed from a Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative study; bars to scale within each panel.

A roughly tenfold rise in declared donations — even as the number of parties declaring them fell.

The Electoral Bonds Chapter

• Scheme: announced in the Union Budget 2017-18 and notified in January 2018; bearer instruments sold by the SBI, with donor identity hidden from the public.
• Eligibility: only parties registered under Section 29A that polled at least 1% of votes in the last Lok Sabha or Assembly election — so most RUPPs could not receive bonds.
• Verdict: in ADR v. Union of India (February 2024), a Constitution Bench struck down the scheme as violating voters’ right to information under Article 19(1)(a), and also struck down the 2017 amendment to Section 182, Companies Act, 2013 that had removed the cap on corporate donations.
• Aftermath: the disclosed data raised questions of possible quid pro quo; the op-ed calls for a court-monitored probe.

Historical Anchor — Attempts to Discipline Parties

• 1994 — Seshan order: Chief Election Commissioner T.N. Seshan invoked the Symbols Order to put all parties on notice about the poor state of their internal functioning.
• ECI guidelines: a registering party must commit to contest elections within five years; if it does not contest continuously for six years, it is taken off the list.
• Committees: Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990) on electoral reforms; Indrajit Gupta Committee (1998) on State funding of elections; Law Commission’s 170th Report (1999) recommending internal democracy and financial transparency in parties.
• RTI: in June 2013, the Central Information Commission declared six national parties “public authorities” under the RTI Act, 2005; parties did not comply and the issue remains pending before the Supreme Court.
• Article 324: in Kanhiya Lal Omar v. R.K. Trivedi (1985), the Supreme Court upheld the Symbols Order as an exercise of the ECI’s plenary power — a “reservoir” of authority where the law is silent.

Reforms Proposed in the Op-Ed

• CAG audit: the ECI, using Article 324, should require party accounts to be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General or its nominee.
• Cap party spending: impose a ceiling on election expenditure by parties — a measure the ECI has repeatedly recommended.
• Limit the tax subsidy: exempt donations only up to the prescribed expenditure limit; tax the rest.
• Automatic deregistration of RUPPs that do not contest elections as per ECI guidelines.
• Central digital portal for standardised, public financial filings by all registered parties.

A Balanced Assessment

• Strength of the argument: tax exemption is a public subsidy; public money justifies public scrutiny. The mismatch between tax privileges and accountability is hard to defend.
• Legal limits: deregistration powers and party-expenditure caps need amendment to the RPA; Article 324 operates only where Parliament’s law is silent, so ECI directions alone may not survive challenge.
• Freedom of association: heavy-handed rules could burden genuine small and new parties, which are also RUPPs. The target should be non-contesting, high-receipt entities, not small parties as such.
• Enforcement capacity: the Income-Tax Department and other agencies already have powers; the gap is as much about will and prioritisation as about law.
• The larger reform: sustainable transparency may need a package — partial State funding, full digital disclosure and an independent audit — rather than piecemeal measures.

◈ Prelims Hooks

• The word “political party” appears in the Constitution only in the Tenth Schedule.
• Registration → RPA Section 29A; recognition → Symbols Order 1968, Paragraph 6.
• Electoral bonds were struck down in 2024 under Article 19(1)(a).
• Recognised parties: up to 40 star campaigners; RUPPs: up to 20.

✎ Mains Practice Question

Political parties in India enjoy significant tax privileges but face minimal financial scrutiny. Examine the gaps in the legal framework governing party finance, with special reference to Registered Unrecognised Political Parties, and suggest reforms. 15 marks · 250 words

02

Should the UNSC Veto Be Abolished? The Case for Restraint and Accountability Over Revolution

Core TopicOpinionGS-II · IR — Important International Institutions, UN ReformPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Parley (expert discussion) · 25 Sep 2026

At the 81st session of the UN General Assembly, France renewed its push to regulate the use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities. With 128 States now backing the initiative and the United Kingdom joining France, two of the five permanent members have accepted the principle of voluntary restraint for the first time.

◈ Static Background — The Security Council and the Veto

The UN Charter was signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and came into force on 24 October 1945. It gave the Security Council “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Article 24), with binding powers under Chapter VII.

• Composition (Article 23): 15 members — 5 permanent (P5): the U.S., U.K., France, Russia and China — plus 10 non-permanent members elected by the UNGA for two-year terms. The Council was enlarged from 11 to 15 by an amendment that came into force in 1965.
• Voting (Article 27): procedural matters need any 9 votes; substantive matters need 9 votes including the “concurring votes” of all permanent members.
• The veto: the word “veto” does not appear in the Charter — it is the practical effect of Article 27(3). By practice, an abstention by a permanent member is not a veto.
• Why it exists: the founders learned from the League of Nations, which collapsed partly because great powers left or never joined. The veto was the price of keeping them inside.
• The reform lock (Article 108): Charter amendments need two-thirds of UNGA members and ratification by two-thirds of members including all P5 — so the veto protects itself.

Three Questions That Are Often Mixed Up

The discussion makes an important analytical distinction. Debates on the veto actually involve three separate questions, and solutions differ for each:

• Use of the veto — can permanent members agree not to use it in certain situations? (French–Mexican initiative, ACT code)
• Accountability for its use — must a permanent member explain itself after a veto? (Liechtenstein initiative)
• Structural reform — should the Council itself be enlarged or the veto abolished or extended? (needs Charter amendment)

▤ The Three Incremental Initiatives at a Glance

• French–Mexican initiative (2015): a political declaration asking P5 members to voluntarily refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and large-scale war crimes. Its roots lie in France’s 2013 proposal for a P5 “code of conduct” after the Ghouta chemical attack in Syria. Now backed by 128 States, including the U.K.
• ACT Code of Conduct (2015): by the Accountability, Coherence and Transparency group; applies to all Council members, permanent and non-permanent — they pledge not to vote against credible action to prevent or halt mass atrocities.
• Liechtenstein “veto initiative” (UNGA Resolution 76/262, April 2022): whenever a veto is cast, the General Assembly meets within 10 working days to debate it; the vetoing member is invited to explain its vote.
• Common feature: all three are political and moral commitments, not legally binding, and none amends the Charter.

Figure 3 — From Charter to restraint: a timeline of the veto debate

1945UN Charter;Art. 27(3)1950Uniting forPeace, Res. 3771965UNSC enlarged11 → 152005R2P at WorldSummit2013Ghouta; Frenchcode proposal2015French–Mexican+ ACT code2022LiechtensteinRes. 76/2622026128 States;U.K. joinsSelected milestones; spacing is not to scale.Also relevant: IGN on UNSC reform (from 2009) and the Pact for the Future (2024).

The trend is clear: since formal amendment is blocked, reformers have shifted to norms, pledges and procedures.

The Spectrum of Options

Figure 4 — Five ways to deal with the veto, from least to most difficult

Easier — no Charter changeHarder — Charter amendment (Art. 108)Status quoVeto usedfreely by P5AccountabilityExplain vetobefore UNGALiechtenstein(adopted 2022)RestraintNo veto inmass atrocitiesFrench–Mexican,ACT codeExtensionVeto for newpermanentmembersEqualityargumentAbolitionRemove vetoaltogetherNeeds P5’s ownratificationAnalytical framework drawn from the Parley discussion.

The French proposal sits in the middle of the spectrum — reformist, not revolutionary.

Two Perspectives From the Discussion

• The pragmatic view: the initiative matters precisely because it is modest. It seeks to change the behaviour of the P5 without the near-impossible task of rewriting the Charter. Accountability through the UNGA may not stop a determined veto but makes its use more costly.
• The realist view: the world may believe in sovereign equality, but power is unequally distributed; no international organisation can survive if it acts against the fundamental interests of major powers. It is easier for France and the U.K. — the lighter members of the P5 — to adopt principled positions than for the U.S., Russia or China.
• The selectivity problem: States interpret conflicts differently; words like “genocide” or “war crimes” are themselves contested, which weakens voluntary restraint.

India’s Stake

• Membership record: India has served eight terms as a non-permanent member, most recently in 2021-22, and is a candidate for 2028-29.
• Group diplomacy: India seeks a permanent seat through the G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan); opposed by the Uniting for Consensus group; Africa’s demand is the Ezulwini Consensus (2005).
• On the veto: India’s long-standing position is that new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and privileges as existing ones, while the G4 has shown flexibility on deferring veto use pending a review.
• Process: reform talks run through the UNGA’s Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) since 2009; the Pact for the Future (2024) committed members to intensify efforts, including on the veto.
• Dilemma: supporting restraint on the veto is consistent with India’s multilateral values, but abolition would also dilute the privilege India hopes to share one day.

Assessment

• Positive: momentum (128 States, two P5 members) builds a norm; norms can shape behaviour even without law, as the growth of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) shows.
• Limits: the three most frequent veto users have not joined; voluntary pledges have no enforcement.
• Structural question unresolved: the Council still reflects the 1945 power order, with no permanent member from Africa, Latin America or India — its legitimacy deficit remains.
• Way forward: combine procedural accountability (the Liechtenstein model), greater use of the UNGA (Uniting for Peace) and continued pressure for expansion, rather than waiting for abolition.

◈ Prelims Hooks

• The word “veto” is not in the UN Charter; the power flows from Article 27(3).
• Charter amendment: Article 108 — needs ratification by all P5.
• Resolution 76/262 (2022): UNGA debate within 10 working days of a veto.
• Uniting for Peace, Resolution 377(V) (1950): UNGA can act when the Council is deadlocked.

✎ Mains Practice Question

“The veto in the UN Security Council cannot be abolished, but it can be restrained.” Discuss the recent initiatives to regulate the use of the veto and examine their implications for India’s pursuit of permanent membership. 15 marks · 250 words