Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items

Core TopicImportantConcise

EditorialsGS Paper II

01The UN at 81: Relevance, Reform & India’s Stakes

OpinionsGS Paper III (and GS II)

02Reviewing India’s Nuclear Doctrine

EditorialsInternational Relations & Global Institutions

01

The United Nations at 81: A Weakened Multilateral Order, the Next Secretary-General, and What It Means for India

Core TopicEditorialGS-II · IR — Important International Institutions, their Structure & Mandate; India’s InterestsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Editorial · The Indian Express · Opinion

The 81st session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) opens amid a record number of conflicts, open defiance of the UN Charter by major powers and the last year of the current Secretary-General’s term. Two commentaries converge on one conclusion: the UN is diminished but not dispensable — and a rising India has more to lose from its decline than to gain.

◈ Static Background — The UN System in Brief

The UN Charter was signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945 (UN Day). The UN began with 51 original members; it now has 193 member states. India is a founding member, having signed the Charter in 1945.

• Six principal organs: General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council (suspended since 1994), International Court of Justice and the Secretariat.
• General Assembly: one country, one vote; decisions on “important questions” (peace and security, admission, budget) need a two-thirds majority (Article 18). A new President of the GA (PGA) is elected for each annual session, rotating among regional groups.
• Security Council (Article 23): 15 members — 5 permanent (P5): China, France, Russia, UK, US — and 10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms, not eligible for immediate re-election.
• Veto (Article 27): substantive decisions require nine votes including the concurring votes of the P5; a single negative vote by a permanent member blocks action.
• Chapter VI covers pacific settlement of disputes; Chapter VII covers binding enforcement action, including sanctions (Article 41) and use of force (Article 42).
• Article 19: a member in arrears equal to or exceeding its contributions for the preceding two full years loses its vote in the GA — relevant to today’s UN liquidity crisis.

The Arguments in Brief

The Hindu editorial reads this session as a moment of urgency: the organisation looks “overweight and weak” — large and bureaucratic, yet unable to restrain the powers that created it. It calls for a reformed UN and a Secretary-General able to steer that reform over the next decade.

• Conflict load: one study cited by the editorial counted over 65 conflicts in 35 countries in 2025 — the highest since 1946.
• Rhetoric over remedies: leaders at the centre of the crises in Ukraine, Gaza and the Persian Gulf used the podium for accusation rather than solutions; one permanent member denied visas to the Palestinian delegation, and another’s head of state stayed away.
• India’s absence noted: the editorial finds it surprising that India’s Prime Minister did not address the Assembly in a year when India is campaigning for a Council seat.
• India–Pakistan narrative: the US President’s repeated claim of having brokered the end of the May 2025 India–Pakistan hostilities runs counter to India’s stated position that the cessation was agreed bilaterally between the two militaries.

The Indian Express column, by a former Permanent Representative of India to the UN, reframes the issue as one of rule-making power. India needs agreements that hold when relations sour; without multilateral forums, the rules are written by whoever controls markets, finance and technology.

• Council paralysis: the veto lets permanent members shield themselves and their partners — seen in Ukraine, Gaza and the Gulf — while Sudan shows the cost of neglect.
• Unilateral coercive measures: sanctions enforced through banks, insurers and payment networks can block a lawful Indian transaction — a form of “weaponised interdependence” outside any Security Council authorisation.
• Residual value: universal membership, humanitarian agencies, documentation of crises and scientific assessments (such as those informing climate talks) keep the UN useful even when the Council is stuck.
• Self-inflicted weakness: states assign unfunded mandates, delay dues and cut aid, then blame the UN; peace operations with ambitious mandates and thin resources are set up to fail.
• AI governance as a test case: India should seek AI safety standards and technology access negotiated where developing countries have a voice, not only among permanent members and technology firms.

▤ Key Facts from This Session

• UNGA-81 is presided over by Bangladesh’s Foreign Minister as President of the General Assembly — who will also oversee the selection of the next Secretary-General.
• The current Secretary-General’s second term ends on 31 December 2026; he has served since 1 January 2017.
• Partners for Multilateralism (P4M): launched on 21 September 2026 by India, Brazil, Canada, Kenya, the EU, Australia and Barbados; its declaration flags the use of economic interdependence to exert pressure on trade, supply chains and development finance.
• On 23 September 2026, technology executives briefed the Security Council on the risks of artificial intelligence.
• India is a candidate for a non-permanent Council seat for 2028–29; its opponent in the June 2027 election is Tajikistan, which has never served on the Council.
• India has contributed more than 2,75,000 personnel to UN peacekeeping — among the largest cumulative contributors.

◈ Static Background — How the Secretary-General Is Chosen

• Article 97: the Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council — so the P5 veto applies at the recommendation stage.
• The five-year term is set by convention (GA resolution of 1946), not by the Charter; two terms have become the norm.
• GA resolution 69/321 (2015) opened the process: candidates now publish vision statements and take part in public informal dialogues.
• There is an informal expectation of regional rotation, and a long-running campaign for the first woman Secretary-General; no woman has held the office since 1945.

Figure 1 — India’s terms as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council

1950–511967–681972–731977–781984–851991–922011–122021–222028–29?Eight terms so far (16 years on the Council) · Election for 2028–29 due in June 2027India lost the 1996 contest for the Asia seat to Japan

A ninth term would be India’s first since 2021–22 — the practical route to Council influence while permanent membership remains blocked.

The Reform Debate — Who Wants What

• G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan): seek expansion in both permanent and non-permanent categories, with each supporting the others’ bids.
• Uniting for Consensus (“Coffee Club”): led by Italy and including Pakistan; opposes new permanent seats and prefers more elected or longer-term seats.
• African Union — Ezulwini Consensus (2005): demands two permanent seats with veto and five non-permanent seats for Africa; Africa has no permanent member today.
• Process: reform talks run through the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) at the GA, since 2009, without an agreed negotiating text.
• The procedural wall — Article 108: any Charter amendment needs a two-thirds vote in the GA and ratification by two-thirds of members including all P5. The Council was expanded only once, from 11 to 15 members, in 1965.
• Recent reform tracks: the Pact for the Future (Summit of the Future, September 2024) with the Global Digital Compact, and the Secretariat’s UN80 Initiative (2025) on efficiency and mandates.

Analysis — India’s Stakes

For India, the UN is less a stage for status than a shield against rule-taking. A world split into rival financial and technology blocs would force Indian firms to accept one camp’s conditions — a direct challenge to strategic autonomy.

• Near-term realism: permanent membership faces the Article 108 barrier and regional rivalries; an elected seat is the achievable goal.
• Coalition diplomacy: cross-camp groupings such as P4M let India build support on climate finance and protection from economic coercion without waiting for Charter reform.
• Credentials: peacekeeping record, Global South advocacy (e.g., the African Union’s G20 membership in 2023 under India’s presidency) and a record of Council terms.
• Presence matters: high-level absence at the Assembly can be read as distance from multilateralism in the very year India seeks votes.

A Balanced View

• The case for the UN: no other body offers universal membership, legitimacy for collective action and the technical agencies (WHO, WFP, UNHCR, IPCC processes) that states rely on.
• The case against complacency: repeated Charter violations without consequence erode deterrence of aggression, and funding shortfalls hollow out operations.
• Limits of India’s leverage: India itself has historically resisted intrusive rule-making on trade, climate and human rights — so it must balance sovereignty with support for binding rules.

✎ Mains Practice Question

“The United Nations retains value even when its Security Council is paralysed.” Critically examine this statement and discuss how India can advance its interests in a weakening multilateral order. 15 marks · 250 words

OpinionsInternal Security & Strategic Affairs

02

Revisiting India’s Nuclear Doctrine: The Case for Review Without Revision

Core TopicOpinionGS-III · Security — Security Challenges & their Management; GS-II · India & its NeighbourhoodPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Op-ed

India’s nuclear doctrine has remained essentially unchanged since 2003, while its security environment has not. The author argues for a periodic review of the doctrine’s assumptions and supporting capabilities — but cautions against reopening No First Use (NFU), which has served India’s interests.

◈ Static Background — How the Doctrine Came About

• Pokhran-I (18 May 1974): code-named “Smiling Buddha”, described as a peaceful nuclear explosion.
• Pokhran-II (11 and 13 May 1998): Operation Shakti — five tests, after which India declared itself a nuclear weapons state; 11 May is observed as National Technology Day. Pakistan tested at Chagai later that month.
• Kargil (1999): showed that nuclear deterrence does not rule out limited conventional war — the stability–instability paradox.
• Draft Nuclear Doctrine (17 August 1999): released by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB).
• Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), 4 January 2003: reviewed progress in operationalising the doctrine and made its core tenets public; the Strategic Forces Command (SFC) was set up the same year.
• India is not a party to the NPT (1968) or the CTBT (1996); it maintains a voluntary moratorium on testing. The 2008 NSG waiver enabled civil nuclear trade.

▤ The 2003 Doctrine at a Glance

• Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD): an arsenal sufficient to deter, not to match adversaries weapon for weapon.
• No First Use: nuclear weapons used only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
• Massive retaliation: retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
• Exception: India retains the option of nuclear retaliation in the event of a major biological or chemical attack.
• Negative security assurance: no use against non-nuclear-weapon states.
• Civilian control: retaliation authorised only by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA).
• Other commitments: strict export controls, participation in Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, test moratorium, and the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world through global, verifiable, non-discriminatory disarmament.

Figure 2 — India’s Nuclear Command Authority and the delivery triad

Nuclear Command Authority (NCA)Political CouncilChaired by the PM · sole authority to order useExecutive CouncilChaired by the NSA · advises and executesStrategic Forces Command (2003)LandPrithvi, Agni seriesAirNuclear-capable combat aircraftSeaSSBNs (Arihant class), K-series

Firm civilian control sits at the apex; the sea leg is the most survivable — the core of an assured second strike under NFU.

The Author’s Argument — Three Shifts Since 2003

• Strategic — a two-front nuclear problem: China has expanded and modernised its arsenal and built infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control, while deepening defence ties with Pakistan. Two aligned nuclear adversaries could apply pressure simultaneously in a crisis.
• Pakistan’s tactical weapons: short-range systems such as Nasr (Hatf-IX) under its “full spectrum deterrence” posture aim to offset India’s conventional edge below the strategic threshold.
• Technological: AI, cyber operations, space-based surveillance, hypersonic missiles and ballistic missile defence compress decision time and threaten command networks — complicating assumptions about assured retaliation.
• Geopolitical: a multipolar order, US–China rivalry and closer China–Russia coordination mean regional crises are shaped by wider great-power competition, not bilateral deterrence alone.

~600

China — estimated warheads

~180

India — estimated warheads

~170

Pakistan — estimated warheads

These are SIPRI Yearbook 2025 estimates as of January 2025. No state officially discloses its warhead count, and the figures are approximate. They show China’s arsenal growing fastest.

Review, Not Revision — What the Author Proposes

• Scrutinise “massive retaliation”: test whether the declared response gives enough clarity against limited or tactical nuclear use, without altering core principles.
• Reaffirm, don’t abandon, NFU: a review can restate its rationale and clarify its scope.
• Invest in capability over declaratory change: survivability, command-and-control resilience, early warning, intelligence, cyber resilience and a robust triad.
• Align with diplomacy: nuclear policy should fit India’s wider goals and strategic autonomy.

◈ Concepts & Capabilities to Know

• Second-strike capability: the ability to absorb a first strike and still retaliate — the foundation of NFU credibility.
• Counter-value vs counter-force: targeting cities and economic centres versus targeting an adversary’s military and nuclear forces.
• MIRV: Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles; India tested an Agni-5 with MIRV technology in March 2024 (Mission Divyastra).
• Sea-based deterrent: INS Arihant completed its first deterrence patrol in 2018, completing the triad; INS Arighaat was commissioned in 2024.
• Hypersonics: India flight-tested a long-range hypersonic missile in November 2024.
• China’s posture: China has declared NFU since its first test in 1964; Pakistan has no NFU policy.
• Export-control regimes: India joined the MTCR (2016), Wassenaar Arrangement (2017) and Australia Group (2018); its NSG membership remains pending.

A Balanced Assessment

The NFU debate is not new — it has surfaced periodically, including in official remarks in 2019 that India’s future adherence would depend on circumstances. The formal position, however, has not changed.

• For retaining NFU: it underpins India’s image as a responsible nuclear power, aided the 2008 NSG waiver, lowers pressure for hair-trigger alert and avoids a costly first-strike force.
• Concerns raised by critics: “massive retaliation” against a small tactical strike may seem disproportionate and so less credible; NFU also places heavy demands on survivability and early warning.
• Risks of ambiguity: signalling doubt about NFU could prompt adversaries to recalibrate, strain crisis stability and weaken India’s disarmament diplomacy.
• Transparency gap: the doctrine has no published full text beyond the 2003 summary, and there is no periodic public review mechanism.
• Takeaway: credibility comes from capability and survivability as much as from declaratory policy — hence the author’s emphasis on review over revision.

✎ Mains Practice Question

India’s nuclear doctrine, operationalised in 2003, rests on credible minimum deterrence and No First Use. In the light of a changing strategic and technological environment, examine whether the doctrine needs review, and discuss the risks of altering its declaratory posture. 15 marks · 250 words