In-Depth PIB Analysis2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Economy & Digital Public InfrastructureGS Paper III 01UPI — 10 Years of Digital Payments Environment & EcologyGS Paper III + GS Paper II (IR) 02India's Land Restoration — UNCCD COP17 & Bonn Challenge Economy & Digital Public InfrastructureGeneral Studies Paper III 01 UPI Completes a Decade: From 21 Banks to the World's Largest Real-Time Payment System GS-III · Indian Economy — Digital Public Infrastructure, Financial InclusionPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Finance · NPCI · 24 Aug 2026 On 25 August 2026, the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) completes ten years since its public launch — during which annual transaction volume expanded roughly 13,000-fold, and the platform grew from a domestic experiment to nearly half of the world's real-time payment traffic. ◈ Background & Context India's retail payments were fragmented before 2016: NEFT was batch-based, IMPS required MMID, and cash dominated low-value commerce. The National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), set up in 2009 as an umbrella body for retail payment systems under RBI oversight, developed UPI to unify these channels on a single interoperable rail. UPI was piloted in April 2016 with 21 member banks, then rolled out publicly in August 2016; the BHIM app followed in December 2016. It allows a user to link multiple bank accounts in a single mobile app, send/receive money instantly using a VPA (Virtual Payment Address), and pay merchants via QR codes — 24 × 7, 365 days a year. Security rests on two-factor authentication (device + UPI PIN) and end-to-end encryption. ▤ UPI at a Glance — Key Facts Launched: August 2016 (pilot: April 2016) by NPCI under RBI oversight Nodal body: National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI) Transaction volume FY 2016–17: 1.78 crore | FY 2025–26: 24,162 crore (~13,000× growth) Transaction value FY 2016–17: ₹0.07 lakh crore | FY 2025–26: ~₹314 lakh crore (~4,000× growth) Banks live on UPI: 44 (FY 2016–17) → 703 (FY 2025–26) → 741 (July 2026) Monthly peak (July 2026): 2,366 crore transactions; ₹29.87 lakh crore in value Global share: ~49% of world's real-time payment transaction volume (IMF, June 2025) Countries live: 11 — UAE, France, Bhutan, Nepal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Qatar, Cambodia, Greece, Maldives UPI's share in India's digital payments: ~70% of all digital transactions (FY 2023–24) The Architecture: Why UPI Works Interoperability: any bank's UPI app can transact with any other — no closed-loop wallets. Open API model: third-party apps (PhonePe, Google Pay, Paytm) plug into the same NPCI rails, fostering competition without fragmentation. Tiered access: UPI 123PAY (IVR/feature phones, 2021), UPI Lite (PIN-less low-value, 2022), and UPI Circle (delegated payments, 2024) progressively widened the user base. Credit on UPI: RuPay credit cards (2022) and Credit Line on UPI (2023) extended credit access to the payments rail — a structural shift from debit-only usage. Transaction Mix: Volume vs Value Divergence Person-to-Merchant (P2M) transactions account for 63% of total volume, reflecting high-frequency low-value retail use. Person-to-Person (P2P) transactions, though only 37% of volume, drive 71% of value — indicating their role in larger fund transfers. This dual character — mass retail platform and trusted high-value channel — is a UPSC-relevant structural point. 86% of P2M transactions are below ₹500 — UPI is deeply embedded in daily commerce. 41% of P2P transactions exceed ₹500, showing growing versatility for personal transfers. Key Milestones in UPI's Evolution 2019: SEBI permitted UPI as an alternative payment mechanism for IPO applications; crossed 1 billion monthly transactions. 2021–22: AutoPay (recurring mandates), UPI 123PAY (feature phones), UPI Lite; FY 2021–22 crossed USD 1 trillion in annual value and 5 billion monthly transactions. 2023: Credit Line on UPI introduced — pre-sanctioned bank credit linked as a funding account. 2024: UPI Circle (delegated payments); tax payment limit raised to ₹5 lakh per transaction; Aadhaar Face Authentication for PIN onboarding. 2025: On-device authentication via fingerprint/face unlock; Aadhaar-based onboarding simplified for first-time users and senior citizens. June–July 2026: UPI went live in Cambodia and Greece (cross-border remittances); Maldives' 'Favara' instant payment system linked with UPI. UPI's Global Footprint Figure 1 — Countries Where UPI is Operational (as of August 2026) UPI is live in 11 countries for acceptance and/or cross-border remittances. Image: Ministry of Finance / PIB; reproduced with credit for educational use. UPI's Growth Trajectory: 10-Year Chart Figure 2 — UPI Annual Transaction Volume (FY 2016–17 to FY 2025–26) 06,00012,00018,000Crore TxnsFY17FY18FY19FY20FY21FY22FY23FY24FY25FY2624,162 CrAnnual Transaction Volume (Crore Transactions) | Source: NPCI / PIB From 1.78 crore in FY 2016–17 to 24,162 crore in FY 2025–26 — a ~13,000-fold rise in a decade. Critical View: Strengths and Gaps Merchant-side concentration: PhonePe and Google Pay together hold over 80% of UPI transaction volume, raising antitrust and systemic-risk concerns. NPCI's 30% market-share cap remains unenforced. Zero MDR challenge: Since January 2020, UPI transactions carry zero Merchant Discount Rate. While this accelerated adoption, it has stressed the commercial sustainability of smaller payment service providers. Feature-phone inclusion: UPI 123PAY was designed to reach ~300 million feature-phone users, but uptake has been limited by last-mile digital literacy barriers. Cross-border depth vs breadth: UPI is "live" in 11 countries, but in several cases only for inbound remittances or a narrow class of transactions — not full merchant QR acceptance. True bilateral interoperability remains work in progress. Fraud and grievance redressal: The volume surge has also raised fraud incidence. Strengthening the ombudsman framework and consumer grievance turnaround times is an ongoing policy challenge. Institutions & Terms to Know (Prelims) NPCI: National Payments Corporation of India — umbrella body for retail payments; a not-for-profit owned by a consortium of banks under RBI guidance. NPCI International Payments Limited (NIPL): Wholly owned subsidiary of NPCI for international deployment of UPI and RuPay. VPA: Virtual Payment Address — e.g. user@bankname — the UPI identifier that masks bank account details. BHIM: Bharat Interface for Money — government-developed UPI app launched December 2016. PSP: Payment Service Provider — banks and fintech apps acting as Remitter PSP or Beneficiary PSP on the UPI rails. IMF recognition: IMF's June 2025 report "Growing Retail Digital Payments: The Value of Interoperability" acknowledged UPI as the world's largest real-time payment system by volume. India Stack: The layered Digital Public Infrastructure — Aadhaar (identity) → UPI (payments) → DigiLocker (documents) — of which UPI is the payments layer. ✎ Mains Practice Question "The Unified Payments Interface (UPI) represents not just a technological achievement but a structural shift in India's financial inclusion architecture." Critically examine this claim, highlighting both the successes and the unresolved challenges of UPI after a decade. 15 marks · 250 words Environment & EcologyGeneral Studies Paper III + IR (Paper II) 02 India Reports 21.76 mn ha Restored in 2011–2020 at UNCCD COP17; Reaffirms 26 mn ha Bonn Challenge Target by 2030 GS-III · Environment — Land Degradation, Sustainable DevelopmentGS-II · IR — Multilateral Environmental AgreementsPrelims + MainsPIB · MoEFCC · 24 Aug 2026 At the 17th Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, India disclosed that it restored 21.76 million hectares of degraded land between 2011 and 2020, generating approximately 1.22 billion person-days of employment. ◈ Background & Context Land degradation — encompassing soil erosion, loss of organic matter, deforestation, waterlogging and desertification — affects about one-third of global land area and directly threatens food security, rural livelihoods and carbon sinks. India is one of the countries significantly affected: an estimated 96–120 million hectares of land is under various degrees of degradation. The UNCCD (established 1994) is one of the three Rio Conventions alongside the UNFCCC and CBD. It focuses on land degradation, desertification and drought — particularly in drylands. The Bonn Challenge (launched 2011) is a global pledge to restore 150 million ha of degraded and deforested land by 2020 and 350 million ha by 2030. India made an initial pledge in 2015, later enhanced to 26 million ha by 2030. Land Degradation Neutrality (LDN) — the idea of no net loss in healthy, productive land — is a target embedded in SDG 15.3. ▤ India's Restoration Metrics at a Glance Bonn Challenge pledge: 26 million hectares restored by 2030 (enhanced from initial 2015 commitment) Restoration achieved (2011–2020): 21.76 million hectares (per Second Progress Report) Employment generated: ~1.22 billion person-days Land-use systems covered: forests, agriculture, soil and water conservation, other land-use systems Next reporting cycle: 2021–2025, in collaboration with ICFRE Centre of Excellence on Sustainable Land Management and IUCN Nodal Ministry: Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) Convention: UNCCD COP17, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (August 2026) India's Programmes Driving Land Restoration Green India Mission (GIM): One of the eight National Missions under the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC); targets increasing forest/tree cover, ecosystem services and carbon sinks by 5 million ha, and improving quality of forest cover on another 5 million ha. CAMPA (Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and Planning Authority): Channels funds collected from project developers who divert forest land, into compensatory afforestation and ecosystem restoration. Nagar Van Yojana: Targets creation of 1,000 urban forests in cities and towns — extends restoration into urban and peri-urban landscapes. Watershed Development: Programmes under PMKSY (Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana) and MGNREGS integrate water harvesting and soil conservation with livelihood support. Agroforestry: National Agroforestry Policy 2014 promotes tree integration on farmlands — a restoration approach with simultaneous food security and income benefits. Lineage: Key Conventions and Their Progression UNCCD (1994) → Established the 10-Year Strategy 2008–2018 → replaced by 2018–2030 Strategy with LDN as the central goal. Bonn Challenge (2011, Germany + IUCN) → New York Declaration on Forests 2014 escalated ambition → AFR100, Initiative 20×20 are regional complements. India's NDC (Nationally Determined Contribution) under the Paris Agreement includes a target to create an additional carbon sink of 2.5–3 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent through forest and tree cover by 2030 — restoration is the delivery mechanism. Critical View Measurement methodology: The 21.76 mn ha figure covers area "brought under restoration" — this includes schemes where interventions were initiated, not necessarily where ecological health has been fully recovered. The quality and permanence of restoration is harder to verify than area figures. Convergence challenge: Land restoration in India is spread across at least eight central ministries (Agriculture, Rural Development, Tribal Affairs, Jal Shakti, Environment, etc.) with no single nodal agency. Convergence at the landscape level remains an acknowledged implementation gap. Finance gap: India called for "diversified, adequate, predictable and sustained" international finance for land restoration at COP17 — an implicit acknowledgement that domestic budgetary support alone is insufficient to meet the 26 mn ha target. LDN accounting: India has not yet submitted a formal LDN target to the UNCCD — the restoration data and the LDN framework are parallel tracks that need integration. Process Diagram: India's Restoration Architecture Figure 3 — India's Multi-Sector Land Restoration Framework India's Commitments26 mn ha by 2030 (Bonn Challenge) · NDC Carbon Sink TargetGreen IndiaMission (GIM)+10 mn ha forestCAMPACompensatoryAfforestation FundNagar VanYojana1,000 Urban ForestsWatershed DevPMKSY + MGNREGSSoil & WaterAgroforestryNational Policy 2014Farm + Tree CoverReported Outcomes (2011–2020)21.76 mn ha Restored1.22 billion person-days of employment generatedSource: PIB / MoEFCC / UNCCD Second Progress Report (2011–2020) India's restoration outcomes flow from convergence across at least five national missions and programmes under different central ministries. Institutions & Terms to Know (Prelims) UNCCD: United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (1994) — one of the three Rio Conventions. Secretariat in Bonn. Bonn Challenge: A global pledge (launched 2011) to restore degraded/deforested land — 150 mn ha by 2020, 350 mn ha by 2030. LDN: Land Degradation Neutrality — SDG 15.3 target; aim: by 2030 the amount of degraded land does not increase from the baseline. IUCN: International Union for Conservation of Nature — co-launched the Bonn Challenge; partner in India's next reporting cycle. ICFRE: Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education — houses the Centre of Excellence on Sustainable Land Management, partner in India's 2021–2025 reporting. NAPCC: National Action Plan on Climate Change — eight missions, of which Green India Mission addresses forest restoration. SDG 15.3: "By 2030, combat desertification, restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land-degradation-neutral world." ✎ Mains Practice Question India's Bonn Challenge commitment and land restoration achievements have both environmental and socio-economic dimensions. Analyse the challenges of translating India's restoration pledges into verifiable on-ground outcomes, with reference to institutional convergence, financing and monitoring. 15 marks · 250 words

Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise OpinionsSigned Op-Eds · The Hindu 01BWSSB Ruling — Industry Definition & Labour Rights02Youth Unemployment — Household Costs & PLFS 2025 OpinionsSigned Op-Eds 01 Labour Rights Beyond the Shadow of BWSSB: The Supreme Court's Nine-Judge Ruling and the Industrial Relations Code Core TopicOpinionGS-II · Polity — Judiciary, Labour Law, Constitutional ProvisionsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Opinion · V. Gopala Gowda & Maitreyi Krishnan · 25 Aug 2026 On 20 August 2026, a nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court delivered its judgment on a reference concerning the definition of "industry" under the now-repealed Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — a ruling that arrived after its own occasion had expired, and whose significance lies less in what it decided than in the anxieties it revealed about the direction of India's labour law framework. ◈ Background & Context The 1978 seven-judge bench ruling in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs A. Rajappa (BWSSB) laid down the "Triple Test" for determining whether an entity constitutes an "industry" under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes (ID) Act, 1947. An entity qualifies if: (a) it involves a systematic activity, (b) organised as a cooperation between employer and employee, and (c) carried on for the production, supply or distribution of goods or services to satisfy human wants. The test's breadth brought a wide range of employers — including government bodies — within the Act's protective ambit. In State of U.P. vs Jai Bir Singh (2005), a five-judge bench questioned the "worker-oriented" character of BWSSB and referred it for reconsideration by a seven-judge bench. By order dated January 2, 2017, the matter was escalated to a nine-judge bench, which framed four questions on 16 February 2026. Critically, the Industrial Relations Code (IRC), 2020 — one of four Labour Codes consolidating 29 central labour laws — came into force on 21 November 2025, simultaneously repealing the ID Act, 1947. The reference to Section 2(j) of the ID Act was therefore effectively rendered moot before the bench even delivered its judgment. What the Nine Judges Actually Decided (and Didn't) CJI (writing for four judges): Reformulated the Triple Test from BWSSB but expressly described this reformulation as "hypothetical" — not binding on pending cases (which remain governed by the BWSSB framework) and inapplicable to future cases (since the ID Act is repealed). Justice D. Datta & Justice U. Bhuyan: Held that "the reference requires no answer." Justice B.V. Nagarathna: Called the exercise "unnecessary and only academic in nature," but affirmed BWSSB and noted that its relevance to the IRC must be assessed by comparing the actual text of Section 2(p) of the IRC — a comparison possible only in a live case, not in the abstract. Justice P.S. Narasimha: Acknowledged the reference had become unnecessary given the repeal, but stated that the IRC's definition of "industry" under Section 2(p) must be "freed of the bondage of ratio" in BWSSB. The Core Tension: What Was the "Burden" of BWSSB? The authors argue that the anxiety surrounding BWSSB — described by the CJI's opinion as a "burden" now lifted — is inseparable from the original intent of the ID Act. The Act was designed to maintain industrial peace by providing basic dispute-resolution mechanisms; exclusion from the definition of "industry" meant exclusion from those mechanisms entirely. The five-judge bench in Jai Bir Singh (2005) criticised BWSSB's "worker-oriented approach" as "unmindful of the interests of the employer" — framing worker protection as a tilt requiring correction. Justice Narasimha's call to free the IRC's interpretation from BWSSB's "bondage" similarly treats protective interpretation as an obstacle rather than as the law fulfilling its design. The authors invoke Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's warning: liberty from state control can become "the dictatorship of the private employer" when workers lack countervailing protection. Constitutional Framework for Labour Protection Article 42 (DPSP): The State shall make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. Article 23 (Fundamental Right): Prohibits traffic in human beings, begar and other similar forms of forced labour. Article 38 & 39 (DPSP): Direct the State to minimise inequalities in income, status, and opportunities — the social justice mandate of Part IV. Kesavananda Bharati (1973): The 13-judge bench held that social, economic and political justice — the Preamble's promise — form part of the Constitution's basic structure. The IRC, 2020 — What Changes? The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 is one of four Labour Codes (along with the Code on Wages, 2019; the Code on Social Security, 2020; and the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020) that consolidate 29 central labour laws. Critics have argued that the Codes narrow the coverage thresholds, dilute collective bargaining rights, and ease conditions for retrenchment and closure. Section 2(p) of the IRC defines "industry" — its text differs from Section 2(j) of the ID Act, which is why the nine judges could not definitively rule on how BWSSB applies to it. The IRC raises the threshold for requiring government permission for retrenchment or closure from 100 workers to 300 workers — excluding a larger share of establishments from this protection. The IRC's definition of "worker" excludes supervisory employees earning above ₹18,000/month, narrowing who can raise a dispute. The authors argue that the IRC's architecture reflects a deliberate "premise of exclusion" — reducing who falls within the law's protective net — and that this must be tested against the constitutional mandate of social justice. Figure 1 — The Reference Timeline: From BWSSB (1978) to the Nine-Judge Ruling (2026) 1947ID Act enactedSec 2(j) defined1978BWSSB — 7-judgeTriple Test laid down2005Jai Bir SinghBWSSB referred20179-judge benchconstitutedNov 2025IRC, 2020 in forceID Act repealedAug 20269-judge ruling;reference "moot"Source: Authors / Supreme Court orders The BWSSB reference took nearly two decades to reach a nine-judge bench — by which point the legislation it concerned had already been repealed. Institutions & Terms to Know (Prelims) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (now repealed): Governed resolution of industrial disputes; defined "industry" (Sec 2j), "workman" (Sec 2s), provided for conciliation, adjudication and strikes. Industrial Relations Code, 2020: Consolidates ID Act 1947, Trade Unions Act 1926, and Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946. Defines "industry" under Section 2(p). Triple Test (BWSSB, 1978): Systematic activity + employer-employee cooperation + production of goods/services to satisfy human wants = "industry." Brought hospitals, universities, government bodies within the ID Act. Sovereign functions: Functions exclusive to the state as sovereign (defence, police, legislation, judiciary) — excluded from the definition of "industry" even under BWSSB. Pending disputes under the repealed ID Act: The Court held that cases arising before the IRC came into force on 21 November 2025 continue to be governed by the ID Act, 1947 and the BWSSB framework. There is no separately named legal principle for this; it is the ordinary rule that a repeal does not extinguish rights and liabilities that had already accrued under the repealed law. Four Labour Codes: Code on Wages (2019), Industrial Relations Code (2020), Code on Social Security (2020), Occupational Safety Health and Working Conditions Code (2020) — consolidated 29 central labour laws; in force from November 2025. ✎ Mains Practice Question The Supreme Court's nine-judge ruling on the BWSSB reference has been described as "only academic" given the repeal of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Analyse the constitutional implications of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020's narrower definition of "industry" in light of the Directive Principles of State Policy and the social justice mandate of the Constitution. 15 marks · 250 words 02 Beyond the Individual: Youth Unemployment as a Household Crisis in India ImportantOpinionGS-III · Economy — Employment, Unemployment, Human CapitalGS-I · Society — Youth, Gender, EducationPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Opinion · Gargi Sridharan & Basit Abdullah · 25 Aug 2026 India's youth unemployment debate typically focuses on the individual jobseeker, but recent analysis of PLFS 2025 data reveals that the costs of educated youth unemployment extend well beyond the individual — imposing measurable and prolonged financial strain on entire households, particularly those with limited earning capacity. ◈ Background & Context The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) is a continuous survey conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO) since 2017–18 to estimate key employment and unemployment indicators. The latest PLFS 2025 provides annual estimates of the labour market situation for youth (18–29 years) and disaggregates by education level, gender and NEET status. Unemployment rate (18–29 years): 14.8% overall; 29.4% among tertiary-educated youth (diploma, graduate, post-graduate). NEET rate (tertiary-educated youth): 40.1% — i.e., 4 in 10 educated young people are Neither in Employment, Education, nor Training. Gender dimension: Among tertiary-educated young women who are NEET, 74.7% are outside the labour force entirely — neither employed nor classified as unemployed because they are not actively seeking work. Unemployment understates the problem — it counts only those not working but actively seeking employment, missing discouraged workers and women who have withdrawn from the labour force. The Household Unit of Analysis The authors reframe the question: instead of asking how many young people are unemployed, they ask what happens to families that invested in higher education and are now financing a prolonged job search. Around 15.4% of Indian households have at least one tertiary-educated young adult aged 18–29. 1 in 5 such households (20.8%) are supporting at least one unemployed tertiary-educated young adult. Households with an unemployed educated youth spend, on average, ₹1,087 less per month on total consumption, and ₹710 less per household member, compared to households without such unemployment. Average earning members: 1.5 in households with unemployed educated youth, vs 2 in comparable households without. 14.4% of such households have no active earner at all; 39.5% depend on a single earner. In 62.5% of these households, no one holds a regular salaried job — the household survives on casual, self-employment or informal earnings. The Duration Problem: Prolonged Search Depletes Households 58% of unemployed tertiary-educated youth have been searching for work for more than a year. 28.9% (nearly 3 in 10) have been unemployed for more than two years. The longer the search, the harder the household's situation: savings deplete, consumption falls, and the pressure to accept underqualified employment mounts. The duration of individual unemployment is therefore also a measure of how long a family must sustain the wait — which depends directly on household earning capacity. For households without a regular salaried earner, the constraint arrives much sooner: the choice becomes "any job vs. economic insecurity," not "good job vs. bad job." Figure 2 — Youth Unemployment: From Individual Statistic to Household Strain PLFS 2025 — Tertiary-Educated Youth (18–29 yrs)Unemployment: 29.4%NEET: 40.1%Women NEET outside labour force: 74.7%Consumption Fall₹1,087/month lesstotal household spend₹710 less per memberThin Earning BaseAvg 1.5 earners14.4% — zero earners62.5% — no regular jobDuration Pressure58% searching >1 year28.9% >2 yearsSavings depletedForced underqualified employment — "any job" over "good job"Source: PLFS 2025 / Authors' analysis Youth unemployment imposes cascading household costs — falling consumption, depleted savings, and pressure toward immediate but underqualified employment — that intensify sharply with search duration. Why Current Policy Falls Short Existing employment policy — apprenticeships, skilling programmes, hiring incentives — treats youth unemployment as an individual-level problem. It does not account for the household's capacity to sustain a prolonged search. Recruitment delays (government job calendar, examination leaks, long selection timelines) impose very different costs depending on household composition — negligible for a multi-earner household, severe for one with a single earner. The authors argue that reducing avoidable delays in entry into work is not merely a labour-market efficiency concern — it is a direct measure of financial relief for vulnerable households. Policy attention must shift from "are youth finding jobs?" to "how long are households financing the search, and what is the cost?" Key Data Points for Prelims PLFS: Periodic Labour Force Survey — conducted by NSO (under MoSPI); annual and quarterly estimates; reference year 2025. NEET: Neither in Employment, Education nor Training — broader than unemployment rate; 40.1% among tertiary-educated youth. Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR): Share of working-age population either employed or seeking work — excludes those who have stopped looking (discouraged workers). Worker Population Ratio (WPR): Share of persons employed among total population — a key PLFS indicator alongside LFPR and unemployment rate. 15.4% of Indian households have a tertiary-educated young adult (18–29 yrs); 20.8% of these are supporting at least one unemployed educated youth. ✎ Mains Practice Question "Youth unemployment in India is not merely an individual labour-market failure but a household-level economic crisis, with costs amplified by the duration of job search and the household's earning capacity." Examine this argument with reference to recent data and suggest policy measures that address the household dimension of educated youth unemployment. 15 marks · 250 words

In-Depth News Analysis6 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity, Governance & JudiciaryGS Paper II 01SC Reduces Practice Period — Judicial Service Entry02SC 9-Judge Bench — Industry Definition & IRC Economy & International TradeGS Paper III 03Press Note 3 Relaxation — FDI from Land-Border Countries Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 04Record El Niño 2026 — Global Food & Climate Impact05Urban Flooding & Heat — Disaster Management Act Amendment History, Art & CultureGS Paper I 06Ashoka in Ujjain — Vaishya Tekri Excavation Polity, Governance & JudiciaryGeneral Studies Paper II 01 Supreme Court Reduces Mandatory Practice Period from 3 Years to 1 Year for Entry-Level Judicial Service GS-II · Polity — Judiciary, Appointments, Constitutional BodiesPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · The Indian Express · 25 Aug 2026 A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, in a 2:1 majority, modified its own May 2025 verdict and reduced the minimum legal practice requirement for entry-level judicial service examinations from three years to one year, while simultaneously making post-selection institutional training mandatory. ◈ Background & Context Entry-level judicial service posts — Munsiffs, Civil Judges (Junior Division), and Judicial Magistrates First Class — are filled through competitive examinations conducted by State Public Service Commissions in consultation with High Courts. Eligibility requirements, including any minimum practice period, are set by the Supreme Court through its supervisory role over subordinate courts under Article 235 of the Constitution. On 20 May 2025, a bench headed by then-CJI B.R. Gavai barred fresh law graduates from appearing in these examinations, imposing a three-year minimum practice requirement. Review petitions were filed against that verdict. A bench of CJI Surya Kant and Justices A.G. Masih and K. Vinod Chandran heard the review. The bench ruled 2:1: CJI Surya Kant and Justice Masih modified the May 2025 order; Justice Vinod Chandran — who had been part of the original bench — dissented and dismissed the review petitions. Key Terms of the Modified Order Selection: Law graduates may now appear for the entry-level judicial service examination after just one year of legal practice (reduced from three years). Post-selection training: Trainee judicial officers must complete one year of intensive institutional training at the concerned State Judicial Academy before assuming judicial duties. Emoluments during training: Trainees are to be paid a fixed emolument equivalent to 50% of the salary of a Judicial Magistrate First Class in the relevant state. Law clerkship (Year 2): After the academy year, trainees undergo a further year of structured law clerkship — the first six months under District/Sessions Judges or senior judicial officers, and the remaining six months under a sitting High Court judge. Equivalence: The clerkship year is to be treated as equivalent to one year of practice at the Bar for the purpose of satisfying eligibility requirements. Supervisory benefit: Senior judicial officers can assess trainee performance over a sustained period before the trainee is given independent judicial charge. Critical View Proponents argue the revised framework addresses concerns about a shrinking pool of judicial service aspirants and the deterrent effect of a three-year practice bar on bright law graduates. Critics, including Justice Chandran in his dissent, likely hold that a minimum period of independent practice is necessary before a candidate is equipped to adjudicate disputes — a concern that institutional training may not fully substitute. The two-year structured training pathway (academy + clerkship) is in effect a form of apprenticeship — addressing quality concerns while lowering the entry barrier. Constitutional & Institutional Anchors Article 235: Control over subordinate courts, including conditions of service, vests in the High Court. Article 233: Appointment of district judges — the gateway into the Higher Judicial Service — is made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court. State Judicial Academy: Set up under each High Court; responsible for pre-service and in-service training of judicial officers. The National Judicial Academy (Bhopal) handles national-level programmes. All India Judges Association cases: A series of SC judgments (1991, 1992, 2002) progressively set service conditions, pay scales and training requirements for judicial officers — the precedent backdrop to this ruling. ✎ Mains Practice Question The Supreme Court's decision to reduce the mandatory practice period for judicial service entry, paired with compulsory institutional training, raises questions about the balance between accessibility and judicial competence. Critically examine the implications of this ruling for the quality and independence of the subordinate judiciary in India. 15 marks · 250 words 02 SC Nine-Judge Bench Severs BWSSB Precedent from Industrial Relations Code: A New Chapter for Labour Law GS-II · Polity — Judiciary, Labour Law, Constitutional ProvisionsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · The Indian Express · 25 Aug 2026 A nine-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held on 20 August 2026 that the nearly five-decade-old definition of "industry" under the landmark BWSSB (1978) judgment will not automatically govern Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code (IRC), 2020, effectively resetting the interpretive framework for India's new labour law regime. ◈ Background & Context The 1978 seven-judge bench in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs A. Rajappa — authored by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer — introduced the "Triple Test" for determining whether an entity constitutes an "industry" under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The test asked: Is the activity (a) systematic and organised, (b) involving employer-employee cooperation, and (c) aimed at providing goods or services to satisfy human wants? This expansive definition brought hospitals, educational institutions, and municipalities within the protective ambit of the Act, with only core sovereign functions (defence, judiciary, law enforcement) excluded. For nearly 50 years, BWSSB enabled workers across diverse sectors to access dispute resolution, enforce labour rights and engage in collective bargaining. In 2005, a five-judge bench in State of U.P. vs Jai Bir Singh questioned BWSSB's "worker-oriented" approach, referring it for reconsideration — first to a seven-judge bench (2017), then to a nine-judge bench. The IRC, 2020 — consolidating the ID Act 1947, Trade Unions Act 1926, and Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 — came into force on 21 November 2025, simultaneously repealing the ID Act. The reference was therefore effectively moot before judgment was delivered. The Judgment: Majority and Minority Positions CJI Surya Kant (with Justices Sharma, Aradhe and Pancholi — 4 judges): The Triple Test of 1978 will continue to apply to pending cases under the ID Act. However, "industry" under the IRC must be interpreted based on the IRC's own text and statutory context, and BWSSB will not serve as the "sheet anchor" for interpreting Section 2(p). The CJI also set down a "reformulated" Triple Test — but expressly described it as hypothetical, with no operative effect given the ID Act's repeal. Justice Joymalya Bagchi: Supported the reference but declined to endorse the "reformulated" Triple Test. Held that concerns about BWSSB converting any organised activity into an industry were "misplaced." Noted that even states can enter non-sovereign activities, and absence of profit motive does not take an activity outside "industry." Justice B.V. Nagarathna: Affirmed BWSSB; found the exercise "unnecessary and only academic." Cautioned that altering the definition creates uncertainty and could disrupt industrial peace. Highlighted that BWSSB reflected the era of privatisation, liberalisation and globalisation. Justices D. Datta and U. Bhuyan: Held the reference "requires no answer" and stressed that institutional credibility rests on respecting finality of established law. Justice P.S. Narasimha: Agreed the reference had become unnecessary but stated the IRC's definition must be "freed of the bondage" of the BWSSB ratio. What Changes, and What Doesn't Pending disputes (filed under the ID Act before November 2025) continue to be governed by the BWSSB framework — no change. Future disputes under the IRC will require fresh interpretation of Section 2(p) — courts cannot treat BWSSB as automatically applying. The IRC raises the threshold for prior government approval before retrenchment or closure from establishments with 100 workers to 300 workers — already narrowing coverage independent of the "industry" definition debate. The IRC's definition of "worker" excludes supervisory employees earning above ₹18,000/month, further limiting who can raise a dispute before labour tribunals. Significance of the Triple Test (Prelims) ▤ The BWSSB Triple Test at a Glance Limb 1 — Systematic activity: Organised, regular, not casual or sporadic. Limb 2 — Employer-employee cooperation: A relationship of employment, not merely contract work. Limb 3 — Service to human wants: Production, supply or distribution of goods or services — profit motive irrelevant. Excluded: Sovereign functions — defence, judiciary, legislature, police — regardless of how organised or staffed. IRC Section 2(p): Its precise text differs from ID Act Section 2(j) — the Court held future courts must interpret 2(p) on its own terms. Figure 1 — The Nine-Judge Bench: Positions at a Glance 9 Judges · 3 Broad PositionsCJI + 3 Judges(Sharma, Aradhe,Pancholi)IRC to be interpretedafresh; BWSSB not"sheet anchor."Reformulated TripleTest (hypothetical only)Justices Nagarathna& BagchiBWSSB affirmed.Reference "unnecessary"or "only academic."Reformulated TripleTest: not endorsed.Justices Datta,Bhuyan & NarasimhaReference "requiresno answer" (ID Actalready repealed).IRC free of BWSSB"bondage" (Narasimha).All 9 judges unanimous: IRC Section 2(p) must be interpreted independently in future cases. Source: SC judgment, 20 Aug 2026 Despite differing reasoning, all nine judges agreed that "industry" under the IRC must be interpreted on the IRC's own terms — not automatically on the basis of the 1978 BWSSB precedent. ✎ Mains Practice Question The Supreme Court's nine-judge bench ruling on the definition of "industry" has been described as "severing" the new labour law regime from a worker-protective precedent. Analyse the significance of the BWSSB (1978) judgment for labour rights in India and assess the implications of its prospective marginalisation for workers under the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. 15 marks · 250 words Economy & International TradeGeneral Studies Paper III 03 Press Note 3 Relaxation: 29 FDI Projects Worth ₹4,896 Cr Reported; But Impact Remains Early-Stage GS-III · Economy — FDI Policy, External Sector, InvestmentGS-II · IR — India-China Relations, Trade PolicyPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · 25 Aug 2026 The Union government disclosed that 29 FDI projects worth ₹4,895.65 crore have been reported under the revised framework following the March 2026 partial relaxation of Press Note 3 — a figure that amounts to less than 1% of India's total FDI in FY 2025–26, but represents early movement in previously locked investments. ◈ Background & Context Press Note 3 (April 2020) amended India's FDI policy to require government approval for any investment originating from a country sharing a land border with India — covering China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. The earlier rule required such approval only for Bangladesh and Pakistan. The stated rationale was to prevent opportunistic takeovers of Indian companies whose stock prices had fallen during the COVID-19 pandemic. The April 2020 timing preceded the May 2020 Galwan clashes between Indian and Chinese troops; however, the policy's continued application over subsequent years has been widely linked to the strained India-China relationship. A key grievance from global investors was that even companies with a very small (minority, non-controlling) Chinese stake were subjected to the full approval process, deterring investment into India. The March 2026 Relaxation The Centre allowed FDI through the automatic route (no prior government approval) for entities where land-border-country investors hold less than 10% stake on a non-controlling basis. Entities with 10% or more stake from land-border countries, or those with controlling interests, continue to require prior approval. The 29 projects received span IT, AI, information and communications, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, data centres and transport — sourced primarily from Mauritius, the US, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands. The government expects the revised rules to provide greater regulatory clarity, ease of doing business, and integration of Indian firms into global supply chains. Critical Assessment ₹4,896 crore is a modest initial figure — India's total FDI in FY 2025–26 was significantly higher; this represents the unlocking of previously stalled pipeline, not yet a surge. The relaxation is targeted and narrow — it does not allow direct Chinese investment above 10% without approval. India-China economic normalisation remains partial and geopolitically contingent. The emphasis on supply-chain integration reflects India's strategic interest in becoming a node in global value chains, particularly in electronics and pharmaceuticals, without excessive dependence on Chinese capital. Key Terms (Prelims) Press Note 3 (2020): DPIIT notification amending the Consolidated FDI Policy — applicable to all sectors, including those under automatic route. Automatic route vs Government route: Under automatic route, no prior approval is needed; under government route, FIPB (now replaced by relevant ministry + DPIIT) approval is required. DPIIT: Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade — nodal body for FDI policy. Land-border countries: China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Afghanistan (all countries sharing a land border with India). ✎ Mains Practice Question India's Press Note 3 framework reflects the challenge of balancing national security with economic openness. Critically examine the evolution of India's FDI policy towards land-border countries, and assess whether the 2026 relaxation adequately addresses the concerns of global investors while safeguarding strategic interests. 10 marks · 150 words Environment & EcologyGeneral Studies Paper III 04 UK Met Office Forecasts Strongest El Niño in Over a Century: 3°C+ Pacific Warming, 2027 Likely Hottest Year on Record GS-III · Environment — Climate Change, El Niño-ENSO, Food SecurityPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · The Indian Express · AFP · 25 Aug 2026 Britain's Met Office has forecast that the 2026 El Niño event is likely to be the strongest in over a century, with Pacific Ocean surface temperatures rising more than 3°C above the baseline — an "unprecedented" reading that has already contributed to well-below-normal monsoon rainfall in India and threatens to push 2027 past 2024 as the warmest year on global record. ◈ Background & Context El Niño is the warm phase of the El Niño–Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle — a periodic climatic pattern arising from warming of sea surface temperatures (SSTs) in the tropical eastern-central Pacific Ocean. It typically occurs every two to seven years, lasts nine to twelve months, and drives significant changes in global wind patterns, atmospheric pressure, precipitation and temperatures. El Niño is defined by SST anomalies of at least +0.5°C above a 30-year rolling baseline in the Niño 3.4 region of the Pacific. The 2026 event is running approximately 2.6°C above the 30-year average — well into "strong" and approaching "extreme" territory. As of August 2026, the Met Office's head of long-range forecasting forecasts a peak above 3°C — "unheard of in modern climate records" and treated as "unprecedented." The European Union's Copernicus Climate Change Service had projected 2026 could itself be a "record-breaking year" even before the El Niño signal intensified. How El Niño Disrupts Global Weather — Key Mechanisms In normal years, strong equatorial trade winds push warm water westward across the Pacific, keeping the western Pacific (near Australia and SE Asia) warm and the eastern Pacific cool. The warm pool drives convection and rainfall over Asia-Pacific. During El Niño, trade winds weaken or reverse. Warm water shifts eastward toward South America. This suppresses convection over the western Pacific and shifts rainfall patterns globally. Result: drier conditions in southeast Asia, Australia, southern Africa, and northern Brazil; wetter conditions in the Horn of Africa, southern USA, Peru and Ecuador. El Niño adds to the background warming from anthropogenic climate change, pushing global average temperatures higher. Figure 2 — Normal Year vs El Niño Year: Pacific Wind and Temperature Patterns In a normal year, trade winds push warm water west. During El Niño, weakened winds allow warm water to migrate east — suppressing rainfall over the western Pacific and triggering drought across SE Asia, Australia and India. Image: External source; reproduced with credit for educational use. Impact on India The Met Office confirmed that El Niño is already causing well-below-normal rainfall in India — threatening the kharif harvest and reservoir replenishment across peninsular and central India. Strong El Niño years historically correlate with deficient Indian monsoons: the 2002, 2009, and 2015–16 drought years all coincided with moderate-to-strong El Niño events. The India Meteorological Department (IMD) and IITM (Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology, Pune) use ENSO forecasts as a primary input for seasonal monsoon prediction. El Niño and the Global Wheat Crisis A supercharged El Niño compounds existing stresses on the global food system — drought in US Great Plains (worst wheat harvest since 1970), disrupted Black Sea grain shipments (Russia-Ukraine war), and Houthi attacks rerouting Red Sea shipping around South Africa. El Niño threatens water levels in the Panama Canal (transit route for grain) and the Rhine-Danube rivers in Europe, raising shipping costs. Russia and Ukraine together account for nearly a third of global wheat trade — with grain shipments nearly halted due to active conflict in the Black Sea. The FAO has warned of higher wheat prices in H2 2026; global food system risks are compounded when "seamless trade, cheap energy and stable climate" — the three pillars of the current model — are simultaneously disrupted. Key Terms & Prelims Hooks ENSO: El Niño–Southern Oscillation — the overarching coupled ocean-atmosphere cycle; La Niña (opposite phase) brings above-normal rainfall to India. Niño 3.4 region: The primary benchmark zone in the equatorial Pacific (5°N–5°S, 170°W–120°W) for defining El Niño/La Niña events. IOD (Indian Ocean Dipole): A separate ocean-atmosphere oscillation that also significantly influences Indian monsoon rainfall — positive IOD generally favours good monsoon. NOAA: US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration — maintains the Climate Brink ENSO dashboard and primary Pacific SST monitoring. Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S): EU's climate monitoring body — part of the Copernicus Earth Observation programme (ESA). El Niño threshold: +0.5°C SST anomaly sustained for five consecutive overlapping three-month periods in the Niño 3.4 region. Origin of term: Coined by Peruvian and Ecuadoran fishermen in the 19th century — "El Niño" (the Christ Child) for the warm current arriving near Christmas that reduced fish catches. ✎ Mains Practice Question An exceptionally strong El Niño in 2026 has compounded pre-existing stresses in the global food and climate system. Analyse the cascading impact of this El Niño event on India's monsoon, agricultural output and food prices, and discuss the policy measures India should adopt to build resilience against ENSO-linked climate shocks. 15 marks · 250 words 05 Why Indian Cities Flood and Overheat: Urban Vulnerability and the 2025–26 Amendments to the Disaster Management Act GS-III · Environment — Disaster Management, Urbanisation, Climate AdaptationGS-II · Governance — Urban Local Bodies, LegislationPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · 25 Aug 2026 Extreme heat and flash flooding across Indian cities in 2026 have once again exposed an underlying structural problem: weather translates into disaster not because of the hazard alone, but because of how Indian cities have been built and governed — with inadequate drainage, disappearing green cover, built-over floodplains, and fragmented disaster-response authority. ◈ Background & Context India's urban population is projected to reach 951 million by 2050. More than half of the infrastructure that Indian cities will need by then is yet to be built. The choices made now — on land use, materials, drainage, and green cover — will determine whether this urbanisation adds to or reduces disaster vulnerability. The World Bank estimates urban temperatures in Indian city centres are already 3–4°C higher than surrounding areas due to the urban heat island effect. A 2021 NITI Aayog report found that 65% of India's 7,933 urban settlements have no master plan — leaving development largely ungoverned by risk-informed frameworks. Responsibility in most cities is fragmented across municipal corporations, district administrations and state departments, operating under different plans and lines of authority. Key Legislative Changes: 2025–26 Section 41A, Disaster Management Act, 2005 (2025 amendment): State governments may now constitute an Urban Disaster Management Authority (UDMA) in every state capital and city with a municipal corporation, except Delhi and Chandigarh. UDMAs are responsible for preparing and implementing urban disaster management plans. August 2026 change — Heatwaves and lightning notified as natural calamities: States can now use the State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF) for eligible heatwave and lightning relief. Heatwave mitigation projects can receive support from the State Disaster Mitigation Fund (SDMF). Why the Framework Falls Short Constitution of UDMAs is left to state governments with no mandatory deadline — leaving most cities without a dedicated urban disaster authority. Flood maps and heat maps are rarely integrated into building regulations, master plans or development permissions. Disaster financing has historically focused on post-event relief, not pre-event mitigation or early warning activation. The World Bank estimates timely urban flood adaptation could prevent annual losses of $5 billion by 2030 and $30 billion by 2070; heat reduction measures could save over 130,000 lives by 2050. Key Institutions & Terms (Prelims) Disaster Management Act, 2005: Establishes NDMA (National), SDMAs (State), DDMAs (District); Chapter IV deals with local authority responsibilities. NDMA: National Disaster Management Authority — headed by the Prime Minister; issues national disaster management guidelines. SDRF / SDMF: State Disaster Response Fund / State Disaster Mitigation Fund — central transfers to states for relief and mitigation respectively. Urban Heat Island (UHI) Effect: Higher temperatures in urban areas compared to surrounding rural areas due to dense construction, asphalt, reduced vegetation and waste heat from buildings and transport. Section 41A (new): Allows state governments to set up Urban Disaster Management Authorities; excludes Delhi and Chandigarh (which have Union Territory-level arrangements). ✎ Mains Practice Question "The recurrence of urban flooding and heat disasters in Indian cities reflects governance failures as much as climatic ones." Critically examine this statement with reference to India's urban planning framework and the recent amendments to the Disaster Management Act, 2005. 15 marks · 250 words History, Art & CultureGeneral Studies Paper I 06 Tracing Ashoka in Ujjain: New Excavation at Vaishya Tekri and What It May — and May Not — Reveal GS-I · History — Mauryan Empire, Buddhist Architecture, Ancient PolityPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · 25 Aug 2026 The Madhya Pradesh government has begun fresh excavations at Vaishya Tekri in Ujjain — a large mound believed to be a Mauryan-era stupa possibly linked to Emperor Ashoka's viceroyalty over Avanti — reopening a site last officially excavated in 1938–39 and raising questions about what archaeology can reliably establish about Ashoka's presence in the region. ◈ Background & Context Ujjayini (modern Ujjain), on the banks of the Sipra river (a tributary of the Chambal), was the capital of Avanti — one of the sixteen Mahajanapadas. It was among ancient India's most important commercial centres, linking trade routes to the western coastal ports of Bharuch and Sopara as well as to Pataliputra. Mud fortifications were first constructed around Ujjain in the 7th century BCE. By the 6th century BCE, Avanti had emerged as a powerful independent kingdom with Ujjain as its capital. Ashoka was sent to Ujjain as viceroy by his father Bindusara — unlike his brief deputation to Taxila for a specific purpose, Ashoka is believed to have spent approximately a decade in Avanti. En route to Ujjain, Ashoka is said to have stayed at Vidisha, where he met Vedisadevi (also known as Devi), the daughter of a merchant. Their children, Mahinda and Sanghamitta, later became pivotal in spreading Buddhism to Sri Lanka. Ashoka's own edicts issued after he became emperor refer to a "kumara" (prince/viceroy) stationed at Ujjain — providing an epigraphic basis for his connection to the city. Vaishya Tekri: What We Know and What Scholars Urge The 1938–39 excavations by the Department of Archaeology of the erstwhile Gwalior State revealed large bricks and punch-marked coins, leading archaeologists to tentatively date the structure to the Mauryan period. Academic Peter Skilling (2011) described Vaishya Tekri as approximately 350 feet at the base and 100 feet high — comparable in scale to the Great Stupa at Sanchi. However, historian Himanshu Prabha Ray has urged caution: the 1938–39 excavation report is decades old, its interpretation was shaped by Alexander Cunningham's earlier writings on Ashoka, and it is premature to assert a direct Ashokan connection without further investigation. Historian Romila Thapar notes that Ujjain was a major crossroads linking trade routes to western ports and to Pataliputra, making it strategically important for Mauryan administration. Figure 3 — Vaishya Tekri Mound, Ujjain: The Site Under Fresh Excavation Vaishya Tekri — the large earthen mound in Ujjain believed to overlay a Mauryan-era stupa. At roughly 350 feet at its base and 100 feet in height, it is comparable in scale to the Great Stupa at Sanchi. Image: The Indian Express; reproduced with credit for educational use. What Good Excavation Should Ask Historian Himanshu Prabha Ray recommends that excavations look beyond the stupa mound itself — at what other structures surrounded it, who the monks were who taught or stayed there, and how the site grew over time. Drawing on the Sanchi model: stupas never occur as isolated structures — they are surrounded by smaller stupas, monasteries and votive offerings, the study of which reveals the social and institutional history of Buddhism at that site. The excavation should use stratigraphic, archaeobotanical and numismatic evidence to establish a reliable chronology, rather than fitting finds into pre-existing Ashokan narratives. Key Facts for Prelims Avanti: One of the 16 Mahajanapadas; capital Ujjayini (Ujjain); conquered by the Nanda dynasty before the Mauryans consolidated control. Sipra river: A tributary of the Chambal; Ujjain is situated on its banks; the Kumbh Mela (Simhastha) held at Ujjain is associated with the Sipra. Vedisadevi / Devi: Ashoka's companion at Vidisha; mother of Mahinda and Sanghamitta — who carried Buddhism to Sri Lanka. Punch-marked coins: The dominant coinage of the Mauryan period — silver coins with symbols punched on them (not inscribed); found at Vaishya Tekri in 1938–39. Alexander Cunningham: First Director-General of the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), founded 1861; his surveys shaped early interpretations of Buddhist sites including Sanchi, Sarnath and Bodh Gaya. Mahinda and Sanghamitta: Ashoka's son and daughter; credited with taking Buddhism to Sri Lanka; Mahinda's arrival is celebrated as Poson Poya in Sri Lanka. Great Stupa at Sanchi: Built by Ashoka; located in Madhya Pradesh; a UNESCO World Heritage Site; the torana (gateways) are renowned examples of early Buddhist art. ✎ Mains Practice Question Discuss the significance of Ujjain in the Mauryan political and cultural landscape, with particular reference to Ashoka's viceroyalty. What methodological cautions should guide the interpretation of new archaeological evidence from sites like Vaishya Tekri? 1