In-Depth PIB Analysis3 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Science, Technology & Internal SecurityGS Paper III 01IMEI tampering & telecom device security Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 02Tokay Gecko seizure in Assam Governance, Society & YouthGS Paper II 03MY Bharat crosses 3 crore registrations Science, Technology & Internal SecurityGeneral Studies Paper III 01 IMEI tampering: why a 15-digit number decides whether a stolen phone can be found GS-III · Internal Security — Cybersecurity, Communication Networks; GS-II · GovernancePrelims + MainsPIB · Department of Telecommunications · 23 Sep 2026 India's active wireless subscriber base touched 1,204.01 million in July 2026. Every one of those handsets is identified on the network by a single number — and altering that number is what makes a stolen or smuggled device untraceable. The Department of Telecommunications has issued a consolidated advisory on the practice, the law against it, and what users can do. ◈ The basics — start here if the term is new Think of the IMEI as the chassis number of a car. The SIM identifies the subscriber; the IMEI identifies the handset. Change the chassis number and a stolen car cannot be traced — the same logic applies here. What it is: the International Mobile Equipment Identity, a unique 15-digit number that identifies a mobile device on a telecom network. Its first eight digits form the Type Allocation Code (TAC), which identifies the device model or type. Who allocates it: the GSMA — the Global System for Mobile Communications Association — oversees global allocation of TACs to manufacturers and brand owners, who then assign unique IMEIs to individual devices. Dual-SIM phones generally carry two IMEI numbers, one per SIM slot. How to see yours: dial *#06#. To verify it, use the Sanchar Saathi portal or app, or SMS KYM <15-digit IMEI> to 14422. Figure 1 — The device identifier the whole system rests on The IMEI is printed on the device and its packaging, and stored in the handset's firmware. Image courtesy Press Information Bureau, Department of Telecommunications, 23 September 2026; reproduced with credit for educational use. Why tampering matters It defeats tracing. A device with an altered identity cannot be reliably matched to its record, so a stolen handset can be resold and used on the network. It enables crime at scale. Equipment such as SIM boxes with configurable IMEIs is used to route international calls as local ones and to run fraud and impersonation operations. It muddies enforcement. When two devices report the same identity, the network cannot distinguish them, which frustrates lawful interception and investigation alike. It undermines consumers. Counterfeit devices sold with cloned IMEIs come with no warranty, no security updates and no recourse. ▤ Who must do what — the lifecycle of accountability Manufacturers: register the IMEIs of applicable devices made in India with the Government before first sale, testing, research or other use, through the Device Setu–Indian Counterfeited Device Restriction (ICDR) portal, and assign valid, unique, untampered IMEIs. Importers: register IMEIs with the Central Government on the same portal before import, for devices meant for sale, testing, R&D or other purposes. Resellers and retailers: deal only in devices with valid and untampered IMEIs; for used devices, verify against the Government's central database of tampered and blacklisted devices (a per-IMEI verification fee applies). Brand owners: register their brands on Device Setu–ICDR, linked to the relevant GSMA TAC, and ensure devices carry authentic, authorised IMEIs. What citizens should avoid — and what they should do Avoid: using, procuring or assembling modems, modules, SIM boxes or similar equipment with configurable or tampered IMEIs; obtaining SIMs through fake documents, fraud, cheating or impersonation; passing on SIMs issued in your own name; and using any app or site to modify Calling Line Identity (CLI) or other telecom identifiers. Do: buy only from authorised sellers and verify the IMEI; secure the handset with a strong password, PIN or biometric; and get repairs done only at authorised service centres, since tampering often happens during unauthorised repair. Figure 2 — What to do when a handset is lost or stolen 1 · File policecomplaintkeep a copy2 · Get duplicateSIM from operatorwait 24 hours for SMS3 · Block onSanchar Saathi (CEIR)get a Request ID4 · If recovered,unblock with IDinform police firstUpload the police report and a valid ID proof; the blocked IMEI is then rejected by every network,which is what makes the stolen handset worthless to a buyer.Telecommunications Act, 2023 — Section 42(3)(c) tampering with identifiers · 42(3)(e) SIMs by fraudUp to 3 years' imprisonment, fine up to ₹50 lakh, or both · cognizable and non-bailable under 42(7) Blocking works on the identifier, not the SIM — which is precisely why tampering with it is criminalised. ◈ Static background you should carry into the exam Telecommunications Act, 2023 replaced the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933. Section 42(3)(c) prohibits tampering with telecommunication identifiers; 42(3)(e) prohibits obtaining SIMs or identifiers by fraud, cheating or impersonation; 42(6) makes abettors liable to the same punishment; 42(7) makes the offences cognizable and non-bailable. Sanchar Saathi is DoT's citizen-facing portal. Its modules to know: CEIR (Central Equipment Identity Register) for blocking and tracing lost handsets, TAFCOP for checking how many connections run in your name, KYM (Know Your Mobile) for IMEI verification, and Chakshu for reporting suspected fraud communication. Device Setu–ICDR is the registration portal for manufacturers, importers and brand owners. TRAI regulations restrict SMS services for the first 24 hours after a re-issued SIM is activated — the reason the blocking request has to wait a day for OTP verification. Related institutions: CERT-In under the IT Act, 2000 for incident response; the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C) and the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal under the Ministry of Home Affairs; the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 for personal data. Cyber Swachhta Kendra — the botnet cleaning and malware analysis centre — is the device-hygiene counterpart of this ecosystem. The critical view Enforcement is the bottleneck, not the law. Reprogramming tools are cheap and widely available; the grey repair market where most tampering happens is informal and hard to police. Cloning versus blocking. A blocked IMEI can be re-cloned onto another handset, and a duplicated IMEI can accidentally block a legitimate user's device — a known false-positive risk in any identifier-based blocklist. Friction for the victim. A police report, a duplicate SIM and a 24-hour wait before the OTP works is a demanding sequence for exactly the person who has just lost their phone. The surveillance question. A central register mapping devices to identities strengthens recovery and tracing, and simultaneously concentrates data — which is why the safeguards in the DPDP Act and in the interception rules under the 2023 Act matter to the same debate. Reseller compliance costs. Per-IMEI verification fees fall hardest on small second-hand dealers, the segment least equipped to absorb them. ✎ Mains Practice Question The integrity of device identifiers has become a question of national digital security rather than mere consumer protection. Examine the legal and institutional framework India has built against telecom identifier tampering, and assess the challenges in its enforcement. 15 marks · 250 words Environment & EcologyGeneral Studies Paper III 02 86 live Tokay Geckos seized in Assam: the species, the schedules and the trade behind the case GS-III · Environment — Wildlife Conservation, Illegal Trade; GS-II · Statutory BodiesPrelims + MainsPIB · Directorate of Revenue Intelligence · 23 Sep 2026 Acting on specific intelligence about an illegal wildlife trade deal, DRI officers intercepted two persons at Bandar Chalia Gaon Ground, Mariani, Assam, on 22 September 2026 and recovered 86 live Tokay Geckos, seized under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. Both the accused and the geckos were handed to the Mariani Range Forest Office. Figure 3 — The Tokay Gecko Blue-grey skin with orange-red spots, a large lidless eye and adhesive toe pads — and a loud "to-kay" call that gives the species its name. Illustrative image. ◈ The basics — know the species Scientific name: Gekko gecko. It is among the largest gecko species, nocturnal and arboreal, native to Northeast India, the Sunderbans, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and across Southeast Asia to Indonesia. Habitat: rainforest trees, cliffs and increasingly human dwellings; it feeds on insects and small vertebrates and is a natural pest controller. IUCN status: Least Concern globally, but with a declining population trend — a useful reminder that a species can be heavily trafficked without being classed as threatened worldwide. Why it is trafficked: unproven claims that its body parts or dried form cure HIV/AIDS, cancer, asthma and diabetes, plus demand in the exotic pet market — exactly the two drivers the DRI release names. ▤ The legal protection — the examinable core Domestic: listed under Schedule I of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 — the highest degree of protection, with the most stringent penalties and no scope for hunting except in narrowly defined circumstances. International: listed under Appendix II of CITES, so international trade is permitted only with an export permit and must be shown to be non-detrimental to the species' survival. The schedule–appendix distinction is where questions are set: Schedule I is about protection within India; CITES Appendix II is about regulating international trade. A species can be Schedule I domestically and only Appendix II internationally, as here. Amendment note: the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2022 restructured the schedules — Schedules I and II now cover animals by level of protection, Schedule III plants, and Schedule IV was added specifically to list CITES-listed specimens. Figure 4 — CITES appendices at a glance Appendix IThreatened with extinctionCommercial trade bannede.g. tiger, Asian elephantAppendix IINot yet threatened, buttrade must be controlledExport permit required◄ Tokay GeckoAppendix IIIProtected in at least onecountry, which seeks thehelp of other partiesCITES (1973, in force 1975) is administered through the UNEP; India has been a party since 1976.Domestic protection under the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 is a separate and parallel layer. Appendix placement governs trade; the Indian schedule governs possession and hunting inside the country. Who enforces — and the Northeast angle DRI, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, is the apex anti-smuggling intelligence agency under the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance. Wildlife trafficking falls to it because trafficked specimens cross customs frontiers. WCCB — the Wildlife Crime Control Bureau under the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change — is the statutory body created by the 2006 amendment to coordinate wildlife crime enforcement; Operation Save Kurma, Operation Turtshield, Operation Lesknow and Operation Wildnet are its named drives. Why Assam and Mariani: the Northeast is both a source of the species and a corridor to Myanmar and onward to Southeast Asian markets — the same route that carries pangolin scales, red sand boa and turtles. Other bodies: TRAFFIC (the wildlife trade monitoring network) and INTERPOL's environmental crime programme on the international side. The critical view Seizure is not deterrence. Interceptions capture couriers at the bottom of the chain; the financiers and cross-border buyers are rarely reached, and conviction rates in wildlife cases remain low. Demand rests on a false premise. The medicinal claims driving the trade have no clinical basis, which makes demand-side awareness campaigns in consumer countries as important as enforcement here. Live-animal seizures create a welfare problem. Confiscated specimens need rehabilitation and, ideally, release into suitable habitat — capacity that forest departments often lack. Data gaps. A Least Concern global listing masks localised collapse; species-specific population monitoring in India is thin, so offtake cannot be measured against a baseline. ✎ Mains Practice Question Illegal wildlife trade in India is increasingly driven by demand from outside the country. Examine the adequacy of India's legal and institutional framework to combat it, with reference to the trafficking of lesser-known species. 15 marks · 250 words Governance, Society & YouthGeneral Studies Paper II 03 Mera Yuva Bharat crosses 3 crore registered youth in under three years GS-II · Governance — Welfare Schemes for Vulnerable Sections, e-Governance; GS-I · SocietyPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports · 23 Sep 2026 MY Bharat, the national youth engagement platform of the Department of Youth Affairs, has crossed 3 crore registered youth — a scale milestone for a platform launched on 31 October 2023. ◈ The basics — what MY Bharat is Full name: Mera Yuva Bharat, an autonomous body and technology-enabled platform (mybharat.gov.in) under the Department of Youth Affairs, Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports. Launched by the Prime Minister on 31 October 2023 — Rashtriya Ekta Diwas — with the stated aim of giving young Indians a common platform for participation in nation-building. What it offers: experiential learning programmes, volunteering, quizzes, leadership initiatives, youth dialogues and community engagement, with an AI-enabled CV Builder recently added. Framing: the platform is positioned within Yuva Shakti, Jan Bhagidari and the vision of Viksit Bharat @2047. ▤ The numbers and the calendar Growth path: 2 crore + registrations in October 2025 → more than 2.46 crore by August 2026 → 3 crore + now. Experiential learning: over 1.22 lakh youth enrolled in nearly 25,000 programmes as of August 2026. VBYLD 2027 — the Viksit Bharat Young Leaders Dialogue — began with the Viksit Bharat Quiz on 17 August 2026, open until 30 September 2026; the flagship Viksit Bharat Challenge runs through an Essay Challenge, District Championships and State/UT stages to the national dialogue in New Delhi from 10–12 January 2027. Five additional VBYLD tracks: Cultural Track, Design for Bharat, Hack for Social Cause, Youth Entrepreneurs Challenge and Youth Parliament. Other initiatives hosted: Nasha Mukt Yuva for Viksit Bharat, Viksit Vibrant Village Programme, Viksit Bharat Youth Parliament, Viksit Bharat Padyatra, Viksit Bharat Yuva Connect and Khelo India Dialogue. The 100 Weeks Nasha Mukt Yuva Abhiyan commenced with the Rashtriya Sankalp Samaroh in September 2026. Static background The predecessors it merges with: the Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan (NYKS, 1972) and the National Service Scheme (NSS, 1969), the two long-standing arms of government youth mobilisation; 12 January, Swami Vivekananda's birth anniversary, is National Youth Day. Policy frame: the National Youth Policy 2014 defines youth as the 15–29 age group; the draft National Youth Policy 2021 proposed a ten-year vision aligned to the SDGs. The demographic dividend argument: India's median age is around 28, and the working-age share is projected to peak around the 2040s — which is what gives youth-skilling platforms their macroeconomic significance. The critical view Registration is an input, not an outcome. 3 crore sign-ups against 1.22 lakh enrolled in experiential learning shows the gap between reach and depth of engagement. Digital access shapes who participates — rural, female and low-connectivity youth are the hardest to onboard, and registration counts do not reveal that distribution. Duplication risk with NYKS and NSS structures unless the platform genuinely integrates rather than layers over them. The test is employability and civic outcome — placements, volunteering hours actually served, and community projects completed — none of which is captured by a registration milestone. ✎ Mains Practice Question Digital platforms have become the preferred instrument for mobilising India's youth for nation-building. Discuss their advantages over traditional institutional structures, and examine whether scale of registration is an adequate measure of success. 10 marks · 150 words

Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Opinions & IdeasGS Papers II & III 01Quality Control Orders & manufacturing scale02BRICS, the Delhi summit & India's multi-alignment Opinions & IdeasGeneral Studies Papers II & III 01 Quality Control Orders and manufacturing scale: the case for extending the reassessment to intermediate inputs Core TopicOpinionGS-III · Economy — Industrial Policy, Standards, MSMEs; GS-II · IR — Trade PolicyPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Opinion The authors argue that mandatory quality regulation has expanded faster than its effects on supply chains have been assessed, and that the current reassessment exercise should be carried further — particularly for the intermediate goods that feed downstream manufacturing. ◈ The basics — what a Quality Control Order is A QCO is the legal instrument that converts a voluntary Indian Standard into a mandatory requirement. Once a product is covered, it cannot be manufactured, imported, stored or sold in India without the BIS Standard Mark. Statutory basis: issued by the administrative ministry concerned under the BIS Act, 2016, read with the powers of the Central Government; certification and enforcement rest with the Bureau of Indian Standards, the national standards body under the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution. Why they are used: to keep sub-standard and unsafe goods — often low-cost imports — out of the domestic market, and to protect consumers where the buyer cannot judge quality before purchase. Certification schemes: Scheme-I of the BIS (Conformity Assessment) Regulations, 2018 is the product-certification licence granted to a manufacturer for a factory; Scheme-II is the certificate of conformity applicable to a batch or consignment. The distinction matters for the new order below. Trade dimension: because a QCO applies equally to imports, trading partners treat it as a technical barrier to trade, governed at the WTO by the TBT Agreement, which requires such measures to be non-discriminatory and no more trade-restrictive than necessary. Figure 1 — The expansion and the reset 201988Dec 2024765End-2025 onwardpace slowsrevocations& suspensionsProducts coveredOver 600 covered products remain to be reassessed, many of them intermediate inputs. A near nine-fold expansion in five years, followed by a policy correction concentrated on intermediate goods. ▤ The record as the authors set it out Coverage: from 88 products in 2019 to 765 by end-December 2024; expansion slowed considerably towards the end of 2025, with several QCOs revoked or suspended — particularly those on intermediate goods, where mandatory certification had raised concerns about input availability, cost and supply-chain disruption. The new instrument: the Transition Facilitation (Quality Control) Order, 2026, notified by DPIIT on 25 June 2026. It permits eligible firms that face difficulty obtaining BIS Scheme-I certification to source temporarily from Scheme-II-licensed suppliers in specified sectors — toys, footwear and air conditioners among them — subject to eligibility criteria and approval by a DPIIT-constituted committee. What remains: more than 600 QCO-covered products are yet to be reassessed, including critical intermediate inputs used in chemicals, steel, textiles, machinery and electronics, and rubber and plastics. External scrutiny: QCOs and other non-tariff measures were raised at the WTO's eighth Trade Policy Review of India in July 2026 — by the European Union and the United States, and also by fellow BRICS members including Brazil, China and Indonesia. The CSEP study on chemical inputs Exposure: the first QCO for a chemical product came in 2018; coverage rose to 52 chemical products by 2024. The share of chemical-using firms facing regulation on the input side rose from 11.8% in 2019 to 56.6% in 2024. Larger firms: input QCOs are associated with a 9.6% increase in production alongside a 37% decline in gross value added — output sustained, value addition compressed, consistent with higher input costs partly passed on through output prices. Smaller firms: no statistically significant effect on production or GVA, but a 47.6% decline in profitability — limited ability to absorb higher input costs and the compliance costs of certification. The authors read this as evidence that the burden is not confined to small firms: even large firms able to sustain output can see value addition fall. Figure 2 — Where the burden lands, by firm size Estimated effects of QCOs on chemical inputs, downstream user firmsLarger firmsProduction ▲ 9.6%Gross value added ▼ 37%Output held, value addition squeezedSmaller firmsProduction / GVA: no significant effectProfitability ▼ 47.6%Costs absorbed out of marginsSource: CSEP study cited in the column; estimates are associations, not established causation. The same regulation transmits differently depending on a firm's capacity to absorb cost. What the authors recommend Focus the next phase of rationalisation on intermediate goods, assessing not only product quality but input availability, cost, competitiveness and domestic value addition. Make supply-chain implications an integral part of both the design of new QCOs and the reassessment of existing ones. Give MSMEs dedicated assistance with certification and compliance, with appropriately designed exemptions or transition periods where costs are particularly burdensome. Judge the regime not by the number of products brought under mandatory regulation, but by whether it improves quality without constraining scale, efficiency and competitiveness. ◈ The other side of the argument A balanced answer should register the case for the regime, which the column does not develop. Consumer and safety rationale: mandatory standards address information asymmetry in goods whose quality cannot be inspected at purchase — helmets, pressure cookers, toys, electrical fittings. Import surge management: QCOs have been used to restrain low-priced imports of uncertain quality, and are one of the few WTO-consistent instruments available once tariffs are bound. Standards as an export enabler: firms that meet demanding domestic standards are better placed for regulated export markets, which is the usual argument for standards-led upgrading. The counterpoint stands nonetheless: standards bind only if certification capacity — testing laboratories, NABL-accredited facilities, BIS inspection bandwidth — keeps pace, otherwise the regulation becomes a queue rather than a quality filter. ✎ Mains Practice Question Mandatory quality standards are intended to raise product quality, but may also raise input costs for downstream industry. Examine this trade-off in the Indian context, and suggest principles for the design of quality regulation consistent with manufacturing competitiveness. 15 marks · 250 words 02 BRICS after the Delhi summit: internal divisions, external convergence, and India's case for multi-alignment Core TopicOpinionGS-II · IR — Groupings and Agreements Involving India, Bilateral RelationsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Opinion Writing after the 18th BRICS summit hosted by India in New Delhi on 12–13 September 2026, the authors argue that the grouping's internal contradictions and its members' external convergence are not in tension but are together the reason the platform retains value for India. ◈ The basics — what BRICS is Origin: the term "BRIC" was coined by Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs in 2001; the countries began meeting as a group in 2006 and held their first standalone summit at Yekaterinburg in 2009. South Africa joined in 2010, making it BRICS. Nature: an informal plurilateral grouping — no charter, no secretariat, no headquarters; the chair rotates annually and decisions are by consensus. Institutional outputs: the New Development Bank (Fortaleza Agreement, 2014; headquartered in Shanghai, first president K.V. Kamath) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, a currency-swap facility. Expansion: membership was enlarged following the Johannesburg summit of 2023; the infographic below reflects the membership as presented for the India-hosted 2026 edition. Figure 3 — BRICS member countries, 2026 Eleven members as listed for the 2026 summit. Image courtesy Press Information Bureau / brics2026.gov.in; reproduced with credit for educational use. The three positions the authors identify in Indian debate Optimists: BRICS can function as an institution capable of multipolarising the global order, or of hastening that transition. Sceptics: the grouping's internal divisions leave it vulnerable to domination by Russia and China. Dismissers: it is an annual gathering generating strategic noise; India should instead concentrate on the partnership with the United States. ▤ The authors' reading of the Delhi summit Consensus among 11 members — including the UAE and Iran, described as being in an undeclared conflict — is treated as an achievement in itself, and the Delhi Declaration as evidence that members continue to value a shared worldview oriented towards a more representative global order. A platform for managing rivalry: with border problems with China unresolved, multilateral forums let India and China remain engaged when high-level bilateral visits are not taking place — creating, in the authors' phrase, guardrails for competitive coexistence. The absence of any comparable channel between Ukraine and Russia is offered as the counter-example. Convergence despite difference: on AI regulation, trade and financial rules, climate change, border conflicts and the status of multilateral bodies, members differ in approach but converge on opposition to unilateralism by any bloc or power. India's balancing: the authors describe India as having repositioned itself as a balancer in West Asia after an initial period of reticence, using SCO and BRICS platforms to do so without damaging its bilateral relationships. The argument on strategic autonomy The authors do not argue for downgrading relations with the United States, which they call extremely important for India's progress; their claim is narrower — that India should not become a frontline in US–China competition. They read BRICS as enabling that path without requiring India to champion an anti-US agenda. They contrast the formulation of "sabka saath" or multi-alignment with the reading of Indian foreign policy as a tilt towards Washington, and hold that India has not abandoned what they call the hesitations of its strategic realism. The structural claim: BRICS is unlike the G-7, where American primacy and the Western order are accepted by all members; its internal divisions themselves prevent domination by any single member, while external convergence — a shared belief that the post-war international system is unfair — holds it together. ◈ Static background and counter-arguments for a balanced answer India's other affiliations pull in different directions and should be named together: the Quad with the US, Japan and Australia; the SCO with Russia, China, Pakistan and the Central Asian states; the I2U2 and IMEC in West Asia; the G-20, which India chaired in 2023. Multi-alignment is the label for holding these simultaneously. Strategic autonomy is the successor concept to non-alignment: not equidistance, but the retention of independent decision-making across issues. The de-dollarisation question: proposals for BRICS local-currency settlement and a common unit of account are frequently discussed; India has publicly distanced itself from any project aimed at replacing the US dollar, favouring trade in national currencies for efficiency rather than as a political programme. Counter-arguments the column does not press: enlargement dilutes coherence and may amplify the China–Russia axis; consensus decision-making can reduce declarations to lowest-common-denominator language; and the grouping has limited enforcement capacity, with the New Development Bank still small relative to the Bretton Woods institutions. A caution on sourcing: the column's account of the war in West Asia, the Bishkek resolution and the September 2026 sanctions legislation reflects the authors' framing and the record as reported; examiners will expect the events to be described neutrally and attributed, not adopted as editorial judgement. ✎ Mains Practice Question "The internal contradictions of BRICS are not an argument against the grouping but a condition of its survival." Critically examine this proposition with reference to India's pursuit of strategic autonomy in a polarised international order. 15 marks · 250 words

In-Depth News Analysis7 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity, Governance & ConstitutionGS Paper II 01SC on Article 22(1): grounds of arrest02Reported dissent within the Election Commission International RelationsGS Paper II 03P4M Summit & reformed multilateralism Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 04World Rhino Day — five species05Super El Niño and projected heat mortality069th India International Water Week 2026 Science & TechnologyGS Paper III 07Antifungal resistance & Candida auris Polity, Governance & ConstitutionGeneral Studies Paper II 01 No grounds of arrest, no lawyer: Supreme Court orders immediate release, and lays down how a second arrest may be made GS-II · Polity — Fundamental Rights, Article 22; Criminal JusticePrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Delhi Edition A Bench of Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar has held that an arrested person who is not told the grounds of arrest and is denied access to a lawyer must be released at once — because such an arrest is itself unconstitutional, not merely irregular. ◈ The basics — what Article 22 actually says Article 22 sits in Part III and deals with protection against arrest and detention. It has two halves: clauses (1) and (2) protect persons arrested under ordinary law, and clauses (4) to (7) govern preventive detention. Article 22(1): no arrested person shall be detained without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds of arrest; nor shall he be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. Article 22(2): every arrested person must be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours, excluding travel time, and cannot be detained beyond that without the Magistrate's authority. Article 22(3): these two clauses do not apply to enemy aliens or to persons under preventive detention — the exception students most often miss. Statutory echo: the same safeguards appear in the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (successor to the CrPC) and are reinforced by Article 21's guarantee of procedure established by law. ▤ What the Court held The right to be told the grounds of arrest in writing, in a language the person understands, together with access to counsel of choice, is a mandatory constitutional safeguard that cannot be breached under any situation. It applies across the spectrum — offences under the general penal law and under special enactments, including laws on terrorism and money laundering. Breach entails immediate release, and the Court was careful about the label: the person is not enlarged on bail, but released from illegal and unconstitutional detention. Investigating agencies cannot treat a breach as a "mere procedural lapse"; a violation vitiates the process of arrest and remand. A subsequent chargesheet or order of cognisance does not cure the defect. The re-arrest question — the operative new rule The Court was answering whether a person released for breach of Article 22(1) and (2) can be re-arrested for the same offence, and on what terms. There is no blanket immunity against future arrest, since some cases involve grave offences. But a second arrest requires prior specific sanction of the Magistrate. The police must apply with recorded reasons, the application must be supported by a senior police officer, and it must state why Article 22(1) was not complied with the first time. The rationale stated: the power to re-arrest must not rest with the very authority that violated the Constitution — it must carry judicial imprimatur. Figure 1 — The Article 22 safeguards, and what follows a breach Arrest under ordinary law — the constitutional minimumGrounds of arrestin writing, in a languagethe person understandsCounsel of choiceright to consult and bedefended — Article 22(1)Produce in 24 hoursbefore nearest Magistrate— Article 22(2)Breach → arrest is unconstitutional → immediate release (not bail)Re-arrest only with Magistrate's prior sanction, recorded reasons, senior officer's support The judgment converts a safeguard that was often treated as a formality into a jurisdictional condition for lawful custody. ◈ Static background — the line of precedent D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997): the foundational arrest and detention guidelines — memo of arrest, intimation to a relative, medical examination, right to inform a friend. Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P. (1994): arrest must not be routine; the existence of the power to arrest is distinct from the justification for its exercise. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014): notice of appearance instead of arrest for offences punishable up to seven years. Pankaj Bansal (2023) and Prabir Purkayastha (2024): grounds of arrest must be furnished in writing, not merely conveyed orally — the immediate lineage of this judgment, applied there to PMLA and UAPA arrests. Legal aid: Article 39A (DPSP) and the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 underpin the right to counsel for those who cannot afford one. Note the distinction: preventive detention under Article 22(4)-(7) has its own regime — communication of grounds under 22(5), Advisory Board review, and no right to a lawyer before the Board. Why this matters beyond the case Remedy with teeth. Earlier rulings established the duty; the innovation here is the automatic consequence — release — and the judicial gatekeeping of re-arrest. Special statutes included. By applying the rule to terrorism and money-laundering arrests, the Court closes the argument that stringent statutes dilute Article 22. The counter-concern: agencies may argue that automatic release in grave cases risks flight or evidence tampering — which is precisely why the Court built the sanction route rather than granting immunity. Implementation is the test. Compliance depends on police station-level practice, translation capacity and the Magistrate's willingness to scrutinise at remand. ✎ Mains Practice Question "Procedural safeguards against arrest are meaningful only when their breach carries a consequence." Examine this statement in the light of the evolving jurisprudence on Article 22 of the Constitution. 15 marks · 250 words 02 Reported differences within the Election Commission: what the record, the law and the Commission's response say GS-II · Polity — Constitutional Bodies, Electoral ReformsPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · The Hindu A newspaper investigation reported that two of the three Election Commissioners recorded formal objections on internal files on at least 14 occasions over ten months. The Commission has responded that differing views are a normal part of its deliberation and that all its actions comply with the law. Treat this as a study of how a multi-member constitutional body is meant to function. ◈ The basics — how the Election Commission is constituted Article 324 vests superintendence, direction and control of elections in the Election Commission of India. It has been a multi-member body continuously since 1993 — a Chief Election Commissioner and two Election Commissioners. Article 324(5): the CEC can be removed only in the manner and on the grounds applicable to a Supreme Court judge; an Election Commissioner can be removed only on the CEC's recommendation. This asymmetry is a standard Prelims point. Decision rule: under the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, business is transacted unanimously where possible, and where the CEC and Commissioners differ, the majority prevails. Appointment: the 2023 Act provides for appointment by the President on the recommendation of a Selection Committee comprising the Prime Minister, a Union Cabinet Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha — replacing the arrangement the Supreme Court had laid down in Anoop Baranwal (2023), which had included the Chief Justice of India. Electoral rolls: prepared under the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, with the Electoral Registration Officer as the statutory authority for inclusion and deletion, and an appeal to the District Magistrate and Chief Electoral Officer. ▤ What was reported, and what the Commission said The report: Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi recorded objections at least 14 times over ten months on matters including new voter registration, deletion and restoration of names, appeals in the revision process, and custody and security of the electoral roll; the report states some decisions were described in these notes as unauthorised and illegal, and that concerns were raised about centralisation of the roll database and about state-level officers' access to the ECINet platform. Scale cited: the Special Intensive Revision, which began in Bihar in June 2025, is reported to have removed more than 13 crore names from draft rolls across 30 States and Union Territories. The Commission's response: that written notes, observations and internal checks are standard practice in a multi-member constitutional body; that all decisions including the revision have been unanimous and with the approval of all three members; that citing specific internal notes while overlooking the larger body of approvals and around 40 new initiatives gives only one part of the picture; and that ECINet operates under data security protocols and audit controls. The political demand: Opposition parties have sought the CEC's removal — which, as the constitutional position above shows, would require the process applicable to removing a Supreme Court judge. How to write about this in an answer Separate the claim from the finding. What exists on the record is a press investigation and an official rebuttal; no adjudicatory body has ruled on the merits. An answer should describe the dispute, not adopt a side. The institutional question is the examinable one: how a collegial constitutional body records dissent, whether internal notes should be disclosed, and what mechanisms exist to resolve differences short of public controversy. Centralisation versus field discretion is a genuine administrative design question — a national database improves consistency and de-duplication, while statutory decision-making on inclusion and deletion rests with the ERO. Reconciling the two is a governance problem independent of this controversy. Reform proposals on record: a collegium-based appointment process, a fixed common tenure, and a statutory framework for internal decision-making have all been recommended at various times by the Law Commission (255th Report, 2015) and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission. ✎ Mains Practice Question The credibility of a constitutional body rests as much on the transparency of its internal functioning as on the legality of its decisions. Discuss with reference to the Election Commission of India, and suggest measures to strengthen institutional trust. 15 marks · 250 words International RelationsGeneral Studies Paper II 03 India at the P4M Summit: the case for reformed multilateralism and the "4F crisis" GS-II · IR — Important International Institutions, GroupingsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Delhi Edition Speaking at the Partners for Multilateralism, International Law, Peace and Prosperity (P4M) Summit in New York, on the margins of the UN General Assembly, the External Affairs Minister argued that multilateral cooperation must be reinforced and global institutions reformed as the international order comes under pressure from competition and conflict. ▤ The grouping and the speech P4M — Partners for Multilateralism, International Law, Peace & Prosperity — was founded by leaders of the European Union, Brazil, Kenya and Canada; the New York session was co-chaired by S. Jaishankar and European Council President António Costa. Its self-description: not another exclusive bloc or international bureaucracy, but a flexible, open framework for countries across regions and political traditions to build coalitions for reform. The "4F crisis" named in the speech — Fuel, Food, Fertiliser and Finance — is presented as a set of vulnerabilities that cannot be left to resolve themselves. Chokepoint dominance: where disruption threatens, de-risking and diversifying should be encouraged; and the like-minded should have the confidence to come together where there is a compelling case. The procedural ask: more participative deliberation and transparent decision-making, with scrupulous observance of international law, rules and norms. The figures cited in the founders' joint editorial: 2025 saw the highest recorded number of state-based armed conflicts since 1946, across 35 countries, and the highest recorded military spending, at nearly $3 trillion. ◈ Static background — what "reformed multilateralism" means for India UNSC reform is the core demand: India seeks permanent membership and has pressed through the G-4 (with Brazil, Germany and Japan), against the Uniting for Consensus grouping (Italy, Pakistan, Mexico and others). Reform requires amendment under Article 108 of the UN Charter — two-thirds of the General Assembly plus ratification by all five permanent members. The process: Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) have run since 2009 without a negotiating text acceptable to all. India's other reform platforms: the Voice of the Global South Summit, the admission of the African Union to the G-20 during India's presidency in 2023, and WTO reform demands on dispute settlement and the public stockholding of foodgrains. The 4F framing is India's standard formulation since the disruptions of 2022, used to argue that developing economies bear the cost of distant conflicts. The critical view Coalitions of the willing can move faster than universal bodies, but they risk fragmenting the very multilateral order they seek to defend if they substitute for it rather than supplement it. A grouping founded without any of the permanent members of the Security Council has moral weight but limited leverage over the reform that matters most. For India, participation is consistent with multi-alignment — but the credibility of the reform argument rests on whether such platforms produce decisions rather than declarations. ✎ Mains Practice Question "The proliferation of flexible plurilateral coalitions is both a symptom of multilateral failure and a possible route to its repair." Examine this proposition with reference to India's pursuit of reformed multilateralism. 15 marks · 250 words Environment & EcologyGeneral Studies Paper III 04 World Rhino Day: "Keep the Five Alive", and where India's one-horned rhino stands GS-III · Environment — Species Conservation, Wildlife ProtectionPrelims + MainsAll India Radio · News Services Division World Rhino Day, observed on 22 September, carried the theme "Keep the Five Alive" — a call to protect habitat, prevent poaching and curb the illegal horn trade. Around 27,000 rhinos remain in the wild, against nearly five lakh a century ago. ◈ The basics — five species, three continents Asia: the greater one-horned rhinoceros (Rhinoceros unicornis), the Javan rhino (Rhinoceros sondaicus) and the Sumatran rhino (Dicerorhinus sumatrensis) — the last is the only Asian species with two horns and the closest living relative of the extinct woolly rhino. Africa: the black rhino (Diceros bicornis) and the white rhino (Ceratotherium simum) — distinguished not by colour but by lip shape: the black rhino has a pointed prehensile lip for browsing, the white rhino a wide square lip for grazing. India has only one of the five — the greater one-horned rhino, found in Assam, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. The recovery story: the Indian and Nepalese population has risen to nearly 4,000 from around 200 a century ago — one of the most-cited conservation successes in South Asia. Figure 2 — The five rhino species compared Only the greater one-horned rhino occurs in India; note that its Vulnerable status is the least severe among the four threatened species here. ▤ Status table worth memorising Greater one-horned: IUCN Vulnerable; about 4,075 in India (2022); Kaziranga, Pobitora, Orang, Manas, Jaldapara, Gorumara and Dudhwa. Javan: Critically Endangered; around 50, confined to Ujung Kulon National Park, Indonesia. Sumatran: Critically Endangered; roughly 34–47, in Sumatra and Borneo. Black: Critically Endangered; about 6,788 across African range states. White: Near Threatened; about 15,752 — the most numerous, though the northern white rhino subspecies is functionally extinct. Protection in India: Schedule I of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972, and CITES Appendix I for Rhinoceros unicornis, which bans commercial international trade. Pobitora has the highest density of one-horned rhinos in the world; Kaziranga holds the largest single population and is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Threats and the conservation architecture Poaching for horn, driven by demand in East and Southeast Asian markets for traditional medicine and status display — the horn is keratin, the same protein as human hair and nails, with no proven medicinal property. Habitat loss and fragmentation in the floodplain grasslands the Indian species depends on, plus annual Brahmaputra flooding that forces animals onto highways. Indian Rhino Vision 2020, a partnership of the Assam Forest Department, WWF-India, IRF and Bodoland authorities, translocated rhinos to Manas to spread risk across populations. Horn stockpile destruction (Assam, 2021) was a demand-signalling measure — a public statement that horn has no value. Global architecture: CITES, the IUCN Species Survival Commission's African and Asian Rhino Specialist Groups, and the Asian Rhino Range States declarations (New Delhi, 2019). ✎ Mains Practice Question The recovery of the greater one-horned rhinoceros is cited as a conservation success, yet the species remains confined to a handful of protected areas. Examine the reasons, and discuss the risks of population concentration in wildlife conservation. 15 marks · 250 words 05 "Super El Niño": a modelling study projects additional heat deaths, and a 15% monsoon deficit adds to the stress GS-III · Environment — Climate Change, Disaster Management; GS-I · GeographyPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Delhi Edition A report by the Climate Impact Lab projects an estimated 15,800 additional heat-related deaths in India, give or take 1,600, between September 2026 and February 2027, measured against average conditions in the corresponding months from 1996 to 2025. ◈ The basics — what El Niño is, in plain terms The Pacific normally has warm water piled in the west and cool upwelling in the east, held there by easterly trade winds. When those winds weaken, the warm pool slides east — and the atmosphere above it follows. El Niño: unusually warm water in the central and eastern tropical Pacific, which alters atmospheric circulation and shifts rainfall and temperature patterns worldwide. Its cold counterpart is La Niña; the atmospheric pressure see-saw that accompanies it is the Southern Oscillation, and the pair together are ENSO. For India it is statistically associated with a weaker southwest monsoon and hotter conditions — an association, not a certainty, as 1997 showed. "Super El Niño" is an informal term for exceptionally strong conditions. Forecasts this month put the chance of a very strong event during the northern hemisphere autumn and winter at over 90%, with eastern equatorial Pacific sea surface temperatures already more than 3°C above normal. The moderating factor students should also know: the Indian Ocean Dipole, whose positive phase can offset El Niño's drying effect on the Indian monsoon. Figure 3 — Projected additional heat-related deaths, September 2026 – February 2027 Sahel (about 10 countries)66,800Philippines, Vietnam,19,400Indonesia19,300India15,800 ± 1,600Brazil13,300Modelled estimates against the 1996–2025 average; global total for this window put at 239,000 (Climate Impact Lab) These are projections from a statistical model, not counted deaths — the distinction matters in an answer. ▤ The numbers and the method Global: 451,000 additional heat-related deaths projected during the first six months of the event, of which 239,000 fall in the September 2026 – February 2027 window. Method: previously estimated temperature-mortality relationships applied across 24,378 regions to seasonal temperature forecasts, accounting for local climate, vulnerability and adaptive capacity. Stated limitation: the report does not publish the underlying coefficients linking a given temperature rise to a number of deaths — a transparency gap the newspaper itself flags. India's monsoon: the national rainfall deficit stood at about 15% below normal up to 22 September 2026, with larger shortfalls in southern and eastern regions, as withdrawal begins. Energy stress: nearly 40% of coal-fired power plants were reporting critically low fuel stocks amid higher demand from hotter weather. The framing offered: this event is described as a "postcard from our future", delivering temperatures that climate change is projected to bring about two decades later. What a good answer should add Heat action plans under the NDMA framework — Ahmedabad's 2013 plan was the first in South Asia and remains the template for early warning, cooling centres and health-system readiness. Heatwave criteria (IMD): declared when maximum temperature reaches 40°C in the plains, 30°C in the hills, or departs 4.5°C or more from normal; a severe heatwave at a departure above 6.4°C. The vulnerability question: outdoor workers, the elderly, and those without electricity or cooling bear most of the burden — which is why heat is increasingly framed as an occupational and equity issue, not merely a meteorological one. Heatwaves are not yet a notified disaster under the national list for State Disaster Response Fund assistance, though States may use a portion of the fund for local disasters — a recurring policy demand. Treat modelled mortality with care: attribution of deaths to heat is methodologically contested, and India's own official heat-death counts are far lower than modelled estimates because of under-reporting in certification. ✎ Mains Practice Question Extreme heat is emerging as India's most widespread climate risk, yet it remains weakly institutionalised in disaster management. Examine the adequacy of India's preparedness, and suggest measures to protect vulnerable populations. 15 marks · 250 words 06 9th India International Water Week opens on the theme of climate-resilient water management GS-III · Environment — Water Resources; GS-II · Governance — SchemesPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Jal Shakti The Vice-President inaugurated the 9th India International Water Week at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, running from 22 to 26 September 2026 on the theme "Climate Resilient Water Management". The event's renaming from India Water Week reflects its widening international participation. ▤ Event essentials Organiser: Ministry of Jal Shakti; partner countries: the Netherlands and Germany; 14 partner States and two partner Ministries. Publications launched: the Sustainable Urban River Management Framework and AI and ML Driven Integrated Reservoir Sediment Management. Concurrent event: the Second International WASH Conference 2026, tied to SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation. Plenaries: on country perspectives, the water–food–energy nexus, and the Global River Cities Alliance, at which five Urban River Management Plans were launched. Figure cited: rural tap water coverage in Jharkhand rose from about 7% to 37% under the Jal Jeevan Mission, recalled by the Vice-President from his tenure as Governor there. ◈ The schemes named — your revision list Jal Jeevan Mission (2019): functional household tap connections to every rural household; Department of Drinking Water and Sanitation. Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana: "Har Khet Ko Pani" and "per drop more crop" — micro-irrigation and watershed development. Atal Bhujal Yojana: community-led groundwater management in water-stressed blocks across seven States, with World Bank support. NAQUIM: the National Aquifer Mapping and Management Programme of the Central Ground Water Board. Namami Gange: the integrated Ganga conservation mission under the National Mission for Clean Ganga. Ken-Betwa Link Project: the first project under the National Perspective Plan for interlinking of rivers, in the Bundelkhand region. Others: Jal Sanchay Jan Bhagidari, the Dam Rehabilitation and Improvement Project, the National Hydrology Project, and Water Vision@2047. Institutional anchors: the Central Water Commission, the Central Ground Water Board, and the constitutional position that water is a State subject (Entry 17, State List), subject to Entry 56 of the Union List on inter-State rivers. The critical view Interlinking of rivers was endorsed from the dais, but it remains contested on ecological grounds — altered sediment and flow regimes, submergence, and the assumption of fixed "surplus" and "deficit" basins under a changing climate. Federal friction is the standing constraint: inter-State disputes under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956 are slow, and the proposal for a single permanent tribunal remains pending. Coverage versus service: as the Drinking Water Secretary himself noted, resilience is about reliable and sustainable service over time, not infrastructure alone — functionality, water quality and source sustainability are the harder metrics. ✎ Mains Practice Question "Climate resilience in water management requires a shift from building infrastructure to sustaining services." Discuss in the context of India's major water sector programmes. 10 marks · 150 words Science & TechnologyGeneral Studies Paper III 07 Rethinking the "arms race" against fungi: what Indian Candida auris isolates reveal about antifungal resistance GS-III · Science & Technology — Health, Biotechnology; GS-II · Health GovernancePrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Science Research on clinical isolates collected across India finds that Candida auris resists antifungals both by mutating drug targets and by multiplying copies of protective genes — and that at very high doses of one drug the fungus survives rather than dies. The conclusion drawn is that simply dousing pathogens with more antifungal is reaching its limit. ◈ The basics — fungi, and why they are hard to drug Two broad forms: molds grow as long strands — the dermatophytes causing dermatophytosis (itchy skin, nail discolouration, hair loss) belong here; yeasts are single oval cells, and Candida auris is one. Why drugs are scarce: fungi are eukaryotes, like us, so a drug target unique to the fungus is hard to find. That is why only a few drug classes exist — compared with dozens of antibacterials. The two fungal shields: the outer cell wall and the inner cell membrane. Azoles (such as fluconazole) and polyenes target ergosterol, a fat enriched in the membrane; echinocandins (such as caspofungin) target the cell wall. Candida auris first reported in Japan in 2009, has become a multidrug-resistant menace in ICUs within two decades, entering the bloodstream and causing infections with a stated 30–40% mortality. Figure 4 — Where each antifungal class strikes, and how the fungus answers fungal cell(eukaryote)cell wall — chitinmembrane — ergosterolEchinocandins → cell wallResistance: Fks1 gene mutations; survival evenat caspofungin doses above 16 µg/mlAzoles & polyenes → ergosterolResistance: extra copies of the Erg11 gene →more ergosterol → the azole effect is swampedEagle effect: at very high doses the fungus makes extra chitin,repairs its wall and survives — paradoxical growth. Two resistance routes — change the target, or make more of it — plus a compensatory pathway that more drug actually triggers. ▤ The findings Resistance profile: more than 90% of Indian clinical isolates of C. auris resist common azoles such as fluconazole; about 30% resist polyenes; most still respond to echinocandins. Azole resistance mechanism: grown with fluconazole, the pathogen makes extra copies of the Erg11 gene, raising ergosterol production and swamping the drug's effect — gene amplification rather than mutation. Echinocandin resistance: Fks1 mutations let the fungus survive caspofungin even above 16 µg/ml, while current susceptibility testing, per US CDC practice followed globally, stops at 2 µg/ml — so clinicians may not detect the problem. The Eagle effect: named after the US pathologist Harry Eagle — at exceptionally high drug concentrations the fungus survives by producing chitin in bulk and repairing its wall, though it dies at lower concentrations. Infrastructure: around 20% of hospital infections are fungal, yet most Indian hospitals lack the capability to identify fungal pathogens. PGIMER Chandigarh holds about 15,000 clinical fungal isolates and supports other centres free of cost; the study was carried out at JNCASR Bengaluru with IISER Thiruvananthapuram and published in Nature Communications. Why fungi are rising — and the proposed change of strategy The thermal argument: fungi grow best in damp conditions below 30°C, and human body temperature of 37°C was historically a barrier. Warming imposes selection for heat-tolerant strains that can then survive inside us — the fungal infection–mammalian selection hypothesis. Raise the testing ceiling: a practical recommendation is to extend caspofungin susceptibility testing beyond 16 µg/ml, since genotyping every isolate for Fks1 mutations is costly. Combination therapy targeting compensatory pathways, to preserve the effectiveness of the major antifungal classes. The gentler alternative: one view holds that targeting molecules essential to survival guarantees that evolution will find a workaround; targeting less critical pathways could leave the pathogen alive but non-virulent — an anti-virulence rather than a kill strategy. ◈ Static background WHO Fungal Priority Pathogens List (2022) — the first of its kind — places Candida auris, Cryptococcus neoformans, Aspergillus fumigatus and Candida albicans in the critical group. AMR governance in India: the National Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance, the National AMR Surveillance Network coordinated by ICMR, and the Red Line campaign on prescription-only antibiotics. Mucormycosis during the COVID-19 second wave is the most recent Indian example of an opportunistic fungal infection becoming a public health event. One Health is the relevant frame: agricultural azole fungicides are implicated in environmental selection for azole-resistant Aspergillus, linking crop protection to clinical failure. ✎ Mains Practice Question Antimicrobial resistance is usually discussed in terms of bacteria, but drug-resistant fungal pathogens pose a comparable and less-recognised threat. Examine the drivers of rising fungal resistance in India and suggest a response. 15 marks · 250 words