In-Depth PIB Analysis2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGS Paper II 01One Nation One Ration Card — PDS Portability & Digitisation EconomyGS Paper III 02NITI Aayog’s Impact Assessment of PLI Schemes Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGeneral Studies Paper II · with GS-III Food Security 01 One Nation One Ration Card: Portability, Digitisation and the Reform of the Public Distribution System GS-II · Governance — Welfare Schemes, Vulnerable SectionsGS-III · Food Security, PDS & Buffer StocksPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution · 12 Nov 2026 A status note from the Department of Food & Public Distribution reports that One Nation One Ration Card (ONORC) now operates in all 36 States/UTs, logging about 3.27 crore portability transactions a month — the point at which a ration card stopped being tied to one shop, one village or one State. ◈ From the Basics: What the PDS Is and Who Runs It Food security, as defined at the 1996 World Food Summit, exists when all people at all times have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food. Its four pillars are availability, access, utilisation and stability. The Public Distribution System (PDS) is India's main instrument for the access pillar. The PDS is a shared responsibility. Foodgrain is bought from farmers at the Minimum Support Price (MSP), stored, moved and finally sold through a network of Fair Price Shops (FPSs) — popularly, ration shops. Centre: procurement through the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and State agencies, storage, transport to principal depots, allocation to States, and fixing the Central Issue Price (CIP). States/UTs: identifying eligible households, issuing ration cards, licensing and supervising FPSs, and intra-State delivery to the shop. Constitutional anchors: Article 47 (DPSP — duty to raise the level of nutrition), Article 21 (right to food read into the right to life in PUCL v. Union of India, 2001), and Entry 33, Concurrent List (supply and distribution of foodstuffs). Static Background: How the PDS Evolved 1940s — Wartime rationing: general rationing began during the Second World War; the Bengal Famine of 1943 made public food distribution a lasting State function. 1965 — Institutions: the FCI (under the Food Corporations Act, 1964) and the Agricultural Prices Commission (renamed CACP in 1985) were set up during the Green Revolution phase. 1992 — Revamped PDS (RPDS): focused on drought-prone, tribal, hilly and remote blocks. June 1997 — Targeted PDS (TPDS): replaced the universal system with BPL/APL targeting. December 2000 — Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY): for the poorest of the poor, at 35 kg per household per month. 2013 — National Food Security Act (NFSA): turned subsidised grain from a welfare benefit into a legal entitlement. 2018 — Integrated Management of PDS (IM-PDS): the central technology platform on which national portability was built. 2019 → 2022 — ONORC: inter-State portability began among State clusters in 2019; national coverage was completed when Assam became the 36th State/UT in 2022. 2020 → 2028 — PMGKAY: launched in April 2020 as COVID relief; since 1 January 2023 NFSA grain is free of cost, extended for five years from 1 January 2024. Figure 1 — From wartime rationing to a portable ration card 1940sWartimerationing1992RevampedPDS2000AntyodayaAnna Yojana2018IM-PDSplatform2020PMGKAY(COVID relief)2024Free grainto 20281965FCI & Agri.Prices Comm.1997Targeted PDS(BPL / APL)2013NFSA — legalentitlement2019ONORCbegins2022All 36States/UTsMaroon: early PDS · Blue: institutions & targeting · Green: rights & portability era The arc runs from universal rationing to targeting, then to a statutory right (2013) and finally to portability of that right (2019 onwards). ▤ NFSA, 2013 — The Entitlement ONORC Makes Portable Coverage ceiling: up to 75% of the rural and 50% of the urban population — about 81.35 crore people on Census 2011 figures. Two categories: Priority Households — 5 kg per person per month; AAY households — 35 kg per household per month. Price: statutory CIP of ₹3/₹2/₹1 per kg for rice/wheat/coarse grains; reduced to zero under PMGKAY since 2023. Women's empowerment clause: the eldest woman aged 18 or above is to be the head of the household for issue of the ration card. Other entitlements: maternity benefit of at least ₹6,000; meals for pregnant/lactating women and children (through ICDS and mid-day meals); a Food Security Allowance if grain is not supplied. Grievance machinery: District Grievance Redressal Officer, State Food Commission, and vigilance committees at FPS, block, district and State levels. ▤ Scheme at a Glance — One Nation One Ration Card Launched: 2019, as a reform under the TPDS, running on the IM-PDS technology platform. Nodal Ministry / Department: Department of Food & Public Distribution, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution. Coverage: all 36 States/UTs; 100% of PMGKAY beneficiaries. How it works: the beneficiary authenticates with Aadhaar biometrics on an ePoS device at any FPS; the transaction is recorded centrally, so the same card works anywhere — no new card is needed. Benefit: the full NFSA entitlement, intra-State or inter-State; a family split across two places can draw its quota in parts at each location. Companion tool: Mera Ration mobile app, now in 13 languages. Where ONORC Stands: The Portability Numbers 36 States/UTs implementing 3.27 cr Portability transactions per month 233+ cr Transactions since inception 614+ LMT Foodgrain distributed via portability These are cumulative operational figures reported by the Department. Dividing 614 lakh tonnes by 233 crore transactions gives roughly 26 kg per transaction — consistent with household-level rather than individual lifting. Figure 2 — ONORC portability milestones (official infographic) Portability has moved from a pilot to a routine, monthly-scale service across the country. Image courtesy Press Information Bureau / Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution; reproduced with credit for educational use. ◈ Key Terms Explained from the Basics Portability: the ability to draw an entitlement at a location other than where it was registered — like mobile number portability, but for food rations. Intra-State vs inter-State portability: moving to another district/shop within the same State, versus moving to another State. Aadhaar seeding: linking each ration card and beneficiary record to the person's Aadhaar number, so one person cannot appear on two cards. e-KYC: electronic identity verification against UIDAI records — the step that confirms the person on the card is real and alive. ePoS (electronic Point of Sale): the biometric device at the ration shop that authenticates the buyer and records every sale online. De-duplication: data analytics that flags duplicate, ghost or ineligible entries for field verification before deletion. The Digital Backbone Behind Portability Portability is possible only because the underlying records are digital and linked. The Department reports the following status as of September–October 2026: Databases: ration-card and beneficiary records are 100% digitised, covering about 78.65 crore beneficiaries, and published on State/UT transparency portals. Aadhaar seeding: 20.27 crore of 20.51 crore ration cards (98.8%); 76.97 crore beneficiaries seeded. e-KYC: completed for 71.52 crore beneficiaries (91%) as on 30 September 2026. Shops: 5.50 lakh of 5.51 lakh FPSs (99.8%) run on ePoS. Supply chain: online allocation nationwide; supply chain computerised in 31 States/UTs. Grievances: transparency portals, online grievance systems and toll-free helplines in every State/UT. Figure 3 — How far PDS digitisation has gone (per cent) Databases digitised100%FPSs on ePoS99.8%Ration cards Aadhaar-seeded98.8%Beneficiaries with e-KYC91%States/UTs: supply chain computerised86.1% (31/36)0%100% Front-end digitisation (records, shops, Aadhaar seeding) is nearly complete; e-KYC and supply-chain computerisation are the remaining gaps. Each bar has a different base, as stated in its label. Rightful Targeting and the SARTHAK-PDS Umbrella Rightful Targeting (Version 1): Aadhaar–PDS analytics flagged 5.95 crore suspicious records; 2.58 crore duplicate or ineligible entries were deleted after verification. A later round (Version 3): about 3.63 crore records were flagged and about 68 lakh deleted, as reported by the Department. SARTHAK-PDS (Scheme for Assistance in Ration Transport and Handling-Income with Automation in PDS): the umbrella scheme, running until 31 March 2031. It funds intra-State movement, handling and FPS dealer margins. NIRMAL: component for data architecture and analytics. SAKSHAM: component for real-time data integration, including Vehicle Location Tracking Systems, from procurement to distribution. SMART-PDS (Scheme for Modernisation and Reforms through Technology in PDS): links ration cards, distribution, supply chain and grievances on an integrated central system, filling State-level technology gaps. Mera Ration App — The Beneficiary Interface Launched in 2021, the Mera Ration app is now available in 13 languages. It is designed mainly for migrants who arrive in a new town and do not know where their nearest ration shop is. Information: monthly entitlement, past transactions, Aadhaar-seeding status and eligibility for national portability. Action: voluntary ONORC registration, plus GPS-based FPS locator and map navigation to the nearest shop. Why It Matters Migrants: Census 2011 counted about 45 crore internal migrants (around 37% of the population); the Economic Survey 2016–17 estimated about 90 lakh people move between States each year. Earlier, migrating meant losing one's ration. Constitutional value: it makes the NFSA entitlement follow the person, giving practical effect to Article 19(1)(e) (freedom to reside anywhere) without loss of a welfare right. Leakage control: biometric sale and de-duplication shrink the space for ghost cards and diversion. Beneficiary choice: a cardholder can switch shops, giving FPS dealers an incentive to serve better. Judicial push: in June 2021, the Supreme Court (in the suo motu case on migrant workers' problems) directed all States/UTs to implement ONORC by 31 July 2021. The Critical View Authentication failures: worn fingerprints of manual workers and the elderly, and patchy connectivity, can lead to exclusion at the shop; robust offline and non-biometric fallbacks are essential. Deletions need due process: removal of "ineligible" entries can sweep in genuine families; transparent verification, notice and appeal must accompany every deletion drive. An outdated ceiling: NFSA coverage is still computed on Census 2011 population. Eligible people added since then may remain outside the quota until the next Census (reference date 1 March 2027) is used. Receiving-State stock planning: heavy inflows to migrant-destination States strain FPS stocks and dealer margins, which are already thin. Awareness gap: much portability is intra-State; many inter-State migrants still do not know they can draw rations away from home. Nutrition, not just calories: the basket is cereal-heavy; pulses, millets and fortified rice matter for tackling hidden hunger. Data protection: linked databases of nearly 79 crore people must meet the standards of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023. Way Forward Pair portability with dynamic allocation, so grain follows migration patterns in real time. Use e-Shram registrations to bring unorganised migrant workers without cards into the PDS net. Make exception handling (OTP, iris, nominee) a right, not a dealer's discretion. Revise coverage once fresh Census data is available, and diversify the basket toward millets and pulses. ▤ Prelims Hooks ONORC launch: 2019; nodal: Department of Food & Public Distribution; platform: IM-PDS. NFSA, 2013 coverage: 75% rural / 50% urban; 5 kg per person (PHH), 35 kg per household (AAY). TPDS: 1997; AAY: 2000; FCI: 1965; PMGKAY free grain extended to 2028. SARTHAK-PDS components: NIRMAL (analytics), SAKSHAM (real-time tracking), SMART-PDS (integrated tech); valid to 31 March 2031. Mera Ration app: 13 languages; Entry 33, Concurrent List covers foodstuff distribution. ✎ Mains Practice Question "One Nation One Ration Card has made the food entitlement under the National Food Security Act portable, but portability alone does not guarantee food security for migrant workers." Critically examine. 15 marks · 250 words Indian EconomyGeneral Studies Paper III 02 NITI Aayog's Impact Assessment of the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Schemes GS-III · Economy — Industrial Policy, Manufacturing, Growth & EmploymentPrelims + MainsPIB · NITI Aayog · 12 Nov 2026 NITI Aayog, with IIM Ahmedabad as knowledge partner, has released the first sector-wise evaluation of all 14 PLI schemes. Its headline finding is that nearly 70% of targeted segments are on track. ◈ From the Basics: What Is a Production Linked Incentive? A PLI is a payment the Government makes to a manufacturer as a percentage of its incremental sales — sales above a fixed base year — of goods made in India. The firm must also meet minimum investment and sales thresholds. The logic differs from an old-style subsidy. The firm is rewarded only after it produces and sells more, so public money follows output rather than promises. Rates vary by sector and usually taper over the scheme period. Scale: it rewards firms that build large, globally competitive plants, addressing the small-scale problem of Indian manufacturing. Global value chains (GVCs): it aims to pull production of components and finished goods into India as firms diversify supply chains. Domestic value addition (DVA): the share of a product's value actually created in India — the true test of whether manufacturing has deepened or merely assembled imports. Static Background: The Lineage of Manufacturing Policy National Manufacturing Policy, 2011: set a goal of raising manufacturing to 25% of GDP and creating 10 crore jobs by 2022. Make in India (September 2014): an investment-promotion and ease-of-doing-business push across 25 sectors. MEIS → RoDTEP: a WTO panel (2019) found India's export subsidy, the Merchandise Exports from India Scheme, inconsistent with WTO rules; it was replaced by RoDTEP from January 2021. PLI (2020): launched first for mobile phones and electronic components (LSEM), bulk drugs and medical devices; extended under Atmanirbhar Bharat. The Union Budget 2021–22 announced a combined outlay of about ₹1.97 lakh crore for 14 sectors. Why the design is WTO-safe: the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) prohibits subsidies tied to exports or to local content. PLI pays on total incremental sales, domestic and export, to stay outside that prohibition. ▤ Report at a Glance Title: Impact Assessment of PLI Schemes. Released by: NITI Aayog; knowledge partner Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad. Scope: all 14 notified PLI sectors, implemented by different Ministries/Departments. Parameters: investment, additional production, exports and employment. Data: firm-level data from implementing Ministries, supplemented by industry-level inputs. Rating categories: On-Track, Partial Impact, Insignificant Evidence of Impact and Data Unavailable. Headline: nearly 70% of targeted segments on track; investment and production reported above targets. What the Report Found Strongest performers: Pharmaceuticals, Mobile Manufacturing (LSEM), Food Processing, Telecom, White Goods, Automobiles and Drones — the last described as an early implementation success. Clean energy: manufacturing capacity in High-Efficiency Solar PV Modules has expanded significantly. Frontier sectors: ACC Batteries, Specialty Steel and Technical Textiles show gradual capacity and ecosystem build-up. Pattern: sectors with strong industry participation did best. Caveat in the report itself: long-term effectiveness depends on deeper domestic value addition and stronger supply chains; it calls for more MSME participation and harmonised data systems. Figure 4 — How the PIB summary characterises the 14 PLI sectors Notable progress7 sectors• Pharmaceuticals• Mobile mfg. (LSEM)• Food processing• Telecom & networking• White goods• Automobiles & parts• Drones (early success)Significant capacityexpansion · 1 sector• High-efficiencysolar PV modulesGradual build-up3 sectors• ACC batteries• Specialty steel• Technical textilesNot individuallydescribed in summary · 3• Critical KSMs / APIs• Medical devices• IT hardwareGrouping follows the wording of the PIB release; the full report rates each segment On-Track / Partial / Insignificant / Data Unavailable. Mature, demand-led sectors (phones, pharma, autos, appliances) responded fastest; deep-tech sectors such as battery cells and specialty steel are still at the build-up stage. The Critical View Assembly vs manufacturing: in electronics, output and exports have risen sharply, but much of the value still comes from imported components. This is why the follow-on Electronics Component Manufacturing Scheme (2025) targets the component layer. Concentration: incentives flow to a few large firms by design; MSME suppliers benefit only if linkages are deliberately built. Jobs: capital-intensive sectors such as ACC batteries and solar create relatively few jobs per rupee of incentive. Data gaps: a "Data Unavailable" category in an official evaluation shows the need for harmonised, public reporting across Ministries. The sunset question: PLIs are time-bound; the test is whether firms stay competitive after incentives end, which depends on logistics, power, labour and tariff policy. Fiscal discipline: incentive payments should be tied to verified output, with clear criteria to exit sectors that do not respond. ▤ Prelims Hooks PLI sectors: 14; combined outlay about ₹1.97 lakh crore (Budget 2021–22). Incentive base: incremental sales over a base year — not export performance. NITI Aayog: set up on 1 January 2015 by executive resolution, replacing the Planning Commission (1950); neither constitutional nor statutory. WTO SCM Agreement: prohibits export-contingent and local-content-contingent subsidies. ✎ Mains Practice Question The Production Linked Incentive schemes have succeeded in raising investment and output, but their long-term value depends on domestic value addition. Evaluate the PLI approach as a tool of industrial policy in India. 15 marks · 250 words

Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise EditorialsGS Paper III · Environment 01COP31 at Antalya — Delivery Before New Pledges OpinionsGS Paper III · Economy 02Green Jobs, Skilling & a Just Transition EditorialsThe paper's own argument, analysed 01 COP31 at Antalya: Why Delivering Past Climate Promises Must Come Before New Targets Core TopicEditorialGS-III · Environment — Climate Change, International AgreementsGS-II · IR — Global Groupings & Agreements Affecting IndiaPrelims + MainsEditorial · “New deal” The 31st Conference of the Parties (COP31) to the UNFCCC has opened in Antalya, Türkiye. The editorial argues that its success should be judged by whether old commitments — chiefly on finance — are honoured, not by how many new targets are announced. ◈ From the Basics: What Is a COP? The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted at the Rio Earth Summit, 1992 and entered into force in 1994. It now has 198 Parties. Its objective (Article 2) is to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations at a level that prevents dangerous interference with the climate system. The Conference of the Parties (COP) is the Convention's supreme decision-making body. It meets every year; the first COP was held in Berlin in 1995. Decisions are taken by consensus, which is why outcomes are often diluted. Kyoto Protocol (1997, in force 2005): binding emission cuts only for developed (Annex I) countries. Paris Agreement (COP21, 2015; in force 4 November 2016): all countries set their own targets through Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), updated every five years. Paris temperature goal (Article 2): hold warming well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. Guiding principle: Common But Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC) — Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC and Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration. ▤ COP31 at a Glance Venue: Antalya, Türkiye — the host country. Unusual arrangement: Türkiye hosts, while Australia presides over the negotiations; ministerial pre-visits went to Fiji and Tuvalu to foreground Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Finance on the table: delivery of $300 billion a year by 2035 (COP29) and the COP30 call to triple adaptation finance by 2035. Deferred: the modalities of how these funds will actually flow — pushed to COP32. Process milestone: the second Global Stocktake (GST) begins. Presidency proposal: raise electricity's share of final energy consumption from 23% to 35% by 2035; India has declined to sign it. Static Background: The Road from Paris to Antalya Figure 1 — Key COP milestones, 2015–2026 COP21 · 2015ParisParis Agreement2°C / 1.5°C goalCOP26 · 2021GlasgowIndia: net zeroby 2070COP27 · 2022Sharm el-SheikhLoss & Damagefund agreedCOP28 · 2023Dubai · 1st GST“Transition awayfrom fossil fuels”COP29 · 2024BakuNCQG: $300 bna year by 2035COP30 · 2025BelémTriple adaptationfinance; no FF roadmapCOP31 · 2026Antalya2nd GlobalStocktake beginsGST = Global Stocktake · NCQG = New Collective Quantified Goal · FF = fossil fuel Since Paris, each COP has added a goal — on mitigation, loss and damage, finance or adaptation. COP31 is the moment those goals are tested for delivery. Core Argument of the Editorial Urgency vs attendance: the pre-COP focus on the Pacific islands recalled who is most exposed to warming, yet several leaders — including from European countries that usually lead the climate cause — stayed away. Old promises first: the real agenda is delivery of existing commitments on finance and adaptation, not fresh pledges. Deferral as a pattern: deciding how money will flow has been postponed to COP32, weakening the credibility of the numbers already agreed. Science lag: the IPCC has not settled the timeline of its next reports, which are meant to feed the stocktake. Ground lost on fossil fuels: COP30 ended without a formal roadmap away from fossil fuels; the voluntary roadmap sits outside the negotiated text. Conclusion: negotiators should hold nations to past promises rather than add new lofty targets. Climate Finance — The Promise Ladder Climate finance is money flowing from developed to developing countries for mitigation (cutting emissions) and adaptation (coping with impacts). Under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, developed countries "shall provide" such finance. The size of the goal has grown, but delivery has repeatedly lagged. Figure 2 — How the collective climate finance goal has evolved $100 bn/yrPledged at COP15Copenhagen, 2009Target year: 2020OECD: first met in 2022(accounting contested)$300 bn/yrNCQG, COP29Baku, 2024By 2035Developed countries“taking the lead”$1.3 trn/yrAspiration by 2035“Baku to BelémRoadmap”All sources, publicand privateHow it flows?Modalitiesdeferred toCOP32The editorial'scentral concern Headline numbers have tripled and more, but the delivery mechanism — who pays, through which channels, as grants or loans — remains unsettled. ◈ Key Terms Explained from the Basics NCQG (New Collective Quantified Goal): the post-2025 climate finance goal, replacing the $100 billion goal; agreed at COP29, Baku. Adaptation finance: funding to cope with climate impacts — sea walls, drought-resistant crops, early warning systems. The Global Goal on Adaptation sits in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. Loss and Damage: impacts too severe to adapt to — destroyed homes, lost land, cultural loss. The Fund for responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) was agreed at COP27 and operationalised at COP28. Global Stocktake (GST): a five-yearly review under Article 14 of collective progress towards Paris goals. The first concluded at COP28 (2023); the second, starting now, concludes in 2028 and informs the next round of NDCs. IPCC: the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, set up in 1988 by the WMO and UNEP. Its Assessment Reports are the scientific basis of negotiations; the Sixth (AR6) was completed in 2023. Electrification: replacing direct use of fuels (petrol, coal, gas) with electricity — for example EVs and heat pumps — which cuts emissions only as fast as the grid itself decarbonises. Why Delivery Has Stalled Geopolitics: conflict in West Asia has raised energy-security concerns and pulled attention and budgets away from climate. US exit: the United States — the largest historical emitter — has again withdrawn from the Paris Agreement, removing a major contributor of finance. Fiscal strain in Europe: rising defence and energy spending limits climate budgets. Scale mismatch: the Loss and Damage fund recently approved about $21 million for Nepal, while estimated needs of developing countries run into billions. Quality of finance: a large share of counted climate finance comes as loans, which add to the debt burden of vulnerable countries. India's Position India declined to sign the COP31 Presidency's electrification pledge. Its stated position rests on three demands: predictable climate finance, technology transfer, and the nationally determined character of mitigation that lies at the heart of the Paris framework. Development space: India's per capita emissions are well below the world average, and its energy demand is still rising; a uniform sectoral target can constrain choices. Existing commitments (updated NDC, 2022): cut emissions intensity of GDP by 45% from 2005 levels by 2030, and reach about 50% of installed power capacity from non-fossil sources by 2030. Long-term goal: net zero by 2070, announced at COP26, Glasgow (2021) as part of the Panchamrit. Consistency: India's position against pledges outside the negotiated text mirrors the editorial's point that voluntary targets can dilute accountability under the formal process. A Balanced Assessment Strength of the editorial's case: trust is the currency of a consensus-based regime; unmet promises reduce developing countries' willingness to raise ambition. The counter-view: the 1.5°C carbon budget is shrinking fast, so delivery and new ambition cannot be fully sequenced — both must run together. Voluntary coalitions: plurilateral pledges (on methane, electrification or fossil-fuel roadmaps) can move willing countries faster, but risk fragmenting the multilateral process. The way forward: an agreed definition of climate finance, a higher grant share, simpler access for vulnerable countries, and finance delivered on a predictable schedule. ▤ Prelims Hooks COP31: Antalya, Türkiye; negotiations presided over by Australia. NCQG: $300 billion a year by 2035 — COP29, Baku. Global Stocktake: Article 14, every five years; first concluded 2023. “Transitioning away from fossil fuels”: language agreed at COP28, Dubai. IPCC: est. 1988 by WMO and UNEP; CBDR-RC is in Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC. ✎ Mains Practice Question “The credibility of the global climate regime depends less on new targets than on the delivery of past commitments.” Discuss with reference to climate finance and India's negotiating position. 15 marks · 250 words OpinionsSigned op-eds, analysed 02 Green Jobs and the Skilling Gap: Building a Workforce for India's Energy Transition Core TopicOpinionGS-III · Economy — Employment, Inclusive Growth; Environment — Energy TransitionGS-II · Human Resources — Skill DevelopmentPrelims + MainsOp-ed · Director, Just Transition & Climate Change, iFOREST The author argues that the sectors of India's energy transition — renewables, EVs, green hydrogen, recycling and nature-based work — can absorb the next wave of young workers. The binding constraint, she argues, is skills, not jobs. ◈ From the Basics: Green Jobs and Just Transition The International Labour Organization (ILO) defines green jobs as decent jobs that help preserve or restore the environment — in traditional sectors such as manufacturing and construction, or in new ones such as renewable energy and energy efficiency. A just transition means moving to a low-carbon economy in a way that is fair to workers and communities who depend on fossil-fuel industries. The ILO Guidelines for a Just Transition (2015) set out the principles, and the Paris Agreement's preamble refers to the "just transition of the workforce". Who is affected: coal mining, thermal power, internal-combustion vehicle and component manufacturing — and the regions built around them, such as India's coal districts. Who gains: rooftop solar, EV repair and charging, battery recycling, green hydrogen, agroforestry and mangrove restoration. The policy task: retrain displaced workers, prepare new entrants, and plan for regional economies. Static Background: India's Transition and Skilling Architecture Climate goals: net zero by 2070 (COP26, 2021) alongside the development goal of Viksit Bharat by 2047. National Green Hydrogen Mission (January 2023): target of 5 million tonnes of green hydrogen production a year by 2030. Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship (MSDE): created in November 2014; the Skill India Mission launched in July 2015. National Policy for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship, 2015: the current policy framework, now being revised. Skill Council for Green Jobs (SCGJ): set up in 2015 under the National Skill Development Corporation (NSDC) to define occupational standards for green-sector roles. Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs): the backbone of vocational training under the Craftsmen Training Scheme; apprenticeships are governed by the Apprentices Act, 1961. Core Argument of the Op-ed From poverty reduction to good jobs: the author cites World Bank estimates of a steep fall in extreme poverty between 2011 and 2023. She argues the next task is to convert that gain into stable, better-paid employment. Scale of opportunity: an iFOREST assessment, India's Green Jobs Moment, estimates that key green sectors could support over 1.3 crore jobs by 2035. Spread across the map: many such jobs — rooftop solar, EV repair, recycling, agroforestry, mangrove restoration — are local and rural, within reach of households just above the poverty line. Demographic fit: more than 27% of Indians are aged 15–29 and are better educated than earlier cohorts. Not starting from zero: much of the existing industrial workforce can be re-skilled rather than replaced. The real gap: converting education into technical skill at scale. Figure 3 — Transferable skills versus the skilling gap (per cent) Skills that can move into green sectorsThermal power roles → renewables / H₂71%Automobile roles → EVs90%The skilling gapYoung people with technical education5.3%Young people with formal vocational training5%Trained workers whose course was < 6 months43%0%100%Transferability: share of roles assessed with high or medium transferability (iFOREST assessment, as cited in the op-ed) The existing industrial workforce is largely re-skillable; the weak link is the small, short-duration pipeline of technically trained young people. The Scale Problem in Numbers 1.3 cr+ Green-sector jobs possible by 2035 (iFOREST estimate) ~4.5 lakh Projected annual growth in direct green employment ~81,000 Trained so far by dedicated green programmes 15,000+ ITIs, with 26 lakh+ seats Even a modest expansion of green employment would need training capacity many times what dedicated green programmes have delivered so far. The gap is one of quantity (seats), quality (labs, trainers) and duration (short courses that do not build deep technical skill). ◈ Key Terms Explained from the Basics Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR): share of the working-age population that is working or seeking work. Worker Population Ratio (WPR): share of the working-age population that is actually employed. A small gap between LFPR and WPR means most job-seekers find some work — but not necessarily good-quality work. Both are measured by the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) of the National Statistics Office, run since 2017. Skill transferability: how much of a worker's existing skill (for example, an electrician in a coal plant) can be reused in a new sector with limited retraining. Demographic dividend: the growth boost possible when the working-age share of the population is high — realised only if those people are employable and employed. What the Author Proposes Modernise ITIs: the PM-SETU scheme is upgrading about 1,000 government ITIs; these need green-technology laboratories, trained instructors and longer-term programmes. Mix of formats: combine high-skill programmes with short courses and apprenticeships. A continuum: build a pathway linking school, technical education, vocational training and work. Policy anchor: use the revision of the National Policy for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship to make green skilling a core pillar. A Balanced Assessment Strength: it shifts the debate from job loss in fossil sectors to job transfer, backed by occupation-level data. Demand-side caveat: skills create employment only if green sectors actually expand — which depends on investment, domestic manufacturing and stable policy for solar, batteries and hydrogen. Geography mismatch: fossil-dependent jobs are concentrated in districts of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha, while renewable capacity is concentrated in states such as Rajasthan and Gujarat; transfer may require migration or targeted regional investment. Job quality: many green jobs (installation, recycling) are informal or contractual; safety standards, social security and fair wages decide whether they are truly "decent". Inclusion: women's participation and informal waste-pickers in recycling need deliberate attention. ▤ Prelims Hooks MSDE: created 2014; Skill India Mission: 2015; NSDC: 2008. Skill Council for Green Jobs: 2015, under NSDC. Apprentices Act: 1961; PLFS by NSO since 2017. National Green Hydrogen Mission: 2023; 5 MMT a year by 2030. ILO Just Transition Guidelines: 2015. ✎ Mains Practice Question “India's energy transition is as much a skilling challenge as a technological one.” Examine the potential of green jobs to absorb India's young workforce, and suggest measures to ensure a just transition for workers in fossil-fuel-dependent sectors. 15 marks · 250 words

In-Depth News Analysis11 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGS Paper II 01SC on Grandson’s Claim to Grandfather’s Property — Hindu Succession Act02Bal Vivah Mukt Bharat & the PCMA, 2006 International RelationsGS Paper II 03India–EU FTA & the India–Germany Partnership Indian EconomyGS Paper III 04Indigenising 100 Critical Items amid China’s Export Curbs05IBC: A Personal Guarantor Declared Bankrupt06PLI Disbursal at 18.5% of Outlay — NITI Aayog Science & TechnologyGS Paper III 07Chennai Metro ‘Transit Biome’ & AMR Surveillance Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 08India’s Emissions Rise amid a Global Fall09Siang Upper Multipurpose Project — Why It Is Contested Society, Art & CultureGS Paper I 10Kurumba Language & the Census 10,000-Speaker Threshold11The Siddis of Gujarat — An Afro-Indian PVTG Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGeneral Studies Paper II 01 No Birthright Through Succession: Supreme Court on a Grandson's Claim to Grandfather's Property GS-II · Polity — Judiciary, Personal Laws; GS-I · Society — Family & InheritancePrelims + MainsThe Indian Express The Supreme Court has held that a man cannot claim a share in his grandfather's property while his father is alive, if the father received it by succession under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Inheritance in such a case is not a birthright. ◈ From the Basics: Two Ways a Hindu Inherits Property Hindu law recognises two routes. Under survivorship, a coparcener acquires an interest in ancestral property by birth. Under succession, property passes to legal heirs only on the death of the owner. Which route applies decides whether a grandson has any claim at all. Mitakshara school: based on Vijnaneshwara's commentary on the Yajnavalkya Smriti; followed in most of India. A son becomes a coparcener by birth in ancestral property. Dayabhaga school: based on Jimutavahana's work; followed in West Bengal and Assam. A son gets rights only on the father's death. Coparcenary: the narrower group within a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) who hold joint property with a right to demand partition — traditionally three generations below the holder. Constitutional location: succession, joint family and partition fall under Entry 5, Concurrent List, so both Parliament and States can legislate. Static Background: The Statutory Framework Hindu Code Bills (1955–56): the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 and Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 codified Hindu personal law. Section 6 (pre-2005): a coparcener's interest passed by survivorship to the other coparceners, except where a female Class I heir survived — then it went by succession. Section 8: when a Hindu male dies intestate (without a will), property goes first to Class I heirs listed in the Schedule — son, daughter, widow, mother, and the son of a predeceased son, among others. Section 19: two or more heirs take as tenants-in-common — each holds a separate, identifiable share — not as joint tenants. State amendments: Andhra Pradesh (1986), Tamil Nadu (1989), Karnataka and Maharashtra (1994) made daughters coparceners through provisions such as Section 29A. 2005 Amendment: made daughters coparceners by birth nationwide; Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma (2020) held the right does not depend on the father being alive on 9 September 2005. Precedent: in CWT v. Chander Sen (1986), the Court held that property a son inherits from his father under Section 8 is his individual property, not joint family property. Figure 1 — Why the grandson's claim failed Grandfather diesIntestate; property devolvesunder Section 8 toClass I heirsSon (Class I heir)Takes as tenant-in-common;after 1993 partition, the plotis his exclusive propertyGrandsonSon of a living son — nota Class I heir; born aftersuccession openedOutcome: the son could sell the plot; the grandson has no share by birthSuccession under Section 8 does not preserve coparcenary — the property stops being “ancestral” in the son’s hands The decisive question is how the father got the property: by survivorship (grandson has a birthright) or by succession (he does not). What the Court Held Right opens on death: a grandson's right in his grandfather's property arises only on his father's death when the father inherited under Section 8. Not a Class I heir: a son's son is excluded from Class I while his father is alive; the legislature did not save the old Mitakshara rule here. Partition ends jointness: after the heirs partitioned the estate, each became exclusive owner of the allotted share as a tenant-in-common. Section 29A argument rejected: the State provision on daughters' coparcenary rights did not revive the coparcenary character of property already partitioned. Timing: succession opened at the grandfather's death, long before the grandson was born, so he was not a surviving coparcener. Significance and Concerns Clarity for property markets: it protects buyers who purchase from an owner who inherited under Section 8 and partitioned. Consistency: it reaffirms the Chander Sen line and limits the reach of the traditional Mitakshara birthright. Records gap: many families still do not know whether a holding is ancestral or self-acquired, which drives long litigation. Wider debate: such complexity is part of the case for codified, simpler succession rules, which feeds the discussion on Article 44 (Uniform Civil Code). ✎ Mains Practice Question Distinguish between devolution by survivorship and by succession under Hindu law. How have the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 and its 2005 amendment altered the traditional Mitakshara coparcenary? 15 marks · 250 words 02 Bal Vivah Mukt Bharat: The Law, the Campaign and the Road to a Child-Marriage-Free India GS-II · Social Justice — Vulnerable Sections, Welfare SchemesGS-I · Society — Women's Issues, Social EmpowermentPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Women & Child Development (Background note) The Bal Vivah Mukt Bharat (BVMB) campaign of the Ministry of Women and Child Development aims to cut the prevalence of child marriage by 10% by 2026 and to make India child-marriage-free by 2030, in line with SDG 5.3. ◈ From the Basics: Why Child Marriage Matters Child marriage cuts short a girl's education, raises the risks of early pregnancy and maternal and infant death, and increases exposure to domestic violence. It also passes poverty to the next generation. Scale: 23% of women aged 20–24 were married before 18 (NFHS-5, 2019–21), down from 26.8% in NFHS-4. Hotspots: high prevalence in West Bengal, Bihar and parts of Uttar Pradesh; 257 high-burden districts are at or above the national average. Constitutional anchors: Article 21 (life and dignity), Article 21A (education), Article 39(f) (children to develop in freedom and dignity). Static Background: A Century and a Half of Reform 19th century: reformers such as Raja Rammohan Roy, Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar and Jyotirao Phule campaigned against the practice; the Age of Consent Act, 1891 followed. Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 (Sarda Act): minimum age of 14 for girls and 18 for boys; amended in 1949 (15 for girls) and 1978 (18 and 21). Prohibition of Child Marriage Act (PCMA), 2006: moved from restraint to prohibition, with relief for victims. Independent Thought v. Union of India (2017): sex with a wife below 18 is rape; the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 retains this, and POCSO, 2012 treats it as aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Raising the age for women to 21: the Prohibition of Child Marriage (Amendment) Bill, 2021 lapsed with the dissolution of the 17th Lok Sabha in 2024. Figure 2 — Salient features of the PCMA, 2006 (official infographic) The Act treats child marriage as voidable (void in cases of force, trafficking or deceit), makes offences cognizable and non-bailable, and gives the girl rights to maintenance and residence. Image courtesy Press Information Bureau; reproduced with credit for educational use. ▤ PCMA, 2006 — Key Provisions Child: a male below 21 or a female below 18; a child marriage is one in which either party is a child. Voidable: at the option of the child party, by petition to the District Court within two years of attaining majority. Void ab initio: where the child was enticed, forced, deceived, sold or trafficked, or where an injunction against the marriage was violated. Punishment: up to 2 years' rigorous imprisonment and/or ₹1 lakh fine for an adult male marrying a child and for those who perform, promote or permit it; no imprisonment for women. Enforcement: Child Marriage Prohibition Officers (CMPOs) appointed by States; reporting via 1098 (Childline), 100, police, CMPO or District Magistrate. The Bal Vivah Mukt Bharat Campaign Launched: 27 November 2024; a 100-day intensive drive ran from 4 December 2025 to March 2026. Supreme Court framework: in Society for Enlightenment and Voluntary Action v. Union of India (18 October 2024), the Court directed full-time CMPOs, Special Child Marriage Prohibition Units, training and at-risk databases, and urged a ban on child betrothals. Technology: the BVMB portal lists CMPOs and enables online reporting and tracking of awareness actions. Incentives: a Child Marriage-Free Village Certificate and a BVMB Yodha Award for the top 10 districts. Ground examples: Balod (Chhattisgarh) was declared India's first child-marriage-free district in 2025; Surajpur declared 75 panchayats free of child marriage. The Critical View Under-reporting: "zero reported cases" is not the same as zero cases; independent verification is needed before certification. Low conviction: prosecutions under PCMA remain few relative to prevalence; families and communities rarely testify. Root causes: poverty, dowry, safety concerns and dropping out of school drive early marriage — enforcement alone cannot fix them. What works: keeping girls in secondary school, conditional cash transfers, and skilling show stronger evidence than punitive action. ✎ Mains Practice Question Despite a strong legal framework, child marriage persists in India. Critically examine the role of law, enforcement and socio-economic measures in eliminating the practice by 2030. 15 marks · 250 words International RelationsGeneral Studies Paper II 03 India–EU FTA and the India–Germany Partnership: Trade, Clean Energy, Submarines and Skilled Mobility GS-II · IR — Bilateral Relations, Agreements Affecting India's InterestsGS-III · Economy — External Sector; Security — Defence IndigenisationPrelims + MainsThe Hindu (Interview) Germany's Ambassador to India has described the recently concluded India–EU Free Trade Agreement as a potential "game changer", pointing to supply-chain integration in automobiles, joint clean-energy manufacturing, the Project 75(I) submarine programme and rising skilled migration. ◈ From the Basics: What Is an FTA? A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) is a treaty under which partners cut or remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers on most of their mutual trade. Modern FTAs also cover services, investment, government procurement, intellectual property and sustainability standards. WTO basis: FTAs are permitted as an exception to the Most-Favoured-Nation rule under GATT Article XXIV, if they cover "substantially all trade". Rules of origin: criteria that decide whether a product counts as made in the partner country — central to the "make in India, re-export to Europe" logic. The EU: 27 member States, a single market of about 450 million people, and a common external trade policy run by the European Commission. Static Background India–EU: Strategic Partnership since 2004; FTA talks (as the Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement) began in 2007, stalled in 2013, relaunched in June 2022, and concluded in 2026. India–Germany: Strategic Partnership since 2000; Intergovernmental Consultations at Head-of-Government level since 2011. Indo-German Energy Partnership: marks 20 years in 2026. Green and Sustainable Development Partnership (GSDP), 2022: Germany offers technical support and loans of over €1 billion a year to India. Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement (2022): framework for skilled workers, students and researchers. Key Takeaways from the Interview Investment for re-export: German firms producing in India can supply the wider European market; sectors span machinery, automotive, pharma, medical equipment, semiconductors and defence. Auto supply chains: two-way sourcing of parts could make both industries more competitive. Clean-energy manufacturing: India should make solar panels and battery storage at home rather than replace one import dependency with another. Tamil Nadu as a hub: German investment spans the Chennai–Oragadam belt, Coimbatore (automotive, wind energy) and Hosur (two-wheelers). Skilled mobility: Indian students in Germany rose from about 17,000 to 70,000 in nine years; about 60,000 long-term visas are issued each year. ▤ Project 75(I) at a Glance What: six conventional submarines with Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) for the Indian Navy, under the Strategic Partnership model of the Defence Acquisition Procedure. Partners: German shipyard TKMS with Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd (MDL); design developed jointly. Indigenous content: about 40% for the first boat, rising to 60% or more by the sixth, as stated by Germany. Beyond the order: a possible production hub for third-country exports and plans for a jointly developed heavyweight torpedo. Lineage: follows Project 75 — six Scorpène (Kalvari-class) submarines built by MDL with France's Naval Group. Why AIP matters: it lets a diesel-electric submarine stay submerged for weeks instead of days, reducing detection risk. The Critical View Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM): the EU levy on carbon-intensive imports (steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers) applies outside the FTA and could offset tariff gains. Sensitive sectors: autos, wines and dairy, and EU demands on IPR and data rules, require careful phasing for Indian producers. Technology transfer: India's experience in earlier programmes shows that "transfer" often means licensed production; real design depth must be built. Mobility: recognition of qualifications and language barriers still limit how many skilled Indians can use the openings. ✎ Mains Practice Question The India–EU Free Trade Agreement can deepen India's integration into global value chains, but regulatory measures such as CBAM may limit its benefits. Discuss with reference to India–Germany economic and strategic ties. 15 marks · 250 words Indian EconomyGeneral Studies Paper III 04 Chemicals to Capital Goods: India's Push to Indigenise 100 Critical Items amid China's Export Curbs GS-III · Economy — Industrial Policy, Supply Chains, External SectorPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT) has begun an effort to indigenise about 100 critical intermediates and capital goods. The trigger is China's proposed export-licensing regime for capital goods such as solar manufacturing equipment and tunnel boring machines. ◈ From the Basics: Intermediates, Capital Goods and Chokepoints Intermediate goods are inputs used to make other goods — chemicals, resins, components. Capital goods are the machines used to make things — production lines, furnaces, tunnel boring machines. A country can assemble a final product at home and still depend on another country for both. Chokepoint: a stage in a supply chain controlled by one supplier, which can be used as economic leverage through export controls. Export licensing: exporters must obtain government permission to ship listed items — allowing the exporting State to slow, ration or deny supply. Indigenisation: building domestic capacity to produce such items, reducing strategic vulnerability even if costs are higher in the short run. Static Background DPIIT: renamed from the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) in 2019; it is under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. National Capital Goods Policy, 2016: aimed to raise capital-goods production and reduce import dependence. Atmanirbhar Bharat (2020) and the PLI schemes, including one for high-efficiency solar PV modules, form the wider policy backdrop. Approved List of Models and Manufacturers (ALMM): a MNRE list that government-supported solar projects must source from; extended from modules to solar cells. Trade remedies: anti-dumping duty is imposed under the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 on the recommendation of the Directorate General of Trade Remedies (DGTR). The Solar Value Chain — Where India Stands Solar manufacturing runs in five steps: polysilicon is cast into ingots, sliced into wafers, processed into cells, and assembled into modules. India is strong at the last, assembly step and weak upstream. Figure 3 — India's solar manufacturing capacity by stage (GW per year, industry estimates) PolysiliconIngotWaferCellModuleModules~233Cells~30Ingots & wafers~2~50 GW of solar capacity added each yearBars to scale. India's cell and wafer capacity is well below annual deployment, so most modules use imported cells. Module capacity alone exceeds annual demand several times over, but the upstream gap — cells, wafers, polysilicon and the machines to make them — is where China's export controls bite. The Wider List: Petrochemicals and Industrial Chemicals Polymers: PVC, polyethylene (LDPE, LLDPE), polypropylene, polystyrene and ABS — the base of packaging, pipes and consumer goods. Chemicals: phosphoric acid and ammonia (fertilisers), acetic acid and toluene (industry, pharma). Resins: polycarbonates and propylene copolymers for auto parts and medical devices. Trade measure: a Minimum Import Price of $0.766 per kg on suspension-grade PVC was imposed in August. Capital goods: a tunnel boring machine plant has been set up in Tamil Nadu; China plans to license TBM exports from 18 November. ▤ The Trade Context India's trade deficit with China: over $100 billion in the current fiscal year. China's global trade surplus: $1.2 trillion in 2025; expected to exceed $1 trillion again in 2026. Global share shift: a Rhodium Group study projects China gaining about 8 percentage points of world export share by 2030, mainly at the expense of economies with export profiles similar to China's. Cost of switching: industry estimates that sourcing equipment from Europe or Japan instead of China can raise costs by 20–40%. The Critical View Cost vs security: domestic production of commodity chemicals and equipment may be costlier for years; the trade-off must be explicit. Scale economics: petrochemicals and polysilicon are capital-heavy and need cheap power and feedstock; selective bets beat a long wish list. Protection risk: MIPs and duties raise input costs for downstream MSMEs and exporters. Diversify, not only indigenise: trusted suppliers (Japan, EU, Korea) and partnerships such as the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative can complement domestic capacity. ✎ Mains Practice Question “Export controls on capital goods have become a tool of economic statecraft.” In this context, examine the challenges India faces in building self-reliance in upstream manufacturing, with reference to the solar value chain. 15 marks · 250 words 05 A Personal Guarantor Declared Bankrupt: How Insolvency and Bankruptcy Work Under the IBC GS-III · Economy — Banking, NPAs, Insolvency ResolutionPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express On 5 November, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) declared a former Videocon promoter bankrupt as personal guarantor for about ₹12,668 crore of SBI loans to group companies. It is one of very few loan-default cases in India to reach the bankruptcy stage. ◈ From the Basics: Insolvency vs Bankruptcy Insolvency: a state in which a person or company cannot pay debts as they fall due. Bankruptcy: the formal legal process by which an insolvent individual is declared bankrupt and their assets are distributed among creditors. Liquidation: the equivalent end-stage for a company — its assets are sold and the firm ceases to exist. Personal guarantor: a promoter who signs a guarantee to repay a company's loan if the company cannot; creditors can then pursue the person. Static Background: The IBC Framework Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016: based on the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee (2015); consolidated laws such as SICA, 1985 and the old provincial insolvency Acts. Adjudicating authorities: NCLT for companies and personal guarantors to companies; Debts Recovery Tribunal for other individuals. Appeals lie to the NCLAT, then the Supreme Court. Regulator: the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI). Timeline: CIRP is to finish in 180 days, extendable by 90, with an outer limit of 330 days including litigation. Personal guarantors: provisions notified with effect from 1 December 2019; upheld in Lalit Kumar Jain v. Union of India (2021) and Dilip B. Jiwrajka v. Union of India (2023). Section 12A: allows withdrawal of a case with approval of 90% of the Committee of Creditors. Figure 4 — From default to bankruptcy: the three stages Loan defaultby the companyStage 1 · CIRP (company)Resolution plan, or elseliquidation of company assetsStage 2 · PIRP (guarantor)Repayment plan offered bythe guarantor to creditorsCan run together; total claim cappedat the amount owedfailsStage 3 · BankruptcyEstate vests in abankruptcy trustee; assetssold to repay creditorsIllustration: owed ₹100;CIRP recovers ₹70 →PIRP/bankruptcy for ₹30 Bankruptcy is the last resort — it begins only when both company resolution and the guarantor's own repayment plan have failed to recover the dues. ▤ The Case and the Numbers Company stage: a resolution plan offering about ₹2,962 crore against admitted claims of about ₹65,000 crore was set aside by the NCLAT in 2022. Guarantor stage: a repayment plan of about ₹600 crore — roughly 0.42% of dues — was rejected; the PIRP ended in July. Consequences: the bankrupt must disclose all income and assets to the trustee, loses control of companies and assets, and cannot serve as a company director. Personal guarantor data (IBBI): 5,186 PIRP applications filed; only 64 repayment plans approved, with creditors realising about 1% of admitted claims. Only 310 bankruptcy applications have been filed since 2019. Figure 5 — Outcomes of 9,166 corporate insolvency (CIRP) cases admitted since 2016 Liquidation ordered3,074Ongoing1,865Resolution plan approved1,484Closed on appeal / settled1,410Withdrawn under Section 12A1,333Average realisation: about 30.5% of admitted claims under resolution plans vs about 4% under liquidation (IBBI data) Liquidations outnumber resolutions roughly two to one, and recoveries in liquidation are a fraction of those in resolution — the IBC's core challenge. Why Personal Insolvency Recovers So Little Hidden wealth: tracing an individual's true net worth is harder than valuing a company's plant and land. Asset structuring: assets held through relatives, trusts or overseas entities are difficult to reach. Legal exemptions: limits on what can be taken from a residence and personal effects reduce the pool. Time: delays at each stage erode asset values; NCLT capacity remains a bottleneck. Significance Deterrence: it signals that promoters' guarantees are enforceable, restoring discipline in the credit culture. Untested law: it will test the IBC's individual bankruptcy provisions, which have been used rarely. Reform agenda: more NCLT benches, a stronger information utility for asset records, and pre-packaged insolvency (available for MSMEs since 2021) can raise recoveries. ✎ Mains Practice Question “The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code has changed the creditor–debtor relationship in India, but recoveries remain low.” Critically examine with reference to corporate liquidation and personal guarantor insolvency. 15 marks · 250 words 06 Six Years On, PLI Disbursals at 18.5% of Outlay: What NITI Aayog's Assessment Reveals GS-III · Economy — Industrial Policy, Growth, EmploymentPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · NITI Aayog The NITI Aayog–IIM Ahmedabad impact assessment shows that cumulative incentive disbursals under the 14 PLI schemes stood at 18.51% of the total outlay of about ₹1.91 lakh crore till March 2026. Disbursals were below 10% in nine schemes. ◈ From the Basics: Why Low Disbursal Is Not Automatically Failure A Production Linked Incentive is paid only after a firm meets its investment and incremental sales thresholds. Low disbursal can therefore mean firms have not yet reached the required output — or that the scheme is still early in its tenure. It is not a direct measure of money "unspent" through waste. Back-loaded by design: incentives rise as firms scale up, so disbursals should increase later in each scheme's tenure. Different start dates: not all schemes began in 2020; some have had less time to mature. Figure 6 — Disbursement as share of outlay, by PLI scheme (per cent, till March 2026) Drones & drone components77.50Large-scale electronics (LSEM)55.83Pharmaceutical drugs44.39Food products24.89Telecom & networking22.59White goods (ACs & LEDs)9.29Automobiles & components9.20Medical devices7.79Specialty steel3.73Textiles (MMF & technical)3.61Bulk drugs (KSMs, intermediates, APIs)1.27IT hardware 2.00.57ACC batteryno figure reportedHigh-efficiency solar PV modulesno figure reportedOverall: 18.51% of total outlayGreen: high · Blue: moderate · Maroon: below 10% of outlay. Source data: NITI Aayog, as reported. Three demand-led sectors — drones, mobile electronics and pharma — account for most of the payouts; nine schemes remain below 10%. ▤ Cumulative Outcomes Reported (till March 2026) Investment attracted: ₹2.40 lakh crore. Production generated: ₹22.66 lakh crore. Employment: over 8.49 lakh people. On track: nearly 70% of targeted segments, with the strongest results in electronics, telecom and pharmaceutical drugs. Reforms Suggested by the Assessment From supply-push to demand-pull: the next generation of schemes should pair production incentives with demand-side support. Sector-specific design: differences in technology adoption, gestation periods, competition and capital needs call for tailored targets rather than a uniform template. Value addition: growth in mobile phone manufacturing has been accompanied by a rise in imports, largely because it is assembly-based. Data: revenue and employment reporting across Ministries needs urgent standardisation. From launch to long-term effect: the focus should shift from measuring initial success to long-term effectiveness. ✎ Mains Practice Question The uneven disbursement under the PLI schemes reflects differences in sectoral readiness rather than scheme failure. Examine, and suggest how the next generation of industrial incentives should be designed. 10 marks · 150 words Science & TechnologyGeneral Studies Paper III 07 Swabbing the Metro: Chennai's ‘Transit Biome’ and the Case for Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance GS-III · S&T — Biotechnology, Developments in Health SciencesGS-II · HealthPrelims + MainsThe Hindu An IIT Madras study of high-touch surfaces in the Chennai Metro has mapped a city-specific microbial community and found low but widespread antimicrobial-resistance (AMR) genes. The researchers say there is no cause for alarm, but argue for routine surveillance. ◈ From the Basics: Microbiomes, Metagenomics and AMR Microbiome: the whole community of microorganisms — bacteria, fungi, viruses — living in a particular environment, from the human gut to a train handrail. Metagenomics: sequencing all the DNA in an environmental sample directly, without first growing microbes in a lab. It can detect organisms that cannot be cultured. Antimicrobial resistance (AMR): the ability of microbes to survive drugs meant to kill them. Resistance genes can pass between bacteria, even across species. AMR genes vs infections: finding a resistance gene on a surface signals potential spread; it does not mean commuters are being infected. ▤ The Chennai Study at a Glance Sampling: 96 swabs from 12 stations and trains on the Blue and Green Lines (December 2021–January 2022); 47 passed quality control and were sequenced. Surfaces: station handrails, ticket-vending kiosks, train rods and ticket counters; kiosks were the most diverse. City signature: nine "unique-core" species — salt-tolerant, tropical-air, soil/water, poultry-associated and skin-associated bacteria — reflecting Chennai's coastal climate, humidity, density and nearby farming. Resistance: 206 AMR gene families across 25 drug classes; sulfonamide and rifamycin resistance genes were relatively more abundant; over 80% of samples carried at least one AMR gene. Published in: the peer-reviewed journal mSphere. Static Background: AMR as a Public Health Threat Global burden: the GRAM study (The Lancet, 2024) estimated 1.14 million deaths directly attributable to bacterial AMR in 2021, and projected 39 million such deaths between 2025 and 2050. UN commitment: the UN General Assembly High-Level Meeting (2024) set a target to cut AMR deaths by 10% by 2030. India's framework: the Chennai Declaration (2012), the Red Line campaign (2016) on prescription-only antibiotics, and the National Action Plan on AMR (2017) based on One Health. Surveillance networks: ICMR's AMR Surveillance Network and the WHO GLASS system (launched 2015). Drugs in the news: rifamycins (e.g. rifampicin) are central to TB treatment; carbapenems are "last-line" antibiotics for multi-drug-resistant infections. The Global Context PathoMap (2013): sampled 468 New York subway stations; nearly 48% of the DNA matched no known organism. MetaSUB Consortium (2015): its first Global City Sampling Day (21 June 2016) covered 54 cities in 32 countries. Global atlas (Cell, 2021): 4,728 samples from 60 cities; 4,246 known species, and 31 species found in 97% of samples. Other studies: Beijing's subway showed possible spread of carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae; Hong Kong's studied palm microbiomes after handrail contact. Why It Matters for India Baseline data: a city "microbial fingerprint" allows future changes — a new resistant strain, an outbreak — to be detected early. Complements wastewater surveillance: both track community-level health signals without testing individuals. Urban design: data can guide cleaning protocols, surface materials and ventilation in crowded transit. Limitation: sampling during COVID-era sanitisation caused many samples to fail quality control; repeat sampling in normal conditions is needed. ✎ Mains Practice Question Antimicrobial resistance is often called a “silent pandemic”. How can environmental and metagenomic surveillance strengthen India's One Health approach to AMR? 10 marks · 150 words Environment, Ecology & Disaster ManagementGeneral Studies Paper III 08 Why India's Carbon Emissions Could Rise in 2026 Even as Global Emissions Fall GS-III · Environment — Climate Change; Economy — Energy, InfrastructurePrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · Global Carbon Budget · CREA The Global Carbon Budget projects that global fossil CO₂ emissions will fall by 0.4% in 2026. India is expected to be the only major emitter to record an increase, at 4.4% — above its average of 3.5% a year over the past decade. ◈ From the Basics: Reading Emissions Data Global Carbon Budget: an annual assessment by the Global Carbon Project, an international scientific network, of CO₂ sources and sinks. Absolute vs intensity: absolute emissions are total tonnes; emissions intensity is tonnes per unit of GDP. India's NDC targets intensity — a 45% cut by 2030 from 2005 levels — not absolute totals. Per capita: India emits about 2 tonnes of CO₂ per person, well under half the world average, though it is the third-largest emitter in total and accounts for about 8% of global emissions. One-year swings: weather, monsoon and economic shocks can move a single year's figure sharply; trends matter more than one data point. Figure 7 — What drove India's 2026 emissions (percentage change, year-on-year) Global fossil CO₂, 2026−0.4India fossil CO₂, 2026+4.4India, 10-year average+3.5India CO₂, H1 2026 (CREA)+3.7Coal power output*+13.2Petrol use, Jan–Oct+6.61Diesel use, Jan–Oct+5.76All petroleum use, Jan–Oct−2.24Oil & gas CO₂, H1 (CREA)−7*Coal-based generation, April–10 November 2026 vs same period of 2025, to about 8.46 lakh million units. Negative bars to the left of zero. The 2026 rise is driven by coal power (a hot, dry year), road fuels and heavy industry — even as total petroleum use and oil-and-gas emissions fell. The Drivers Weather: a wet pre-monsoon in 2025 held down cooling demand and emissions; a drier monsoon and higher temperatures under El Niño conditions in 2026 pushed electricity demand up. Coal power: coal-based generation rose about 13.2% to about 8.46 lakh million units between April and 10 November, drawing down coal stocks. Transport fuels: petrol consumption rose 6.61% (34.85 → 37.15 million tonnes) and diesel 5.76% (76.46 → 80.86 million tonnes), even as overall petroleum consumption fell 2.24%. Industry: CREA analysis found India's CO₂ emissions in the first half of 2026 up 3.7%, led by steel and cement. The global decline: attributed to solar and wind expansion and the energy shock from the West Asia conflict; the study cautions this may be a one-year dip, not a structural shift. The Structural Point: Power Has Plateaued, Industry Has Not According to CREA, power-sector CO₂ stayed flat for two years till June 2026, as clean energy met all of the growth in electricity demand. The challenge has shifted to industry, where coal dominates and electricity is a smaller share of energy use than in most G20 economies. ▤ India's Climate Commitments and Tools Updated NDC (2022): 45% cut in emissions intensity of GDP by 2030 (vs 2005); about 50% of installed power capacity from non-fossil sources by 2030. Long-term: net zero by 2070 (COP26, Glasgow). Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (2023): under the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022; sets emission-intensity targets for energy-intensive sectors. Industry pathways: a green steel taxonomy, the National Green Hydrogen Mission, and energy-efficiency schemes such as PAT (Perform, Achieve and Trade). A Balanced View Development need: rising emissions partly reflect growth in a country with low per capita energy use; CBDR-RC recognises this space. Risk of lock-in: new coal plants and carbon-intensive industrial capacity built now will operate for decades. The lever: industrial electrification, green hydrogen for steel and fertilisers, and storage to make renewable power available round the clock. Transport: growth in petrol and diesel use shows that EV adoption and public transport have not yet bent the curve. ✎ Mains Practice Question India's power sector emissions have plateaued, but industrial and transport emissions continue to rise. Discuss the challenges of decarbonising Indian industry and suggest a pathway consistent with its development needs. 15 marks · 250 words 09 Siang Upper Multipurpose Project: Water Security, Tribal Rights and the China Factor GS-III · Environment — EIA, Infrastructure (Energy), Disaster ManagementGS-II · IR — India–China, Transboundary RiversGS-I · Geography — DrainagePrelims + MainsThe Hindu (Explainer) The proposed Siang Upper Multipurpose Project (SUMP) in Arunachal Pradesh faces protests by the Adi community, who say at least 40 villages would be affected and 27 submerged. The State government presents it as a strategic counter-storage to China's planned Medog dam upstream. ◈ From the Basics: The River and the Region One river, many names: it rises in Tibet near Lake Mansarovar as the Yarlung Tsangpo, turns sharply at the Great Bend, and enters India in Upper Siang as the Siang. Becomes the Brahmaputra: it is joined by the Dibang and Lohit near Sadiya in Assam, and enters Bangladesh as the Jamuna. Seismic zone: the region is in Seismic Zone V; the 1950 Assam–Tibet earthquake (magnitude about 8.6) struck this area. The Adi: one of Arunachal's major tribes in the Siang valley; their traditional village council is the Kebang, and Solung is a key festival. Hydro frontier: Arunachal has about 50 GW of assessed hydro potential — the largest of any State; about 143 hydro agreements were signed in the late 2000s, most of which never progressed. Figure 8 — SUMP and Medog: the river sequence and the reported numbers Yarlung TsangpoTibet · Medog damSiangArunachal · SUMP siteBrahmaputraAssam (+ Dibang, Lohit)JamunaBangladeshSchematic sequence, not to scale — flow runs left to rightLive storage (billion m³)SUMP~9.2Medog~5.5Installed capacity (MW)SUMP~11,000–11,200Medog~60,000 (reported)Figures as cited by the State government and in reports; SUMP is only at the pre-feasibility stage. Medog is designed mainly for power; SUMP's case rests on storage — a larger reservoir that could absorb sudden upstream releases. ▤ Project at a Glance Developer: NHPC (National Hydroelectric Power Corporation). Status: declared a national project in 2008; currently at the Pre-Feasibility Report (PFR) stage. Scale (as cited): about 11,000–11,200 MW; dam height 280–300 m; about 9.2 billion m³ of live storage — the usable water that can be released, excluding the "dead" bottom layer. Lineage: an earlier 3,750 MW "Stage-II" Siang Upper project shows the idea has existed in other forms for years. Impact claimed by protesters: at least 40 villages affected, 27 submerged. The Clearance Pathway Environmental clearance: under the EIA Notification, 2006, appraised by the Expert Appraisal Committee of the MoEFCC, with public hearings. Forest clearance: under the Van (Sanrakshan Evam Samvardhan) Adhiniyam, 1980 (the renamed Forest Conservation Act). Community consent: the Forest Rights Act, 2006 requires Gram Sabha consent, as affirmed in the Niyamgiri case (2013). Technical safety: a full impact study with one year of baseline data, a dam-break analysis and a disaster management plan; oversight under the Dam Safety Act, 2021. Arguments For and Against For — strategic storage: a large reservoir could regulate flows, buffer sudden releases from Medog, and moderate floods in Assam. For — development: clean power, local jobs and infrastructure in a remote border region. Against — displacement and identity: submergence of ancestral land, forests and sacred sites of the Adi. Against — risk: a very tall dam in Zone V, with landslide and glacial lake outburst hazards, raises questions of safety for downstream populations. Against — fairness: villagers ask why they should bear the cost of the absence of a water treaty with China. ◈ The Transboundary Dimension No treaty with China: cooperation rests on an Expert Level Mechanism (2006) and MoUs for sharing flood-season hydrological data on the Brahmaputra and Sutlej. International law: neither India nor China is party to the UN Watercourses Convention, 1997, which sets the principle of equitable and reasonable use. Water as leverage: upstream States can use flows to pressure downstream neighbours; disputes over Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and India's holding of the Indus Waters Treaty "in abeyance" show how contested river management has become. ✎ Mains Practice Question “Large dams in the Eastern Himalaya are as much a strategic question as a developmental one.” Critically examine with reference to the Siang Upper Multipurpose Project, the rights of affected communities and India–China water relations. 15 marks · 250 words Society, Art & CultureGeneral Studies Paper I · with GS-II Vulnerable Sections 10 Kurumba and the 10,000-Speaker Rule: Will the Census Erase India's Smallest Languages? GS-I · Society & Culture — Diversity, Languages, Tribal CommunitiesGS-II · Vulnerable Sections — PVTGsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu The Kurumbas of Attappady in Keralam's Palakkad district — a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group (PVTG) of about 2,719 people — speak Kurumba, an oral language without a script. Under the Census rule that groups mother tongues with fewer than 10,000 speakers under "others", it is unlikely to be counted separately. ◈ From the Basics: How Languages Become Endangered Endangered language: one whose speakers are declining across generations, as children stop learning it. Language shift: the gradual replacement of a community language by a dominant one; it can occur within one or two generations or slowly over a long period. In practice: Kurumba children attending school outside their villages use Malayalam; the word chechi (elder sister) is replacing the Kurumba akke. Why oral languages are most at risk: without a script or documentation, loss can go unnoticed until the last fluent speakers are gone. Static Background Census language method: raw mother tongues are rationalised and grouped; in Census 2011, those with 10,000+ speakers yielded 121 languages — 22 scheduled and 99 non-scheduled. People's Linguistic Survey of India (2010): by the Bhasha Research and Publication Centre; identified about 780–800 languages. SPPEL (2013): the Scheme for Protection and Preservation of Endangered Languages, run through the Central Institute of Indian Languages, Mysuru, for languages with fewer than 10,000 speakers. Constitution: Article 29 protects a distinct language, script or culture; Article 350A calls for primary education in the mother tongue; the Eighth Schedule lists 22 languages. NEP 2020: mother tongue or home language as the medium of instruction at least till Grade 5, wherever possible. Global frame: the UN's International Decade of Indigenous Languages (2022–2032). ▤ PVTGs — Key Facts Origin: the Dhebar Commission (1960–61) noted inequality among tribes; "Primitive Tribal Groups" were identified from 1975 and renamed PVTGs in 2006. Criteria: pre-agricultural technology, low literacy, economic backwardness and a stagnant or declining population. Number: 75 PVTGs across States and the UT of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Keralam's five: Cholanaickan, Kadar, Kattunaickan, Koraga and Kurumbar. Scheme: PM-JANMAN (2023) for housing, roads, water, health and education in PVTG habitations. Why the Threshold Matters Statistical invisibility: a language not counted separately tends to disappear from policy, funding and school planning. Identity: for Adivasi communities, language is tied to rituals, ecological knowledge and kinship; losing one weakens the other. Structural pressure: lack of schooling beyond the primary level in Kurumba areas pushes children into Malayalam-medium institutions. Way Forward Publish raw mother-tongue data alongside grouped figures so small languages remain visible. Document oral languages through audio-visual archives with community elders. Use multilingual education models — tribal-language primers and local teachers — in early grades. ✎ Mains Practice Question Language loss among tribal communities is also a loss of knowledge and identity. Examine the challenges in protecting endangered languages in India, and evaluate the adequacy of existing measures. 10 marks · 150 words 11 The Siddis of Gujarat: History, Identity and Development of an Afro-Indian Tribal Community GS-I · Society, History & Culture — Tribal Communities, DiversityGS-II · Vulnerable Sections — Scheduled Tribes, PVTGsPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express (Explained) A 15-year-old Siddi judoka from Gujarat won silver in the girls' 63 kg category at the Youth Olympic Games in Dakar, Senegal — only the second Indian Youth Olympics medal in judo. It has turned attention to the Siddis, a community of East African descent. ◈ From the Basics: Who Are the Siddis? The Siddis are descendants of Africans, largely from the East African coast, who came to India over several centuries. Their features are African, but their language, food and dress are fully Gujarati — they speak Kathiawadi Gujarati. Where in Gujarat: concentrated in 18 villages of Talala taluka, Gir Somnath; Jambur is called "Mini Africa"; also in Junagadh, Jamnagar, Bhavnagar, Rajkot and other districts. Beyond Gujarat: Siddi communities also live in Karnataka (Uttara Kannada), Maharashtra, Goa, Diu and Daman. Population: a survey cited in Rajya Sabha (2025) put Gujarat's PVTG Siddis at 12,959; the 2001 Census recorded 8,662. Livelihood: many work as guides, drivers and labourers around Gir National Park, the home of the Asiatic lion. Static Background: The Historical Anchor Arrival: accounts vary — through Arab and Persian trade networks, as enslaved people brought by the Portuguese, or as soldiers and guards for Indian rulers. There is no definitive record. Habshis in Indian history: Africans rose to power in medieval India — Malik Ambar led the Ahmadnagar Sultanate; the Siddis of Janjira held the island fort off the Konkan coast. Architecture: the Sidi Saiyyed Mosque (1573) in Ahmedabad, famous for its stone jali lattice, was built by an Abyssinian noble. Faith: mostly Sufi-influenced Muslims, venerating Baba Gor, whose principal dargah is at Ratanpur (Bharuch); local Hindu rituals also form part of practice. Dance: Dhamal (also called Goma), with African-origin rhythms, is performed by men and dedicated to Baba Gor. ▤ Legal Status Scheduled Tribe: declared in 1956 under Article 342, but only in the Saurashtra region — an example of area restriction in ST lists. Outside Saurashtra: Siddis (e.g. in Bharuch) are classified as SEBC (Socially and Economically Backward Class). PVTG: Siddis and Padhars were declared primitive tribal groups in 1982; Kotwalias and Kathodis in 1978. With the Kolghas, they are Gujarat's five PVTGs. Lokur Committee (1965) criteria for ST status: primitive traits, distinctive culture, geographical isolation, shyness of contact, backwardness. Issues and Opportunities Area restriction: members of the same community receive different benefits depending on where they live — a recurring debate in tribal policy. Education: more young people are entering higher education and professional courses, but numbers remain small. Sport as a pathway: Siddi athletes have done well in judo and athletics; sustaining them needs scholarships and support to stay in training camps. Stereotyping: describing communities by "natural athleticism" or temperament risks stereotypes; outcomes depend on access, coaching and opportunity. ✎ Mains Practice Question The Siddis illustrate India's long history of Indian Ocean connections. Discuss their historical contributions and the challenges they face today as a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group. 10 marks · 150 words