Contents01 India's Emerging Technology Ecosystem Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology / Department of Science & Technology — 12-Year Review GS 3GS 2 02 India Becomes World's Top Ship Recycling Nation in 2025 Ministry of Ports, Shipping & Waterways · UNCTAD Report GS 3GS 2 Article 01 Article 01 India's Emerging Technology Ecosystem Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology / Department of Science & Technology · 12-Year Review (2014–2026) Relevance: GS 3 (science & technology — AI, semiconductors, quantum tech, IT/digital infrastructure) · GS 2 (government policies and interventions for development). GS 3GS 2 Key Data at a Glance 42.36 lakh kmoptical fibre route coverage in 2025 (up from 19.35 lakh km in 2019) 102.86 crinternet connections in 2026 (up from 25.15 crore in 2014) ₹76,000 crSemicon India Programme outlay (Dec 2021) ₹6,003.65 crNational Quantum Mission outlay (April 2023) ₹10,300+ crIndiaAI Mission outlay (2024) 38thIndia's Global Innovation Index rank, 2025 (up from 81st in 2015) Issue in Brief India has moved from being viewed as a large digital consumer market to an emerging global technology power, over a 12-year period (2014–2026) of sustained mission-mode investment. Mission-mode programmes in Artificial Intelligence (AI), semiconductors, quantum technologies, supercomputing, cloud computing and cybersecurity are shaping a strong innovation ecosystem, feeding into the Viksit Bharat 2047 vision. The transformation rests on three pillars: expanding national capacity, strengthening technological capability, and building global credibility. Static Background Digital India Programme (launched 2015): laid the foundational digital infrastructure — optical fibre, broadband, 5G — underlying all subsequent mission-mode technology programmes. Anusandhan National Research Foundation (ANRF): operationalised in 2024 as India's apex body promoting collaboration among academia, industry, startups and government for high-impact research. NEST Division (New, Emerging and Strategic Technologies): set up in 2020 under the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA); handles foreign-policy and legal aspects of technologies such as 5G/6G, AI, biotech and semiconductors — i.e. technology diplomacy. Bharat 6G Alliance (B6GA): formed in 2023, an industry-led, government-facilitated initiative driving indigenous 6G research and development. Key Dimensions — Digital Backbone Optical fibre coverage rose from 19.35 lakh route km (2019) to 42.36 lakh route km (2025); 5G reached 99.9% of districts — among the world's fastest rollouts. Internet connections grew from 25.15 crore (2014) to 102.86 crore (2026); broadband connections rose from 6.1 crore (2014) to 99.56 crore (Dec 2025). Data cost fell sharply from ₹269 per GB (2014) to ₹8–10 per GB (Dec 2025), while average monthly data use rose from 61.66 MB to 24.01 GB — driving population-scale adoption of telemedicine, online education and digital payments. Key Dimensions — Frontier Technology Missions National Supercomputing Mission (NSM), 2015, ₹4,500 crore outlay: 38 supercomputers deployed with combined power of 47 petaflops; indigenous PARAM Rudra series built with Indian-designed hardware and software. Semicon India Programme (Dec 2021, ₹76,000 crore) and India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) 2.0 (Union Budget 2026–27, ₹1,000 crore initial outlay for FY27). As of June 2026, 12 projects worth ~₹1.64 lakh crore approved under ISM — one semiconductor fab, two compound semiconductor fabs, nine packaging units. National Quantum Mission, approved April 2023, ₹6,003.65 crore, across four pillars — Quantum Computing, Quantum Communication, Quantum Sensing & Metrology, Quantum Materials & Devices. Four Thematic Hubs, 152+ researchers across 43 organisations, and 17 startups (9 deep-tech) supported. India demonstrated a 1,000-km secure quantum communication network, six years ahead of schedule; Quantum Valley foundation laid at Amaravati, February 2026. IndiaAI Mission, approved 2024, outlay over ₹10,300 crore. As of March 2026: ~1.8 lakh startups (nearly 89% of new startups using AI); a common computing facility with over 38,000 GPUs being established; AI Kosh platform hosts 12,115 datasets and 306 AI models across 20 sectors. Key Dimensions — Cloud, Blockchain, Data Centres & Biotechnology MeghRaj (2014, by MeitY): India's national cloud platform, strengthened by MeghRaj 2.0 (hybrid cloud architecture, stronger cybersecurity). Adoption rose from 342 departments (2015–16) to 2,323 departments (June 2026), powering DigiLocker, MyGov and the National Scholarship Portal. National Blockchain Framework (NBF), MeitY, 2021, ₹64.76 crore outlay: platforms include the Vishvasya Blockchain Stack, NBFLite sandbox and Praamaanik app verification. As of October 2025, over 3 crore property documents verified via blockchain; RBI's Digital Rupee (e₹) pilots, TRAI's DLT-based spam control, and NSDL's blockchain audit trails are notable applications. Data centre capacity grew from ~375 MW (2020) to ~1,500 MW (2025), with hubs in Mumbai, Hyderabad, Bengaluru, Noida and Jamnagar. National Biopharma Mission (2017, ₹1,500 crore) and the BioE3 Policy (2023) anchor biotechnology growth. The sector crossed USD 150 billion (2023) — two years ahead of the National Biotech Development Strategy 2021 target — and reached USD 190 billion (June 2026); 94 bioincubators established across 25 States/UTs by DBT-BIRAC. Key Dimensions — Human Capital & Skilling Research Development and Innovation (RDI) Scheme (July 2025): ₹1 lakh crore corpus under ANRF, implemented by DST, for long-term affordable financing of private-sector research. FutureSkills PRIME (2018, MeitY–NASSCOM): 27.53 lakh registered candidates, 17.14 lakh trained (March 2026); ~80% of learners from Tier-2/3 cities. NIELIT: 56 centres, 750 affiliated institutes, 9,000+ facilitation centres; became a Deemed-to-be University in July 2024; established IndiaAI Data Labs across 27 centres. Four AI Centres of Excellence (₹1,490 crore total) at IIT Madras (Education), IISc Bengaluru (Healthcare), IIT Kanpur (Sustainable Cities) and IIT Ropar (Agriculture). Chips to Start-up (C2S) Programme (MeitY, 2022, ₹250 crore over 5 years): targets 85,000 industry-ready semiconductor professionals; ChipIN Centre at SCL, Mohali conducted six shared wafer runs enabling 122 chip-design submissions from 46 institutions. Key Dimensions — Global Credibility Global Innovation Index rank improved from 81st (2015) to 38th (2025). Global Capability Centres (GCCs): India hosts over 2,100 GCCs across 3,728 units, employing ~2.36 million professionals; nearly half established since 2021 are AI-focused from inception. India AI Impact Summit 2026: declaration adopted by 92 countries/organisations; catalysed over USD 200 billion in AI-related investment commitments. India Stack / DPI diplomacy: agreements signed with 23 countries; UPI operational in Singapore, UAE, France, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Critical Analysis — Strengths Mission-mode architecture (NSM, NQM, IndiaAI, Semicon India) provides dedicated outlays, governance boards and measurable deliverables, rather than diffuse policy intent. Affordability-led scale — the collapse in data costs and rise in broadband penetration — created the demand base that made AI, cloud and blockchain adoption viable at population scale. DPI diplomacy (UPI abroad, DPI cooperation agreements) gives India distinctive soft-power leverage in technology governance beyond pure hardware capability. Critical Analysis — Structural Questions Several figures (GCC counts, GII rank context, DPI agreements) originate from a single government retrospective; independent triangulation against WIPO, UNCTAD or RBI data would strengthen verification. Large headline outlays (₹76,000 cr Semicon, ₹1 lakh cr RDI) are approved/budgeted figures; actual disbursement and project-completion rates are not detailed in this review. The cited 70–80% indigenisation in semiconductors is largely at the assembly/packaging level; India does not yet have an operational leading-edge fab, so frontier chip fabrication remains import-dependent. Researcher and startup density under the National Quantum Mission (152 researchers, 17 startups) remains modest relative to the mission's stated ambition of global leadership in quantum technology. Way Forward Commission independent audits (CAG/NITI Aayog) of mission-mode outlay utilisation against stated targets, especially for Semicon India and ISM 2.0. Prioritise commissioning of a leading-edge fabrication facility over packaging/testing capacity to close the indigenisation gap meaningfully. Sustain, rather than one-time, funding for quantum and AI talent to build researcher and startup density comparable to global competitors. Deepen state-level execution capacity so DPI and skilling gains reach Tier-2/3 India uniformly, not only metro hubs. Prelims Pointers Digital India: launched 2015; backbone of India's digital transformation. National Supercomputing Mission: 2015, ₹4,500 cr; indigenous PARAM Rudra series. Semicon India / ISM 2.0: Dec 2021, ₹76,000 cr; ISM 2.0 announced Budget 2026–27. National Quantum Mission: April 2023, ₹6,003.65 cr; four pillars — Computing, Communication, Sensing & Metrology, Materials & Devices. IndiaAI Mission: 2024, ₹10,300+ cr; AI Kosh hosts datasets and models. MeghRaj: India's national cloud platform, MeitY, 2014. National Blockchain Framework: MeitY, 2021, ₹64.76 cr. ANRF: operationalised 2024; programmes — MAHA, PAIR, ATRI. RDI Scheme: July 2025, ₹1 lakh crore corpus, under ANRF/DST. NEST Division: 2020, under MEA — technology diplomacy. Bharat 6G Alliance: formed 2023. Global Innovation Index: India 38th (2025), up from 81st (2015); published by WIPO. Practice Mains Question “India's transition from a 'technology consumer' to a 'technology creator' rests on mission-mode governance in frontier sectors.” Critically examine this claim with reference to India's semiconductor, quantum, and AI missions. GS Paper 3 · 250 words · 15 marks Practice MCQs Q1. Consider the following statements regarding the National Quantum Mission: (1) It was approved by the Union Cabinet in 2023 with an outlay of ₹6,003.65 crore. (2) It focuses on four areas — Computing, Communication, Sensing & Metrology, and Materials & Devices. (3) India achieved a 1,000-km secure quantum communication network ahead of schedule. Which of the above are correct? A) 1 and 2 onlyB) 2 and 3 onlyC) 1 and 3 onlyD) 1, 2 and 3 Q2. Match List I (Mission) with List II (Outlay/Year): A. National Supercomputing Mission · B. India Semiconductor Mission (Semicon India) · C. National Blockchain Framework // 1. MeitY, ₹64.76 cr · 2. 2015, ₹4,500 cr · 3. Dec 2021, ₹76,000 cr. Choose the correct match: A) A-2, B-3, C-1B) A-1, B-2, C-3C) A-3, B-1, C-2D) A-2, B-1, C-3 Q3. The “Global Innovation Index”, in which India's rank improved from 81st (2015) to 38th (2025), is published by: A) World Economic ForumB) World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)C) UNCTADD) World Bank Article 02 Article 02 India Becomes World's Top Ship Recycling Nation in 2025 Ministry of Ports, Shipping & Waterways (MoPSW) · UNCTAD Report · 22 June 2026 Relevance: GS 3 (infrastructure — ports and shipping; environment — circular economy and sustainable recycling) · GS 2 (government policies and interventions). GS 3GS 2 Key Data at a Glance 35.4%India's share of global ship recycling in 2025 (up from 30.1% in 2024) 2.99 mn GTships recycled in India in 2025 (up ~60% from 1.86 million GT in 2024) 115ship recycling facilities made HKC-compliant ₹53.5 crfinancial assistance for yard modernisation 40%scrap value as credit note under the Ship-breaking Credit Note Scheme ~9 mn LDTtarget capacity after planned Alang yard expansion (nearly double current) Issue in Brief India's share of global ship recycling rose to 35.4% in 2025 (from 30.1% in 2024), per the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), making it the world's No. 1 ship recycling nation. This achieves the Maritime India Vision (MIV) 2030 target of global leadership in ship recycling five years ahead of schedule. Static Background Ship recycling (ship-breaking): dismantling end-of-life vessels to recover steel and materials — historically concentrated in South Asia (India, Bangladesh, Pakistan) using tidal “beaching” methods, which have long raised environmental and labour-safety concerns. Hong Kong International Convention (HKC) for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships: an International Maritime Organization (IMO) treaty setting global ship-recycling standards; India ratified it in 2019. Recycling of Ships Act, 2019: India's domestic law aligning its ship recycling ecosystem with HKC standards. Alang (Gujarat): the world's largest ship-breaking yard, the backbone of India's ship recycling capacity. Maritime India Vision (MIV) 2030: the Government of India's roadmap for transforming India into a global maritime hub through infrastructure development, sustainability and reforms. Key Dimensions — Scale & Compliance India recycled 2.99 million GT (gross tons) in 2025, up ~60% from 1.86 million GT in 2024. 115 ship recycling facilities have become HKC-compliant, backed by ₹53.5 crore in government financial assistance for yard modernisation. Key Dimensions — Policy Levers Ship-breaking Credit Note Scheme: ship owners receive a credit note equivalent to 40% of the scrap value of a recycled ship, usable for up to 5% of the cost of a new vessel built at an Indian shipyard — linking recycling incentives to domestic shipbuilding demand. Regular stakeholder engagement with the Gujarat Maritime Board, the Ship Recycling Industries Association, global shipping companies, cash buyers and classification societies. India is pursuing inclusion in the European Union Ship Recycling Regulation (EUSRR) approved list of recycling facilities — a key market-access lever for high-value European-flagged vessels. Key Dimensions — Capacity Expansion & Outlook India aims to nearly double its ship recycling capacity to about 9 million LDT (Light Displacement Tons) through the planned expansion of the Alang Ship Recycling Yard; the Gujarat government has prepared a comprehensive master plan. According to the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), more than 16,000 vessels are expected to be recycled globally over the next decade; with its 35.4% market share, India is positioned to recycle 500–600 vessels annually. Critical Analysis — Strengths Demonstrates a rare case where environmental compliance (HKC) and economic competitiveness reinforce each other — compliance investment correlates with a market-share gain, not a trade-off. The Ship-breaking Credit Note Scheme is a structurally smart instrument: it converts a recycling subsidy into a shipbuilding demand-side incentive, addressing two sectors with one policy lever. Achieving a 2030 target in 2025 reflects genuine policy-execution alignment rather than purely favourable global conditions. Critical Analysis — Structural Questions The 35.4% global share reflects volume leadership; it does not, by itself, confirm labour-safety and environmental outcomes at the yard level — Alang's beaching-method yards have historically drawn scrutiny from international labour and environmental observers, which would need independent verification beyond this release. EUSRR inclusion remains pending — India's largest market-access gap is access to EU-flagged ships, not technical capability; this is a work-in-progress, not yet achieved. The 60% single-year jump partly reflects a low 2024 base and cyclical global ship-scrapping demand linked to fleet age and freight rates; the sustainability of the 35.4% share over the coming decade is not guaranteed by a single year's data. Way Forward Pursue EUSRR (EU-approved list) inclusion vigorously to capture higher-value European-flagged recycling contracts. Strengthen third-party labour-safety and environmental audits of Alang and other yards to pre-empt international scrutiny. Track actual uptake of the Credit Note Scheme in domestic shipbuilding orders, not just recycling volume, to validate the linked-incentive design. Fast-track the Alang capacity expansion (towards 9 million LDT) with environmental safeguards built in from the design stage. Prelims Pointers UNCTAD: source of the 35.4% global ship recycling share data for India (2025). Hong Kong International Convention: IMO treaty for safe/sound ship recycling; India ratified in 2019. Recycling of Ships Act, 2019: India's domestic law aligning with HKC. Alang: located in Gujarat; world's largest ship recycling/breaking yard. Maritime India Vision (MIV) 2030: India's maritime roadmap; ship recycling leadership achieved 5 years early. BIMCO: Baltic and International Maritime Council — source of the 16,000-vessel decade projection. Ship-breaking Credit Note Scheme: 40% of scrap value as credit, usable for up to 5% of a new Indian-built vessel's cost. EUSRR: European Union Ship Recycling Regulation — India seeking inclusion in its approved facilities list. Practice Mains Question India's emergence as the world's top ship recycling nation in 2025 illustrates how regulatory compliance can become a competitive advantage rather than a constraint. Discuss with reference to the Hong Kong Convention and India's Maritime India Vision 2030. GS Paper 3 · 250 words · 15 marks Practice MCQs Q1. Consider the following statements: (1) India's share of global ship recycling rose to 35.4% in 2025, as per a UNCTAD report. (2) The Hong Kong International Convention sets global standards for safe and environmentally sound ship recycling. (3) India is yet to ratify the Hong Kong Convention. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? A) 1 and 2 onlyB) 2 and 3 onlyC) 1 onlyD) 1, 2 and 3 Q2. (Assertion–Reasoning) Assertion (A): The Ship-breaking Credit Note Scheme is expected to boost both ship recycling and domestic shipbuilding. Reason (R): The credit note received from recycling a ship can be used toward payment for a portion of the cost of a new vessel built at an Indian shipyard. A) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of AB) Both A and R are true, but R is NOT the correct explanation of AC) A is true, R is falseD) A is false, R is true Q3. “Alang Ship Recycling Yard”, in the news for capacity expansion plans, is located in: A) MaharashtraB) GujaratC) KeralaD) Tamil Nadu

Contents01 The Challenge of India’s Digital Sovereignty Manish Verma & Sthanu R. Nair, IIM Kozhikode · The Hindu · Digital infrastructure, national security, strategic autonomy GS 2 — Governance & IRGS 3 — Science & SecurityEssay 02 ESA for Western Ghats: Why Conservation is Key Nikhil Ghanekar · The Indian Express · Environment, biodiversity, Centre-State federalism GS 3 — EnvironmentGS 2 — Federalism Editorial 01 of 02 Article 01 The Challenge of India’s Digital Sovereignty Manish Verma & Sthanu R. Nair — IIM Kozhikode · The Hindu Relevance: GS 2 (governance, international relations, security architecture), GS 3 (science & technology, internal security, economy) and Essay (sovereignty in a digital age, strategic autonomy) — examined through recent incidents of foreign-controlled digital infrastructure affecting Indian entities. GS 2 — Governance & IRGS 3 — Science & SecurityEssay — Strategic Autonomy 1 — Issue in Brief Two recent incidents have exposed India’s dependence on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure: the April 2026 discovery that Chinese CCTV software (EseeCloud) was used by an ISI-linked espionage network to transmit live feeds of troop movements near sensitive defence sites to Pakistan via China-based servers; and the July 2025 Microsoft suspension of Nayara Energy’s access to Outlook, Teams, and cloud-stored data, triggered by Microsoft’s compliance with EU sanctions on a firm ~49% owned by Russia’s Rosneft. Both episodes reveal that authentication systems, productivity suites, and cloud platforms used by Indian government and businesses are owned and operated by foreign entities — meaning effective control shifts to overseas corporations and foreign governments, even when data is physically stored within India. The core argument: digital sovereignty — the ability to control one’s own critical digital infrastructure — is now central to national security, economic continuity, and strategic autonomy, not a peripheral technical concern. The piece situates India’s predicament within Power Transition Theory, arguing that as a rising power approaches parity with an established hegemon, the hegemon acts to constrain it — making India’s quest for tech sovereignty structurally harder than that of other nations. 2 — Static Background EseeCloud espionage case (April 2026): Nine Chinese-made, solar-powered, SIM-enabled CCTV cameras linked to EseeCloud (developed by Guangzhou Juan Intelligent Tech) were found transmitting footage from sensitive border locations (Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, J&K) to China-based servers, relayed to ISI handlers; Delhi Police’s Special Cell busted the module (linked to ISI and Babbar Khalsa International), arresting six people. India’s Ministry of Home Affairs subsequently ordered a nationwide CCTV audit and banned non-certified cameras under an STQC chipset-level certification regime. Nayara Energy case (July 2025): Following the EU’s 18th sanctions package against Russia (18 July 2025), Microsoft suspended Nayara’s access to Outlook, Teams and cloud services without prior notice. Nayara filed for an interim injunction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in the Delhi High Court; Microsoft restored access just before the hearing (30 July 2025), and the case was disposed of. China’s National Intelligence Law (2017) legally obligates Chinese firms and citizens to assist state intelligence work, even when operating abroad — the legal backbone of concerns over Chinese-origin hardware and software. 1999 Kargil conflict: the US’s denial of precision GPS access to India during the conflict is the textbook example of foreign-controlled technology constraining India’s military options — and the proximate trigger for India developing its own satellite navigation system, NavIC. India’s R&D spending averaged ~0.74% of GDP between 2000–2020 (author-cited), against considerably higher levels in major economies — a persistent structural gap also flagged in government R&D statistics, which place India’s GERD around 0.6–0.7% of GDP in recent years. 3 — Key Dimensions Software-defined warfare: Modern defence platforms (fighter aircraft, missile systems, radar) are controlled by embedded code answerable to foreign manufacturers/governments, who could in principle degrade performance or redirect intelligence through software configuration changes during a conflict — a far more insidious vulnerability than denial of hardware. Comparative global response: France plans to migrate government departments off Microsoft Teams/Zoom to a sovereign platform by 2027; Netherlands, Denmark, German states are exploring alternatives to Microsoft Office, Outlook and Teams; the EU is building independent cloud infrastructure; Türkiye is reducing foreign-tech reliance — showing this is a global, not India-specific, anxiety. India’s distinctive vulnerability: Per Power Transition Theory, a rising power nearing parity with a hegemon faces active containment — paralleling the ongoing US–China rivalry — making India’s bid for tech sovereignty more contested than that of smaller, non-rival states. Domestic success models exist: UPI and RuPay demonstrate India can build sovereign alternatives to foreign-controlled payment rails at scale — a template the author argues should extend to cloud infrastructure, e-commerce, authentication systems, and defence technologies. Defence production model gap: India’s reliance on public-sector defence manufacturing has not delivered (the indigenous fighter aircraft programme begun in the 1980s still lacks a fully realised platform), unlike the US model of private-sector-led development backed by government R&D funding and assured procurement. Cooperative sovereignty model: Partnering with other states (e.g., the India–Russia BrahMos missile programme) builds capability while creating mutual dependence, reducing the risk of unilateral foreign action — contrasted with China’s more isolationist, indigenous-only approach. Recent steps in this direction: Micron Technology’s semiconductor ATMP facility at Sanand, Gujarat (India–US cooperation) commenced commercial production; India formally joined the US-led Pax Silica initiative on 20 February 2026 at the AI Impact Summit in New Delhi, aimed at securing semiconductor, AI and critical-mineral supply chains; government email migration for some central ministries to the homegrown Zoho platform. 4 — Critical Analysis In favour — Demonstrated proof of concept: UPI and RuPay’s success shows sovereign digital infrastructure is achievable at population scale without sacrificing efficiency or innovation — de-risking the broader sovereignty agenda from being dismissed as protectionist or impractical. In favour — Cooperative development balances autonomy and isolation risk: Joint programmes (BrahMos) and trusted-partner coalitions (Pax Silica, Micron–Sanand) let India build capability without the diplomatic and economic costs of full self-reliance, avoiding the isolation that China’s indigenous-only path risks. In favour — Decisive institutional response once triggered: The CCTV STQC certification regime and the rapid market shift to Indian camera brands crossing 80% market share show that swift regulatory action can meaningfully correct sovereignty gaps once political will exists. In favour — Strategic logic is historically validated: The Kargil GPS-denial episode directly produced NavIC — concrete evidence that a recognised vulnerability can be converted into durable indigenous capability. Against — Reactive, not anticipatory, policy pattern: India recognised CCTV-hardware risks as early as 2021 (Parliament was told of roughly a million Chinese-sourced cameras in government institutions) but acted only after the 2026 espionage scandal — a wait-for-disaster-then-scramble pattern that undermines genuine pre-emptive sovereignty. Against — Hardware-only fixes leave deeper layers exposed: Even after the camera-import ban, Network Video Recorders were excluded from certification, cloud platforms such as EseeCloud continue to operate in India, and firmware already deployed in existing devices cannot be retroactively audited — leaving the structural vulnerability only partly addressed. Against — R&D deficit undermines the strategy: At roughly 0.74% of GDP, India’s R&D spending lags major economies substantially; without closing this gap, indigenous alternatives to foreign platforms in AI, semiconductors and cloud computing cannot be sustained at the pace global competition demands. Against — Defence self-reliance has structurally underperformed: Decades of public-sector-led defence production have not yielded a modern indigenous fighter aircraft, exposing a gap between sovereignty rhetoric and delivered capability, though private-sector participation in programmes like the AMCA is now beginning to widen this base. 5 — Way Forward Extend certification regimes beyond cameras to NVRs, cloud management platforms, and drones, and develop mechanisms to audit or phase out already-deployed vulnerable firmware rather than relying solely on import bans for new purchases. Scale the UPI/RuPay model to cloud infrastructure, digital identity, and e-commerce platforms, using the proven sovereign-payments template to reduce single-vendor foreign dependency across other critical digital layers. Reform defence production toward the private-sector-led US model — expanding competitive private participation (building on the AMCA precedent) backed by assured government procurement and dedicated R&D funding. Pursue cooperative-sovereignty partnerships strategically — deepening joint-development arrangements (BrahMos-style) and trusted-coalition memberships (Pax Silica, India–US semiconductor cooperation) to build capability while avoiding diplomatic isolation. Substantially raise R&D spending toward levels comparable to global technology leaders, recognising that the real question, per the author, is not whether India can afford comprehensive technological sovereignty, but whether it can afford to forgo it. Shift from reactive to anticipatory technology-risk governance by institutionalising continuous, forward-looking security audits of emerging technology categories such as AI systems, IoT devices, and drones. 6 — Data & Key Facts Apr 2026EseeCloud-linked ISI espionage network busted by Delhi Police; 9 cameras, 6 arrests 18 Jul 2025EU’s 18th Russia sanctions package, which triggered Microsoft’s Nayara Energy suspension ~49%Rosneft’s (Russia) stake in Nayara Energy — the basis for its EU sanctions exposure 1999Kargil conflict; US GPS-access denial spurred India’s NavIC programme ~0.74%India’s average gross R&D expenditure as % of GDP, 2000–2020 (author-cited) 20 Feb 2026India formally joined the US-led Pax Silica initiative at the AI Impact Summit, New Delhi Section 9, Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996: the legal provision under which Nayara Energy sought interim injunctive relief in the Delhi High Court against Microsoft’s suspension of services. STQC certification (2026): India’s chipset-level CCTV security testing regime, introduced after the EseeCloud episode; Indian brands (CP Plus, Sparsh, Matrix, Qubo) now hold over 80% of the domestic camera market. 7 — Prelims Pointers NavIC — India’s indigenous satellite navigation system, developed after the 1999 Kargil GPS-denial episode National Intelligence Law (China, 2017) — obligates Chinese organisations and citizens to assist state intelligence work, including abroad STQC — Standardisation Testing and Quality Certification; basis of India’s 2026 chipset-level CCTV security certification Pax Silica — US-led initiative (launched Dec 2025) on semiconductor, AI and critical-mineral supply-chain security; India joined Feb 2026 BrahMos — India–Russia jointly developed supersonic cruise missile programme, a model of cooperative-sovereignty technology development AMCA — Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft; India’s next-generation fighter programme, now opening to private-sector competitive participation Exam note: Do not confuse the two trigger incidents — the EseeCloud CCTV breach involved Chinese software and an ISI-linked network; the Nayara Energy episode involved a US company (Microsoft) enforcing EU sanctions, with no Indian or US legal compulsion to do so. 8 — Practice Mains Question "Digital sovereignty is no longer a technical question but a matter of national security and strategic autonomy." Discuss with reference to recent incidents of foreign-controlled digital infrastructure affecting Indian entities, and suggest a roadmap for India to reduce such vulnerabilities.GS 2 + GS 3 crossover · 15 marks · ~250 words · Governance + Security + Strategic Autonomy Intro: Frame digital infrastructure as the substrate of modern commerce, governance, and defence; introduce the EseeCloud and Nayara episodes as evidence of foreign-control risk. Body 1 — Nature of the vulnerability: Software-defined critical systems, foreign jurisdiction over cloud and data, and the asymmetry exposed by both incidents. Body 2 — India’s response and structural challenges: UPI/RuPay as proof of concept; defence self-reliance shortfalls; the R&D deficit; Power Transition Theory context. Conclusion: A multipronged strategy — indigenous capability, cooperative partnerships, private-sector defence participation, and sustained R&D investment — is essential to convert recognised vulnerability into durable sovereignty. 9 — Practice MCQ With reference to recent developments concerning India’s digital and technological sovereignty, consider the following statements: 1. The EseeCloud CCTV espionage case (2026) involved Chinese-origin surveillance software transmitting footage to servers in China. 2. Microsoft’s suspension of services to Nayara Energy in 2025 was a direct legal requirement under Indian law. 3. India formally joined the US-led Pax Silica initiative in February 2026. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only(b) 1 and 3 only(c) 2 and 3 only(d) 1, 2 and 3 Editorial 02 of 02 Article 02 ESA for Western Ghats: Why Conservation is Key Nikhil Ghanekar · The Indian Express Relevance: GS 3 (environment and biodiversity conservation, ecologically sensitive areas) and GS 2 (Centre-State federalism in environmental governance) — examined through the decade-long delay in finalising the Western Ghats ESA notification. GS 3 — Environment & BiodiversityGS 2 — Federalism The extent of demarcation: Western Ghats region and proposed Ecologically Sensitive Areas across the six states 1 — Issue in Brief The Western Ghats, a 1,500-km mountain chain across six states and one of India’s richest biodiversity hotspots, has lacked a finalised Ecologically Sensitive Area (ESA) notification for over a decade despite repeated expert panel recommendations. The Kasturirangan panel (2013) identified 56,825 sq km (~37% of the Western Ghats) as ESA — a dilution of the more expansive Gadgil Committee (2011) recommendation, which had proposed the entire 1,29,037 sq km for special protection. Six draft notifications have been issued since 2014 without finalisation, due to persistent Centre-State disagreement over the extent and content of demarcation. The report frames continuing unregulated mining, quarrying, encroachment, and unsustainable land use as drivers of ecological degradation and increasingly frequent extreme-weather disasters in the region. 2 — Static Background Gadgil Committee (Western Ghats Ecology Expert Panel, 2010–11): headed by Madhav Gadgil; classified roughly 60% of the Western Ghats as ESA under a graded, three-tier zonation, which faced strong opposition from states as overly restrictive. Kasturirangan High-Level Working Group (2012–13): constituted after the Gadgil report’s recommendations drew criticism; adopted a cultural landscape versus natural landscape approach, classifying only the natural landscape (~37%) as ESA and leaving human-settled "cultural landscape" areas outside restrictions. First draft notification: issued 31 July 2014; subsequent draft notifications lapse periodically without final notification — six iterations issued since 2014, with the latest issued 31 July 2024 and its validity extended to 31 July 2026. States affected: Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu — with Karnataka allotted the largest ESA share and Maharashtra the second-largest. Expert Committee (2022): headed by former Director General of Forests Sanjay Kumar, tasked with reconciling state objections through field visits, revenue data, and satellite imagery. 3 — Key Dimensions Demarcation dispute: Karnataka has formally rejected the Kasturirangan panel’s recommendations and sought a reduction; Kerala has sought to exclude villages in Idukki and Wayanad from its allotted share; Maharashtra has sought exclusion of 378 of the 2,515 affected villages. The conservation case: the Ghats are home to nearly 2,000 plant species, 84 fish species, 87 amphibian species, 89 reptile species, 15 bird species and 12 mammal species, many found nowhere else — making the region one of the world’s most significant biodiversity hotspots. Federal financing ask: the six states have sought Centre-funded grant-in-aid for restoration and have called for a financial mechanism for ecosystem services drawn from regions both within and outside the proposed ESA. Cost of continued delay: ongoing mining, quarrying, plantation and horticulture activity, and dense settlement within ecologically fragile zones are linked by the report to recurring landslides and flooding across the region, particularly in Kerala. Two-tier classification approach: the Kasturirangan framework splits the Ghats into "cultural landscape" (human-dominated, agriculture, settlements) and "natural landscape" (high biodiversity, low population density, the proposed ESA) — the key innovation distinguishing it from the Gadgil Committee’s blanket approach. 4 — Critical Analysis In favour — Scientifically grounded targeting: the cultural-versus-natural landscape distinction concentrates conservation effort where biodiversity value is highest, rather than blanket-restricting the entire 1,500 km Western Ghats, addressing the core objection that drove rejection of the Gadgil report. In favour — Partial reconciliation progress: talks have nearly converged for Goa, Maharashtra, and Gujarat, showing the expert-committee mechanism of field visits, revenue data, and satellite imagery can produce negotiated outcomes acceptable to at least some states. In favour — Recognises livelihoods alongside ecology: excluding settled and agricultural "cultural landscape" from restrictions attempts to balance conservation against the lived economic realities of lakhs of residents, addressing earlier criticism that ESA proposals ignored ground realities. Against — Twelve-plus years of non-finalisation: six successive draft notifications without a final notification represent a serious governance failure, exposing the region to unregulated activity during the interim while biodiversity and disaster-risk costs accumulate. Against — States progressively dilute protection: Karnataka’s outright rejection and Kerala’s and Maharashtra’s repeated requests to exclude villages suggest a pattern where political and economic pressure shrinks the protected footprint each cycle, regardless of underlying ecological assessment. Against — Satellite-based demarcation seen as disconnected from ground reality: classifying land as sensitive based primarily on aerial or satellite surveys, without adequate ground verification, risks both inclusion and exclusion errors that fuel local resentment and litigation. Against — No firm enforcement timeline: repeated lapses and re-notifications, most recently extended to July 2026, suggest the process lacks a credible mechanism to compel timely finalisation, leaving conservation outcomes hostage to indefinite Centre-State negotiation. 5 — Way Forward Set a binding finalisation deadline with clear consequences for further delay, to end the cycle of draft notifications lapsing and being reissued without resolution. Strengthen ground-truthing methodology, combining satellite imagery with village-level field verification, as the Sanjay Kumar committee has partly attempted, to reduce both ecological under-protection and unjust livelihood disruption. Institutionalise a dedicated Centre-State financing mechanism for ESA regions — potentially a payment-for-ecosystem-services framework — addressing states’ demand for grant-in-aid while linking funds to verified conservation outcomes. Integrate disaster-risk data into demarcation criteria, explicitly factoring landslide and flood history into which areas receive the strictest protections, rather than relying solely on biodiversity classification. Build a permanent, empowered monitoring body to track post-notification compliance, rather than treating the exercise as concluded once a final notification is issued. 6 — Data & Key Facts 1,500 kmLength of the Western Ghats, from Gujarat to Tamil Nadu 1.29 lakh sq kmTotal Western Ghats area; full extent recommended as ESA by the Gadgil Committee (2011) 56,825 sq kmArea (~37%) recommended as ESA by the Kasturirangan panel (2013) — basis for current drafts 6Draft ESA notifications issued since 2014, none yet finalised 31 Jul 2026Extended validity of the latest (31 Jul 2024) draft notification ~2,000Plant species found in the Western Ghats, alongside rich faunal diversity Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: the statutory basis under which Ecologically Sensitive Areas are declared, empowering restrictions on mining, red-category industries, and large construction in notified zones. Sanjay Kumar Committee (2022): expert panel formed to reconcile state objections to the Kasturirangan-based draft notification through field visits, revenue records, and satellite-based assessment. 7 — Prelims Pointers Western Ghats — partially a UNESCO World Heritage Site; spans Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu; source of the Godavari, Krishna and Cauvery rivers Gadgil Committee — Western Ghats Ecology Expert Panel (2010); chaired by Madhav Gadgil; recommended ~60% of the Ghats as ESA across a three-tier zonation Kasturirangan panel — High-Level Working Group (2012–13); chaired by K. Kasturirangan; recommended ~37% (56,825 sq km) as ESA using the cultural-versus-natural landscape distinction ESA — Ecologically Sensitive Area, declared under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 Biodiversity hotspot — a region with exceptional levels of plant endemism and serious habitat loss; the Western Ghats is one of the world’s recognised hotspots Sanjay Kumar Committee — 2022 expert panel reconciling state objections to the Western Ghats ESA draft notification Exam note: Do not reverse the Gadgil-Kasturirangan comparison — Gadgil recommended a larger ESA (~60% of the Ghats); Kasturirangan’s recommendation (~37%) was a dilution, not an expansion, of that proposal. 8 — Practice Mains Question "The repeated postponement of the Western Ghats Ecologically Sensitive Area notification reflects the broader tension between ecological conservation and federal political economy in India." Discuss, with reference to the Gadgil and Kasturirangan Committee recommendations.GS 3 · 15 marks · ~250 words · Environment + Federalism Intro: note the Western Ghats’ biodiversity significance and the decade-plus delay in finalising the ESA notification. Body 1 — The conservation case: biodiversity hotspot status, disaster-risk linkage, and the Gadgil-to-Kasturirangan dilution as a scientific compromise. Body 2 — The federal political economy: state-by-state resistance (Karnataka’s rejection, Kerala’s and Maharashtra’s exclusion demands), financing disputes, and the governance failure of six lapsed draft notifications. Conclusion: a binding timeline, better ground-truthing, and a Centre-State financing mechanism are needed to convert recurring negotiation into durable protection. 9 — Practice MCQ With reference to the demarcation of Ecologically Sensitive Areas (ESA) in the Western Ghats, consider the following statements: 1. The Kasturirangan panel recommended a larger ESA area than the Gadgil Committee. 2. The Kasturirangan panel’s recommendations are based on a distinction between "cultural landscape" and "natural landscape." 3. Karnataka has the largest allotted ESA share among the six Western Ghats states under the current draft notification. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only(b) 2 and 3 only(c) 1 and 3 only(d) 1, 2 and 3

Contents 22 & 23 June 2026 Building Viksit Bharat from Ground Up: 12 Years of Panchayat ReformsGS2 Biochar: Turning India's Farm Smoke into ‘Black Gold’GS3 Mombasa Declaration on Fisheries TransparencyGS2 Exercise Khaan Quest 2026GS2 Kheer Bhawani Mela: Faith, Spring and Sacred Memory in KashmirGS1 No One Should Own the Law: Public Access to Government StandardsGS2 ASI Transfers Rakhigarhi Skeletons to AnSI for Scientific StudyGS1 CAG Report: States Spent ₹1.9 Lakh Crore on Power SubsidiesGS3 Built in India, Served in India: Sarvam AI's Sovereign AI PushGS3 Article 01 Building Viksit Bharat from Ground Up: 12 Years of Panchayat Reforms and Innovation GS Paper 2 — Local Government | 73rd Constitutional Amendment | Decentralization | Government Schemes Why in News The Ministry of Panchayati Raj, headed by Union Minister Shri Rajiv Ranjan Singh (Lalan Singh), has released a review of the last twelve years of rural governance, highlighting progress in empowering Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) through fiscal devolution, digital transformation, and grassroots capacity building, in line with the vision of Viksit Bharat. Approximately 3.18 crore property cards have been issued under the SVAMITVA Scheme, over 4.10 crore elected representatives have been trained, and Rural Local Body grants have seen an 84% jump under the 16th Finance Commission recommendations compared to the 15th. Constitutional and Conceptual Basics The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 Inserted Part IX (Articles 243 to 243O) and the Eleventh Schedule (29 subjects) into the Constitution, giving Panchayats constitutional status as the third tier of government. Article 243(d) defines “Panchayat”; Article 243(b) defines “Gram Sabha” — the body of all persons registered as electors in a village, distinct from the elected Gram Panchayat. Article 243D mandates reservation of seats for SC/ST in proportion to population, and not less than one-third of seats (including chairperson posts) for women at all three tiers. Article 243E mandates that elections to Panchayats be conducted regularly, every five years. Article 243I mandates the constitution of a State Finance Commission (SFC) every five years to recommend the distribution of funds between the State and Panchayats. Article 243K provides for an independent State Election Commission (SEC) for superintendence and conduct of Panchayat elections, distinct from the Election Commission of India. Panchayat is a State subject under the State List of the Seventh Schedule; States enact their own Panchayati Raj Acts within the constitutional framework. Historical Background The Balwant Rai Mehta Committee (1957) first recommended a three-tier Panchayati Raj structure — Gram Panchayat, Panchayat Samiti, and Zila Parishad. The Ashok Mehta Committee (1978) recommended a two-tier structure instead, though this was not widely adopted. The L.M. Singhvi Committee (1986) recommended granting constitutional status to PRIs, which directly paved the way for the 73rd Amendment. Focus on Capacity Building and Digitalization Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan (RGSA) Introduced in 2018-19 and revamped from 2022-23, RGSA has trained 4.10 crore Panchayat elected representatives and functionaries across more than 2.70 lakh PRIs at all three tiers. More than 33.55 lakh women elected representatives were trained from FY 2022-23 to FY 2025-26 alone. Over 25,100 Gram Panchayat buildings and over 61,000 computers have been provided under RGSA, strengthening both physical and digital infrastructure. Planning and Digital Platforms Gram Panchayat Development Plans (GPDPs) have been institutionalized as the primary instrument of participatory village planning, prepared across more than 2.55 lakh Gram Panchayats, digitally integrated via the e-GramSwaraj platform. SVAMITVA Scheme (launched 2020): drone-based survey of inhabited rural areas; ~3.18 crore property ownership cards distributed across 1.92 lakh villages (as on 10 June 2026), improving access to institutional credit and reducing property disputes. e-Panchayat ecosystem: over 2.59 lakh Panchayats onboarded; integration with the Public Financial Management System (PFMS) enables real-time financial monitoring — over ₹3.16 lakh crore in online transactions processed as on 10 June 2026. Meri Panchayat App — citizen-facing app for accessing Panchayat development information; over 1 crore downloads. Strengthening Local Finances Finance Commission Award Period Grants to Rural Local Bodies 15th FC 2020–26 ₹2.82 lakh crore (94.98% of total allocation — highest-ever release percentage) 16th FC 2026–31 ₹4,35,236 crore recommended (+84% over 15th FC) SAMARTH Panchayat Portal and the Atmanirbhar Panchayat Program have been launched to strengthen Own Source Revenue (OSR) mobilization, providing digital tools for revenue assessment, demand generation, and collection. AI Transforming Rural Governance Panchayat Advancement Index (PAI) introduced in April 2025 — assesses Panchayat performance against the nine themes of Localised Sustainable Development Goals (LSDGs); covers over 2.59 lakh Gram Panchayats; won the gold prize at National Awards for e-Governance (NAeG) 2026. SabhaSaar — AI-enabled platform launched August 2025 for automatic generation of Gram Sabha Minutes of Meetings in 23 Indian languages; used by more than 1.35 lakh Panchayats, generating over three lakh Minutes of Meetings. Gram Panchayat-level weather forecasting — launched October 2024 in collaboration with the India Meteorological Department and Ministry of Earth Sciences; India’s first such initiative at the GP level. Gram Manchitra and GPSDP — GIS-based spatial governance tools; enhanced GPSDPs align local infrastructure with the “One Nation One Map” framework. Empowerment of Tribals, Women and Youth PESA Implementation The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), rooted in the Bhuria Committee (1995) recommendations, empowers traditional Gram Sabhas in Fifth Schedule Areas. Seven specialized training manuals translated into tribal languages; a dedicated PESA-GPDP Portal; a Centre of Excellence for PESA; and India’s first PESA Ranking Framework, fostering competitive federalism among States and districts. Women and Youth Leadership Sashakt Panchayat-Netri Abhiyan (launched 2025) — enhances leadership and governance capacities of elected women representatives; 744 Model Women Friendly Gram Panchayats identified; Nirbhay Raho Campaign launched for women’s safety and participation. Model Youth Gram Sabha (MYGS) (launched October 2025) — introduces students to grassroots democracy via simulated Gram Sabha proceedings, covering 619 Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalayas, 200 Eklavya Model Residential Schools, and select government schools; engaged over 29,000 students across 819 residential schools in 2025, aligned with NEP 2020. Persistent Challenges — The ‘3Fs’ Deficit Funds Heavy reliance on tied grants and state devolution; Own Source Revenue (OSR) remains abysmal — PRIs depend on devolved funds for up to 95% of revenue. As per the RBI’s 2024 report on ‘Finances of Panchayati Raj Institutions’, PRIs generate a mere 1.1% of total revenue from local taxes and fees. Irregular constitution of State Finance Commissions (SFCs) and non-implementation of their recommendations cripple financial autonomy and predictability. Functions Incomplete devolution of the 29 subjects listed in the Eleventh Schedule (e.g., agriculture, minor irrigation, rural housing, poverty alleviation); functional devolution has stagnated or declined in several States. State governments frequently bypass PRIs by creating Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), parastatals, or line-department committees, fragmenting local governance and eroding the Gram Panchayat’s constitutional authority. Despite Article 243E mandating timely elections, States often delay them citing delimitation, census, or administrative reasons; courts frequently intervene to enforce timely elections. Functionaries Severe shortage of dedicated Panchayat cadres and technical staff (engineers, accountants), leading to excessive dependence on state-appointed bureaucrats and ad-hocism. Structural and Social Barriers The persistent phenomenon of ‘Sarpanch Pati/Pradhan Pati’, where male relatives dominate decision-making of elected women representatives, undermines the 33%+ reservation mandate. National surveys indicate critically low Gram Sabha participation, with entrenched caste divisions and gender biases limiting meaningful citizen involvement. Way Forward Operationalize the ‘4Fs’ Framework: time-bound devolution of Functions, Funds, Functionaries, and Freedom, enabling genuine local autonomy free from excessive bureaucratic control. Institutionalize Fiscal Empowerment: enhance OSR mobilization by empowering Panchayats to levy local taxes and user charges; explore monetization of rural assets and credit rating of high-performing PRIs. Granular Activity Mapping: replace vague delegation of the Eleventh Schedule’s 29 subjects with strict task-level mapping across village, block, and district tiers. Panchayat Bonds: credit-rate high-performing PRIs to access capital markets via local/Panchayat bonds, drawing on Indonesia’s Dana Desa model. Institutionalized Social Audits: following the Mani Shankar Aiyar Committee (2012) report, treat Gram Sabhas as supreme local deliberative assemblies; replicate Meghalaya’s Community Participation and Public Services Social Audit Act, 2017 nationwide. Leverage Emerging Technologies: AI-based analytics for predictive planning, early warning systems, and asset management. Realizing a Viksit Bharat requires transforming India’s 2.59 lakh Gram Panchayats into micro-engines of economic growth and social equity. Matching historic fiscal outlays with systemic administrative freedom, professional cadres, and digital transparency can help India shift from centralized governance toward a genuinely efficient model of localized self-rule. Prelims Pointers 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992 — inserted Part IX (Articles 243–243O) and the Eleventh Schedule (29 subjects). Article 243(d) defines “Panchayat”; Article 243(b) defines “Gram Sabha” — the body of all registered village electors, distinct from the elected Gram Panchayat. Article 243D — reservation: SC/ST proportional to population; women not less than one-third at all tiers. Article 243E — mandates Panchayat elections every five years. Article 243I — mandates a State Finance Commission (SFC) every five years. Article 243K — provides for an independent State Election Commission (SEC) for local body elections. Panchayat is a State subject under the State List, Seventh Schedule. Balwant Rai Mehta Committee (1957) — recommended the three-tier Panchayati Raj structure. L.M. Singhvi Committee (1986) — recommended constitutional status for PRIs. SVAMITVA Scheme (2020) — drone-based rural land survey and property card distribution. RGSA = Rashtriya Gram Swaraj Abhiyan — capacity-building scheme for PRIs, introduced 2018-19. PESA Act, 1996 — based on the Bhuria Committee (1995); extends Panchayati Raj to Fifth Schedule Areas. PAI = Panchayat Advancement Index — assesses GPs on nine LSDG themes. OSR (Own Source Revenue) — PRIs generate only about 1.1% of revenue from local taxes (RBI, 2024). SabhaSaar — AI tool for Gram Sabha minutes, in 23 Indian languages. 15th Finance Commission award period: 2020–26; 16th FC: 2026–31. Mani Shankar Aiyar Committee (2012) — recommended treating Gram Sabhas as supreme deliberative bodies. Eleventh Schedule — 29 subjects devolved to Panchayats, including agriculture, minor irrigation, and rural housing. Practice Mains Question “The 73rd Constitutional Amendment promised democratic decentralization, but the persistent ‘3Fs deficit’ continues to constrain Panchayati Raj Institutions. Critically examine the structural and fiscal challenges facing PRIs and suggest reforms to operationalize genuine local self-governance.” GS Paper 2  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Match List-I (Constitutional Provision) with List-II (Subject Matter) and select the correct answer using the codes given below: List-I A. Article 243D B. Article 243E C. Article 243I D. Article 243K List-II 1. State Finance Commission 2. Reservation of seats for women and SC/ST 3. State Election Commission 4. Five-yearly Panchayat elections AA-1, B-2, C-4, D-3 BA-2, B-4, C-1, D-3 CA-2, B-3, C-4, D-1 DA-4, B-1, C-2, D-3 Answer: B Article 243D provides for reservation of seats for women and SC/ST in Panchayats. Article 243E mandates Panchayat elections every five years. Article 243I mandates the constitution of a State Finance Commission every five years. Article 243K provides for an independent State Election Commission for the superintendence and conduct of Panchayat elections. Article 02 Biochar Offers Way to Turn India’s Farm Smoke into ‘Black Gold’ GS Paper 3 — Environment & Ecology | Climate Change Mitigation | Agriculture | Renewable Energy Why in News India’s farms burn more than 20 million tonnes of paddy straw every year, primarily in Punjab and Haryana, due to short post-harvest windows and lack of alternatives. Scientists say this same biomass could instead be converted into biochar — a carbon-rich material being called ‘black gold’ for soil health and climate action, addressing both crop residue burning and declining soil organic carbon. What is Biochar? — The Basics Definition: Biochar is a highly porous, carbon-rich material resembling charcoal, produced through thermal decomposition of organic biomass (agricultural waste, forestry residues, food processing waste). The Process — Pyrolysis: heating biomass in an oxygen-depleted environment at high temperatures, typically between 300°C and 700°C. Valuable By-products: pyrolysis also yields syngas and bio-oil, both usable as renewable energy sources. Mechanism in Soil: its highly porous structure aggregates soil particles, holds water, and creates a habitat for beneficial microorganisms. Key Conceptual Distinctions Carbon-negative (biochar’s classification) means it removes more CO₂ from the atmosphere than is emitted in its production and use — distinct from carbon-neutral (no net addition) and carbon-positive (net emitter). Soil Organic Carbon (SOC) is a key indicator of soil health and fertility; many Indian soils, including semi-arid and black soil regions, are widely SOC-deficient. Biochar-related interventions fall under the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA), one of the eight missions under the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC). Significance and Applications Enhancing Agricultural Productivity Applying biochar to degraded soils improves crop yields by 10% to 30%, particularly in nutrient-deficient regions. Increases soil’s water-holding capacity by 10% to 25%, helping crops withstand moisture stress during droughts and heatwaves. Mitigating Air Pollution and Managing Waste India produces over 500 million tonnes of crop waste annually; converting stubble into biochar offers a sustainable alternative to open-field burning in North India. Offers a solution for urban waste management — over 50% of India’s 62 million tonnes of annual urban waste is biodegradable municipal solid waste that could be diverted from landfills via this route. Carbon Sequestration and Climate Action Biochar locks atmospheric carbon into a stable form that persists in soil for centuries, preventing its release as methane or CO₂. One tonne of biochar can sequester an estimated 2.5 to 3 tonnes of CO₂-equivalent. Carbon Credits: each tonne of certified biochar can generate an estimated 2 to 2.8 tonnes of CO₂-equivalent in carbon credits, typically traded in voluntary carbon markets (as distinct from regulated compliance markets). India’s domestic regulatory architecture for carbon trading is the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), 2023, notified under the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022. Other Applications Application Estimated Impact Power generation (syngas) 8–13 TWh of electricity annually Power generation (bio-oil) Substitutes 12–19 million tonnes of diesel/kerosene; cuts fossil fuel emissions by over 2% Water purification Chemically modified biochar filters heavy metals — chromium, arsenic, lead Construction (concrete) 2–5% biochar improves strength, raises heat resistance by ~20%, captures ~115 kg CO₂ per cubic metre Domestic and Global Success Stories India Field trials in Akola district, Maharashtra using maize stalk biochar improved soil fertility and organic carbon content in black soils. Research in Kerala showed biochar from coconut leaf stalks significantly increased soil quality across cropping systems. The KISAN kiln project from IIT-Kharagpur is enabling smallholders to monetise farm waste through village-level biochar production. Global Examples Kenya: converting rice husks into biochar has produced certified carbon credits while improving soil phosphorus content and pH. Thailand: the government has tied biochar certification to its national carbon registry system. Brazil: reported large yield gains and high carbon retention using biochar from sugarcane bagasse. Concerns Verification of Claims: the yield-improvement, carbon-sequestration, and energy-potential figures circulating for biochar are largely research-based and pilot-scale estimates rather than nationally audited statistics, and should be read with that caveat. Logistics and Cost: aggregation of dispersed crop residue and the upfront cost of pyrolysis units remain barriers to large-scale, farmer-level adoption. Short Harvest Windows: the same time pressure that drives stubble burning in Punjab and Haryana also constrains the window available for residue collection and processing into biochar. Way Forward Scale up tractor-mounted pyrolysis units for village-level conversion of stubble into biochar, giving farmers an income stream instead of smoke. Strengthen linkages between biochar production and carbon credit markets to make adoption financially attractive for farmer cooperatives. Integrate biochar promotion with existing crop residue management schemes and the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture. Expand pilot programmes like the KISAN kiln project beyond IIT-Kharagpur to other agricultural universities and KVKs (Krishi Vigyan Kendras). Biochar represents a rare convergence of waste management, soil restoration, and climate mitigation — converting a pollution problem into a productive, carbon-negative resource. Its success at scale, however, will depend on resolving the logistical and financial barriers that currently keep India’s farms burning rather than building with their stubble. Prelims Pointers Biochar = porous, carbon-rich solid produced via pyrolysis of biomass. Pyrolysis = thermal decomposition of biomass in an oxygen-depleted environment (300–700°C). Byproducts of pyrolysis: syngas (energy) and bio-oil (diesel/kerosene substitute). Punjab and Haryana together burn over 20 million tonnes of paddy straw annually. “Carbon-negative” = removes more CO₂ than it emits — distinct from carbon-neutral. Soil Organic Carbon (SOC) — key soil-health indicator; many Indian soils are SOC-deficient. National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA) — one of eight missions under NAPCC. 1 tonne of biochar can sequester an estimated 2.5–3 tonnes of CO₂-equivalent. Carbon credit potential: 2–2.8 tonnes CO₂-equivalent per tonne of certified biochar. Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS), 2023 — India’s domestic carbon market, under the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022. KISAN kiln project — IIT-Kharagpur initiative enabling smallholder biochar production. Biochar in water purification removes heavy metals — chromium, arsenic, lead. India generates over 500 million tonnes of crop waste annually. Biochar use in concrete (2–5%) improves heat resistance and captures CO₂ per cubic metre. Voluntary carbon markets (not compliance markets) are the typical venue for trading biochar-based credits. Field trials: Akola (Maharashtra) — maize stalk biochar; Kerala — coconut leaf stalk biochar. Global examples: Kenya (rice husk biochar), Thailand (carbon registry linkage), Brazil (sugarcane bagasse biochar). Practice Mains Question “Biochar represents a rare convergence of waste management, soil health restoration, and climate mitigation. Discuss the potential of biochar technology in addressing India’s crop residue burning crisis and examine the policy support needed for its large-scale adoption.” GS Paper 3  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Assertion (A): Biochar is classified as a carbon-negative material. Reason (R): Biochar locks atmospheric carbon into a stable solid form that resists decomposition in soil for long periods, removing more carbon from the atmosphere than is released during its production and application. Which one of the following is correct? ABoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A. BBoth A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A. CA is true, but R is false. DA is false, but R is true. Answer: A Both the assertion and reason are true, and the reason correctly explains the assertion. Biochar is produced via pyrolysis and forms a chemically stable carbon structure that persists in soil for centuries, preventing carbon from re-entering the atmosphere as CO₂ or methane — this is precisely why it is termed carbon-negative rather than merely carbon-neutral. Article 03 Sixteen Countries Adopt Mombasa Declaration to Advance Fisheries Transparency and Combat Illegal Fishing GS Paper 2 — International Relations and Agreements | GS Paper 3 — Conservation, Marine Resources, Environmental Pollution Why in News Sixteen national governments from across Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Europe, and the Pacific adopted the Mombasa Declaration at the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa, Kenya (June 2026), committing to advance global fisheries transparency and strengthen efforts to combat illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Notably, India is not a signatory. Maritime and Fisheries Governance — The Basics UNCLOS (1982) — the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea — is the foundational legal framework for ocean governance; it establishes the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), extending 200 nautical miles from a coastal State’s baseline, within which most fisheries jurisdiction and IUU disputes arise. “Blue Economy” refers to the sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth while preserving ocean health; India has articulated a draft Blue Economy Policy framework under the Ministry of Earth Sciences (MoES). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) is the lead UN agency on global fisheries governance, publishing the periodic “State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture” report; its Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), 2009 is the principal binding international instrument against IUU fishing. India’s domestic fisheries architecture is anchored by the Department of Fisheries under the Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying, and the flagship Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana (PMMSY), launched in 2020. About the Mombasa Declaration Parameter Detail Adopted at 11th Our Ocean Conference, Mombasa, Kenya Number of signatories 16 countries (including Belgium, Cameroon, Chile, Dominican Republic, France — on behalf of its Overseas Countries and Territories, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Korea) Governing framework Global Charter for Fisheries Transparency — 10 low-cost or no-cost policy principles Developed with support of Coalition for Fisheries Transparency (50+ global civil society organisations) India’s status Not a signatory Next Our Ocean Conference 2027 Key Commitments Modernizing vessel registries and improving collection and dissemination of vessel information. Publishing fishing authorisations and improving public access to vessel ownership data. Strengthening information-sharing mechanisms to support enforcement and accountability across fisheries sectors. Why Transparency Matters — The Need IUU fishing threatens marine ecosystems, coastal communities, small-scale fishers, food security, and livelihoods, especially in developing and low-income countries dependent on fisheries. IUU fishing is estimated to cost the global economy up to $50 billion annually, while distorting markets and reducing income for legitimate fishers. Limited transparency in vessel ownership, tracking, fishing activity, and supply chains allows such practices to persist and is often linked to serious human rights abuses, including unsafe working conditions and forced labour. Significance and Stakeholder Voices Ghana’s Minister of Fisheries and Aquaculture noted that 60% of the country’s animal protein comes from fish, and 10% of its population depends on the fisheries value chain for livelihood, framing fisheries transparency as a matter of culture and national security. France participated on behalf of its Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), underscoring that combating IUU fishing requires greater transparency and international cooperation. Global Fishing Watch, an NGO providing open vessel-tracking data, offered to equip signatory nations with open data and analytical tools to drive these transparency measures. Concerns India’s Non-Participation: despite India’s significant coastline and growing Blue Economy ambitions, it is not among the 16 signatories — a gap worth noting against its stated interest in sustainable ocean governance. Enforcement Gap: the Declaration itself carries no binding enforcement mechanism; its impact depends on voluntary implementation by signatory States. Transnational Nature of IUU Fishing: vessels frequently operate across multiple jurisdictions, complicating accountability even where transparency commitments exist. Way Forward India should evaluate joining future transparency frameworks, leveraging its own vessel registry and PMMSY-linked digital infrastructure. Strengthen the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA) ratification and implementation globally to close enforcement gaps. Expand use of satellite-based vessel tracking (e.g., through partnerships with organisations like Global Fishing Watch) for real-time monitoring of high-seas fishing activity. The Mombasa Declaration reflects a growing global consensus that transparency — not just enforcement — is central to combating illegal fishing and protecting coastal livelihoods. India’s absence from the list of signatories, even as it pursues an ambitious Blue Economy agenda, is a point worth tracking as the framework builds momentum ahead of the next Our Ocean Conference in 2027. Prelims Pointers Mombasa Declaration — adopted at the 11th Our Ocean Conference, Mombasa, Kenya, June 2026. IUU Fishing = Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing. Global Charter for Fisheries Transparency — 10 low-cost or no-cost policy principles. Coalition for Fisheries Transparency — network of 50+ global civil society organisations. IUU fishing is estimated to cost the global economy up to $50 billion annually. India is not a signatory to the Mombasa Declaration. Global Fishing Watch — NGO providing open vessel-tracking data; partnered on this initiative. UNCLOS (1982) — UN Convention on the Law of the Sea; basis of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from a coastal State’s baseline. PSMA (2009) — FAO’s Port State Measures Agreement, the principal binding instrument against IUU fishing. PMMSY = Pradhan Mantri Matsya Sampada Yojana — India’s flagship fisheries scheme, launched 2020. Department of Fisheries functions under the Ministry of Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Dairying (India). Next Our Ocean Conference is scheduled for 2027. France participated in the Declaration “on behalf of its Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs).” “Blue Economy” — sustainable use of ocean resources for economic growth while preserving ocean health. Practice Mains Question “Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing poses a transnational threat to marine ecosystems and coastal livelihoods. Discuss the significance of global transparency initiatives like the Mombasa Declaration and examine why India’s participation in such frameworks matters for its Blue Economy goals.” GS Paper 2/3  |  150 words  |  10 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Which one of the following statements regarding the Mombasa Declaration is correct? AIt is a legally binding international treaty enforceable through the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. BIndia is one of its founding signatories, given its leadership role in Indian Ocean fisheries governance. CIt was adopted at the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa, Kenya, and builds support for the Global Charter for Fisheries Transparency. DIt exclusively addresses fisheries subsidies and not vessel-ownership transparency. Answer: C The Mombasa Declaration was adopted at the 11th Our Ocean Conference in Mombasa, Kenya, by 16 countries, and builds momentum for the Global Charter for Fisheries Transparency. It is a voluntary call to action, not a binding treaty (Option A is incorrect). India is not among its signatories (Option B is incorrect). It focuses on vessel registries, ownership data, and fishing authorisations — not fisheries subsidies (Option D is incorrect). Article 04 Indian Army Contingent Leaves for Mongolia to Participate in Exercise Khaan Quest 2026 GS Paper 2 — International Relations, Defence Cooperation | GS Paper 3 — Internal Security Why in News An Indian Army contingent of 40 personnel, comprising troops from a battalion of the JAT Regiment and personnel from other Arms and Services, left for Mongolia to participate in the multinational joint military exercise Khaan Quest 2026, held from 20 June to 3 July at the Five Hills Training Area, Ulaanbaatar. About Exercise Khaan Quest Parameter Detail Started 2003, as a bilateral exercise between the USA and Mongolian Defence Forces Became multilateral 2006 2026 edition 23rd iteration; troops from 18 countries Indian contingent 40 personnel — JAT Regiment battalion + other Arms and Services Venue Five Hills Training Area, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia Legal framework Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (peace support operations) Objective and Training Focus Objective: enhances interoperability, cooperation, and operational readiness among participating militaries for UN peacekeeping and peace support operations in a multinational environment. Chapter VII, UN Charter: deals with action the UN Security Council may take in response to threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression, including enforcement measures. Training focus: joint planning and tactical drills — static and mobile checkpoints, cordon and search operations, patrolling, evacuation of civilians from hostile areas, counter-IED drills, combat first aid, and casualty evacuation. Strategic Significance Reflects India’s steadfast commitment to global peace and UN peacekeeping. Strengthens India’s strategic partnership with Mongolia. Facilitates sharing of best practices in tactics, techniques, and procedures among participating armed forces. Prelims Pointers Khaan Quest — annual multilateral military exercise hosted by Mongolia. Started 2003 as a bilateral US–Mongolia exercise; became multilateral from 2006. 2026 edition is the 23rd iteration; held at Five Hills Training Area, Ulaanbaatar. Chapter VII, UN Charter — deals with action against threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. India’s 2026 contingent: 40 personnel, including troops from the JAT Regiment. The exercise prepares forces for UN peacekeeping and peace support operations in a multilateral environment. Prelims Practice MCQ With reference to Exercise Khaan Quest, consider the following statements: 1. It is a bilateral exercise conducted only between India and Mongolia. 2. It was first held in 2003 and became a multilateral exercise from 2006 onwards. 3. It focuses on preparing participating defence forces for UN peace support operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? A1 only B2 and 3 only C1 and 3 only D1, 2 and 3 Answer: B Statement 1 is incorrect — Khaan Quest 2026 involves 18 countries, not just India and Mongolia; it started as a bilateral US–Mongolia exercise in 2003. Statements 2 and 3 are correct. Article 05 Kheer Bhawani Mela: Faith, Sacred Springs and Cultural Memory in Kashmir GS Paper 1 — Indian Culture, Religious Traditions, Temple Architecture, Festivals Why in News The annual Kheer Bhawani Mela at the Mata Kheer Bhawani Temple, Tulmulla, in central Kashmir’s Ganderbal district, recorded a notable turnout of displaced Kashmiri Pandits on the occasion of Jyeshtha Ashtami. Many devotees, including members of the post-exodus generation, travelled to the Valley for the pilgrimage, with the Mata Kheer Bhawani Ji Yatra Welfare Society facilitating logistics, including community kitchens (langar) for thousands of pilgrims. The Deity — Ragnya Devi (Kheer Bhawani) Ragnya Devi, popularly known as Kheer Bhawani, is the principal household deity (Kuldevi) of a large section of Kashmiri Pandits. She is regarded as a form of Adi Shakti, within the broader Shakta tradition of goddess worship in Hinduism. The name “Kheer Bhawani” derives from the temple’s central ritual — the offering of kheer (a rice-and-milk pudding) into the sacred spring at the site. The Temple and Sacred Geography The temple is located at Tulmulla village, on the banks of a stream in Ganderbal district, and is built around a sacred spring, locally called a “nag”. The colour of the spring’s water is traditionally believed by devotees to change, and is read as an omen — with darker hues considered inauspicious and clearer, lighter water seen as auspicious. This spring-worship tradition forms part of a wider Kashmiri practice of venerating nags (springs); Kashmir has historically been referred to as the “Land of Nagas,” a theme found in the Nilamata Purana, an important early text on Kashmiri religious geography and the valley’s mythological origins. Philosophical Roots — Kashmir Shaivism Kashmiri Pandit religious practice is historically rooted in Kashmir Shaivism, also called the Trika philosophy — a distinct non-dualist (advaita) school of thought within Hindu philosophy, differing from the dualist Shaiva Siddhanta tradition prevalent in South India. Vasugupta is credited with the Shiva Sutras, a foundational text of Kashmir Shaivism. Abhinavagupta (10th–11th century CE) was among the most significant polymath philosopher-aestheticians in Indian intellectual history — author of the Tantraloka and major contributions to Indian aesthetic theory, particularly the theory of rasa. Shakta worship of goddesses such as Kheer Bhawani is closely interwoven with the Trika framework, in which the Goddess represents the dynamic, creative aspect (Shakti) of consciousness. The Festival — Jyeshtha Ashtami Jyeshtha Ashtami falls on the eighth day (Ashtami) of the bright lunar fortnight in the Hindu month of Jyeshtha (typically May–June), and marks the temple’s principal annual festival day. The pilgrimage is organised with the support of the Mata Kheer Bhawani Ji Yatra Welfare Society, which coordinates devotee logistics, including the operation of a community kitchen (langar) that, in the run-up to this year’s festival, attended to over 10,000 devotees. The temple and its festival calendar sit alongside other major Kashmir-linked Hindu pilgrimage traditions, such as the Amarnath Yatra. Cultural Memory and Heritage For the Kashmiri Pandit community, a large section of which has been displaced from the Valley since 1990, the annual pilgrimage functions as an act of cultural continuity, sustaining ritual practice, oral tradition, and a connection to ancestral land despite long physical displacement. Visits to ancestral homes during the pilgrimage period — a recurring feature of such yatras — illustrate the broader theme of how sacred sites and recurring festivals help displaced communities preserve collective memory and identity across generations. This phenomenon is studied within Indian culture and society as part of the broader relationship between pilgrimage, displacement, and heritage preservation, a theme with parallels among other displaced or diaspora communities. The Kheer Bhawani Mela illustrates how a living religious tradition — rooted in the philosophy of Kashmir Shaivism and the region’s ancient spring-worship customs — continues to anchor the cultural memory of a displaced community. Such festivals remain a vital thread connecting Kashmiri Pandit heritage to its ancestral landscape. Prelims Pointers Kheer Bhawani Temple is located at Tulmulla, Ganderbal district, Kashmir. Presiding deity: Ragnya Devi (Kheer Bhawani) — regarded as a form of Adi Shakti within the Shakta tradition. Central ritual: offering of kheer into the temple’s sacred spring (nag). Kashmir’s nag (spring) worship tradition is referenced in the Nilamata Purana, a key source on early Kashmiri religious geography. Kashmir Shaivism (Trika philosophy) — a non-dualist school of Hindu philosophy, distinct from South India’s dualist Shaiva Siddhanta. Vasugupta — credited with the Shiva Sutras, a foundational Kashmir Shaivism text. Abhinavagupta (10th–11th century CE) — major Kashmiri philosopher; authored the Tantraloka; key contributor to Indian aesthetic (rasa) theory. Jyeshtha Ashtami — the principal festival day, the eighth day of the bright lunar fortnight in the month of Jyeshtha (May–June). Kuldevi — term for a family or clan’s principal household deity in Hindu tradition. Mata Kheer Bhawani Ji Yatra Welfare Society organises the annual pilgrimage and its community kitchen (langar). Kashmiri Pandit displacement from the Valley is generally dated to 1990. Amarnath Yatra — another major Hindu pilgrimage tradition associated with the Kashmir region. Practice Mains Question “Living religious traditions can serve as powerful anchors of cultural memory for displaced communities. Discuss, with reference to Kashmiri Pandit pilgrimage traditions such as the Kheer Bhawani Mela, the role of festivals and sacred sites in sustaining cultural continuity and heritage.” GS Paper 1  |  150 words  |  10 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Which one of the following statements regarding the Kheer Bhawani Mela and its associated tradition is NOT correct? AThe presiding deity, Ragnya Devi, is worshipped as a form of Adi Shakti within the Shakta tradition. BThe temple is built around a sacred spring, locally referred to as a “nag.” CJyeshtha Ashtami falls in the Hindu month of Kartik, typically in October–November. DAbhinavagupta, a key exponent of Kashmir Shaivism, also made significant contributions to Indian aesthetic theory. Answer: C Jyeshtha Ashtami falls in the Hindu lunar month of Jyeshtha (May–June), not Kartik. Statements A, B, and D are correct — Ragnya Devi is worshipped as a form of Adi Shakti, the temple is built around a sacred spring (nag), and Abhinavagupta was both a key Kashmir Shaivism philosopher and a major contributor to Indian aesthetic (rasa) theory. Article 06 No One Should Own the Law: Why Government Standards Should Be Public GS Paper 2 — Governance, Transparency, Right to Information, Government Policies and Interventions Why in News An opinion piece by Carl Malamud, founder of the U.S.-based non-profit Public Resource, revisits long-running disputes over public access to technical standards issued by the Indian Roads Congress (IRC) and the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS), linking the debate to Parliament’s recent passage of the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act and proposals that all “edicts of government” be made freely and centrally accessible. As the author is the petitioner in the underlying disputes, this article should be read as an advocacy perspective rather than an official government position. Foundational Concepts Right to Information Act, 2005 — the foundational transparency law in India; Section 2(h) defines “public authority,” a definition broad enough to cover bodies that are substantially financed, controlled, or established by government, even when structured as societies or non-profits. Delegated/subordinate legislation — rules, regulations, and notifications made under the authority of a parent statute; this is why non-statutory instruments such as circulars, office memoranda, and advisories can still carry legal force even though they are not Acts of Parliament. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution — guarantees freedom of speech and expression, judicially interpreted to underpin the citizen’s right to know and access public information. India Code — the Government of India’s official portal for consolidated central and state legislation, proposed as the natural home for centralizing access to all government edicts. The Core Argument The principle that rules governing public life must be widely accessible is traced in the article to Emperor Ashoka, whose 7th Pillar Edict (now in Delhi) contained an extensive section on road safety and was meant to be broadly disseminated. Today, the Indian Roads Congress continues this function — though structured as a non-profit association, it is described in the article as effectively an arm of government: it is subject to the RTI Act, its website is maintained by the National Informatics Centre (NIC), and its governing council is predominantly composed of government officials. IRC standards cover matters such as route signage on national highways, vehicle design dimensions and weights, and the design of prestressed concrete road bridges, and are incorporated into subordinate legislation and regulations issued by bodies including the National Rural Infrastructure Development Agency and the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways. The BIS Dispute and Its Resolution The author’s non-profit had posted over 14,000 Indian Standards issued by the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) — covering areas such as the National Building Code, safety requirements for motorcycle helmets and drinking water, sewer entry procedures, and construction practices in typhoon-prone areas. When BIS objected, the author and two Indian co-petitioners filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in the Delhi High Court; the case ran for seven years. During this period, even as the standards remained freely posted, BIS’s own sales of these publications reportedly rose — even though government revenue from selling such documents is not its primary purpose, and the standards had been hard to procure through official channels. A senior Ministry official eventually directed that BIS standards be made freely available on the BIS website, after which the PIL was withdrawn before the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court. The ‘Shadow Instruments’ Problem Parliament has passed the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, described in the article as a move to “liberate governance from the steel cage” — a characterisation offered by commentators rather than the Act’s own stated text. The Act’s formal legislative objective is to decriminalize and rationalize minor, technical, or procedural offences across numerous Central Acts, reducing compliance burden as part of the “ease of doing business/living” agenda. Commentators cited in the article have called for removing what they term “shadow instruments” — edicts not readily available to read — including circulars, master circulars, departmental and ministerial directions, office memoranda, public notices, general orders, guidance notes, advisories, schemes, consultation papers, standard operating procedures, policies, notifications, and gazettes. The proposal: post all such edicts on a central website such as India Code, and treat any edict not publicly accessible as null and void. Comparative Legal Approaches Jurisdiction Approach United States “Works of government” clause in copyright law — federal government documents are not eligible for copyright; courts have held that “no man shall own the law.” European Union A constitutional bench has ruled that mandatory safety standards form an integral part of the law, and ensuring public access to them is of “overriding public importance.” United Kingdom Maintains “Crown Copyright” over government works, but pairs it with an Open Government Data Licence permitting reuse. India (proposed) No equivalent “works of government” copyright policy currently exists; the article argues it would be a simple matter to adopt one. Edicts vs. Works of Government — A Key Distinction Edicts of government — instruments carrying normative or binding legal force (laws, regulations, mandatory standards) — are argued to have a special, protected place in constitutional law and must be freely accessible for democracy to function. Works of government — other documents issued by the state that may be informational or cultural rather than binding, such as publications by the Publications Division, the National Book Trust, and the Archaeological Survey of India — are treated as a distinct category, though still considered valuable public knowledge. Concerns IP vs. Right to Know: standard-setting bodies often cite cost-recovery and intellectual property rationale for restricting access, which sits in tension with the constitutional right to access binding legal instruments. Proliferation of Shadow Instruments: the wide array of non-statutory instruments that nonetheless carry the force of law, without centralized public access, complicates compliance for citizens and businesses alike. Advocacy Source: as this account originates from the very petitioner who challenged these bodies, the specific claims of revenue trends and institutional motivations should be read as one party’s characterization of the dispute. Way Forward Adopt a clear “works of government” policy in India, drawing on the US and UK models, distinguishing copyright treatment of binding edicts from other government works. Operationalize a single centralized portal (building on India Code) listing all binding government instruments, including circulars and standards with the force of law. Extend the spirit of the Jan Vishwas Act’s ease-of-compliance objective to cover free access to all technical standards referenced in regulations. Whether characterized as ancient Ashokan practice or modern constitutional principle, the underlying argument is consistent: rules that bind citizens must be visible to them. As India modernizes its regulatory architecture through reforms like the Jan Vishwas Act, the debate over free public access to technical standards remains a live governance question with direct relevance to ease of compliance and the rule of law. Prelims Pointers RTI Act, 2005, Section 2(h) — defines “public authority,” covering bodies substantially financed or controlled by government. Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) — statutory body; publishes over 14,000 Indian Standards. Indian Roads Congress (IRC) — publishes road design and safety standards used in subordinate legislation. Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act — aims to decriminalize and rationalize minor offences across multiple Central Acts (ease of doing business/living). India Code — Government of India’s official portal for consolidated central and state legislation. “Works of government” doctrine (USA) — federal government documents are not copyrightable. Crown Copyright (UK) — government copyright regime, paired with an Open Government Data Licence for reuse. Article 19(1)(a) — freedom of speech and expression; underpins the judicially recognised right to access public information. National Building Code — a key BIS-governed safety standard cited in the dispute. National Informatics Centre (NIC) — maintains the IRC’s official website. 7th Pillar Edict of Ashoka — cited as a historical precedent for public dissemination of governance rules, including on road safety. Delegated/subordinate legislation — rules and regulations made under a parent statute, carrying legal force without being a standalone Act. “Public authority” under RTI includes bodies established, financed, or substantially controlled by government, even if structured as societies/non-profits. Practice Mains Question “Government standards and regulations that carry the force of law must be freely accessible for democracy to function meaningfully. Critically examine the tension between intellectual property claims of quasi-governmental bodies and the citizen’s right to access binding legal instruments in India.” GS Paper 2  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Consider the following statements: 1. The Right to Information Act, 2005 defines “public authority” broadly enough to potentially cover bodies that are substantially financed or controlled by government, even if structured as non-profit societies. 2. Under United States law, documents issued by the federal government are generally not eligible for copyright protection. 3. The Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act is primarily a transparency law mandating free public access to all government technical standards. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? A1 and 2 only B2 and 3 only C1 and 3 only D1, 2 and 3 Answer: A Statements 1 and 2 are correct. Statement 3 is incorrect — the Jan Vishwas Act’s primary legislative objective is to decriminalize and rationalize minor, technical, or procedural offences across Central Acts to ease compliance; it is not itself a transparency law mandating free access to technical standards, though commentators have invoked its spirit in arguing for such access. Article 07 ASI Transfers Rakhigarhi Skeletons to AnSI for Scientific Investigation GS Paper 1 — Indian Culture, Ancient History, Indus Valley Civilisation | GS Paper 3 — Science and Technology (Genomics) Why in News Human skeletal remains excavated from the archaeological site of Rakhigarhi in Haryana have been formally handed over by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) to the Anthropological Survey of India (AnSI), a national research institute under the Union Culture Ministry, for detailed scientific investigation. The transfer was carried out under a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two institutions, as announced by AnSI Director Dr. B.V. Sharma. Institutional Basics Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) — premier organisation for archaeological research and protection of monuments, under the Ministry of Culture; conducts excavations such as at Rakhigarhi. Anthropological Survey of India (AnSI) — also under the Ministry of Culture; established in 1945, with Dr. Biraja Sankar Guha as its first Director; the only institute of its kind in the world pursuing anthropological research within a governmental setup; current Director is Dr. B.V. Sharma. AnSI maintains an ancient human skeletal repository and laboratory in Kolkata, where the transferred remains will be examined. About Rakhigarhi Spread across approximately 550 hectares in Haryana, Rakhigarhi is widely recognised as the largest known settlement of the Harappan Civilisation. Excavations reveal evidence of continuous habitation from the Early Harappan to Mature Harappan periods. Mound 7 at the site has been identified as a burial plot, where 56 skeletons were recovered, including that of a woman roughly 4,600 years old, whose DNA analysis created significant scientific interest. Basics of the Harappan Civilisation Also referred to as the Indus Valley Civilisation or, in some scholarship, the Indus-Saraswati Civilisation. Chronologically divided into three phases: Early Harappan, Mature Harappan, and Late Harappan. Known for advanced town planning — grid-pattern streets, covered drainage systems, granaries, and standardised weights and measures. The Indus script remains undeciphered to date, despite numerous attempts. Major Harappan Sites — Comparative Table Site Location Known For Rakhigarhi Haryana Largest known Harappan site by area Mohenjo-daro Sindh, Pakistan Great Bath, granaries Harappa Punjab, Pakistan First site discovered (1921) Dholavira Gujarat Sophisticated water conservation system, unique signboard Lothal Gujarat Dockyard Kalibangan Rajasthan Fire altars; evidence of an earthquake Ganeriwala Punjab, Pakistan Second largest Harappan site by area The Scientific Significance DNA analysis of the “Rakhigarhi woman” skeleton reportedly revealed the absence of the steppe pastoral gene, fanning ongoing debate around the migration of Indo-Aryan-speaking groups into India. The term “Indo-Aryan” is increasingly preferred by scholars over “Aryan” to avoid racial connotations associated with the older usage. Two broad frameworks exist in current academic and public discourse on Indo-Aryan origins: the Aryan Migration Theory (AMT), which holds that Indo-Aryan-speaking groups migrated into the subcontinent from Central Asia around 1500 BCE, and the Out-of-India Theory (OIT), which proposes an indigenous origin. Both views continue to be debated, and this analysis does not take a position on the matter. Three complete human skeletons from Mound 7, along with skeletal fragments from other burials, have now been transferred to AnSI’s Kolkata repository, with the remaining material expected to follow shortly. Research Methods to Be Applied Ancient DNA (aDNA) analysis — extraction and sequencing of genetic material from ancient remains. Stable isotope studies — used to infer diet, migration patterns, and environmental conditions of ancient populations. Osteological assessments — study of skeletal structure to determine age, sex, health, and physical characteristics. Palaeopathological investigations — study of ancient disease and trauma evidence in skeletal remains. Environmental reconstruction — reconstructing the ecological context in which the population lived. Collaborating Institutions Birbal Sahni Institute of Palaeosciences University College London (UCL) Banaras Hindu University (BHU) The transfer of Rakhigarhi’s skeletal remains to AnSI marks a significant step in applying modern archaeogenetic and osteological techniques to one of South Asia’s most important Harappan sites. As with all genetic findings bearing on the Aryan migration debate, the results will need to be assessed within the broader, still-evolving scientific consensus rather than treated as final. Prelims Pointers Rakhigarhi — largest known Harappan Civilisation site by area, located in Haryana (~550 hectares). ASI = Archaeological Survey of India — under the Ministry of Culture; conducts excavations. AnSI = Anthropological Survey of India — also under the Ministry of Culture; current Director: Dr. B.V. Sharma. AnSI was established in 1945; its first Director was Dr. Biraja Sankar Guha. Mound 7 at Rakhigarhi — identified burial plot; 56 skeletons recovered. The “Rakhigarhi woman” skeleton is approximately 4,600 years old; DNA analysis showed no steppe pastoralist ancestry marker. “Indus-Saraswati Civilisation” — alternative nomenclature sometimes used for the Indus Valley/Harappan Civilisation. aDNA = ancient DNA analysis — a key technique in archaeogenetics. “Indo-Aryan” is increasingly preferred over “Aryan” in scholarship, to avoid racial connotations. Early, Mature, and Late Harappan are the three chronological phases of the Indus Valley Civilisation. The Indus script remains undeciphered to date. Mohenjo-daro (Sindh, Pakistan) — known for the Great Bath and granaries. Dholavira (Gujarat) — known for its sophisticated water conservation system. Lothal (Gujarat) — known for its dockyard. Kalibangan (Rajasthan) — known for evidence of fire altars. Two competing frameworks on Indo-Aryan origins: Aryan Migration Theory (AMT) and Out-of-India Theory (OIT). AnSI’s ancient human skeletal repository and laboratory is located in Kolkata. Practice Mains Question “The Rakhigarhi excavations have reignited the scientific and historical debate on Indo-Aryan migration into India. Discuss the significance of archaeogenetic studies in understanding the Indus Valley Civilisation and the methodological challenges involved in interpreting such evidence.” GS Paper 1  |  150 words  |  10 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Match List-I (Harappan Site) with List-II (Distinctive Feature) and select the correct answer using the codes below: List-I A. Rakhigarhi B. Dholavira C. Lothal D. Kalibangan List-II 1. Dockyard 2. Fire altars 3. Largest site by area 4. Water conservation system AA-3, B-4, C-1, D-2 BA-4, B-3, C-2, D-1 CA-1, B-2, C-3, D-4 DA-2, B-1, C-4, D-3 Answer: A Rakhigarhi (Haryana) is the largest known Harappan site by area. Dholavira (Gujarat) is known for its sophisticated water conservation system. Lothal (Gujarat) is known for its dockyard. Kalibangan (Rajasthan) is known for evidence of fire altars. Article 08 CAG Report: Indian States Spent ₹1.9 Lakh Crore on Power Subsidies in a Year GS Paper 3 — Indian Economy, Fiscal Federalism, Government Budgeting Why in News The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), Shri K. Sanjay Murthy, released the State Finances 2024-25 report, showing that Indian states spent nearly ₹1.9 lakh crore on energy subsidies in 2024-25 — the largest component of their subsidy bill — even as interest payments on old loans exceeded total subsidy spending and put growing pressure on state budgets. Constitutional and Conceptual Basics Article 148 of the Constitution provides for an independent office of the CAG, the apex audit institution of India; Articles 149–151 deal with the CAG’s duties, powers, and the form of accounts of the Union and States. The current CAG, K. Sanjay Murthy, is the 15th CAG of India, in office since 21 November 2024, succeeding Girish Chandra Murmu. FRBM Act, 2003 (Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act) — targets a fiscal deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP for the Centre; States enact parallel FRBM legislation with similar targets, typically around 3% of GSDP. Revenue expenditure (recurring, e.g., salaries, subsidies, interest payments) is distinguished from capital expenditure (asset-creating, e.g., infrastructure) — a distinction central to understanding the “crowding out” concern raised in the report. “Crowding out” refers to a situation where committed, largely non-discretionary revenue expenditure (salaries, pensions, interest, subsidies) leaves little fiscal space for capital investment. Key Findings — Subsidy Spending Category Amount (2024-25) Share of Total Subsidy Total state subsidies ₹4.37 lakh crore ~9% of total state expenditure Energy/Power ₹1.89 lakh crore 43.4% Agriculture & allied ₹1.30 lakh crore ~29.7% Others (food, transport, industry, education, welfare) — 26.76% Energy and agriculture together accounted for about 73% of all state subsidies in 2024-25. Power subsidies were mainly used to support distribution companies (discoms), supply electricity at subsidised rates to domestic and agricultural consumers, and compensate for power-sector revenue losses. State subsidy expenditure rose 214% over the decade — from ₹1.39 lakh crore in 2015-16 to ₹4.37 lakh crore in 2024-25. Top Spenders — Energy Subsidy (2024-25) Rank State Energy Subsidy 1 Rajasthan ₹32,572 crore 2 Karnataka ₹26,701 crore 3 Madhya Pradesh ₹18,790 crore 4 Uttar Pradesh ₹17,392 crore 5 Maharashtra ₹16,094 crore Top Spenders — Agricultural Subsidy (2024-25) Rank State Agricultural Subsidy 1 Maharashtra ₹21,815 crore 2 Madhya Pradesh ₹16,600 crore 3 West Bengal ₹16,518 crore 4 Karnataka ₹12,902 crore 5 Gujarat ₹11,807 crore The Debt Burden Total public debt of states rose from ₹23.92 lakh crore in 2015-16 to a projected ₹75.52 lakh crore in 2024-25 — an increase of 216% over ten years. Outstanding state debt reached 186% of annual revenue receipts. Several states are reportedly using borrowings to cover revenue deficits rather than create capital assets, adding to fiscal pressure. Tamil Nadu had the highest public debt in absolute terms as of March 2025, at ₹7.98 lakh crore, followed by West Bengal (₹6.12 lakh crore), Rajasthan (₹5.02 lakh crore), and Andhra Pradesh (₹4.95 lakh crore). As a share of GSDP, Nagaland had the highest public debt at 41.5%, followed by Punjab (39.9%), Arunachal Pradesh (38.8%), and Meghalaya (36.6%). Public debt in 10 states exceeds 30% of GSDP; total liabilities in 13 states exceed the 32.8% of GSDP limit suggested by the Finance Commission. Less Room for Development Spending Interest payments stood at about ₹5.7 lakh crore in 2024-25, exceeding total subsidy spending by around ₹1.3 lakh crore. In 2024-25, states spent ₹7.71 lakh crore on employee salaries and about ₹5.12 lakh crore on pensions; together these accounted for roughly 25% of total state expenditure (about ₹12.84 lakh crore). Including grants-in-aid for salaries in autonomous institutions, universities, and local bodies, salary spending rises to ₹11.07 lakh crore, taking combined salary-and-pension spending to about ₹16.2 lakh crore. Rising debt, salaries, pensions, and interest payments are progressively reducing the fiscal space available for development schemes, infrastructure, and capital investment. Concerns Discom Financial Stress: persistent financial losses of power distribution companies underlie much of the growth in power subsidies. Fiscal Squeeze: states spending more on interest than on subsidies signals a structural debt-servicing burden, not a temporary shortfall. Capital Expenditure Crowding Out: committed revenue expenditure (salaries, pensions, interest, subsidies) is increasingly leaving little room for capital/development spending. FRBM Breaches: several states exceed the suggested 32.8% of GSDP total liabilities limit, raising medium-term fiscal sustainability concerns. Way Forward Discom Reform: address the root cause of rising power subsidies by improving distribution company efficiency and reducing revenue losses, building on schemes like UDAY (Ujwal Discom Assurance Yojana) and its successors. Targeted Subsidy Delivery: shift toward better-targeted, direct benefit transfer-based subsidy mechanisms to reduce leakages. Strengthen FRBM Compliance: states exceeding the suggested debt-to-GSDP limits should adopt credible medium-term fiscal consolidation roadmaps. Expenditure Reprioritization: rebalance state budgets to protect capital/development spending even amid rising committed expenditure. The CAG’s State Finances 2024-25 report underscores a structural fiscal squeeze across Indian states — rising debt, salaries, pensions, and interest payments are steadily crowding out the capital investment needed for long-term development. Power subsidies, as the single largest subsidy category, remain both a politically significant commitment and a key lever for fiscal consolidation going forward. Prelims Pointers CAG = Comptroller and Auditor General — established under Article 148 of the Constitution. Current CAG: K. Sanjay Murthy, 15th CAG of India, in office since 21 November 2024. State Finances 2024-25 report — published by the CAG. Power/Energy subsidy is the largest component of state subsidy spending in 2024-25 (43.4%). Agriculture is the second-largest subsidy category for states. FRBM Act, 2003 — fiscal responsibility legislation; targets a fiscal deficit ceiling of 3% of GDP for the Centre. The Finance Commission has suggested a total liabilities limit of 32.8% of GSDP for states. Tamil Nadu — highest absolute state public debt (₹7.98 lakh crore, March 2025). Nagaland — highest state debt as a share of GSDP (41.5%). Discom = Distribution Company — financial stress in this sector drives much of the rise in power subsidies. “Crowding out” — when committed revenue expenditure leaves little fiscal space for capital investment. Revenue expenditure (recurring: salaries, subsidies, interest) is distinct from capital expenditure (asset-creating: infrastructure). State subsidy expenditure grew 214% from 2015-16 to 2024-25. CAG audits the Consolidated Fund of India and of the States under Articles 149–151. In 2024-25, states spent more on interest payments (~₹5.7 lakh crore) than on total subsidies. Salaries and pensions together accounted for about 25% of total state expenditure in 2024-25. Practice Mains Question “Rising committed expenditure — salaries, pensions, interest payments, and subsidies — is increasingly crowding out capital investment in Indian states. Critically examine the findings of the CAG’s State Finances report and suggest measures to restore fiscal space for development spending.” GS Paper 3  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ Which one of the following statements regarding the CAG’s State Finances 2024-25 report is NOT correct? AEnergy/power subsidies were the largest component of state subsidy spending in 2024-25, accounting for 43.4% of the total. BTamil Nadu had the highest public debt in absolute terms among Indian states as of March 2025. CTotal state subsidy spending in 2024-25 exceeded total interest payments made by states during the same year. DTotal liabilities in 13 states exceed the 32.8% of GSDP limit suggested by the Finance Commission. Answer: C Statement C is incorrect and is therefore the correct answer to this “NOT correct” question — interest payments (~₹5.7 lakh crore) actually exceeded total subsidy spending (₹4.37 lakh crore) by around ₹1.3 lakh crore in 2024-25, not the other way around. Statements A, B, and D are correct as per the report. Article 09 Built in India, Served in India — How Unicorn Sarvam AI Plans to Inject Its Millions GS Paper 3 — Science and Technology, Digital India, Artificial Intelligence | GS Paper 2 — Government Policies (IndiaAI Mission) Why in News Bengaluru-based Sarvam AI became an AI unicorn after raising $300 million in Series B funding, led by HCLTech, taking its valuation past $1 billion. The company plans to direct 30–50% of the new funding toward procuring compute and GPU power, while scaling its “sovereign” AI offerings for Indian governments, defence, and enterprises. Foundational Concepts A “unicorn” is the standard term for a privately-held startup valued at $1 billion or more. “Sovereign AI” refers to nationally controlled AI infrastructure — compute, data, and models — aimed at reducing dependency on foreign AI providers and infrastructure. Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) — India’s foundational digital stack, including Aadhaar and UPI, is frequently cited as the base layer upon which sovereign AI ambitions such as Sarvam’s are being built. IndiaAI Mission — approved in January 2024 with a total outlay of ₹10,372 crore, structured around seven pillars: IndiaAI Compute Capacity, IndiaAI Innovation Centre, IndiaAI Datasets Platform, IndiaAI Application Development Initiative, IndiaAI FutureSkills, IndiaAI Startup Financing, and Safe & Trusted AI. About Sarvam AI Parameter Detail Founded August 2023, by Vivek Raghavan and Pratyush Kumar Headquarters Bengaluru Latest funding round $300 million, Series B Lead investor HCLTech Valuation Over $1 billion (unicorn status, achieved 15 June) IndiaAI Mission support One of 12 organisations selected; received financial and computing support up to ₹246.74 crore Compute allocation (new round) 30–50% of funds toward compute/GPU procurement Business Model and Focus Areas Over 90% of Sarvam’s current usage comes from revenue-generating business and government enterprise clients rather than individual consumers. The company describes its business model as closer to Anthropic’s than to a direct-to-consumer model like OpenAI’s — targeting governments, defence, large developers, and enterprises rather than individual users (B2G/B2B, not B2C). Sarvam is building a full-stack approach — spanning compute and cloud infrastructure, data centres, APIs, LLM training, and customer-facing products — which the company frames as the “sovereign” aspect of its work. According to investor Bessemer Venture Partners, Sarvam is among a small group of labs globally capable of pre-training competitive agentic AI models from scratch. Key Products Sarvam Samvaad — voice-based conversational AI, available in 11 Indian languages; plans to scale to a full-fledged software-as-a-service (SaaS) model. Sarvam Studio — AI content tool for dubbing and translation. Sarvam Akshar — AI document digitalisation tool, with active work to improve digitisation capabilities tailored for Indian government documents. New agentic and coding products are planned beyond the existing five products. Government and Enterprise Partnerships UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India) — for Aadhaar services enhancement. Governments of Odisha and Tamil Nadu — for AI compute infrastructure and data centres. Swiggy — Voice AI offerings. Pixxel — orbital data centres. Microsoft — developing a sovereign, “Indic” LLM for Azure. HCLTech — lead investor in the latest funding round, also an enterprise customer relationship. Expansion Plans Plans to set up a San Francisco office for frontier model research and to attract top talent, though no date has been finalised. The company says it will predominantly continue to hire in India, with exceptions for select individuals based in the US. Plans to raise additional funding rounds in the future, citing the capital-intensive nature of the AI industry. Strategic Significance AI Sovereignty Push: the company’s framing connects its growth to a broader Indian push for AI sovereignty, which it links to recent restrictions imposed by the United States government on access to certain foreign AI models — a characterisation offered by the company rather than an established government policy position. India-Specific Differentiation: Sarvam’s stated value proposition, unlike global labs such as OpenAI, Anthropic, or Mistral, is being purpose-built for Indian languages, documents, and region-specific use cases at a cost affordable to Indian enterprises and governments. Investor View: Bessemer Venture Partners has framed the coming decade as “India’s AI decade,” reflecting growing investor confidence in India-focused AI infrastructure plays. Concerns Compute Dependency: a large share of new funding going toward compute/GPU procurement highlights India’s continuing reliance on imported hardware for frontier AI development. Talent Retention vs. Global Expansion: the planned San Francisco office sits in some tension with the company’s India-first hiring philosophy and sovereign AI framing. Capital Intensity: the company itself acknowledges that the current funding, while substantial, will not be sufficient long-term given the capital-intensive nature of frontier AI development. Way Forward Scale up domestic compute capacity under the IndiaAI Mission’s Compute Capacity pillar to reduce reliance on imported GPUs over time. Deepen India-specific datasets and language coverage through the IndiaAI Datasets Platform pillar. Expand government partnerships for digital public service delivery while maintaining data security and sovereignty safeguards. Build a sustainable funding pipeline through a mix of domestic and global investors to support continued frontier research. Sarvam AI’s rise to unicorn status reflects India’s growing ambition to build indigenous, India-specific AI capability atop its existing Digital Public Infrastructure. Its government- and enterprise-first business model, contrasted with consumer-facing global labs, represents one distinctive strategic bet within India’s broader and still-evolving AI sovereignty push. Prelims Pointers Sarvam AI — Bengaluru-based AI start-up, founded August 2023. Founders: Vivek Raghavan and Pratyush Kumar. Sarvam’s Series B round: $300 million; lead investor: HCLTech. “Unicorn” — standard term for a privately-held startup valued at $1 billion or more. IndiaAI Mission — approved January 2024; total outlay ₹10,372 crore; structured around seven pillars. Sarvam was selected among 12 organisations under the IndiaAI Mission, receiving support up to ₹246.74 crore. “Sovereign AI” — nationally controlled AI compute, data, and models, reducing foreign dependency. Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) — India’s foundational digital stack (Aadhaar, UPI), cited as the base layer for sovereign AI ambitions. Sarvam’s government partners include UIDAI, and the governments of Odisha and Tamil Nadu. Sarvam Samvaad — voice-based conversational AI, available in 11 Indian languages. Sarvam’s business model is B2G/B2B (government, defence, enterprise) rather than direct B2C. Bessemer Venture Partners — investor; has termed the 2020s “India’s AI decade.” IndiaAI Innovation Centre — pillar of the IndiaAI Mission focused on indigenous foundational model development. Sarvam plans a San Francisco office for frontier research, while continuing predominantly India-based hiring. Practice Mains Question “India’s push for ‘sovereign AI’ reflects both a technological ambition and a strategic anxiety about dependency on foreign AI infrastructure. Discuss the rationale, opportunities, and challenges in building indigenous AI capability through initiatives like the IndiaAI Mission.” GS Paper 3  |  250 words  |  15 marks Prelims Practice MCQ With reference to Sarvam AI, which one of the following statements is correct? AIt is headquartered in Hyderabad and was founded in 2020. BIts primary business model is direct-to-consumer, similar to global chatbot applications. CIt was selected among 12 organisations to receive support under the IndiaAI Mission. DIts Series B funding round was led by the Government of India directly. Answer: C Sarvam AI was selected among 12 organisations to receive financial and computing support under the IndiaAI Mission. It is headquartered in Bengaluru and was founded in August 2023 (Option A is incorrect). Its business model is primarily B2G/B2B, not direct-to-consumer (Option B is incorrect). Its Series B round was led by HCLTech, a private enterprise, not the Government of India (Option D is incorrect).