In-Depth PIB Analysis3 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGS Paper II 01PMAY-Urban & PMAY-U 2.0: Housing for All Economy, Inclusive Growth & InfrastructureGS Paper III 02PM Vishwakarma: Three Years of Artisan Support03India Electric Mobility Index (IEMI) — 2nd Edition Polity, Governance & Social JusticeGeneral Studies Paper II 01 PMAY-Urban at a Crossroads: The First Mission Closes, PMAY-U 2.0 Takes Over GS-II · Welfare Schemes, Vulnerable Sections · GS-I · UrbanisationPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Housing & Urban Affairs · PIB Backgrounder, 16 Sep 2026 With the extended tenure of the original Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana–Urban (PMAY-U) ending on 30 September 2026, a Government backgrounder takes stock of India’s flagship urban housing mission and its successor, PMAY-U 2.0. ◈ Static Background — Housing as a Governance Question The Constitution does not list housing as a separate Fundamental Right. The Supreme Court, however, has read the right to shelter into the right to life under Article 21, and urban housing delivery sits largely with States and municipalities. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985): linked eviction of pavement dwellers to the right to livelihood under Article 21. Chameli Singh v. State of U.P. (1996): held that the right to shelter is part of the right to life — adequate living space, safe environment, basic amenities. 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992: the Twelfth Schedule (Article 243W) lists urban planning, slum improvement and upgradation and urban poverty alleviation as municipal functions. Scale of the need: the Technical Group on Urban Housing Shortage (2012) estimated a shortage of about 18.78 million units, with over 95% concentrated among EWS and LIG households. Global anchor: SDG Target 11.1 — access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services, and upgrading of slums, by 2030. Lineage — From JNNURM to PMAY-U 2.0 2005 — JNNURM (Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission): its BSUP (Basic Services to the Urban Poor) and IHSDP (Integrated Housing & Slum Development Programme) components funded slum housing in cities and towns. 2007 — National Urban Housing and Habitat Policy (NUHHP): set the goal of affordable housing for all with a focus on the urban poor. 2008–2013 — ISHUP (Interest Subsidy Scheme for Housing the Urban Poor), Affordable Housing in Partnership (2009) and Rajiv Awas Yojana (a “slum-free India” approach) — later subsumed. 25 June 2015 — PMAY-U launched with four verticals: In-situ Slum Redevelopment (ISSR), Credit-Linked Subsidy Scheme (CLSS), AHP and BLC; original tenure to March 2022, later extended to 30 September 2026 to complete sanctioned projects. July 2020 — Affordable Rental Housing Complexes (ARHCs): a sub-scheme introduced after the COVID-19 migrant crisis. August–September 2024 — PMAY-U 2.0 approved by the Union Cabinet for 1 crore additional families; ISSR dropped, CLSS replaced by the Interest Subsidy Scheme (ISS), and rental housing upgraded to a full vertical. ▤ Scheme at a Glance — PMAY-U 2.0 Nodal Ministry: Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA); delivered through States/UTs and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). Approving authority: Union Cabinet (2024); Government assistance of about ₹2.30 lakh crore (Centre + States) announced at approval. Tenure: 2024–2029 (five years). Target: financial assistance to 1 crore additional urban poor and middle-class families (government target). Income eligibility: EWS up to ₹3 lakh; LIG ₹3–6 lakh; MIG ₹6–9 lakh annual household income. Beneficiary family: husband, wife and unmarried children owning no pucca house anywhere in India; an adult earning member counts as a separate household; benefit under only one vertical. Unit assistance: up to ₹2.5 lakh per unit under BLC and AHP. Gender clause: house in the name of the woman head or in joint ownership. The Four Verticals of PMAY-U 2.0 Beneficiary-Led Construction (BLC): up to ₹2.5 lakh for EWS families to build a new pucca house on their own land, carpet area up to 45 sq m. Affordable Housing in Partnership (AHP): public or private agencies build 30–45 sq m units; Centre and State jointly contribute up to ₹2.5 lakh towards the purchase price for EWS buyers; a Technology Innovation Grant (TIG) is available for projects using alternative technologies. Affordable Rental Housing (ARH): short-term rental units for EWS/LIG — migrants, industrial and construction workers, working women, street vendors, the homeless and destitute — with water, sanitation and access roads. Interest Subsidy Scheme (ISS): subsidy on home loans sanctioned on or after 1 September 2024 for EWS/LIG/MIG; the Government’s published design offers 4% subsidy on the first ₹8 lakh of a loan (loan up to ₹25 lakh, house value up to ₹35 lakh), capped at ₹1.80 lakh, released in five yearly instalments. Figure 1 — The four components of PMAY-U 2.0 BLC and AHP support ownership; ARH addresses renters; ISS routes support through home loans. Image courtesy PIB / Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs; reproduced with credit for educational use. Progress So Far (as on 9 August 2026) The Ministry reports 1.25 crore houses sanctioned across PMAY-U and PMAY-U 2.0, of which more than 1 crore have been completed and delivered. It contrasts this with about 8 lakh urban houses completed under earlier schemes between 2005 and 2014. Figure 2 — Headline outcomes of PMAY-U and PMAY-U 2.0 About four in five sanctioned houses carry a woman’s name as owner or co-owner. Image courtesy PIB / Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs; reproduced with credit for educational use. Under PMAY-U 2.0 alone, 18.38 lakh houses have been sanctioned in its first two years — the distribution across verticals is heavily skewed towards self-construction. Figure 3 — PMAY-U 2.0 sanctions by vertical (lakh units, 9 Aug 2026) BLC14.40 (78.3%)AHP2.48 (13.5%)ISS1.36 (7.4%)ARH0.13 — 13,046 units (0.7%) Recreated from MoHUA data. Shares are of the 18.38 lakh total; rental housing remains marginal. Technology and Monitoring Architecture Unified Web Portal: single platform for application, verification, geo-tagging and fund release, linking beneficiaries, ULBs and States/UTs. Geo-tagging in five stages: grounding → foundation → superstructure → finishing & external development → completion. Technology Sub-Mission (TSM): under the Global Housing Technology Challenge–India (GHTC-India), 54 proven disaster-resilient technologies were shortlisted; six Light House Projects (LHPs) were built with six distinct technologies. Technology & Innovation Sub-Mission (TISM): its successor under 2.0 — green building standards and climate-responsive designs for different geo-climatic zones. Why It Matters Asset for the poor: a titled pucca house is often the largest asset a low-income urban household will own, improving access to credit and tenure security. Women’s agency: with 1 crore houses in women’s names or joint names, the mission is one of India’s largest channels of asset transfer to women. Convergence gains: linkage with Swachh Bharat Mission–Urban, AMRUT, Ujjwala and Saubhagya converts a house into a bundle of services — sanitation, water, clean fuel, electricity. The Critical View — Strengths and Structural Questions Ownership over renting: BLC accounts for about 78% of 2.0 sanctions, which presumes clear land title; the landless and circular migrants, who need rental housing, get 0.7% of units through ARH. Sanction–completion gap: up to about 25 lakh sanctioned houses remain to be completed as the first mission closes, raising questions on State matching shares and stalled projects. Location and occupancy: AHP units on city peripheries, far from jobs and transit, have faced low occupancy; output counts do not measure whether houses are lived in. Targeting dilution: inclusion of MIG households up to ₹9 lakh widens the base but may crowd out the poorest within a fixed budget. Slum strategy: dropping ISSR removes a land-as-resource model for in-place slum rehabilitation, though it had seen limited uptake. Strengths: scale, digital tracking, women-centric titling and adoption of alternative construction technologies mark a clear departure from earlier fragmented schemes. Way Forward Rental first for migrants: scale up ARH and push States to adopt the Model Tenancy Act, 2021 to unlock vacant stock. Outcome metrics: publish occupancy, service-connection and distance-to-work data alongside completion figures. Urban land reform: transit-oriented, inclusionary zoning so affordable housing is built near employment hubs. Closure audit of PMAY-U (2015–2026) to guide mid-course corrections in 2.0. ✎ Mains Practice Question “India’s urban housing policy has moved from building houses to building homes, but not yet to housing people where they work.” Critically examine this statement in the light of the evolution from PMAY-Urban to PMAY-U 2.0. 15 marks · 250 words Economy, Inclusive Growth & InfrastructureGeneral Studies Paper III 02 PM Vishwakarma at Three: Registration Target Met, Credit and Market Access Lag GS-III · Inclusive Growth, MSMEs, Employment · GS-II · Welfare SchemesPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of MSME · Release & PIB Backgrounder, 16 Sep 2026 Completing three years on 17 September 2026, the PM Vishwakarma scheme has registered its target of 30 lakh traditional artisans; the more telling test is how far training has translated into credit, markets and incomes. ◈ Static Background — India’s Artisan Economy Traditional artisans — carpenters, potters, blacksmiths, cobblers, tailors and others — work largely in the unorganised sector, on self-employment, with skills passed through the family or the Guru–Shishya parampara. Most lack formal credit, modern tools and market links. Name and date: named after Vishwakarma, the divine architect in Indian tradition; launched on Vishwakarma Jayanti, 17 September 2023, after Union Cabinet approval in August 2023. Institutional anchors for crafts: Khadi and Village Industries Commission (KVIC) (statutory, KVIC Act 1956); Development Commissioner (Handicrafts) under the Ministry of Textiles; TRIFED (1987) for tribal produce. Earlier artisan/micro-enterprise schemes: SFURTI (2005) for traditional-industry clusters; PMEGP (2008) for credit-linked subsidy; MUDRA (2015) for micro-loans; PM SVANidhi (2020) for street vendors. What is new: PM Vishwakarma is the first to bundle recognition, skilling, toolkit, credit, digital incentive and marketing into one end-to-end package for a defined set of trades. ▤ Scheme at a Glance — PM Vishwakarma Type and outlay: Central Sector Scheme, ₹13,000 crore for FY2023-24 to FY2027-28 (fully Centre-funded). Nodal Ministry: Ministry of MSME, with Ministry of Skill Development & Entrepreneurship (MSDE) for training and Department of Financial Services for credit. Three pillars: Samman (respect), Samarthya (capability), Samriddhi (prosperity). Coverage: 18 family-based traditional trades; target of 30 lakh beneficiaries — now achieved. Eligibility: age 18+, working with hands and tools in a notified trade, self-employed in the unorganised sector; one member per family; no similar credit-based self-employment loan in the past five years; government employees and their families excluded. Registration: only through Common Service Centres (CSCs); three-stage verification — Gram Panchayat/ULB → District Implementation Committee → Screening Committee. Formalisation: beneficiaries are onboarded on the Udyam Assist Platform as Informal Micro Enterprises, bringing them into the MSME ecosystem. The 18 Notified Trades (Prelims hook) Carpenter, boat maker, armourer, blacksmith, hammer and toolkit maker, locksmith, goldsmith, potter, sculptor/stone carver/stone breaker, cobbler/footwear artisan, mason, basket/mat/broom maker and coir weaver, traditional doll and toy maker, barber, garland maker, washerman, tailor and fishing net maker. Benefit Structure — Six Components Recognition: PM Vishwakarma Certificate and ID Card after verification. Skill upgradation: Basic Training of 5–7 days (40 hours) and optional Advanced Training of 15 days (120 hours), with a stipend of ₹500 per day. Toolkit incentive: up to ₹15,000 for modern tools, delivered to the doorstep through India Post. Credit support: collateral-free Enterprise Development Loans up to ₹3 lakh — first tranche ₹1 lakh (18 months) after Basic Training; second tranche ₹2 lakh (30 months) after repaying the first and adopting digital transactions or completing Advanced Training. Concessional rate: borrower pays a fixed 5%; the Government bears interest subvention of up to 8%; loans are backed by a credit guarantee. Digital and marketing support: ₹1 per digital transaction, up to 100 transactions a month; trade fairs, branding and listing on Government e-Marketplace (GeM) and other platforms. Figure 4 — The skilling pathway under PM Vishwakarma Assessment identifies the gap; Basic Training unlocks the first loan tranche; Advanced Training can unlock the second. Image courtesy PIB / Ministry of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises; reproduced with credit for educational use. Progress After Three Years (as of 15 September 2026) Figure 5 — Achievements reported by the Ministry of MSME Figures are cumulative since launch. Image courtesy PIB / Ministry of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises; reproduced with credit for educational use. Market outreach: over 30,000 artisans onboarded on e-commerce platforms including GeM and ONDC; an MoU with a large online marketplace for onboarding. New channels: stalls under One Station One Product (OSOP) for Divyangjan artisans (42+ beneficiaries, 14 States/UTs) and at airports under the Civil Aviation Ministry’s AVSAR scheme. Events: first PM Vishwakarma National Exhibition-cum-Trade Fair at Dilli Haat (17–31 January 2026); tribal artisan melas with TRIFED; packaging workshops with the Indian Institute of Packaging. AI skilling: over 12,000 artisans trained in AI tools for branding, design and packaging. Federal footprint: West Bengal onboarded the scheme in May 2026 and has registered 3,000 beneficiaries so far. Figure 6 — The conversion funnel: from registration to credit Registered30.00 lakh · 100%Basic Training24.37 lakh · 81%Toolkit received18.16 lakh · 61%Loan sanctioned6.19 lakh · 21% (₹5,316 crore)Percentages computed against the 30 lakh registrations. Recreated from Ministry of MSME data: the sharpest drop is between training and credit. Why It Matters Formalisation: identity, Udyam registration and a credit history pull informal artisans into the formal MSME and banking system. Livelihood and heritage together: supports non-farm rural and small-town employment while sustaining crafts linked to GI-tagged products and local cultural economies. Digital and inclusive finance: transaction incentives and collateral-free loans extend the JAM and financial inclusion architecture to a hard-to-reach group. The Critical View — Strengths and Structural Questions Credit conversion is thin: only about one in five registered artisans has received a loan; the average sanction of roughly ₹86,000 sits close to the first-tranche ceiling, so second-tranche uptake is not yet visible. Market access remains small: 30,000 e-commerce onboardings equal about 1% of registered beneficiaries; demand, design and logistics — not just listings — decide sales. Family-trade criterion: critics argue a “family-based traditional trade” test risks reinforcing hereditary, caste-linked occupations; some States, such as Tamil Nadu, chose their own artisan schemes instead. Training depth: a 5–7 day course may upgrade tool use but is unlikely to shift productivity or design capability on its own. Outcome evidence: reported indicators are outputs (registrations, kits, loans); independent data on income change and repayment are needed. Strengths: last-mile delivery via CSCs and India Post, a clear multi-stage verification chain and bundled support distinguish it from single-instrument schemes. Way Forward Credit push: bank-wise sanction targets and fast-tracking of second-tranche loans for repaying borrowers. Cluster and design linkage: converge with SFURTI clusters, One District One Product and design institutes to build saleable product lines. Occupation-neutral framing: define eligibility by skill and trade practised, reducing the perception of a lineage test. Third-party evaluation of income and enterprise outcomes before the scheme ends in FY2027-28. ✎ Mains Practice Question PM Vishwakarma seeks to convert traditional artisans into formal micro-entrepreneurs. Evaluate its design and three-year performance, and suggest measures to improve credit and market outcomes. 15 marks · 250 words 03 Second India Electric Mobility Index: States Improve, but the Median Remains Low GS-III · Infrastructure (Energy), Environment · GS-II · Cooperative FederalismPrelims + MainsPIB · NITI Aayog · Release, 16 Sep 2026 NITI Aayog released the second edition of the India Electric Mobility Index (IEMI) at a workshop on State EV policies, framing electric mobility as an economic, environmental and strategic priority for Viksit Bharat 2047. ◈ Static Background — NITI Aayog’s State Indices and India’s EV Policy NITI Aayog (National Institution for Transforming India) replaced the Planning Commission on 1 January 2015. One of its tools of competitive and cooperative federalism is ranking States on thematic indices. Sister indices: SDG India Index (2018), Composite Water Management Index (2018), Export Preparedness Index (2020) and State Energy & Climate Index, among others. IEMI first edition (August 2025): scores all States and UTs out of 100 on 16 indicators under three themes — Transport Electrification Progress (demand), Charging Infrastructure Readiness and EV Research & Innovation Status (supply side). Policy lineage: National Electric Mobility Mission Plan (NEMMP) 2020, launched in 2013 → FAME India Phase I (2015) → FAME II (2019) → PM E-DRIVE (2024). Other pillars: PM e-Bus Sewa (2023) for city buses; PLI for Automobiles & Auto Components and PLI for Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) batteries; concessional 5% GST on EVs. National ambition: an EV share of 30% of new vehicle sales by 2030, linked to India’s net-zero by 2070 commitment. ▤ Index at a Glance — IEMI 2nd Edition Released by: NITI Aayog, at the Workshop on State EV Policies. State policy coverage: 29 of 36 States and UTs have notified EV policies. Score movement (one year): highest State score 77 → 84; median score 36 → 40. Central support cited: over ₹92,000 crore across FAME, PM E-DRIVE, PM e-Bus Sewa and the two PLI schemes. New charging tool: the Unified Bharat e-Charge app, intended to make charging points easier to locate and use. Priorities urged for States: electrify public transport in select cities, ensure spatially distributed, reliable charging, invest in research and innovation. Figure 7 — IEMI scores: first vs second edition (out of 100) Highest State score77 · 1st edition84 · 2nd editionMedian score36 · 1st edition40 · 2nd edition Recreated from NITI Aayog figures: the leader gained 7 points, but half the States still score 40 or below. Why It Matters — The Case Made at the Launch Energy security: India imports about 89% of its crude oil; NITI Aayog argues this dependence will rise with car ownership unless EVs spread. The recent West Asia crisis was likened to the 1970s oil shocks as a possible inflection point. Industrial stakes: the automotive sector contributes around 7.1% of GDP and supports about 1.9 crore jobs, so falling behind the global shift carries economic risk. Global pace (2025, as cited): electric cars formed roughly one-tenth of new car sales in the US, over a quarter in the EU and over half in China. Public health: vehicular emissions add heavily to urban air pollution, notably in Delhi-NCR. Federal design: the index treats diverse State strategies — shaped by industrial base, fiscal capacity and geography — as a strength, provided States learn from each other. The Critical View — Strengths and Structural Questions Wide inter-State gap: a median of 40 against a top score of 84 shows electric mobility is concentrated in a few advanced States and metros. Battery and minerals dependence: cells and critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt and nickel are largely imported, shifting import dependence from oil to battery supply chains unless domestic ACC manufacturing and the National Critical Mineral Mission deliver. Grid carbon intensity: with coal still the largest source of power, lifecycle emission gains depend on the pace of renewable energy addition. Fiscal trade-off: falling fuel sales erode excise and VAT revenue, while State road-tax waivers add to costs. Headline support figure: the ₹92,000 crore total includes the auto-component PLI, which is not exclusively for EVs. Strengths: a transparent, repeatable scorecard creates peer pressure among States and grounds policy in data. Way Forward Bus and three-wheeler first: high-utilisation fleets give the fastest fuel and emission returns. Charging as public infrastructure: interoperable, reliable networks along highways and in tier-2/3 towns, not just metros. Battery ecosystem: recycling rules, battery swapping standards and domestic cell manufacturing. Peer learning: use index findings to pair leading and lagging States. ✎ Mains Practice Question Electric mobility is often presented as a solution to India’s energy-security and air-pollution challenges. Discuss the role of States in this transition and the structural constraints that could slow it. 15 marks · 250 words

Editorials, Opinions & Explained3 Items Core TopicImportantConcise EditorialsGS Papers II & III 01BRICS Local Currency Trade & India’s Calculus02Pygmy Hog & Floodplain Grasslands OpinionsGS Papers I & II · Essay 03Nationalism, Diaspora & the Question of Loyalty EditorialsInternational Relations · Economy · Environment 01 Currency Conundrum: Why BRICS Local Currency Trade Is Not a Simple Choice for India Core TopicEditorialGS-II · IR — Groupings Involving India · GS-III · External SectorPrelims + MainsThe Hindu The New Delhi Declaration of the 18th BRICS Summit endorses local currency trade but offers no concrete mechanism; the editorial argues that India’s own conflicting interests as an exporter, importer and China-wary partner explain the caution. ◈ Static Background — BRICS from Acronym to Institution 2001: the term “BRIC” was coined by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill to describe fast-growing emerging economies — Brazil, Russia, India, China. 2006: the first BRIC Foreign Ministers’ meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly; 2009: first leaders’ summit at Yekaterinburg, Russia. 2010–11: South Africa joined, turning BRIC into BRICS. 2014 (Fortaleza Summit): agreements on the New Development Bank (NDB), headquartered in Shanghai, and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) of US$100 billion for balance-of-payments support. Expansion: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE joined in January 2024; Indonesia in January 2025. Saudi Arabia was invited in 2023, and the 2026 Chairship lists it among members. India’s Chairships: 2012, 2016, 2021 and 2026 — the fourth, coinciding with the bloc’s 20th anniversary. Figure 1 — BRICS membership as listed for India’s 2026 Chairship Expansion has made BRICS more diverse — and consensus on financial questions harder. Image courtesy PIB / brics2026.gov.in; reproduced with credit for educational use. ▤ The 18th Summit and the Declaration Venue and dates: Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, 12–13 September 2026. Chairship theme: “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.” On payments: the Declaration asks the BRICS Payment Task Force to keep working on interoperable cross-border payments and settlement in local currencies. Key qualifier: local currency trade is to be promoted “while respecting national priorities”, acknowledging there is no one-size-fits-all approach. India’s stated position: the Ministry of External Affairs said there is no proposal for a BRICS currency; local currency settlement is seen as a complement to, not a replacement for, the global payments system. Key Concepts — Local Currency Trade vs a BRICS Currency Local currency settlement: trading partners invoice and pay in their own currencies (for example rupee–dirham), cutting conversion costs and exposure to the US dollar. Common BRICS currency: a single unit shared by members — India has opposed this, largely owing to the likelihood of Chinese dominance. India’s tools: RBI’s July 2022 framework for international trade settlement in rupees through Special Rupee Vostro Accounts (SRVAs); a Local Currency Settlement System with the UAE (2023). De-dollarisation: the broader effort to reduce reliance on the dollar for trade, reserves and payments, sharpened by sanctions on some members. The Editorial’s Argument The editorial reads the Declaration’s cautious wording as evidence of intra-BRICS differences, and suggests India may have been among those stressing national priorities. It notes that, per the Commerce Ministry, India’s rupee trade with BRICS partners is limited to the UAE and Russia, in small volumes. The Russia experience: Russia accumulated rupees it struggled to spend; new outlets, such as importing petroleum products from India, remain a trickle, the editorial says. Third-currency workaround: India has used the UAE dirham to pay for Russian oil — treating any BRICS currency as “local”. Exporter’s interest: a depreciating rupee means each export dollar fetches more rupees, so India prefers dollar receipts. Importer’s interest: as a major importer, India would like to pay in cheaper local currencies — a contradiction it must eventually resolve. The yuan problem: China accounts for about two-thirds of BRICS exports, so BRICS local currency trade would largely become yuan trade. Tariff risk: the U.S. President has threatened 100% tariffs on countries adopting a BRICS currency; India, the editorial argues, will not court this lightly. Figure 2 — India’s competing interests in BRICS local currency trade India’s choicelocal currency trade?As exporterprefers dollar receiptsAs importerprefers cheaper currenciesChina factor~2/3 of BRICS exports → yuanU.S. factortariff threat on BRICS currency Two economic pulls and two strategic constraints shape India’s incremental approach. Critical Analysis In favour of expanding local currency trade: Lower transaction costs and reduced exchange-rate risk from double conversion through the dollar. Resilience against sanctions-related payment disruptions with partners such as Russia and Iran. A gradual path to rupee internationalisation, building on RBI’s rupee settlement framework and payment links such as UPI. Against a rapid push, as the editorial suggests: Trade imbalances leave surplus partners holding rupees they cannot easily use, as Russia’s experience showed. In practice, the BRICS framework risks becoming yuan-centric, strengthening China’s financial leverage. India lacks a pressing reason to exit the dollar, unlike Iran and Russia, and faces possible U.S. trade retaliation. Way Forward Bilateral, need-based arrangements (as with the UAE) rather than a bloc-wide mandate. Deepen rupee usability — investment avenues for SRVA balances in Indian government securities and wider convertibility steps. Payment interoperability through fast-payment links, which reduce costs without choosing a currency bloc. Keep a firm distinction between local currency settlement (supported) and a common BRICS currency (opposed). ✎ Mains Practice Question India supports local currency settlement within BRICS but opposes a common BRICS currency. Examine the economic and strategic reasons behind this position. 15 marks · 250 words 02 Hog in the Limelight: Saving the Pygmy Hog Means Saving Assam’s Grasslands ImportantEditorialGS-III · Environment — Biodiversity, Species ConservationPrelims + MainsThe Hindu Assam’s captive breeding programme has raised the pygmy hog population 32-fold in three decades; the editorial argues that survival in the wild now depends less on breeding and more on restoring the alluvial floodplain grasslands the species needs. ◈ Static Background — The Species and Its Habitat Identity: Porcula salvania, described by B.H. Hodgson in 1847; the sole species of the genus Porcula and the world’s smallest wild suid (pig family). Status: Endangered on the IUCN Red List; Schedule I of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972. Habitat: tall, wet alluvial grasslands of the Himalayan foothills (Terai–Duar belt); it builds a grass nest with a “roof”, unusual among mammals. Indicator species: its presence reflects grassland health; the same habitat supports the Bengal florican, hispid hare, hog deer and greater one-horned rhinoceros. Linked species: the host-specific pygmy hog-sucking louse depends entirely on the hog — a case of possible co-extinction. Figure 3 — Pygmy hog at a glance Uncontrolled burning, grazing and succession of grassland into woodland are the principal threats. Infographic reproduced with credit to the original publisher for educational use. ▤ Protected Areas to Know (Assam) Manas National Park: UNESCO World Heritage Site (1985), Tiger Reserve and Biosphere Reserve; holds the last surviving natural population in the Panbari grasslands. Orang National Park: on the north bank of the Brahmaputra; a major reintroduction site. Sonai Rupai Wildlife Sanctuary: site of the first reintroduction (2008). Grassland patches flagged for defragmentation: Rupahi and Kanchanbari. Figure 4 — From “extinct” to recovery: a timeline 1847Described~1950sFearedextinct1971Rediscovered1995ConservationProgramme2008Firstreintroduction2025~250 in wild2040Target:300 wild Captive breeding has built an insurance population; the 2040 target now hinges on habitat. The Editorial’s Argument Causes of decline: floodplains converted to farms, tea plantations and flood-control works, plus invasive plants, altered flood cycles and unscientific grassland burning. Captive breeding is demanding: suids are highly vulnerable to swine diseases, so breeders must track pedigree, follow biosafety protocols and condition animals before release. Uncertain numbers: the elusive species is hard to count; the Durrell Wildlife Conservation Trust estimated about 250 in early 2025, while the programme’s infographic puts it at fewer than 350. Genetic risk: low genetic diversity and accumulation of harmful gene variants threaten long-term fitness. Management paradox: widespread dry-season fires destroy dense cover, but suppressing natural processes lets trees and shrubs convert grassland to woodland. Key Concepts Ex-situ vs in-situ conservation: captive breeding (ex-situ) buys time; long-term survival requires habitat protection (in-situ). Ecological succession: without periodic floods or fire, grassland gradually turns into shrub and woodland. Umbrella species: protecting one species’ habitat protects many co-occurring species. Critical Analysis In favour of the current approach: a 32-fold rise shows that sustained State–NGO–international partnership can reverse near-extinction, and reintroductions have created additional wild populations. Against complacency: grasslands are often treated as “wastelands” in land-use policy, receive less attention than forests, and remain fragmented; captive stock alone cannot secure evolutionary fitness. Way Forward Reverse fragmentation in protected grasslands, especially Rupahi and Kanchanbari, as the editorial recommends. Restore buffer zones around Manas, Orang and Sonai Rupai. Science-based fire and grazing regimes that mimic natural disturbance without destroying cover. Genetic management of captive and wild stock, and a national grassland conservation policy. ✎ Mains Practice Question “The conservation of flagship species is ultimately the conservation of ecosystems.” Discuss with reference to the pygmy hog and India’s floodplain grasslands. 10 marks · 150 words OpinionsSociety · Polity · Essay 03 Territory, Culture and Citizenship: The Diaspora and the Question of National Loyalty ImportantOpinionGS-I · Society — Nationalism, Secularism · GS-II · Citizenship, DiasporaMains + EssayThe Hindu A recent public statement in London — that people of Indian origin who are citizens of another country owe their loyalty to their country of residence — prompts the author to examine whether national loyalty is defined by faith, culture, territory or citizenship. ◈ Static Background — Two Ideas of the Nation Nationalism is a shared sense among a people that they form one community. Political theory broadly distinguishes civic/territorial from ethnic/cultural nationalism, a contrast associated with Hans Kohn’s The Idea of Nationalism (1944). Territorial nationalism: all who live within a territory form the nation, irrespective of religion, language or ethnicity. Cultural nationalism: all who share a culture, religion or ancestry form the nation, wherever they live. Nation as a construct: Ernest Renan (1882) called the nation a “daily plebiscite”; Benedict Anderson (1983) described nations as “imagined communities”. Indian national movement: blended both — Jawaharlal Nehru’s The Discovery of India (1946) presented a territorial nation drawing on shared civilisational culture, and composite nationalism stressed unity amid diversity. Diaspora roots of the freedom struggle: India House, London (1905), the Ghadar Party (1913) in North America, and Gandhi’s formative years in Britain and South Africa. ▤ Constitutional and Legal Framework on Citizenship Part II (Articles 5–11): citizenship at commencement, based largely on birth and domicile — not religion. Article 9: a person who voluntarily acquires foreign citizenship ceases to be an Indian citizen — India does not permit dual citizenship. Citizenship Act, 1955: citizenship by birth, descent, registration and naturalisation; the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) scheme (Section 7A, operational from 2005) is a lifelong visa-like status, not citizenship, with no voting rights. Secularism: Articles 14, 15 and 25–28; “secular” added to the Preamble by the 42nd Amendment (1976); held part of the basic structure in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994). Fraternity: the Preamble pairs fraternity with the unity and integrity of the Nation, a civic rather than faith-based bond. Diaspora institutions: the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora (2000–02); Pravasi Bharatiya Divas on 9 January, marking Gandhi’s return from South Africa in 1915. Scale: the author notes that about 1.5 lakh Indians give up Indian citizenship each year on average. Figure 5 — Territorial vs cultural conceptions of the nation Territorial / CivicCultural / EthnicMembership: residence and citizenshipMembership: shared culture or ancestryBoundary: the territoryBoundary: community, across bordersLoyalty: to the state one lives inLoyalty: tied to shared identity In practice the two overlap: territorial nationalism uses cultural symbols, and cultural nationalism makes territorial claims. The Author’s Argument The trigger: a statement in London on 6 September 2026 that people of Indian origin holding foreign citizenship should side with their karmabhoomi (land of residence and work) in any conflict of interest, while drawing values from their janmabhoomi (land of origin). Territory and culture intertwined: the author notes that no conception of the nation is purely territorial or purely cultural, since people and ideas cross borders and borders themselves change over time. Globalisation’s complication: migration and the backlash against it have made the link between culture, territory and belonging harder to settle. Diaspora dilemmas: migrants may carry dual emotional attachments — for instance in sporting loyalties — and, the author says, sometimes transplant caste, sect and religious divisions to new countries. Changing context abroad: the growing visibility of Indian-origin communities in Western politics has coincided with rising nativism, which questions whether migrants of a different faith can be loyal citizens. The consistency test: the author argues that if loyalty abroad rests on residence and citizenship rather than faith, the same standard must apply to all citizens within India — echoing Nehru’s advice that Indians abroad identify with their adopted countries. Critical Analysis In favour of a citizenship-based standard of loyalty: It matches India’s constitutional design, where citizenship rests on birth, descent, registration and naturalisation, never on religion. A uniform standard for all citizens strengthens fraternity and equality before law (Article 14). It helps Indian-origin communities abroad answer nativist suspicion by affirming civic loyalty to host states, supporting India’s soft power. Against, or complicating, the argument: Many hold that cultural or civilisational identity and civic loyalty are complementary layers, not rival claims. The diaspora (foreign citizens abroad) and citizens at home are in legally different positions, so direct comparison has limits. Multiple identities — cultural ties to a homeland alongside political loyalty to a state — are normal in a globalised world and need not imply divided allegiance. Way Forward Anchor public debate on belonging in constitutional citizenship and the values of justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. Frame diaspora engagement around culture, trade and knowledge ties, respecting the political sovereignty of host nations. Encourage diaspora communities to avoid importing sectarian and caste divisions into host societies. ✎ Mains Practice Question Distinguish between territorial and cultural nationalism. How does the Indian Constitution resolve the question of national belonging, and what challenges does a large diaspora pose to this framework? 15 marks · 250 words

In-Depth News Analysis8 Items Core TopicImportantConcise International RelationsGS Paper II 01India–Pakistan 1991 Agreement & Naval Collision02Oman’s Sohar Port & India’s Gulf Energy Access03UK Devolved Nations & the Cardiff Agreement Economy, Labour & InfrastructureGS Paper III 04EPFO Wage Ceiling Raised to ₹25,00005Railways: High-Density Network & Multitracking Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 06Sumatran vs Asian Elephants & Indonesian Wildfires Society, Gender & CultureGS Paper I 07Dadasaheb Phalke Award 2024 — Anant Nag08Global Gender Gap Index 2026 — India 131st International RelationsGeneral Studies Paper II 01 Naval Collision at Sea: India Invokes the 1991 India–Pakistan Agreement on Military Exercises GS-II · IR — India and its Neighbourhood · GS-III · SecurityPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express India summoned Pakistan’s Chargé d’Affaires after a Pakistani ship collided with an Indian Navy vessel on 15 September 2026, calling the conduct a direct contravention of Article 10 of the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements. ◈ Static Background — Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) Confidence-Building Measures are agreed rules that reduce the risk of war by misperception — through transparency, notification and communication. Between India and Pakistan, most formal CBMs emerged in the 1980s–2000s, after the 1971 war and the Simla Agreement (1972). Drivers in the 1980s: advancing nuclear weapons programmes in both countries raised the cost of war; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979) made Pakistan and the U.S. keen on a calm eastern border. 10 March 1983: Agreement establishing an India–Pakistan Joint Commission. January 1987 — Exercise Brass Tacks: a large Indian exercise in Punjab and Rajasthan (reportedly about 1.5 lakh troops) alarmed Pakistan and triggered a near-crisis — the direct trigger for the 1991 notification regime. 31 December 1988: Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities and a Cultural Cooperation Agreement. 6 April 1991: the Advance Notice agreement and a companion Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations and permitting overflights and landings by military aircraft. ▤ The 1991 Agreement at a Glance Purpose: a mechanism to inform each other of exercises and troop movements to prevent a crisis arising from misreading intentions. Scope: rules for land, naval and air forces; major exercises close to the border to be avoided, or notified in advance if held. Naval “major exercise”: six or more ships of destroyer/frigate size and above, exercising together and crossing into the other’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Article 10: naval ships and submarines of either country must not close within 3 nautical miles (about 5.5 km; 1 NM ≈ 1.85 km) of each other in international waters. Clarification clause: either side may seek clarification on assembly of forces, direction, extent and duration of an exercise. Last comparable incident: 16 June 2011 — Pakistani warship PNS Babur brushed past INS Godavari in the Gulf of Aden, damaging its helicopter safety net. Figure 1 — Evolution of India–Pakistan military CBMs 1972SimlaAgreement1983JointCommission1987Brass Tackscrisis1988Nuclearinstallations pact1991Advance notice +airspace pacts2011Babur–Godavariincident2026ShipcollisionMost CBMs followed moments of crisis or heightened nuclear risk. The 1991 agreement grew directly out of the 1987 Brass Tacks scare. Maritime Law Context UNCLOS (1982): the EEZ extends up to 200 nautical miles from baselines; beyond territorial waters (12 NM), warships enjoy freedom of navigation but must show due regard for others. COLREGs (1972): the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea set universal rules on safe speed, right of way and look-out. Bilateral rules add a stricter layer: the 3 NM stand-off under Article 10 goes beyond general law, reflecting the risks of close encounters between rival navies. Why It Matters Escalation risk: close encounters between warships of nuclear-armed neighbours can escalate quickly without agreed rules and communication. Durability of CBMs: India’s invocation shows the 1991 framework remains legally live even when political dialogue is frozen. Diplomatic channel: the summons of a Chargé d’Affaires reflects downgraded diplomatic ties, with no High Commissioners in place since 2019. Critical View and Way Forward Limitation: CBMs lack enforcement or dispute mechanisms; compliance depends on political will. Gaps: no dedicated naval incidents-at-sea agreement (like the U.S.–USSR INCSEA, 1972) or real-time naval hotline exists between the two navies. Way forward: joint investigation of the incident, activation of DGMO/naval communication channels, and exploring an INCSEA-type protocol for the Arabian Sea. ✎ Mains Practice Question Confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan have survived periods of hostility but have rarely prevented crises. Examine their relevance with reference to the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises. 15 marks · 250 words 02 Beyond Hormuz: Oman Pitches Sohar Port for Indian Investment GS-II · IR — India and West Asia · GS-III · Energy Security, InfrastructurePrelims + MainsThe Hindu With shipping through the Strait of Hormuz disrupted by Iran–U.S. hostilities, Oman has invited Indian investment in Sohar Port and Freezone, located on the Gulf of Oman outside the strait. ◈ Static Background — Geography and India–Oman Ties Strait of Hormuz: the narrow link between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman / Arabian Sea, bordered by Iran to the north and Oman’s Musandam peninsula to the south — the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint. Oman: Sultanate on the south-eastern Arabian Peninsula; capital Muscat; member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); long a neutral mediator in regional disputes. Strategic partnership: India and Oman are strategic partners since 2008; Oman was India’s first Gulf partner for joint military exercises across all three services. Duqm: India secured access to Duqm Port for military logistics and maintenance in 2018. Trade: the India–Oman Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was signed in December 2025. Figure 2 — Sohar Port lies on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz Ships using Sohar need not transit Hormuz, and the port sits near UAE and Saudi energy pipeline routes. Base map courtesy original publisher; Sohar Port and Strait of Hormuz marked by Legacy IAS for educational use. ▤ Sohar Port — Key Facts Location: north-eastern Oman, on the Batinah coast of the Gulf of Oman, between Muscat and the UAE border. Scale: investments of over US$30 billion; capacity to handle about 72 million tonnes of cargo a year, as stated by Sohar officials. Advantage over Duqm and Salalah: proximity to energy pipelines of the UAE and eastern Saudi Arabia, allowing Gulf energy to reach the sea bypassing Hormuz. Model: a port-cum-Freezone integrated industrial and logistics platform; Indian firms already operate there. Why It Matters for India Energy security: India imports most of its crude oil and a large share of LPG and LNG from the Gulf; a Hormuz disruption threatens supply and prices. Route diversification: pipelines such as the UAE’s Habshan–Fujairah line already bypass the strait; access to ports like Sohar adds redundancy. Maritime strategy: complements India’s presence at Duqm and Chabahar (Iran), and the SAGAR / MAHASAGAR vision of Indian Ocean engagement. Economic diplomacy: investment in Gulf free zones can support Indian manufacturing and re-export to West Asia and Africa. Challenges Pipeline dependence: bypass capacity is limited compared with the volume normally moving through Hormuz. Regional volatility: the Gulf of Oman itself is not immune to attacks on shipping. Competition: Chinese investment in Gulf and Omani ports shapes the commercial landscape. ✎ Mains Practice Question Chokepoint vulnerability is a central challenge to India’s energy security. Discuss the importance of Oman in India’s strategy to secure uninterrupted energy supplies from West Asia. 10 marks · 150 words 03 United No More? Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland Signal Push for Independence Referendums GS-II · IR — Developed Countries’ Politics · Comparative ConstitutionsPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express The First Ministers of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, together with the leader of the opposition in the Republic of Ireland, signed the “Cardiff Agreement”, a memorandum asserting their nations’ right to self-determination and calling on London to facilitate constitutional change. ◈ Static Background — How the United Kingdom Was Formed British Isles: over 6,000 islands in north-western Europe; the two largest are Great Britain and Ireland. Wales: conquered by England in the late 1200s; legally annexed to the Kingdom of England by an Act of Union in 1536. 1707 — Acts of Union: England and Scotland united as the Kingdom of Great Britain. 1801 — Acts of Union (1800): after the failed 1798 Irish rebellion, Ireland joined, forming the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 1922: after the Anglo-Irish War (1919–21), most of Ireland became independent; six counties formed Northern Ireland within the UK, now the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Devolution (1998): the Scotland Act, Government of Wales Act and Northern Ireland Act created devolved legislatures; the Good Friday Agreement (1998) provides for a possible border poll on Irish unification. Figure 3 — The four nations of the United Kingdom UK = England + Scotland + Wales + Northern Ireland; Great Britain = England + Scotland + Wales. Image courtesy The Indian Express, 17 September 2026; reproduced with credit for educational use. ▤ Referendums and Legal Position 2014 Scottish referendum (18 September): 55.3% No, 44.7% Yes, held under a Section 30 order of the Scotland Act, 1998 that temporarily transferred the power to legislate. 2022 UK Supreme Court ruling: the Scottish Parliament cannot unilaterally call a second referendum — the power lies with the UK Parliament. Northern Ireland border poll (1973): 98.9% voted to remain in the UK, amid a boycott by Irish nationalists. Wales: has never held an independence referendum. Recent polling (reported): support for independence at 47% in Scotland, 36% in Northern Ireland and 32% in Wales. Trigger: the UK Prime Minister said referendums for Scotland and Northern Ireland were not on the cards, while the U.S. President expressed support for Irish reunification. Comparative Lens — The UK and India Union model: the UK is a unitary state with devolution and no codified constitution; parliamentary sovereignty means Westminster can grant or withhold referendums. India: described as an “indestructible Union of destructible States” — Article 1 calls India a Union of States, and Article 3 lets Parliament reorganise States, but there is no right to secede. Anti-secession safeguards: the 16th Constitutional Amendment (1963) allowed reasonable restrictions on free speech in the interests of sovereignty and integrity and added this to the oaths of legislators. Lesson: asymmetric devolution can accommodate regional identity, but where it is perceived as insufficient, demands can shift from autonomy to independence. Why It Matters Post-Brexit strains: Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain in the EU in 2016, sharpening constitutional tensions. India–UK ties: constitutional uncertainty could affect the implementation climate for the India–UK Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). ✎ Mains Practice Question Compare the constitutional position on secession and regional autonomy in the United Kingdom and India. What explains the stability of the Indian Union despite its diversity? 15 marks · 250 words Economy, Labour & InfrastructureGeneral Studies Paper III 04 Cabinet Raises EPFO Wage Ceiling from ₹15,000 to ₹25,000 a Month GS-III · Employment, Inclusive Growth · GS-II · Social Security, WelfarePrelims + MainsThe Hindu · PIB The Union Cabinet raised the wage ceiling for mandatory coverage under the Employees’ Provident Fund Organisation (EPFO) from ₹15,000 to ₹25,000 a month — the first revision since 2014 — effective 17 September 2026. ◈ Static Background — India’s Provident Fund System Constitutional basis: Article 41 (DPSP) directs the State to secure public assistance in old age and disablement; Article 43 seeks a living wage; social security is in the Concurrent List (Entry 23). Statute: the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, now consolidated in the Code on Social Security, 2020. EPFO: a statutory body under the Ministry of Labour and Employment, governed by a tripartite Central Board of Trustees (CBT) of government, employers and workers. Three schemes: Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF, 1952) for savings; Employees’ Deposit Linked Insurance (EDLI, 1976) for death cover; Employees’ Pension Scheme (EPS, 1995) for pension. Coverage rule: applies to establishments with 20 or more employees; workers earning up to the wage ceiling must be enrolled, those above may join voluntarily. Ceiling history: raised from ₹6,500 to ₹15,000 in September 2014; unchanged for 12 years until now. ▤ How Contributions Work Employee: 12% of basic wage + dearness allowance, all to EPF. Employer: 12%, of which 8.33% goes to EPS (calculated on the wage ceiling) and 3.67% to EPF. Government: contributes 1.16% of wages (up to the ceiling) to EPS. Effect of new ceiling: the maximum monthly EPS share rises from ₹1,250 to about ₹2,082.5 (8.33% of ₹25,000). Fiscal cost: annual Government outgo estimated at about ₹11,339 crore, against existing budgetary support of about ₹10,250 crore. Coverage (government estimate): over 51 lakh additional employees brought under mandatory coverage; the Labour Ministry puts potential beneficiaries at up to 1 crore. Wage context: average salary in private establishments is about ₹23,000, per a government survey cited by the Ministry. Figure 4 — What changes with the new wage ceiling Wage ceiling (₹/month)15,000 (2014)25,000 (2026)Maximum EPS share (₹/month)1,250≈2,082.5Government budgetary support (₹ crore/year)10,250≈11,339 Recreated from Government figures: a 67% rise in the ceiling raises annual budgetary support by about 11%. Stakeholder Positions Government: expects wider access to PF savings, EPS pension and EDLI insurance, and better returns on savings. Trade unions: a central trade union called it “too little and too late”, arguing inflation since 2014 justified at least ₹30,000 and warning that take-home pay may fall if employers shift costs onto workers. MSME employers: an entrepreneurs’ body warned of cash-flow strain and a possible shift towards gig arrangements, seeking Government absorption of the increase for two years and EPFO software upgrades. Staffing industry: described it as a structural gain for formalisation. Critical Analysis Strengths: the move expands the formal social-security net for middle-wage workers, improves old-age income under EPS and aligns the ceiling more closely with prevailing private-sector wages. Take-home pay: higher mandatory deductions reduce immediate disposable income for newly covered workers. Informality incentive: higher labour costs could push small firms to under-report wages or use contract/gig engagements. No indexation: a 12-year gap between revisions erodes coverage in real terms; an automatic, inflation-linked review would be more predictable. Pension adequacy: the minimum EPS pension and the actuarial health of the pension fund remain long-standing concerns. Way Forward Periodic indexation of the ceiling to wages or inflation, decided through the tripartite CBT. Transitional support for MSMEs and simplified compliance through digital systems. Portability and extension of social security to gig and platform workers under the Code on Social Security, 2020. ✎ Mains Practice Question Raising the EPFO wage ceiling expands social security coverage but also raises the cost of formal employment. Critically examine this trade-off in the context of India’s efforts to formalise its workforce. 15 marks · 250 words 05 Decongesting the Rail Backbone: Multitracking the High-Density Network and New Freight Corridors GS-III · Infrastructure — Railways, LogisticsPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express Indian Railways has taken up multitracking — four lines instead of two — on all seven High-Density Network (HDN) routes, and is expediting the East–West Dedicated Freight Corridor, to relieve congestion that limits freight growth. ◈ Static Background — Railways and the Freight Economy Scale: a network of over 69,000 route-km; among the world’s largest freight carriers. Cross-subsidy: freight earns over 65% of revenue and subsidises passenger fares. Modal share: rail carries about 27% of India’s freight, having lost ground to roads as National Highways expanded. National Rail Plan (NRP): a long-term capacity plan targeting a rail freight modal share of 45% by 2030. Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Ltd (DFCCIL): set up in 2006 to build freight-only lines. Policy links: PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan (2021) and the National Logistics Policy (2022), which aim to cut logistics costs. Figure 5 — Indian Railways’ seven high-density routes About 16% of the network carries over 40% of total traffic. Map not to scale. Image courtesy The Indian Express, 17 September 2026 (source: Indian Railways); reproduced with credit for educational use. ▤ The Numbers Seven HDN routes: 11,051 km — about 16% of the network, carrying over 40% of traffic. Longest: Delhi–Chennai (2,040.63 km); shortest: Chennai–Howrah (1,116.85 km). Ideal vs actual use: HDNs should run at 70–80% of capacity, but only 4.6% of the network operates below 80%. Example of saturation: the 28-km Karjat–Lonavala ghat section near Mumbai sees about 67 trains each way daily against a capacity of 40. Freight speed: average freight train speed is only about 25 km/h. Loading: 1,670 million tonnes in 2025-26; target of 3,000 million tonnes by 2030. Recent approval: eight multitracking projects covering 1,196 km worth ₹20,804 crore; about 2,000 km of HDN routes are already four-line. Figure 6 — Projected line-capacity utilisation by 2031 without multitracking (share of network) Over 150%50%100–150%39%70–100%9%Source: National Rail Plan, as reported. Recreated by Legacy IAS. Without capacity addition, nearly nine-tenths of the network would be saturated or worse by 2031. Dedicated Freight Corridors (DFCs) Eastern DFC: Ludhiana (Punjab) – Sonnagar (Bihar); carries mainly coal and minerals from eastern India. Western DFC: connects JNPT and Mumbai and Gujarat ports (Pipavav, Mundra, Kandla) to Inland Container Depots in north India, mainly carrying ISO containers. Operational status: both corridors are fully operational, running about 420 freight trains a day on average. East–West DFC (under way): 1,738 km from Dankuni (West Bengal) to Surat (Gujarat), serving coal, iron ore, bauxite, steel, fertilisers and FCI godowns. In the pipeline, not yet sanctioned: East Coast corridor (Kharagpur–Vijayawada) and North–South corridor (Itarsi–Nagpur–Vijayawada). Critical Analysis and Way Forward Strengths: separating freight and passenger traffic raises speed, punctuality and safety, and shifting freight from road to rail lowers emissions and logistics costs. Challenges: land acquisition delays, high capital cost, last-mile connectivity gaps and the freight–passenger cross-subsidy that keeps rail freight tariffs high. Way forward: rationalise freight tariffs, expand Gati Shakti multimodal cargo terminals, ensure time-bound project completion and deploy Kavach automatic train protection on upgraded routes. ✎ Mains Practice Question Indian Railways’ declining share in freight transport is as much a capacity problem as a pricing problem. Discuss with reference to the high-density network and dedicated freight corridors. 15 marks · 250 words Environment & EcologyGeneral Studies Paper III 06 Wildfires Threaten the Critically Endangered Sumatran Elephant: How It Differs from India’s Asian Elephant GS-III · Environment — Biodiversity, Disaster (Forest Fires)Prelims + MainsThe Hindu (AFP) An Indonesian conservation group reported over 4,500 fire hotspots across 21 Sumatran elephant habitats between June and early September 2026, with more than 5.6 lakh hectares burned, pushing one of the world’s rarest elephants closer to the brink. ◈ Static Background — The Asian Elephant and Its Subspecies Two genera of living elephants: Loxodonta (African savanna and forest elephants) and Elephas (the Asian elephant, Elephas maximus). Asian elephant subspecies: Indian (E. m. indicus) on the mainland; Sri Lankan (E. m. maximus); Sumatran (E. m. sumatranus); and the Bornean elephant of Borneo. Sumatran elephant: endemic to the island of Sumatra, Indonesia; uplisted to Critically Endangered in 2011 owing to rapid habitat loss. India’s share: India holds the largest population of wild Asian elephants; the elephant is India’s National Heritage Animal (2010). Figure 7 — Sumatran elephant vs Indian (mainland Asian) elephant FeatureSumatran elephantIndian elephantScientific nameE. maximus sumatranusE. maximus indicusIUCN statusCritically EndangeredEndangered (species level)RangeSumatra island, IndonesiaIndia, Nepal, Bhutan, SE AsiaWild population~2,400–2,800 (WWF)India holds the largest shareMain threatsFires, palm oil, deforestationFragmentation, conflict, trains Same species, very different risk levels: an island subspecies with shrinking forests is far more vulnerable. ▤ Fire Impact (as reported) Hotspots: over 4,500 in 21 habitats (June–early September); over 2,800 in the first week of September alone, more than double August’s ~1,300. Area burned: over 5,60,000 hectares. Ecological effects: habitat loss and fragmentation, reduced food and water, altered movement patterns, and physiological stress from toxic smoke. Wider impact: fires across Sumatra and Borneo have caused regional haze. Why Indonesian Forests Burn Peatlands: drained peat soils store vast carbon and can smoulder underground for weeks, releasing heavy smoke. Land clearing: slash-and-burn clearing for oil palm and pulpwood plantations is a major ignition source. Climate: dry seasons intensified by El Niño conditions increase fire spread. Regional law: the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (2002) seeks cooperation on fire prevention and haze control. India’s Framework for Elephant Conservation Project Elephant (1992): a Centrally Sponsored Scheme for habitat, corridor and conflict management; now merged with Project Tiger as Project Tiger and Elephant. Legal protection: Schedule I of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972; CITES Appendix I. Monitoring: the MIKE (Monitoring the Illegal Killing of Elephants) programme under CITES. Key issues: human–elephant conflict, train collisions, and fragmentation of elephant corridors — lessons India shares with Sumatra. ✎ Mains Practice Question Forest fires are increasingly a threat to biodiversity rather than only a seasonal event. Discuss their causes and ecological impacts, drawing lessons for elephant conservation in India. 10 marks · 150 words Society, Gender & CultureGeneral Studies Paper I 07 Dadasaheb Phalke Award 2024: India’s Highest Film Honour Goes to Kannada Actor Anant Nag GS-I · Art & Culture — Indian Cinema, AwardsPrelims-orientedThe Hindu · PIB On the recommendation of the Dadasaheb Phalke Award Selection Committee, the Government announced that veteran actor Anant Nag will receive the Dadasaheb Phalke Award 2024 — making him only the second Kannada film artist honoured for work in Kannada cinema, after Dr. Rajkumar (1995). ◈ Static Background — Dadasaheb Phalke and the Award Dadasaheb Phalke (Dhundiraj Govind Phalke, 1870–1944): known as the “Father of Indian Cinema”; made Raja Harishchandra (1913), India’s first full-length feature film. Institution: instituted in 1969 by the Government of India to mark Phalke’s birth centenary; the first recipient was actress Devika Rani. Status: India’s highest award in cinema, for outstanding lifetime contribution to the growth and development of Indian cinema. Administering Ministry: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting; presented at the National Film Awards ceremony, by the President of India. Components: a Swarna Kamal (Golden Lotus) medallion, a shawl and a cash prize. Selection: a committee of eminent film personalities recommends the awardee; the award year refers to the year for which it is given, not the year of announcement. Figure 8 — Anant Nag, Dadasaheb Phalke Award 2024 recipient A career of more than five decades across mainstream and parallel cinema. Photo courtesy original publisher; reproduced with credit for educational use. 1973 Film debut — Kannada film Sankalpa 300+ Films, over 250 in Kannada 2025 Padma Bhushan conferred 22 Sep 72nd National Film Awards, Kevadia, Gujarat ▤ The Awardee — Key Facts Background: born Anant Nagarkatte in 1948 in Uttara Kannada district; began in Kannada, Marathi, Hindi and Konkani theatre, largely shaped in Mumbai. Range: worked in both mainstream and parallel (New Wave) cinema, including Hindi art-house films of the 1970s. State honours: five Karnataka State Film Awards, including a Lifetime Achievement award. Ceremony: to be presented at the 72nd National Film Awards on 22 September 2026 at Kevadia (Ekta Nagar), Gujarat. Karnataka connection: cinematographer V.K. Murthy (from Karnataka) received the award for 2008, but for work in Hindi cinema. Recipients from Southern Film Industries (Prelims hook) B.N. Reddi (1974) — Telugu; the first recipient from South India. Akkineni Nageswara Rao (1990) — Telugu; Dr. Rajkumar (1995) — Kannada; Sivaji Ganesan (1996) — Tamil. Adoor Gopalakrishnan (2004) — Malayalam; K. Balachander (2010) — Tamil; Rajinikanth (2019) — Tamil. Mohanlal (2023) — Malayalam; Anant Nag (2024) — Kannada. Significance Recognising regional cinema: the award highlights the contribution of language cinemas to India’s film culture beyond Hindi cinema. Soft power and heritage: Indian cinema is a major vehicle of cultural diplomacy and a record of social change. Theatre–cinema link: the awardee’s career reflects how regional theatre traditions fed into Indian film acting. ✎ Mains Practice Question Regional language cinemas have enriched India’s cultural identity and contributed to social reform. Discuss with suitable examples. 10 marks · 150 words 08 Global Gender Gap Index 2026: India Holds at 131st GS-I · Society — Role of Women · GS-II · Vulnerable SectionsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu (PTI) India retained its 131st rank in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index 2026, with its parity score edging up to 64.5% — still below the global average. ◈ Static Background — The Index Publisher: the World Economic Forum (WEF), Geneva; first released in 2006. Scoring: from 0 to 1 (0–100%), where 100% means full parity between women and men. Four sub-indices: Economic Participation & Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health & Survival and Political Empowerment. Measures gaps, not levels: it assesses relative gaps between men and women, not absolute development. ▤ 2026 Rankings Top three: Iceland, Finland and Norway, unchanged. Bottom three: Chad (last), Iran and Pakistan. India: 131st, score 64.5%, slight improvement but unchanged rank; 14 countries rank below India, including several West Asian and African states. Where India Lags and Why Economic participation: low female labour force participation, wage gaps and few women in senior roles pull the score down. Political empowerment: women’s share in Parliament and ministerial positions remains low; the Constitution (106th Amendment) Act, 2023 (Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam) reserves one-third of seats in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, operative after the next Census and delimitation. Health & survival: the sex ratio at birth weighs on this sub-index. Relative strength: near-parity in educational enrolment. Critical View Methodological critiques: the index relies on national averages and gives heavy weight to political representation, missing unpaid care work and local-government representation (where 73rd/74th Amendments reserve at least one-third of seats for women). Way forward: childcare and safe transport to raise women’s workforce participation, skilling, and timely operationalisation of legislative reservation. ✎ Mains Practice Question Despite progress in education and health, India continues to rank low on global gender parity indices. Examine the reasons and suggest measures to improve women’s economic and political participation. 15 marks · 250 words