Contents01 MANAS: A Digital Shield Against Drugs National Narcotics Helpline · Narcotics Control Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs GS 2GS 3 02 Strengthening Emergency Care: Enhanced Safety Provisions for Road Ambulances Draft AIS-125 Amendments · Ministry of Road Transport & Highways GS 3GS 2 Article 01 Article 01 MANAS: A Digital Shield Against Drugs National Narcotics Helpline · Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Ministry of Home Affairs · Launched 18 July 2024 Relevance: GS 2 (governance, citizen-centric service delivery, welfare architecture) · GS 3 (internal security, narco-terrorism, Digital Public Infrastructure). GS 2GS 3 Key Data at a Glance 18 Jul 2024date MANAS was launched by the Union Home Minister ~10 lakhconnection attempts on Helpline 1933 since launch (June 2026) 2,65,673drug-related inputs recorded on the MANAS portal 16,200+actionable leads escalated to NCB Zonal Units / ANTFs 30 + 36NCB Zonal Units and State/UT Anti-Narcotics Task Forces linked to MANAS 47,500+calls connected to professional counselling support Issue in Brief MANAS (Madak Padarth Nishedh Asoochna Kendra) — the National Narcotics Helpline — was launched on 18 July 2024 by the Union Home Minister under the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Ministry of Home Affairs, with Digital India Corporation (DIC) as technology partner. It is a secure, round-the-clock platform (helpline 1933, web portal, UMANG app, email) enabling anonymous reporting of drug offences and access to counselling and rehabilitation, advancing the Nasha Mukt Bharat vision. Static Background India's anti-narcotics legal architecture rests on the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985 (offences and penalties) and the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PITNDPS) Act, 1988 (preventive detention). NCB, constituted in 1986 under the NDPS Act, is the central nodal agency for drug-law enforcement and inter-ministerial coordination. The Narco-Coordination Centre (NCORD) mechanism was formed in 2016 and restructured in 2019 into a four-tier structure — Apex, Executive, State and District level committees. The National Investigation Agency (NIA) was empowered under the NDPS Act in 2020 to investigate narco-terrorism cases, reflecting the security dimension of drug trafficking. Key Dimensions — Architecture & Institutional Linkage MANAS was launched alongside the 7th NCORD Apex-level meeting, the inauguration of an NCB Zonal Office at Srinagar, and release of the NCB Annual Report 2023 and a Compendium on Nasha Mukt Bharat. Dual function: citizens can anonymously report trafficking, peddling and illicit cultivation, or seek help — counselling calls are transferred to the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment (MoSJE) Helpline 14446. Actionable tips flow to 30 NCB Zonal Units and 36 State/UT Anti-Narcotics Task Forces (ANTFs), each headed by an ADG/IG-rank officer functioning as the State NCORD secretariat. Digital ticket generation and workflow management enable faster information sharing with concerned agencies, improving coordination and response time. Key Dimensions — Impact & Outreach As of June 2026: nearly 10 lakh connection attempts since launch; 2,65,673 drug-related inputs logged; over 16,200 actionable leads escalated to NCB/ANTFs. 47,500+ calls connected to professional counselling; 32,900 citizens assisted for substance-abuse concerns; 12,800+ rehabilitation requests addressed. MyGov-hosted awareness drives — a Drug-Free India Quiz and poster/reel contests — have drawn youth participation, supplementing enforcement with prevention messaging. Planned upgrades include multilingual IVRS, chatbot integration and regional-language support to widen accessibility. Critical Analysis — Strengths Digital ticketing converts scattered public alertness into trackable, time-bound intelligence, embedding citizens as active partners rather than passive service recipients. Anonymity lowers the fear-of-retaliation barrier that typically suppresses reporting of trafficking and peddling, especially in vulnerable neighbourhoods. Convergence of enforcement (NCB/ANTF) and welfare (MoSJE counselling) within one architecture reflects a genuinely whole-of-government design. Critical Analysis — Structural Questions Reported metrics (calls, tickets, leads) measure activity, not outcomes — conviction rates under the NDPS Act or de-addiction success rates are not disclosed. MANAS's downstream effectiveness depends on ANTF capacity, which varies sharply by state; several ANTFs are still building basic infrastructure. Multilingual and chatbot access remain under development, meaning rural and non-Hindi/English-speaking citizens may face continued access barriers. Way Forward Commission independent outcome evaluation linking MANAS-generated leads to actual NDPS Act conviction rates, not just case registration numbers. Expedite rollout of multilingual IVRS and chatbot support to extend genuine reach beyond digitally literate, urban callers. Strengthen manpower and forensic capacity in under-resourced State ANTFs so leads translate into swift, sustained enforcement. Integrate MANAS analytics with NCORD dashboards for pattern-based, predictive identification of trafficking corridors. Prelims Pointers MANAS: Madak Padarth Nishedh Asoochna Kendra; launched 18 July 2024; helpline 1933; nodal agency — NCB (MHA); tech partner — Digital India Corporation. Counselling linkage: Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment Helpline 14446. NCORD: 4-tier mechanism (Apex–Executive–State–District); formed 2016, restructured 2019. Key Acts: NDPS Act, 1985; PITNDPS Act, 1988. NCB structure: 30 Zonal Offices, 7 Regional Offices; ANTFs in every State/UT (36 total). NIA role: empowered under NDPS Act (2020) to investigate narco-terrorism cases. Practice Mains Question Digital platforms such as MANAS mark a shift from passive service delivery to active citizen participation in governance. Examine this claim with reference to India's anti-narcotics architecture, and discuss the challenges in converting digital intelligence into enforcement outcomes. GS Paper 2/3 · 250 words · 15 marks Practice MCQs Q1. Consider the following statements regarding MANAS: (1) It is administered by the Ministry of Social Justice & Empowerment. (2) Counselling calls are transferred to Helpline 14446. (3) It is accessible via the UMANG app. Which are correct? A) 1 and 2 onlyB) 2 and 3 onlyC) 1 and 3 onlyD) 1, 2 and 3 Q2. With reference to the NCORD mechanism, which of the following statements is/are correct? (1) It has a four-tier structure — Apex, Executive, State and District. (2) The District-level NCORD is headed by the District Magistrate. (3) It was first constituted in 2016. A) 1 onlyB) 1 and 3 onlyC) 2 and 3 onlyD) 1, 2 and 3 Q3. The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (PITNDPS) Act primarily provides for: A) Regulation of prescription drug salesB) Preventive detention in drug-trafficking casesC) Compensation to drug-abuse victimsD) Licensing of pharmaceutical exports Article 02 Article 02 Strengthening Emergency Care: Enhanced Safety Provisions for Road Ambulances Draft Amendments to AIS-125 · Ministry of Road Transport & Highways (MoRTH) · Draft Notification GSR 382(E), 14 May 2026 Relevance: GS 3 (infrastructure, disaster/emergency management, science & technology) · GS 2 (health infrastructure, welfare schemes). GS 3GS 2 Key Data at a Glance 8 Sep 2016date AIS-125 (Part 1) was first notified (GSR 868(E)) 14 May 2026draft amendment notification GSR 382(E) issued 4,87,707road accidents recorded in India in 2024 1,77,175road accident fatalities in India in 2024 ~50%of road deaths preventable with Golden Hour treatment ₹1.5 lakhcashless treatment cover per victim under PM-RAHAT (7 days) Issue in Brief MoRTH has proposed amendments to Automotive Industry Standard (AIS)-125, governing road ambulance construction, function and medical equipment, via draft notification GSR 382(E) dated 14 May 2026, open for public comment. Key changes: new Neonatal and Multi-stretcher ambulance categories, mandatory rescue equipment, and dedicated power provisions for e-ambulances. Static Background AIS-125 (Part 1) was notified via GSR 868(E), 8 September 2016, prescribing constructional and functional standards for road ambulances. AIS-125 (Part 2) is a guideline standard specifying medical-equipment requirements across ambulance categories (Class B/C/D, corresponding to increasing levels of life support). MoRTH's Road Accidents in India 2024 report recorded 4,87,707 accidents and 1,77,175 fatalities; National Highways alone contributed ~36.6% of fatalities despite carrying ~31% of accidents. The "Golden Hour" principle — that nearly 50% of road accident deaths are preventable with hospital admission within the first hour — underpins both this standard revision and the recently launched PM-RAHAT scheme. Key Dimensions — Amendments to AIS-125 New categories: Neonatal Road Ambulance (transports sick/premature newborns to higher-care hospitals) and Multi-stretcher Road Ambulance (carries multiple stretchers, typically with intensive-care focus on one patient). Mandatory rescue equipment: Class B, C and D ambulances must now carry extraction tools for accident victims, and rescue equipment for the ambulance's own crew if it is involved in a crash. e-Ambulance provision: dedicated power sources for medical devices, ensuring the shift toward green mobility does not compromise in-transit patient care. All medical devices installed in ambulances must conform to the standards specified in AIS-125 (Part 2). Key Dimensions — Policy Linkage with PM-RAHAT The Pradhan Mantri Road Accident Victims' Hospitalisation and Assured Treatment (PM-RAHAT) Scheme offers cashless treatment up to ₹1.5 lakh per victim for 7 days, funded via the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (MVAF). PM-RAHAT is integrated with ERSS-112, eDAR and TMS 2.0, forming a financial-plus-technical stack for Golden Hour care alongside the AIS-125 equipment standards. Critical Analysis — Strengths Neonatal and multi-patient transport were previously unstandardised gaps; formal categories close a real capability shortfall in emergency paediatric and mass-casualty care. Mandatory rescue equipment addresses a documented weakness — ambulances historically lacked tools to extract trapped victims from wreckage. Timed alongside PM-RAHAT, the amendment creates policy coherence — financial coverage plus physical/technical standards for the golden hour. Critical Analysis — Structural Questions The standard remains in draft/consultation stage; no timeline is yet specified for final notification or phased compliance by existing ambulance fleets. Rural and remote regions, which account for a disproportionate share of India's road fatalities, may see delayed uptake given retrofitting costs. Equipment standards alone do not guarantee trained paramedical staffing — technical compliance without skilled personnel may not fully translate into better survival outcomes. Way Forward Finalise AIS-125 amendments promptly post-consultation, with a realistic, phased compliance timeline for existing ambulance fleets. Link AIS-125 compliance to PM-RAHAT reimbursement eligibility, incentivising faster fleet upgrades among private and state operators. Expand Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) training and staffing norms in parallel with equipment mandates. Prioritise ambulance density and response-time improvements on National Highways and rural stretches, which show the highest fatality concentration. Prelims Pointers AIS-125 (Part 1): notified via GSR 868(E), 8 September 2016 — constructional/functional norms for ambulances. AIS-125 (Part 2): specifies medical-equipment requirements by ambulance category. 2026 draft amendment: GSR 382(E), 14 May 2026 — Neonatal & Multi-stretcher categories, mandatory rescue kits, e-ambulance power provisions. Golden Hour: first hour post-injury; ~50% of road deaths considered preventable with timely treatment. PM-RAHAT: cashless treatment up to ₹1.5 lakh for 7 days; funded via Motor Vehicle Accident Fund. PM-RAHAT integration: ERSS-112, eDAR, TMS 2.0. Practice Mains Question India's road-safety architecture is increasingly combining financial protection with technical standards for emergency care. Discuss with reference to the PM-RAHAT Scheme and the proposed AIS-125 amendments, and examine the gaps that remain in translating standards into on-ground outcomes. GS Paper 3 · 250 words · 15 marks Practice MCQs Q1. Consider the following statements: (1) AIS-125 (Part 1) was first notified in 2016. (2) The 2026 draft amendments introduce Neonatal and Multi-stretcher ambulance categories. (3) Mandatory rescue equipment applies only to Class D ambulances. Which are correct? A) 1 and 2 onlyB) 2 and 3 onlyC) 1 and 3 onlyD) 1, 2 and 3 Q2. (Assertion–Reasoning) Assertion (A): The AIS-125 amendments and PM-RAHAT Scheme are both anchored in the "Golden Hour" concept. Reason (R): Studies indicate nearly 50% of road accident deaths can be averted if victims reach hospital within the first hour of injury. A) Both A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of AB) Both A and R are true, but R is NOT the correct explanation of AC) A is true, R is falseD) A is false, R is true Q3. The Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (MVAF), referenced in the PM-RAHAT Scheme, is primarily used for: A) Subsidising ambulance purchase by statesB) Reimbursing hospitals for cashless treatment of accident victimsC) Funding highway constructionD) Compensating traffic police personnel

Contents01 As US Reshapes Its Asia Strategy, India Must Rewire Its Regional Leadership Ajay Srivastava, Founder, GTRI · The Indian Express · India-US-China relations, South Asia, strategic autonomy GS 2 — International RelationsGS 3 — Economy & SecurityEssay 02 PPP 2.0 Should Focus on Matching Capital to Risk Arvind Mayaram, Former Finance Secretary, GoI · The Indian Express · Infrastructure financing, PPPs, capital markets GS 3 — InfrastructureGS 2 — GovernanceEssay Editorial 01 of 02 Article 01 As US Reshapes Its Asia Strategy, India Must Rewire Its Regional Leadership Ajay Srivastava — Founder, Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI) · The Indian Express Relevance: GS 2 (India’s foreign policy, effect of developed-country policies on India’s interests, regional groupings), GS 3 (economy — manufacturing and critical-minerals self-reliance) and Essay (strategic autonomy, balance of power) — built around the US recalibration of its Asia strategy and its implications for India’s regional leadership. GS 2 — International RelationsGS 3 — Economy & SecurityEssay — Strategic Autonomy 1 — Issue in Brief The US is recalibrating its Asia strategy as costly overstretch in Europe (Ukraine) and West Asia (Iran) reduces its appetite and capacity to bear the economic and military cost of containing China. Washington’s view of India is shifting — from a central Indo-Pacific strategic partner toward more of a large market and an “aligned” subordinate partner, even as bilateral trade and technology cooperation deepens. Both the US and China are now directly courting India’s own neighbours — Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Maldives — contesting a space India has traditionally treated as its sphere of primary influence. Author’s prescription: build economic self-reliance, keep relations with both Washington and Beijing transactional, and avoid actions or optics that legitimise outside-power involvement in South Asian affairs. 2 — Static Background Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) — informal Indo-Pacific strategic forum of India, US, Japan and Australia; revived in 2017; India is due to host the next Quad Leaders’ Summit. AUKUS — trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK and the US, announced September 2021, centred on nuclear-powered submarines and advanced-technology sharing; India is not a member. “String of Pearls” — informal term for China’s network of ports and infrastructure across the Indian Ocean Region: Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota and Colombo Port City (Sri Lanka), Chittagong (Bangladesh) and Kyaukpyu (Myanmar) — seen as encircling India. Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) — China’s global connectivity programme, launched 2013; India has stayed out, citing sovereignty concerns over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passing through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Operation Sindoor — India’s military operation launched 7 May 2025 against terror infrastructure in Pakistan/PoJK, in retaliation for the 22 April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack (26 killed). The ceasefire followed direct DGMO-to-DGMO military contact; India has consistently rejected US claims of having mediated it. US-India COMPACT — launched at the 13 February 2025 Trump-Modi Washington meeting (“Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce and Technology”); a further Joint Statement in February 2026 announced an Interim Trade Agreement and cut the US reciprocal tariff on India from 25% to 18%. Sergio Gor — confirmed by the US Senate on 8 October 2025 as US Ambassador to India; concurrently serving as US Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs since 22 August 2025 — a dual-hatted posting that supports the editorial’s reading that Washington now treats South Asia as one integrated strategic space. SAARC — South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; largely dormant since India led a boycott of the 2016 Islamabad summit after the Uri attack, pushing India toward bilateral and sub-regional (BBIN) engagement instead. 3 — Key Dimensions Overstretch reduces US risk appetite: the financial and military burden of the Ukraine war, and an inconclusive Iran conflict, have weakened confidence in US security guarantees among old partners such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, pushing some toward China. Economic entanglement blunts Indo-Pacific alignment: most regional economies, including US allies, remain deeply tied to China as their top trading partner — Malaysia’s withdrawal from a US trade deal is cited as an example. Quieter Quad/Taiwan posture: read by the author as Washington’s shift from containment toward avoiding open confrontation with Beijing — an implicit “G2” dynamic. India recast as market, not co-equal pole: the COMPACT-era emphasis on purchases, tariffs and “aligning” India’s economic and security interests with America’s reads as more transactional than the earlier Indo-Pacific “democratic counterweight” framing. Contest for South Asia itself: the US is now mirroring China’s playbook by deepening bilateral defence, maritime, digital and infrastructure ties directly with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives — bypassing an India-centric hub-and-spokes approach. Smaller neighbours gain leverage: as the US, China and India all compete, states like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives can extract greater concessions by playing outside powers against one another. Pakistan as perennial swing state: its value to both Washington and Beijing — as a Sunni-Shia diplomatic bridge and a nuclear-armed Muslim state relevant to West Asia — persists regardless of the broader US-China balance. Optics risk on mediation: the author flags India’s high-level informal participation in the Colombo “South Asia Dialogue” (alongside Pakistani, US, UK and other representatives) as blurring India’s consistent no-mediation stance — though India’s Foreign Secretary has separately clarified such Track-1.5/Track-II meetings are unofficial and do not reflect government policy. 4 — Critical Analysis In favour — Grounded in real costs: the Ukraine/West Asia overstretch argument gives the “US recalibration” thesis an evidentiary basis rather than mere sentiment. In favour — Consistent with strategic-autonomy tradition: India’s post-Cold War multi-alignment with the US, Russia and regional blocs has historically served it better than binary alliance choices. In favour — Targets structural dependence: prioritising manufacturing, semiconductors, critical minerals, AI and defence production addresses the real leverage gap vis-à-vis China. In favour — Legitimate optics concern: forums seating Pakistan and outside powers alongside India on South Asian security matters can complicate India’s long-held bilateral-only Pakistan policy. Against — Risk of overstating US “retreat”: the COMPACT framework, INDUS-X, space cooperation and the $500-billion trade target show expanding, not shrinking, US-India engagement — the relationship looks renegotiated on more transactional terms rather than abandoned. Against — China’s regional weight is structural: decades of Chinese investment in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and the Maldives cannot be offset quickly by Indian diplomacy alone; India’s fiscal capacity for competing connectivity spending is far smaller. Against — “Avoid all optics” is hard to operationalise: many South Asia dialogues are unofficial Track-1.5/Track-II platforms outside government control, as the Colombo episode itself illustrates. Against — Pakistan’s leverage is structural, rooted in geography and nuclear-armed status, not something Indian policy alone can neutralise; the piece offers no concrete lever to reduce it. 5 — Way Forward Strengthen the domestic economic base — manufacturing, semiconductors, critical minerals, AI and defence production — to cut China-dependence and raise bargaining weight with both major powers. Keep relations with Washington and Beijing transactional and issue-based rather than bloc-committed, judging cooperation on its individual merits. Invest in India’s own regional connectivity and development partnerships to compete credibly with China’s String of Pearls and the US’s new direct-to-neighbour engagement. Sustain consistent, high-level bilateral political engagement with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Maldives to reduce their incentive to play external powers against India. Avoid official or informal platforms that could be read as accepting third-party mediation or an enlarged outside-power role in South Asian security matters. 6 — Data & Key Facts 8 Oct 2025Sergio Gor confirmed as US Ambassador to India; also Special Envoy for South & Central Asian Affairs since Aug 2025 13 Feb 2025US-India COMPACT launched at the Trump-Modi Washington meeting 25% → 18%US reciprocal tariff on India, per the Feb 2026 US-India Joint Statement 7 May 2025Operation Sindoor launched, after the 22 April 2025 Pahalgam attack 2021AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) trilateral security pact announced 2016SAARC Islamabad summit boycotted by India after the Uri attack China’s regional footprint: CPEC and Gwadar Port (Pakistan), Hambantota Port and Colombo Port City (Sri Lanka), BRI projects in Nepal, and major investments in Bangladesh and the Maldives. South Asia Dialogue, Colombo (June 2026): a Track-1.5 format platform; India’s Foreign Secretary has clarified such meetings are unofficial and do not reflect government policy (author-flagged optics concern). 7 — Prelims Pointers Quad — India, US, Japan, Australia; revived 2017. AUKUS — Australia, UK, US (2021); nuclear submarines/advanced tech; India not a member. CPEC — flagship BRI corridor, Kashgar (China) to Gwadar (Pakistan), via PoK. “String of Pearls” — China’s Indian Ocean port network (Gwadar, Hambantota, Colombo Port City, Chittagong, Kyaukpyu). Operation Sindoor — 7 May 2025 strikes, after the 22 April 2025 Pahalgam attack. US-India COMPACT — launched 13 Feb 2025. Exam note: Do not confuse the Quad (India, US, Japan, Australia) with AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) — India is a Quad member but not an AUKUS member. Also recall that India has consistently and repeatedly rejected all third-party mediation claims regarding Operation Sindoor. 8 — Practice Mains Question “As great-power competition intensifies in the Indian Ocean Region, India’s traditional primacy in its own neighbourhood is being contested by both established and emerging external powers.” Critically examine this statement with reference to recent shifts in US and Chinese engagement with South Asia, and suggest a strategy for India to preserve its regional leadership.GS 2 · 15 marks · ~250 words · India and its Neighbourhood + Effect of Policies of Developed/Developing Countries on India’s Interests Intro: Frame the shift from India-as-central-Indo-Pacific-partner to a more transactional US relationship, alongside continuing Chinese regional entrenchment. Body 1 — Evidence of contestation: Sergio Gor’s dual envoy role, direct US engagement with Bangladesh/Sri Lanka/Nepal/Maldives, China’s String of Pearls/CPEC, Pakistan’s swing-state utility. Body 2 — India’s constraints and options: economic dependence on China, fiscal limits vis-à-vis Chinese connectivity spending, the strategic-autonomy tradition, the case for transactional ties. Conclusion: Economic self-strengthening plus sustained neighbourhood-first diplomacy is the durable answer, since neither Washington nor Beijing will preserve India’s regional primacy on India’s behalf. 9 — Practice MCQ With reference to recent developments in India’s extended neighbourhood, consider the following statements: 1. Sergio Gor serves simultaneously as US Ambassador to India and US Special Envoy for South and Central Asian Affairs. 2. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is a flagship project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 3. India launched Operation Sindoor in response to the Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only(b) 2 and 3 only(c) 1 and 3 only(d) 1, 2 and 3 Editorial 02 of 02 Article 02 PPP 2.0 Should Focus on Matching Capital to Risk Arvind Mayaram — Former Finance Secretary, Government of India · The Indian Express Relevance: GS 3 (infrastructure — investment models, resource mobilisation, capital markets, InvITs), GS 2 (public finance governance) and Essay (fiscal prudence in financing India’s development) — built around a “capital circulation” model for India’s next generation of infrastructure financing. GS 3 — Infrastructure & Investment ModelsGS 2 — GovernanceEssay — Fiscal Prudence 1 — Issue in Brief Twenty years after India’s first PPP wave transformed airports, highways and ports but also generated post-2008 financial stress, the author argues the lesson was never that PPPs fail — it is that they were financed wrongly: short-tenor bank debt against long-life assets. India’s current infrastructure pipeline (~13,000 NIP projects worth ~₹185 lakh crore) plus a multi-trillion-dollar net-zero transition far exceed what public capital or corporate balance sheets alone can fund. The author’s central prescription is “capital circulation” — a “PPP 2.0” where government capital funds high-risk early stages, and financing/ownership progressively migrates to long-duration institutional capital as project risk falls, freeing public capital for the next generation of projects. 2 — Static Background Public-Private Partnership (PPP) — a long-term contract between government and a private party to finance, build and operate public infrastructure, with shared risk; India’s major PPP wave began in the 2000s across highways (BOT/toll), airports (AAI-private JVs such as Delhi, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Hyderabad) and ports. Post-2008 stressed-assets episode: many PPP loans carried 7–10-year bank repayment schedules against 30–50-year asset lives; after the Global Financial Crisis and domestic slowdown, revenues underperformed while debt obligations stayed fixed — a major driver of the subsequent banking-sector NPA build-up, especially in power and roads. National Infrastructure Pipeline (NIP) — launched 2019-20 with a ₹111 lakh crore target for FY2020-25; as of March 2025 it covers ~13,000 projects worth ~₹185 lakh crore, nearly half in transport. Net-zero 2070 — India’s COP26 (2021) pledge; independent estimates put required capex at roughly $20 trillion (UBS); a more recent (Feb 2026) NITI Aayog study, Scenarios Towards Viksit Bharat and Net Zero, estimates ~$22.7 trillion in cumulative investment needs, with a financing gap of about $6.5 trillion requiring institutional and concessional capital. Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs) — SEBI-regulated pooled vehicles (introduced 2014) holding operating infrastructure assets (roads, transmission, telecom towers, warehousing) with tax-pass-through, regulated cash flows; industry AUM grew to ~₹7 lakh crore by December 2025. National Investment and Infrastructure Fund (NIIF) — India’s quasi-sovereign infrastructure fund-of-funds, set up 2015 as a SEBI Category-II Alternative Investment Fund, combining government anchor capital with global institutional investors including sovereign wealth funds. Infrastructure debt funds (IDFs) — specialised NBFCs/funds that refinance operational projects’ bank debt with longer-tenor bonds — the “bridge” instrument between construction-stage and long-term institutional finance. Recent policy reinforcement: Union Budget 2026-27 announced an Infrastructure Risk Guarantee Fund (IRGF) for partial lender guarantees during construction, and a National Monetisation Pipeline (NMP) 2.0 targeting ~₹16.7 lakh crore of asset monetisation through FY2030. 3 — Key Dimensions Core mismatch: “long-lived assets financed with short-lived capital” — 7–10-year bank tenors against 30–50-year asset lives made first-generation PPPs vulnerable exactly when growth slowed. Scale of unmet need: ~₹185 lakh crore of current NIP commitments is “only a fraction” of what a $30-trillion, developed India by 2047 requires, layered atop a separate multi-trillion-dollar decarbonisation bill. “Circulation” over mere “mobilisation”: the real question is not only how much new capital India can attract, but whether capital already locked in mature, de-risked assets can be recycled to fund the next generation of projects. Sequencing capital to risk across the project life cycle: government/developer capital → high-risk construction and land-acquisition phases; InvITs/institutional capital → stabilised operating assets; infrastructure debt funds → the bridge in between. Scale of global institutional capital: pension funds, insurers and sovereign wealth funds together are commonly estimated to control well over $100 trillion globally — much of it seeking stable, inflation-linked, long-duration returns that match operating infrastructure cash flows. Existing proof of concept: InvITs and NIIF already show India can attract long-term domestic and global institutional capital — the task is to scale and institutionalise circulation, not invent it. 4 — Critical Analysis In favour — Correct diagnosis: tenor mismatch, not private participation itself, caused the first PPP crisis — this supports refining rather than abandoning the model. In favour — Fiscally efficient: recycling public capital out of stabilised assets lets a limited government purse fund far more projects than holding capital indefinitely. In favour — Builds on demonstrated instruments: InvIT AUM’s multi-fold growth and NIIF’s global partnerships show Indian markets can already price long-duration infrastructure risk. In favour — Aligned with current policy: Budget 2026-27’s Infrastructure Risk Guarantee Fund and NMP 2.0 both reflect the government-de-risks-construction/private-capital-takes-operating-risk logic the author advocates. Against — Institutional capital is selective: pension funds, insurers and SWFs typically demand investment-grade, low-volatility, currency-hedged returns — many Indian assets outside roads/transmission/telecom may not yet qualify. Against — Sectoral concentration: nearly 90% of current InvIT AUM sits in just two segments (telecom and roads) — the model is proven narrowly, not yet across water, urban or social infrastructure. Against — Fiscal space and capacity gaps remain: government capital for early stages still needs land-acquisition reform and project-preparation capacity — capital sequencing alone does not resolve these. Against — Heavy foreign-investor reliance in InvITs, with domestic retail/institutional participation still low, exposes financing to global risk-appetite and currency swings; the article also does not directly engage with the valuation and dispute-resolution capacity needed to scale asset recycling. 5 — Way Forward Institutionalise “capital circulation” as explicit policy: government/developer capital for preparation, land acquisition and construction; mandated/incentivised migration of stabilised assets into InvITs once revenues settle. Revive and scale infrastructure debt funds as the intermediate bridge, refinancing bank debt with tenor-matched bonds. Deepen and diversify the InvIT universe beyond roads and telecom into power transmission, renewables, water, warehousing and urban infrastructure. Widen domestic institutional participation (EPFO/NPS, insurance, mutual funds) in InvITs/IDFs to build a durable home-grown long-duration investor base. Continue and expand government de-risking instruments (IRGF, NaBFID credit enhancement, NMP 2.0) so private/institutional capital bears operating-stage risk while the state retains construction-stage risk it is best placed to absorb. 6 — Data & Key Facts ~13,000NIP projects, worth ~₹185 lakh crore as of March 2025 (up from ~6,800 projects/₹111 lakh crore at 2019-20 launch) $20–22.7 TnEstimated investment needed for net-zero by 2070 (UBS / NITI Aayog, 2026) $100 Tn+Global pension, insurance and sovereign wealth fund capital commonly estimated (industry-level figure) ~₹7 lakh CrIndia’s InvIT industry AUM by December 2025 (SEBI-regulated since 2014) ~90%Share of InvIT AUM concentrated in just the telecom and roads segments ₹16.7 lakh CrNMP 2.0 asset-monetisation target through FY2030 NIP (National Infrastructure Pipeline): launched 2019-20; as of March 2025, ~13,000 projects worth ~₹185 lakh crore, nearly half in the transport sector. Net-zero 2070: NITI Aayog’s 2026 study flags a ~$6.5 trillion financing gap requiring international/concessional and institutional capital, on top of domestic savings and FDI. 7 — Prelims Pointers PPP — long-term government-private contract to finance/build/operate infrastructure with shared risk. NIP — launched 2019-20; ~13,000 projects, ~₹185 lakh crore (March 2025). InvIT — SEBI-regulated (since 2014) trust holding income-generating infrastructure assets. NIIF — India’s infrastructure fund-of-funds, set up 2015, SEBI Category-II AIF. Net-zero target — pledged at COP26, 2021 (Glasgow), for 2070. IRGF — announced in Union Budget 2026-27; partial lender guarantees during construction. Exam note: Do not confuse InvITs (hold operating, revenue-generating assets) with the construction-stage risk that government/developer capital is meant to bear — InvITs are the recycling vehicle for de-risked, stabilised assets, not a financing source for under-construction projects. 8 — Practice Mains Question “The first generation of Public-Private Partnerships in India failed not because private capital is unsuited to infrastructure, but because long-lived assets were financed with short-lived capital.” Critically examine this statement and discuss the elements of a “capital circulation” model for India’s next generation of infrastructure financing.GS 3 · 15 marks · ~250 words · Infrastructure — Investment Models and Resource Mobilisation Intro: State the tenor-mismatch diagnosis of the first PPP wave and the scale of India’s current plus net-zero financing needs. Body 1 — Case for capital circulation: sequencing government capital → InvITs → infrastructure debt funds; scale of global institutional capital seeking long-duration returns. Body 2 — Constraints: sectoral concentration of InvITs, yield-selectivity of institutional capital, foreign-capital dependence, need for complementary reforms. Conclusion: A calibrated capital-circulation architecture, backed by government de-risking instruments and deeper domestic institutional participation, can make capital circulation as important as capital mobilisation for Viksit Bharat @2047. 9 — Practice MCQ With reference to Infrastructure Investment Trusts (InvITs) in India, consider the following statements: 1. InvITs are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India and were introduced in 2014. 2. InvIT AUM in India is currently concentrated mainly in the telecom and roads sectors. 3. InvITs typically hold assets that are still under construction rather than operational. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only(b) 2 and 3 only(c) 1 and 3 only(d) 1, 2 and 3

Contents 03 July 2026 VB-G RAM G Act, 2025: Rural Employment Guarantee ReformGS 2 & 3 India's Historic Climb in the 2026 UN SDG IndexGS 2 & 3 16th India-Japan Annual Summit & the UNICORN Mast Defence PactGS 2 & 3 Kisan Sarathi: India's Digital Agro-Advisory PlatformGS 3 Vikram-1: India's First Private Orbital Rocket Gears Up for LaunchGS 3 West Bengal's First Budget: Welfare Promises vs Fiscal ConstraintsGS 3 Article 01 VB-G RAM G Act, 2025: Rural Employment Guarantee Reform GS Paper 2 & 3 — Governance, Welfare Schemes, Rural Development Why in News The Viksit Bharat – Guarantee for Rozgar and Ajeevika Mission (Gramin) Act, 2025 (VB-G RAM G) came into force across rural India from 1 July 2026, replacing the two-decade-old Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 2005. The framework was formally launched at a national event in Andhra Pradesh, with the Union government notifying an interim allocation of over ₹95,600 crore to states and union territories to ensure an uninterrupted transition. Static Background Evolution of Rural Employment Programmes India’s rural employment initiatives evolved from the Rural Manpower Programme (1960s) and the Crash Scheme for Rural Employment (1971) to the Jawahar Rozgar Yojana (1993) and the Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (1999). The Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Act, 1977 first introduced a statutory right to work, laying the foundation for MGNREGA, 2005. VB-G RAM G, 2025 places Gram Panchayats at the centre of rural transformation, prioritising durable asset creation, natural resource management, water conservation and women’s empowerment through Self Help Groups. Key Features of the Act Guaranteed wage employment raised from 100 to 125 days per eligible household per financial year. A 60-day aggregated pause during peak sowing and harvesting seasons safeguards agricultural labour supply; the 125 guaranteed days fall within the remaining 305 days. A nationwide minimum wage floor of ₹300 per day has been introduced for the first time under this programme. Wages must be disbursed weekly, or within a strict ceiling of a fortnight (14 days). New Gramin Rozgar Guarantee Cards are being issued; existing e-KYC-verified job cards remain valid through the transition period. Funding shifts from MGNREGA’s 100% central wage coverage to a 60:40 (Centre:State) split for normal states — 90:10 for Northeastern/Himalayan states and Union Territories with a legislature, and 100% Centre-funded for UTs without a legislature. A “top-down” normative allocation replaces the earlier demand-driven funding model, with state-wise expenditure ceilings based on the 16th Finance Commission’s horizontal devolution recommendations. Employment generation is integrated with four strategic verticals: water security, core rural infrastructure, livelihood-related infrastructure, and climate-resilience works. Local planning through Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans is spatially integrated with PM Gati Shakti, and every asset created is mapped onto the Viksit Bharat National Rural Infrastructure Stack. Drawbacks of MGNREGA that Prompted Reform Fragmented and scattered asset creation limited durable rural infrastructure. The demand-driven model sometimes reduced agricultural labour availability during peak seasons. Fund-release delays and administrative bottlenecks caused late wage payments. Leakages such as ghost beneficiaries, fake muster rolls and poor-quality assets affected implementation. The open-ended, demand-driven funding model led to fiscal unpredictability and pending dues. Concerns Raised The new 60:40 funding pattern is projected to raise states’ financial burden by up to six times, raising cooperative-federalism concerns. Normative allocation tied to the 16th Finance Commission’s devolution formula may disadvantage states with stronger demographic performance; any spending beyond the Centre’s ceiling must be borne entirely by the state. Critics argue the shift from a demand-driven model to pre-approved budget ceilings weakens the legal “right to work” and the bargaining power of rural labour. A mandatory 60-day work suspension during sowing/harvesting may hurt income security during droughts or irregular monsoons. Greater Union control over planning and finances may weaken Gram Sabha autonomy under the spirit of the 73rd Constitutional Amendment; centralised grievance and audit mechanisms may reduce local accountability. The ₹300 wage floor triggered wage hikes above 15% in northern and northeastern states (e.g. Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Assam) but minimal change (under 3%) in southern states already paying above the floor; Sikkim retains a special panchayat-level rate of ₹450. Over ₹17,000 crore in pending MGNREGA dues remains unresolved, raising questions about implementing the new Act before clearing past liabilities. Way Forward Adopt a graded transition and a fiscal-compensation or devolution-bonus mechanism to prevent a north-south funding asymmetry; Tamil Nadu has proposed retaining full central funding for wages/administration while sharing material costs in a 75:25 Centre-State ratio. Decentralise the “blackout” period to Gram Sabhas and District Collectors so it can reflect local agro-climatic variation and be lifted during localised droughts or crop failures. Establish a National Contingency Buffer Fund to trigger demand-driven funding automatically during economic shocks or climate disasters. Legally permit offline authentication (manual muster rolls, Panchayat verification) where digital or biometric systems fail, to prevent wage denial. Strengthen Gram Panchayats’ financial autonomy over local asset planning and codify an independent social audit mechanism. The Act marks a shift in rural governance from poverty alleviation toward asset-led capital formation aligned with Viksit Bharat @2047; its ultimate success will depend on preventing fiscal stress on states and ensuring digital systems empower rather than exclude vulnerable workers. Prelims Pointers VB-G RAM G Act, 2025 replaces MGNREGA, 2005; in force from 1 July 2026. Guaranteed employment raised from 100 → 125 days per household per year. Funding pattern: 60:40 (Centre:State) for normal states; 90:10 for NE/Himalayan states & UTs with legislature; 100% Centre for UTs without legislature. Nationwide minimum wage floor introduced for the first time: ₹300/day. Aggregated blackout period: 60 days during peak agricultural season. Wage payment ceiling: within 14 days (a fortnight) of work performed. Statutory right to work was first introduced by the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Act, 1977. State allocation ceilings are based on the 16th Finance Commission’s horizontal devolution formula (Chair: Dr Arvind Panagariya). Interim allocation for FY 2026-27 rollout: ₹95,692.31 crore. Mains Practice Question The VB-G RAM G Act, 2025 replaces a two-decade-old demand-driven employment guarantee with a normatively-funded, infrastructure-linked framework. Critically examine the implications of this shift for fiscal federalism and the statutory “right to work” in India. GS Paper 2 & 3 · 15 marks MCQ Practice With reference to the VB-G RAM G Act, 2025, consider the following statements: Assertion (A): The Act replaces MGNREGA’s 100% central wage funding with a 60:40 Centre-State funding pattern for normal states. Reason (R): The Act shifts from a demand-driven expenditure model to a normative allocation based on the 16th Finance Commission’s recommendations. Which one of the following is correct? ABoth A and R are true, and R is the correct explanation of A BBoth A and R are true, but R is not the correct explanation of A CA is true, but R is false DA is false, but R is true Answer: B Both statements are factually accurate, but the 60:40 vertical funding ratio and the normative (ceiling-based) allocation method are distinct design changes under the Act — the reason explains the shift to ceiling-based budgeting, not specifically why the sharing ratio became 60:40. Article 02 India’s Historic Climb in the 2026 UN SDG Index GS Paper 2 & 3 — International Institutions, Sustainable Development Why in News India recorded its highest-ever position in the 2026 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) Index, released at the Hamburg Sustainability Conference by the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). India climbed to 94th among 167 countries with an overall score of 68.3 out of 100 — its strongest performance since the SDGs were adopted in 2015 — even as the report flags hunger as one of the country’s most serious unresolved challenges. Static Background About the SDG Index The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) comprise 17 global goals adopted by UN member states in 2015, with a target completion year of 2030. The annual Sustainable Development Report (SDG Index) is published by the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN). India has risen 18 places since 2015 (112th → 94th in 2026) — among the largest improvements of any major economy, alongside China’s 14-place rise. India continues to trail four South Asian neighbours — Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka — in the overall rankings. India’s Overall Performance India faces challenges on 13 of the 17 SDGs; major challenges persist on seven — SDG 2 (Zero Hunger), SDG 3 (Good Health and Well-being), SDG 5 (Gender Equality), SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities), SDG 14 (Life Below Water), SDG 15 (Life on Land) and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). Significant challenges remain on six more goals — SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation), SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy), SDG 8 (Decent Work), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production) and SDG 17 (Partnerships for the Goals). Only about a third (33.3%) of India’s targets are on track to be met by 2030; progress is limited on 42.7% of targets, while 24% have moved in the wrong direction. Hunger — India’s Sharpest Challenge (SDG 2) Cereal yield is the only on-track SDG 2 indicator for India, reaching 3.6 tonnes per hectare in 2023. Stunting among under-five children fell from 37.9% (2015) to 29.3% per NFHS-6, though nearly one in three children remain affected. Child wasting worsened — from 16.9% (2017) to 19% per NFHS-6; India records the highest wasting prevalence in the world per the UN FAO food security report. Undernourishment reversed course, rising from 10.5% (2018) back up to 12% (2023). Adult obesity nearly doubled — from 4.91% (2015) to 7.27%, marking a reversing trend on this indicator. Other Notable Challenges SDG 3: Air-pollution-linked deaths rose marginally to 132 per 100,000 population in 2023; mortality from heart disease, cancer, diabetes and chronic lung disease among the 30–70 age group rose from 22.6% (2015) to 23.6% (2021). SDG 13: Per-capita CO₂ emissions from fossil-fuel combustion and cement rose from 1.69 tonnes (2015) to 2.21 tonnes (2023), the highest level since SDG adoption. SDG 16: India’s Press Freedom Index score fell sharply, from 59.51 (2015) to 31.96 (2026) — its worst-performing indicator under this goal. The Global Picture No SDG is currently on track to be achieved globally by 2030. Cities (SDG 11), oceans (SDG 14), land ecosystems (SDG 15) and peace/institutions (SDG 16) remain the furthest off track worldwide. Globally, hunger-related and governance-related indicators (obesity, sustainable agriculture, the Press Freedom Index, the Corruption Perceptions Index) lag the most — mirroring India’s own weak spots. India has made notable progress in expanding electricity access (SDG 7) and mobile broadband/internet penetration (SDG 9), both areas that are also progressing globally. As the world’s most populous country, India’s trajectory will significantly influence whether the global SDG agenda can be met by 2030; sustaining momentum will require faster gains specifically on hunger, health, climate and governance indicators. Prelims Pointers 2026 UN SDG Index: India ranked 94th of 167 countries (score 68.3/100), up from 99th in 2025. Publishing body: UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN); report released at the Hamburg Sustainability Conference. SDGs comprise 17 goals, adopted in 2015, with a target year of 2030. India’s rank improvement since 2015: 112th → 94th (18 places). India trails Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka among South Asian neighbours. India’s worst-performing indicator: the Press Freedom Index (fell from 59.51 in 2015 to 31.96 in 2026). India’s only on-track SDG 2 indicator: cereal yield (3.6 tonnes/hectare). Mains Practice Question India has climbed the global SDG Index rankings even as it continues to face “major challenges” on core human-development goals such as hunger and health. Discuss this paradox and suggest measures to accelerate India’s progress toward the 2030 Agenda. GS Paper 3 · 15 marks MCQ Practice Match List I (SDG) with List II (status assigned to India in the 2026 UN SDG Index) and select the correct answer using the code given below: List I — 1. SDG 2 (Zero Hunger); 2. SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation); 3. SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy); 4. SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) List II — A. Major challenge; B. Significant challenge; C. Notable progress (electricity access); D. Notable progress (mobile broadband/internet) A1-A, 2-B, 3-C, 4-D B1-B, 2-A, 3-D, 4-C C1-A, 2-C, 3-B, 4-D D1-D, 2-B, 3-A, 4-C Answer: A SDG 2 is flagged as a “major challenge” and SDG 6 as a “significant challenge” for India in the 2026 index, while SDG 7 (electricity access) and SDG 9 (mobile broadband/internet penetration) are both cited as areas of notable progress, consistent with global trends. Article 03 16th India-Japan Annual Summit & the UNICORN Mast Defence Pact GS Paper 2 & 3 — Bilateral Relations, Defence Technology Why in News Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi held the 16th India-Japan Annual Summit in New Delhi on 2 July 2026, during which the two countries signed their first-ever defence co-development pact — for the UNICORN naval radio antenna mast — along with agreements on artificial intelligence, critical technology, health and energy cooperation. Key Outcomes of the Summit Both sides agreed to prepare a roadmap for economic security cooperation and issued a joint statement on artificial intelligence, with Indian AI-ecosystem institutions signing agreements with Japanese counterparts. Japan announced an investment of 10 trillion yen in India over the next decade, alongside plans to double the number of Japanese companies operating in the country. Agreements were signed in pharmaceuticals, medical devices and biotechnology aimed at strengthening global health security. An India-Japan bio-gas initiative was announced to set up 1,000 bio-gas and organic-fertiliser plants in India. The UNICORN Mast Co-Development Project The project follows a 2024 Memorandum of Implementation signed in Tokyo for co-developing the UNICORN (Unified Complex Radio Antenna) Mast for future Indian Navy warships. India becomes only the second Asian country, after the Philippines, to receive this category of Japanese defence technology. UNICORN integrates multiple communication systems and scattered antennas into a single unified radar mast, reducing a warship’s radar cross-section and improving stealth and tactical-evasion capability. It is also known as Nora-50 and is regarded as one of the highest-grade weapon-antenna systems in the world. Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) will manufacture the mast domestically in collaboration with Japanese partners — Japan contributing design expertise, India handling system integration and production — supporting the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. The mast is expected to progressively replace the Indian Navy’s existing Advanced Composite Communication System (ACCS)-based external communication infrastructure. Strategic Significance Deepens bilateral strategic trust and enhances India’s maritime domain awareness. Reinforces both nations’ shared commitment to a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific. Prelims Pointers 16th India-Japan Annual Summit held on 2 July 2026 in New Delhi. The bilateral relationship is framed under the “Special Strategic and Global Partnership.” UNICORN = Unified Complex Radio Antenna; also known as Nora-50. This is the first India-Japan defence co-development project: the UNICORN Mast for Indian Navy warships. Indian manufacturing partner: Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL). India is the second Asian country, after the Philippines, to receive this category of Japanese defence technology. The original Memorandum of Implementation for the UNICORN Mast was signed in Tokyo in 2024. Japan’s announced investment commitment: 10 trillion yen over 10 years. Mains Practice Question The India-Japan UNICORN Mast co-development project marks a new phase in bilateral defence-technology cooperation. Analyse its significance for India’s naval modernisation and the broader India-Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership. GS Paper 2 & 3 · 15 marks MCQ Practice Consider the following statements regarding the UNICORN Mast recently in the news: 1. It is a naval radar/communication mast being co-developed by India and Japan for the Indian Navy. 2. It consolidates multiple antennas into a single unified structure to reduce a warship’s radar cross-section. 3. Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) will manufacture the mast in India in collaboration with Japanese partners. How many of the above statements are correct? AOnly one BOnly two CAll three DNone Answer: C All three statements accurately describe the UNICORN Mast project — it is a joint India-Japan naval radar/communication mast, its structural integration reduces radar cross-section to improve stealth, and BEL is the designated Indian manufacturing partner. Article 04 Kisan Sarathi: India’s Digital Agro-Advisory Platform GS Paper 3 — Agriculture, Digital Governance Why in News With Kisan Sarathi now serving 2.95 crore registered farmers across 36 States and Union Territories, the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology and the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare have highlighted the platform’s role as India’s largest integrated digital agro-advisory system, built on the Interactive Information Dissemination System (IIDS) for two-way farmer-expert communication. Static Background About Kisan Sarathi Launched in July 2021; implemented jointly by the Indian Agricultural Statistics Research Institute and the Digital India Corporation. Connects farmers with 730+ Krishi Vigyan Kendras (KVKs), 100+ ICAR institutes and 65+ agricultural universities. Integrates key national digital platforms — Kisan Call Centre, Common Service Centre, India Meteorological Department, MyScheme and BHASHINI — on a single interface. Accessible via Kisan Call Centres, Common Service Centres, a web portal, WhatsApp and a mobile app, to accommodate varying levels of digital access. How It Helps Farmers Provides region-specific advisories on weather, market prices and crop, livestock and fisheries management. Helps farmers discover and track eligibility and status for government schemes, including PM-KISAN; as of 25 June 2026, 610 schemes (102 central) are listed on the platform. Enables direct queries to KVK experts in local languages, and access to training sessions and video consultations. Provides district-wise mandi prices and market-trend information. Technology Backbone — IIDS The Interactive Information Dissemination System enables two-way communication — voice, video, text and image — between farmers and experts, and follows a “Know Your Farmer” approach to tailor advisories. Farmer queries are centrally routed to relevant experts, with query history retained for future reference and a shared knowledge database accessible to experts. Reach and Coverage As of 25 June 2026: active in 36 States/UTs, 768 districts and 6.63 lakh villages. Network of 4,767 ICAR scientists across 113 ICAR institutes. 2.95 crore registered farmers, including 56.16 lakh women beneficiaries. 19.21 lakh queries handled; 21,900 advisories released, covering 351 commodities across 34 States/UTs. Benefits for the Wider Ecosystem Research institutions gain wider dissemination and practical application of their findings. KVKs and agricultural experts achieve faster outreach and improved technology transfer from lab to field. Policymakers gain access to real-time dashboards and analytics for evidence-based planning. By combining multilingual advisory, multi-channel access and two-way communication on a single platform, Kisan Sarathi strengthens lab-to-land knowledge transfer and represents a significant step in the digital transformation of India’s agricultural extension system. Prelims Pointers Kisan Sarathi was launched in July 2021. Nodal ministries: Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology and Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare. Implementing agencies: Indian Agricultural Statistics Research Institute (IASRI) and Digital India Corporation. Underlying technology: Interactive Information Dissemination System (IIDS). Live interaction is supported in 13 regional languages. Registered farmers (as of 25 June 2026): 2.95 crore, including 56.16 lakh women beneficiaries. Coverage: 36 States/UTs, 768 districts, 6.63 lakh villages. Integrated platforms: Kisan Call Centre, Common Service Centre, IMD, MyScheme and BHASHINI. Mains Practice Question Digital agro-advisory platforms like Kisan Sarathi seek to bridge the gap between agricultural research and field-level practice. Discuss their significance and the challenges in ensuring last-mile, inclusive delivery of such services. GS Paper 3 · 10 marks MCQ Practice Which of the following statements about the Kisan Sarathi platform is NOT correct? AIt was launched in July 2021 as India’s largest integrated digital agro-advisory platform. BIt is powered by the Interactive Information Dissemination System (IIDS), enabling two-way farmer-expert communication. CIt is implemented solely by the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, with no role for the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. DIt integrates services such as Kisan Call Centre, Common Service Centre, IMD, MyScheme and BHASHINI on a single interface. Answer: C Kisan Sarathi is a joint initiative of the Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology and the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare, implemented by IASRI and Digital India Corporation — it is not administered solely by the Agriculture Ministry. Article 05 Vikram-1: India’s First Private Orbital Rocket Gears Up for Launch GS Paper 3 — Science & Technology, Space Why in News Skyroot Aerospace, a Hyderabad-based private space company, announced that the launch window for Vikram-1 — India’s first privately developed orbital-class rocket — opens between 12 July and 4 August 2026, under Test Flight-1 (Mission Aagaman), to be conducted from the Satish Dhawan Space Centre, Sriharikota, subject to weather, safety and range clearance. Prelims Pointers Vikram-1 is developed by Skyroot Aerospace, a Hyderabad-based private space company. Mission name: Mission Aagaman (“the arrival”); launch site: Satish Dhawan Space Centre, Sriharikota. Vikram-1 is Skyroot’s second mission; its first was the suborbital Vikram-S launch on 18 November 2022 — India’s first privately developed rocket to reach space. Vikram-1’s Test Flight-1 will be a partially commercial flight; full commercial operations are planned after one or two successful orbital demonstrations. Test objectives include gathering data on propulsion, stage separation, guidance, navigation, control and overall vehicle performance. Article 06 West Bengal’s First Budget: Welfare Promises vs Fiscal Constraints GS Paper 3 — Indian Economy, Fiscal Federalism Why in News West Bengal’s newly elected BJP government presented its first state Budget on 22 June 2026, seeking to balance pre-poll welfare commitments — including a revamped women’s cash-transfer scheme and a Dearness Allowance hike for state employees — against a stated goal of narrowing the fiscal and revenue deficit. West Bengal Chief Minister Suvendu Adhikari and Finance Minister Swapan Dasgupta present the state Budget in the Legislative Assembly, Kolkata. The fiscal figures and projections discussed below are drawn from West Bengal’s 2026-27 Budget Estimates and an accompanying economic commentary; deficit and tax-collection projections are estimates set by the state government and the cited analysis, not confirmed outcomes. Prelims Pointers West Bengal’s first BJP government (Suvendu Adhikari, Chief Minister; Swapan Dasgupta, Finance Minister) presented its maiden state Budget on 22 June 2026. Total budgeted expenditure for 2026-27: ₹4,28,557 crore — ₹82,083 crore higher than the Revised Estimate for 2025-26. Fiscal deficit is projected to fall from ₹67,774 crore (RE 2025-26) to ₹62,421 crore (BE 2026-27). Revenue deficit is projected to fall from ₹41,164 crore to ₹21,984 crore. The largest driver of projected revenue growth is a ₹49,324 crore rise in the Centre’s grant-in-aid to the state, mainly via Centrally Sponsored Schemes. The Annapurna Yojana (₹3,000/month to women) replaces the earlier Laxmir Bhandar scheme (₹1,500/month); the ₹36,000 crore allocation is projected to cover about 1.3 crore women, against Laxmir Bhandar’s roughly 2.4 crore beneficiaries. Dearness Allowance for state employees has been hiked by 20%, effective from October 2026. Capital expenditure is proposed to rise by about ₹15,000 crore over the RE for 2025-26.