In-Depth PIB Analysis3 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Indian EconomyGS Paper III 01Index of Services Production (Trial Series) Environment & EcologyGS Paper III 02Revised GRAP for Delhi-NCR — CAQM’s 30th Meeting03PRAMAAN — India’s First Forest & Wood Certificates Indian EconomyGeneral Studies Paper III 01 Trial Index of Services Production: A Monthly Gauge for India’s Largest Sector ImportantGS-III · Economy — Growth, Official StatisticsPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation · 29 Sep 2026 MoSPI has released the sub-sectoral trial Index of Services Production (ISP) for July 2026, covering 19 sub-sectors with base year 2024–25. It is an attempt to give services — which generate more than half of India’s gross value added — a monthly output measure similar to what the IIP provides for industry. ◈ From the Basics — Measuring the Economy Month by Month GDP is estimated quarterly and with a lag. Policymakers — the RBI’s Monetary Policy Committee, the Finance Ministry, markets — therefore rely on high-frequency indicators to judge the economy in between. Industry has long had a monthly production index. Services, despite being the largest sector, have been tracked through scattered proxies: GST collections, e-way bills, air and rail traffic, bank credit, and the privately compiled Services PMI. Index of Industrial Production (IIP) — monthly, compiled by the NSO (MoSPI); covers mining, manufacturing and electricity. Index of Eight Core Industries — monthly, compiled by the Office of the Economic Adviser, DPIIT. What a production index measures: real output (volume), not prices, relative to a base year = 100. A reading above 100 means output is higher than in the base year. Institutions: MoSPI was formed in 1999 by merging the Department of Statistics and the Department of Programme Implementation. The National Statistical Office (NSO) was formed in 2019 by merging the CSO and the NSSO. Global practice: the OECD published a Compilation Manual for an Index of Services Production in 2007; the UK’s ONS publishes a monthly Index of Services. ▤ Index at a Glance — ISP (Trial Series) Compiler: Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation (MoSPI). Frequency & reference period: monthly; latest release for July 2026, compared with July 2025. Base year: 2024–25. Coverage: 19 services sub-sectors, published at the sub-sector level; month-wise indices are available from July 2025. Status: experimental / trial series. It is meant to test data quality and resilience and to gather stakeholder feedback before a regular series is adopted. Revisions: indices for Railways, Banking and Insurance are based on provisional monthly data and will be revised annually. Access: MoSPI website and the eSankhyiki data portal (launched 2024). Figure 1 — Where the ISP Fits in India’s Monthly Data Dashboard OUTPUT (VOLUME)PRICESLABOURIIP — Industrial ProductionMining · manufacturing · electricityEight Core IndustriesInfrastructure output (DPIIT)ISP — Services Production (trial)19 sub-sectors · base 2024–25 · NEWCPIRetail inflation (NSO)WPIWholesale prices (DPIIT)PLFSMonthly labour estimatesInputs to quarterly GDP estimates · RBI monetary policy · fiscal planning The ISP fills the largest gap in India’s monthly output data — the services sector — which until now was tracked only through indirect proxies. Why It Matters Closing the data gap: a direct monthly services measure improves nowcasting and the accuracy of quarterly GDP estimates. Policy timing: the RBI and the Government can read turning points in services — trade, transport, finance, IT — earlier. Sector diagnostics: sub-sector indices show which services are driving or dragging growth, which aggregate GVA cannot show at monthly frequency. Statistical reform: the ISP is part of MoSPI’s broader push towards newer base years and higher-frequency releases. The Critical View Heterogeneity: services range from trade and transport to software, finance, real estate and public administration. Many lack a clear physical volume measure. Informality bias: a large part of services output is from unincorporated enterprises. Monthly inputs drawn mostly from formal or administrative sources may under-represent them. Deflation risk: where output is measured in value terms, errors in the price deflator pass directly into the volume index. Revisions: provisional inputs for railways, banking and insurance are revised annually, so early readings may change materially. Transparency: until the full methodology and weights are published and validated, the trial ISP is best read alongside existing indicators, not in place of them. ✎ Mains Practice Question The services sector accounts for more than half of India’s gross value added, yet has lacked a robust high-frequency output indicator. Discuss the significance and limitations of the Index of Services Production. 10 marks · 150 words Environment & EcologyGeneral Studies Paper III 02 Revised GRAP for Delhi-NCR: CAQM Front-Loads Curbs on Vehicles, Dust and Diesel Generators Before Winter Core TopicGS-III · Environment — Air Pollution, ConservationGS-II · Statutory BodiesPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change · 29 Sep 2026 At its 30th Full Commission meeting on 28 September 2026, the Commission for Air Quality Management (CAQM) revised the Graded Response Action Plan (GRAP). It moved curbs on diesel generator sets and older inter-state buses into Stage I, extended the older-car restriction to Sonipat, and ended the exemption for older goods vehicles carrying essentials — ahead of the October–January pollution season. ◈ From the Basics — Why NCR Chokes, and Who Governs Its Air Winter smog in Delhi-NCR combines local emissions (vehicles, road and construction dust, industry, diesel generators, waste burning) with regional sources such as paddy-stubble burning. These pollutants are trapped by low wind speeds, temperature inversion and a lower mixing height in winter, so emissions that disperse in summer accumulate near the ground. Legal base: Article 21 (right to a pollution-free environment — Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, 1991); Article 48A (DPSP) and Article 51A(g) (Fundamental Duty); the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. EPCA (1998–2020): the Environment Pollution (Prevention & Control) Authority was notified under Section 3 of the EPA, 1986 on the Supreme Court’s directions in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India. It was dissolved when CAQM was created. CAQM: set up first by Ordinance (October 2020) and then under the CAQM in NCR and Adjoining Areas Act, 2021. Its jurisdiction covers the NCR and adjoining areas of Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. Its directions prevail over those of other authorities on air-quality matters within that jurisdiction. Stubble burning: the 2021 Act keeps farmers outside its penal provisions and provides for environmental compensation instead. GRAP origin: prepared by EPCA after a Supreme Court order (December 2016) and notified by MoEFCC in January 2017. CAQM overhauled it in 2022 into an AQI-linked, forecast-based plan that can be invoked in advance of predicted deterioration. National AQI (2014): six categories based on eight pollutants — PM10, PM2.5, NO₂, SO₂, CO, O₃, NH₃ and Pb. Bharat Stage norms: BS-IV nationwide from April 2017; India leapfrogged BS-V to BS-VI from 1 April 2020. How GRAP Works — Four Graded, Cumulative Stages Figure 2 — Revised GRAP Schedule: Stages, AQI Triggers and Number of Actions Measures are cumulative — each higher stage adds to all lower-stage actionsSTAGE I‘Poor’ · AQI 201–30025actionsSTAGE II‘Very Poor’ · 301–4008actionsSTAGE III‘Severe’ · 401–45010actionsSTAGE IV‘Severe+’ · AQI >4505actionsTotal: 48 actions in the revised schedule (September 2026) Stage I now carries more than half of all actions, reflecting a shift towards earlier, preventive intervention. AQI bands follow the National AQI categories. ▤ Plan at a Glance — Revised GRAP (September 2026) Approving authority: Full Commission of CAQM (30th meeting, 28 September 2026). Statutory basis: CAQM in NCR and Adjoining Areas Act, 2021. Coverage: National Capital Region (NCR defined under the NCR Planning Board Act, 1985). Structure: 48 actions — 25 (Stage I) + 8 (Stage II) + 10 (Stage III) + 5 (Stage IV). Trigger: observed and forecast AQI; a CAQM sub-committee invokes and revokes stages. Enforcement: CAQM’s Enforcement Task Force (ETF) and flying squads, with SPCBs and the DPCC. What Changed in the Revised Schedule Stage I consolidated: repeated actions on dust control, municipal solid waste (MSW) and transport merged. Moved from Stage II to Stage I: actions on diesel generator (DG) sets and on the entry of BS-IV and below buses from NCR and adjoining States. Stage III relaxation: minor works, including repair of potholes, permitted under Action No. 1. Older-car curb widened: restrictions on BS-III petrol and BS-IV diesel (or below) four-wheeler LMVs extended to Sonipat, in addition to the existing high vehicle density districts of Gurugram, Faridabad, Ghaziabad and Gautam Budh Nagar. Essentials exemption removed: BS-IV and below LGVs and MGVs (Stage III) and trucks/HGVs (Stage IV) carrying essential commodities are no longer exempt. Clarified under Stage III: entry into Delhi of diesel BS-IV and below LGVs and MGVs registered outside Delhi is restricted. Citizens’ Charter: expanded Do’s and Don’ts under each stage. Other Decisions at the Meeting C&D dust monitoring: amendment to Direction Nos. 11–18 (11 June 2021) extends web-portal registration and monitoring to eligible construction and demolition projects beyond municipal limits — urban, controlled, development and industrial areas and highway corridor zones. The threshold of plot area ≥500 sq m is unchanged. Advisory No. 18 (10 September 2026): physical sports competitions in NCR during November–December to be rescheduled in view of air-quality trends, to protect students’ health. Technical capacity: the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (ACC) approved two full-time Technical Members for three years or until age 70, whichever is earlier. Enforcement (as on 17 September 2026): 1,831 units issued closure orders; 1,479 allowed to resume after compliance; 126 cases transferred to SPCBs/DPCC. Greening drive 2026–27: 4,13,68,929 plantations (trees, shrubs, bamboo) reported against an overall target of 4,60,54,740 as on 22 September 2026. Figure 3 — NCR Plantation Drive 2026–27: Achievement as % of Target, by State Target (100%)Delhi62.01 L of 58.01 L106.9%Uttar Pradesh (NCR)185.60 L of 171.45 L108.3%Rajasthan (NCR)116.13 L of 107.10 L108.4%Haryana (NCR)60.00 L of 120.00 L50.0%0%50%100% Three of the four NCR constituents exceeded their plantation targets; Haryana (NCR) stood at half its target as on 22 September 2026. L = lakh plantations. Chart recreated from figures in the PIB release. Why It Matters Earlier action: moving DG-set and bus curbs to Stage I means they apply from ‘Poor’ AQI days rather than waiting for ‘Very Poor’. Closing loopholes: the essentials exemption had allowed older, more polluting goods vehicles to operate during the worst episodes. Regional reach: adding Sonipat and extending C&D monitoring beyond municipal limits acknowledges that emissions in peri-urban NCR affect Delhi’s air. The Critical View Emergency brake, not a cure: GRAP responds to episodes. Lasting gains depend on year-round source reduction under the National Clean Air Programme (NCAP, 2019), which targets up to 40% reduction in PM10 by 2025–26 in over 130 non-attainment cities. Airshed mismatch: pollution does not respect administrative boundaries. CAQM’s “adjoining areas” mandate recognises this, but enforcement capacity varies across States. Livelihood costs: construction bans idle daily-wage workers. The Supreme Court has directed NCR States to support them from labour-welfare cess funds. Supply-chain effects: removing the essentials exemption may raise logistics costs in the short run, though it also pushes fleet renewal. Forecast dependence: pre-emptive invocation is only as good as the AQI forecast; late or inaccurate forecasts weaken the preventive design. Enforcement pattern: 1,479 of 1,831 closed units resumed after compliance, which suggests that closures work mainly as a compliance lever rather than a lasting deterrent. ✎ Mains Practice Question The Graded Response Action Plan can manage air-pollution emergencies in Delhi-NCR but cannot substitute for structural, airshed-level action. Critically examine in the light of the recent revisions to GRAP. 15 marks · 250 words 03 PRAMAAN: First Certificates Issued under India’s Home-Grown Forest and Wood Certification Scheme Core TopicGS-III · Environment — Forest ConservationGS-III · Economy — Trade & AgriculturePrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change · 29 Sep 2026 The first PRAMAAN certificates under the Indian Forest and Wood Certification Scheme (IFWCS) were handed to the Andhra Pradesh Forest Development Corporation (33,000 ha of plantations) and to a bamboo farmer associated with the Odisha Bamboo Development Agency. The scheme, launched in December 2023, has thus moved from framework to field. ◈ From the Basics — What Is Forest Certification? Forest certification is a market-based conservation tool. An independent auditor verifies that a forest or plantation is managed to a defined sustainability standard, and that certified wood is tracked through every processing step to the final product. Forest Management (FM) certification — covers the forest or plantation unit itself. Chain of Custody (CoC) certification — tracks certified material through processors, traders and manufacturers, so the final product can carry a label. Global systems: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC, 1993) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC, 1999), which endorses national schemes. Trade driver: the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR, Regulation (EU) 2023/1115) requires proof that products are deforestation-free (cut-off date 31 December 2020) and legally produced. It covers cattle, cocoa, coffee, oil palm, rubber, soya and wood; its application has been deferred more than once. The US Lacey Act was amended in 2008 to cover timber and plant products. India’s forest base (ISFR 2023): forest and tree cover at 25.17% of geographical area — forest cover 21.76% and tree cover 3.41%. Bamboo: the Indian Forest (Amendment) Act, 2017 removed bamboo grown outside forests from the definition of “tree”, freeing it from felling and transit permits. Agroforestry: India adopted a National Agroforestry Policy in 2014, among the first countries to do so. Climate link: India’s NDC commits to an additional carbon sink of 2.5–3 billion tonnes of CO₂-equivalent by 2030 through additional forest and tree cover. ▤ Scheme at a Glance — IFWCS / PRAMAAN PRAMAAN: Programme for Recognition and Accreditation of sustainable Management practices for Agroforestry And Natural forestry resources. Nodal Ministry: MoEFCC; scheme launched in December 2023. Operating agency: Indian Institute of Forest Management (IIFM), Bhopal (established 1982). Certification types: Forest Management, Trees Outside Forests (TOF) Management and Chain of Custody. Coverage: forests, wood and non-timber forest products (NTFPs). FM standard: the Indian Forest Management Standard, part of the National Working Plan Code (NWPC) 2023. Assurance model: independent audit by certification bodies accredited by the National Accreditation Board for Certification Bodies (NABCB) under the Quality Council of India (QCI, 1997) — not self-declaration. International alignment: accreditation architecture benchmarked against international frameworks (as stated by the Ministry). First certificates (29 September 2026): APFDC for 33,000 ha of plantations; a farmer linked to the Odisha Bamboo Development Agency (OBDA). Other applications from State Forest Departments, FDCs, farmers and industry are under process. Figure 4 — How PRAMAAN Certification Works MoEFCCScheme ownerIIFM, BhopalOperating agencyNABCB (under QCI)Accredits auditorsForest ManagementStandard under NWPC 2023Trees Outside ForestsFarms · agroforestry · bambooChain of CustodyProcessors · traders · industryAccredited certification bodiesIndependent field and management audit — not self-declarationPRAMAAN certificate → domestic & export marketsFirst holders: APFDC (33,000 ha plantations) · OBDA-linked bamboo farmer The design separates standard-setting and operation (IIFM) from auditor accreditation (NABCB), so that certificates rest on third-party verification rather than on the Government’s own assessment. Lineage — What Changed NWPC 2014 → NWPC 2023: the revised Working Plan Code carries the Indian Forest Management Standard, making State forest management plans “certification-ready”. International schemes → a national scheme: Indian producers earlier relied on international certification systems; IFWCS offers a Government-owned, domestic route. Self-declaration → third-party assurance: sustainability claims now rest on audits by NABCB-accredited bodies. Why It Matters Market access: exporters of furniture, handicrafts, paper and plywood face due-diligence rules in the EU, UK and US. Verifiable Chain of Custody documentation helps them meet these rules. Livelihoods: the Ministry expects smallholders, tribal and forest-dependent communities, women SHGs and NTFP collectors to reach premium markets. This links with the Forest Rights Act, 2006, which recognises community rights over minor forest produce. Trees outside forests: certifying farm and agroforestry timber could make domestic wood more marketable and reduce pressure on natural forests. Climate and SDGs: supports the NDC carbon-sink goal and SDG 15 (Life on Land). The Critical View Recognition gap: being benchmarked against international frameworks is not the same as formal mutual recognition. Acceptance by foreign buyers and regulators will decide PRAMAAN’s real value. EUDR reality: certification can support, but does not replace, an EU operator’s own due diligence, including geolocation and traceability of plots. Slow uptake: the first certificates have come nearly three years after launch, which points to capacity gaps among auditors and applicants. Plantation question: certifying large monoculture plantations as “sustainable” has been questioned by ecologists on biodiversity grounds. Cost for smallholders: audit costs and paperwork can exclude small farmers unless group certification and support for audit costs are offered. Independence: the Government owns the scheme and State corporations are among the first certificate holders. Credibility therefore depends on keeping audits genuinely independent. ✎ Mains Practice Question As deforestation-linked due-diligence laws reshape global commodity trade, a credible domestic forest certification system serves as both a trade instrument and a livelihood tool. Examine with reference to the Indian Forest and Wood Certification Scheme. 15 marks · 250 words

Editorials, Opinions & Explained2 Items Core TopicImportantConcise OpinionsGS Paper II · Polity & IR 01Privacy Beyond Surveillance — The State, Firms & Networks02UNGA-81 & the UN’s Trust Deficit OpinionsSigned Op-Eds · General Studies Paper II 01 Surveillance Is Not the Only Privacy Issue: Watching Dispersed across the State, Private Firms and Online Networks Core TopicOpinionGS-II · Polity — Fundamental Rights (Art. 21), ElectionsGS-III · Internal Security — Cyber & Data GovernancePrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Op-Ed · Pankhuri Agarwal The article reads three developments of 2026 — facial recognition at a protest site, the doxxing of women protesters, and the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls — as one pattern. It argues that India’s privacy law is built to check an identifiable State actor, while surveillance today is diffuse. ◈ From the Basics — How Privacy Became a Fundamental Right The Constitution does not mention privacy in express terms. The right was read into Article 21 (protection of life and personal liberty) through a long line of judgments, and was settled only in 2017. M.P. Sharma v. Satish Chandra (1954) — an eight-judge Bench declined to recognise a right to privacy in the context of search and seizure. Kharak Singh v. State of U.P. (1962) — struck down night-time domiciliary visits by police as violating personal liberty, but held that privacy was not a guaranteed right. Justice Subba Rao’s dissent recognised privacy as part of liberty. Govind v. State of M.P. (1975) — accepted a limited right to privacy, subject to a compelling State interest. R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) — recognised the “right to be let alone”. PUCL v. Union of India (1997) — held that telephone tapping infringes Article 21 unless procedural safeguards are followed. These safeguards were later codified in Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) — a nine-judge Bench unanimously held privacy to be a fundamental right under Article 21 and Part III, overruling M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh to that extent. Puttaswamy II (Aadhaar, 2018) — a five-judge Bench upheld the Aadhaar Act, 2016 by 4:1, but struck down its use by private entities under Section 57. Figure 1 — The Evolution of Privacy Jurisprudence in India 1954M.P. SharmaNo privacy right1962Kharak SinghPrivacy not an FR1975Govind v. M.P.Qualified privacy1994R. Rajagopal‘Let alone’ right1997PUCLTapping safeguards2017Puttaswamy IPrivacy is an FR2018Puttaswamy IIAadhaar Act upheld2021Pegasus orderExpert panel set up2023Kaushal KishorHorizontal reach Privacy moved from a right denied (1954, 1962) to a fundamental right (2017). The open question now is how far it reaches non-State actors — firms, platforms and anonymous online networks. ▤ Key Terms & Frameworks — Prelims Hooks Puttaswamy test for any State intrusion on privacy: legality (a law must exist), legitimate aim (necessity) and proportionality (least intrusive means). Procedural safeguards against abuse form a fourth limb in some opinions. Horizontal application: in Kaushal Kishor v. State of U.P. (2023), a Constitution Bench held (4:1) that rights under Articles 19 and 21 can be enforced even against non-State actors. Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023: Section 17(2)(a) allows the Union Government to exempt any State instrumentality by notification on grounds such as security of the State and public order. Section 3(c)(ii) keeps publicly available personal data outside the Act. The DPDP Rules were notified in November 2025 with phased commencement. Interception law: Section 69, IT Act, 2000 and Section 20, Telecommunications Act, 2023 (which replaced the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885). Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022: replaced the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920. It permits collection of “measurements” (including iris and retina scans and biological samples), with records kept by the NCRB for 75 years. Online harms: the IT (Intermediary Guidelines) Rules, 2021 require takedown within 24 hours of content exposing private areas or depicting impersonation, including morphed images. Doxxing is not a distinct offence; it is dealt with through provisions on stalking (Section 78) and criminal intimidation (Section 351) of the BNS, 2023. Pegasus: in Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India (2021), the Supreme Court set up a technical committee supervised by a retired judge. Its 2022 report found malware in some phones but could not conclusively attribute it to Pegasus, and recorded the Union Government’s non-cooperation. The Core Argument — Three Kinds of Watching The author identifies three distinct modes by which individuals are made visible and identifiable. Each is carried out by a different actor and governed by a different legal regime. The State watches in public: a petition before the Supreme Court alleges that police used facial recognition, AI-enabled smart glasses, drones and a mobile command vehicle at protests at Jantar Mantar, with the data hosted by two private firms. Networks expose: women who took part in the protests were later doxxed — their personal details published online alongside threats. In March 2020, the Allahabad High Court ordered the removal of Lucknow hoardings displaying photographs and addresses of anti-CAA protesters, holding them an unwarranted invasion of privacy. Today, identification and amplification can happen within hours. Records sort: the SIR uses identity checks to determine who remains on the electoral roll. In Bihar, the roll moved from about 7.89 crore electors to a final 7.42 crore — a net reduction of about 47 lakh. The Supreme Court upheld the exercise in May 2026, holding that the Election Commission may examine citizenship for this limited purpose but cannot itself decide citizenship. The legal gap: Puttaswamy’s test is framed around State action, the DPDP Act permits exemptions for State agencies, and the Pegasus inquiry remained inconclusive. Consequently, no single safeguard follows a person’s data as it passes from camera to vendor to social media. Historical continuity: the State’s drive to make populations identifiable is old. The novelty lies in its scale and speed, and in the involvement of private and foreign vendors. Figure 2 — The Chain of Watching and the Safeguard at Each Link 1 · STATE WATCHES2 · FIRMS HOLD3 · NETWORKS EXPOSE4 · RECORDS SORTFacial recognition,drones, smart glassesat protest sitesSurveillance datahosted by privatevendorsDoxxing, deepfakes,threats by anonymousaccountsSIR: identity checksdecide who stayson electoral rollsPuttaswamy testlegality · necessity ·proportionalitySTRONGESTDPDP Act, 2023but s.17 lets Govtexempt State bodiesPARTIALIT Rules 2021, BNSDPDP excludespublicly available dataWEAKESTRPA, 1950notice, hearing andappeal (Section 24)PROCEDURALOne person’s data can pass through all four links, each governed by a different regime The protection is strongest where the State acts directly and weakest where anonymous private actors expose individuals. This is the gap the article highlights. Diagram by Legacy IAS based on the article’s framework. The Colonial Roots of Identification 1858: William Herschel, a British magistrate at Jungipur (Bengal), began taking handprints on contracts. 1897: the Calcutta Fingerprint Bureau — the first in the world — adopted the Henry classification system, largely devised by Azizul Haque and Hem Chandra Bose. Criminal Tribes Act, 1871: brought entire communities under registration and surveillance. They were “denotified” in 1952, but the stigma persisted through Habitual Offenders laws. Lesson: identification technologies have historically fallen hardest on marginal and dissenting groups. This is why proportionality and oversight matter more than the technology itself. Critical Appraisal The article’s principal contribution is conceptual: it shifts the question from “who is watching?” to “who is accountable when watching is shared?”. However, a balanced assessment must weigh several counter-considerations. Jurisprudence is less State-bound than suggested: Kaushal Kishor (2023) opens the door to enforcing Article 21 against private actors. The difficulty lies more in remedies and enforcement than in doctrine. Legitimate State interests: facial recognition has been used to trace missing children and to solve crimes. Electoral-roll purification — removing dead, duplicate and shifted entries — is itself a democratic value. The debate is about proportionality, not prohibition. Conflating distinct harms: doxxing is a crime by private individuals; roll revision is a statutory administrative process with notice and appeal. Grouping them together clarifies the pattern but may blur the different remedies each needs. The real vacuum is statutory: India has no specific law governing facial recognition, and no independent oversight of interception beyond executive review committees. Way Forward A surveillance statute: legislative authorisation for FRT and biometric surveillance, with purpose limitation, retention limits and judicial or parliamentary oversight, as recommended by the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee (2018). Narrow the DPDP exemptions: subject Section 17 notifications to the Puttaswamy proportionality test and to publication and periodic review. Vendor accountability: police contracts with private firms should mandate data localisation, audit, deletion and liability for breaches. Platform duty against doxxing: fast-track takedown, preservation of evidence, and possibly a specific offence for malicious publication of personal information. Due process in roll revision: transparent reasons for deletion, individual notice and accessible appeals under the RPA, 1950. Lal Babu Hussein (1995) requires due inquiry before deleting names on citizenship grounds. Global benchmarks: the EU AI Act (2024) largely prohibits real-time remote biometric identification in public spaces for law enforcement, subject to narrow exceptions. ✎ Mains Practice Question “The right to privacy in India is jurisprudentially robust but institutionally thin when surveillance is dispersed across the State, private firms and online networks.” Critically examine. 15 marks · 250 words 02 The United Nations’ Long Road to Restoring Trust: Deadlock, Donor Influence and the Global South Deficit Core TopicOpinionGS-II · IR — International Institutions, UN ReformPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Op-Ed · Raja Karthikeya As the 81st UN General Assembly convenes under the theme “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: a UN that delivers for all”, the article argues that the UN, once a builder of trust between nations, must now rebuild trust in itself. It identifies four structural causes of the decline. ◈ From the Basics — The UN’s Architecture The UN Charter was signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945 (UN Day). India was among the 51 original members, despite not yet being independent. Membership now stands at 193. Six principal organs: General Assembly, Security Council, ECOSOC, Trusteeship Council (operations suspended in 1994), International Court of Justice and the Secretariat. UNSC: 15 members — 5 permanent (P5) with the veto under Article 27(3), and 10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms. The Council was expanded from 11 to 15 members in 1965, its only enlargement. Amending the Charter (Article 108): requires two-thirds of the GA and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all P5. This gives the P5 a veto over reform itself. Uniting for Peace (Resolution 377(V), 1950): allows the GA to take up a matter when the Council fails to act because of a veto. Funding: assessed contributions follow a scale based on capacity to pay, with a ceiling of 22% and a floor of 0.001%. Voluntary (earmarked) contributions dominate the development and humanitarian system. Under Article 19, a member in arrears equal to two full years’ dues loses its GA vote. Secretary-General (Article 97): appointed by the GA on the Council’s recommendation. The incumbent’s second term ends on 31 December 2026, making 2026 a selection year. ▤ The Numbers Behind the Trust Deficit 52%Want deep reform 58%Think UN can lead 98 mnAided, 2025–26 8 of 9Experts, one sponsor UN Foundation poll: 52% of respondents feel the UN struggles to deliver and want deep structural reform. Over half see it as weak on enforcing international law and dominated by a few powers. Rockefeller Foundation–Focaldata poll: only 58% believe the UN can lead global problem-solving, possibly a historic low. 2025 surveys (Edelman, Pew): recorded declining trust in, and favourability towards, the UN. ACABQ (2024): in one UN agency, eight of nine technical experts recruited were sponsored by a single government. Delivery: humanitarian assistance reached 98 million people in 2025–26, about 1.1% of the world’s population. The Core Argument — Four Drivers of Distrust Security Council deadlock: repeated vetoes have eroded the GA’s confidence in the Council. Resolution A/RES/76/262 (April 2022) — the “veto initiative” — requires the GA to meet within 10 working days of any veto, with the vetoing member given priority to explain its vote. Weak internal accountability: controversies over procurement (Afghanistan, 2013), sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers (2017) and contracts for non-existent housing projects (2021) were blamed on individuals, while systemic accountability was rarely addressed. Financial muscle: major donors shape the system through earmarked funding and sponsored staff. This raises doubts about the neutrality of advice to beneficiary countries and makes the bureaucracy risk-averse in conflict prevention. Global South under-representation: most UN programmes are delivered in the Global South, where trust in the UN is also higher, yet decision-making power lies largely elsewhere. Missed openings for peace: the UN achieved tactical successes — the Black Sea Grain Initiative (2022) and the FSO Safer operation off Yemen (2023), which averted a Red Sea oil spill — but could not convert that goodwill into talks between belligerents. Peacemaking initiative has become overly centralised. Figure 3 — The Representation Gap in UN Leadership (%) DEVELOPING COUNTRIES / GLOBAL SOUTHShare of world population84%Share of UN leadership posts44%Share of UN entity HQ cities~40%AFRICAAfricans in UN leadership in Africa~33% Countries that make up 84% of humanity hold only 44% of UN civil-service leadership positions. HQ-city (“two-fifths”) and Africa (“a third”) figures are approximations given in the article. Chart recreated by Legacy IAS. Critical Appraisal The article is persuasive on internal governance, an area often neglected in UN-reform debates that focus narrowly on Council seats. Its analysis nonetheless needs to be balanced against the constraints under which the Secretariat operates. Member States, not the Secretariat, cause deadlock: the UN can only be as effective as its members allow. Paralysis on major conflicts reflects great-power rivalry more than bureaucratic failure. Money and trust are linked: arrears and reduced contributions have forced cuts under the UN80 Initiative (2025). A weaker UN delivers less, which in turn erodes trust further. Competing forums: the rise of minilateral and plurilateral groupings (G20, BRICS, Quad) offers alternatives. Some complement the UN, but they also dilute its centrality. Reform is structurally hard: Article 108 gives the P5 a veto over Charter amendment. The Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Council reform, under way since 2009, have yet to produce an agreed negotiating text. Norms still matter: as a former Secretary-General put it, the UN was created not to take humanity to heaven but to save it from hell. Its value lies partly in preventing worse outcomes. Figure 4 — From Drivers of Distrust to Levers of Reform DRIVER OF DISTRUSTREFORM LEVERSecurity Council deadlockVetoes paralyse action on major warsVeto restraint & Council reformA/RES/76/262 · IGN on expansionWeak internal accountabilityScandals pinned on individualsSystemic oversightOIOS · JIU · open procurement dataDonor captureEarmarked funds · sponsored staffPredictable core fundingFunding Compact (2019) · public reportingGlobal South under-represented84% of people · 44% of leadershipEquitable geographyArt. 101(3) · hubs in the South Each cause identified in the article has an existing institutional lever. The obstacle is political will among Member States, not the absence of tools. India’s Stake & Position Reformed multilateralism: India seeks permanent membership of an expanded Council through the G4 (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan, 2005). It supports Africa’s Ezulwini Consensus, while the Uniting for Consensus group opposes new permanent seats. Council record: India has served eight non-permanent terms, the latest in 2021–22, and is a candidate for 2028–29. Peacekeeping: among the largest cumulative troop contributors. India was the first country to contribute to the UN Trust Fund for victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. Voice of the Global South: India hosted the Voice of the Global South Summits (from 2023), and the African Union became a permanent G20 member during India’s presidency (2023). Both reflect the same representational argument that the article makes about the UN. Pact for the Future (2024): adopted at the Summit of the Future, it commits members to making the Council more representative. India has pressed for time-bound outcomes. Way Forward Council reform through text-based IGN negotiations; wider adherence to the ACT Code of Conduct (2015) against vetoes in mass-atrocity situations. Institutional accountability: strengthen the independence of OIOS; apply consequences at the managerial and system level, not only to individuals. Funding reform: timely payment of assessed dues and a higher share of flexible core funding to reduce donor capture. Representation: apply Article 101(3) — recruitment “on as wide a geographical basis as possible” — to senior posts, and locate hubs in the Global South. People-centred transparency: report programme spending to the publics of beneficiary countries, not just to donor governments; decentralise peacemaking initiative to the field. ✎ Mains Practice Question “The crisis facing the United Nations today is less one of capability than of credibility.” Examine the causes of declining trust in the UN and suggest reforms, with reference to India’s call for reformed multilateralism. 15 marks · 250 words

In-Depth News Analysis7 Items Core TopicImportantConcise Polity & GovernanceGS Paper II 01J&K Statehood Resolution — From Article 370 to Union Territory02SC Flags Steep Mark-ups on Essential Drugs International RelationsGS Paper II 03‘Enemy State’ Clauses in the UN Charter Environment, Ecology & Disaster ManagementGS Paper III 04Drought in Maharashtra & Karnataka — India’s Drought Management05IWC-70 at Hobart & Cetacean Conservation Internal Security & SocietyGS Paper III 06AFSPA Extended in Manipur, Nagaland & Arunachal07Cyber Fraud — Who Is Vulnerable & How Victims Seek Redress Polity & GovernanceGeneral Studies Paper II 01 J&K Assembly Seeks Restoration of Statehood: Tracing the Constitutional Journey from Accession to Union Territory Core TopicGS-II · Polity — Federalism, Special Provisions, Union TerritoriesGS-I · Modern History — Integration of Princely StatesPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express The Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly has taken up a resolution seeking the immediate restoration of statehood. Amendments seeking to include Articles 370 and 35A were moved and then withdrawn — bringing the Union Territory’s constitutional history back into focus. ◈ From the Basics — How J&K Joined the Union With the lapse of British paramountcy under the Indian Independence Act, 1947, princely states could accede to India or Pakistan. The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir initially sought to remain independent. Invasion and accession: after tribal raiders backed by Pakistan entered Kashmir in October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. It ceded three subjects — defence, external affairs and communications. The UN dimension: India referred the matter to the UN Security Council on 1 January 1948. The UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was set up, and Resolution 47 (21 April 1948) linked a plebiscite to prior demilitarisation, which never took place. A ceasefire took effect on 1 January 1949. Article 370 (drafted as Article 306A) was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 17 October 1949 and placed in Part XXI — “Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions”. Parliament’s power was confined to the accession subjects; other provisions needed the State Government’s concurrence. Clause (3) of Article 370 allowed the President to declare the Article inoperative, but only on the recommendation of the State’s Constituent Assembly. Milestones of Integration (1952–1965) Delhi Agreement (July 1952): between the Union and State Governments. The State accepted the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction and the supremacy of the national flag (the State flag continued alongside). It also accepted the President’s power under Article 352 for internal disturbance, subject to the State’s concurrence. Constitution (Application to J&K) Order, 1954: extended large parts of the Constitution and inserted Article 35A through an Appendix. Article 35A empowered the State legislature to define “permanent residents” and reserve for them rights to property, government jobs and scholarships. Constitution of J&K: adopted on 17 November 1956 and in force from 26 January 1957, after which the State’s Constituent Assembly dissolved. 1965: the State’s constitution was amended to replace the titles “Sadar-i-Riyasat” and “Prime Minister” with Governor and Chief Minister. Figure 1 — Jammu & Kashmir’s Constitutional Status, 1947–2026 1947AccessionIoA, 26 Oct1949Art. 370 adopted17 October1952Delhi AgreementUnion–State pact19541954 OrderArt. 35A added1957J&K ConstitutionIn force 26 Jan2019370 inoperativeTwo UTs formed2023SC verdictUpholds, 11 Dec2024Assembly pollsFirst since 20142026Statehood callHouse resolution Special status was built up gradually between 1949 and 1957 and dismantled in 2019. The present demand concerns statehood, a distinct question from Article 370. 2019: Abrogation and Reorganisation Constitution (Application to J&K) Order, 2019 (C.O. 272), 5 August 2019: superseded the 1954 Order and applied the entire Constitution. It amended Article 367 so that “Constituent Assembly of the State” would read as “Legislative Assembly”. With the State under President’s Rule, the Assembly’s role was exercised through Parliament and the Governor. C.O. 273 (6 August 2019): declared Article 370 inoperative except for a modified clause (1). J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019: created two Union Territories from 31 October 2019 — J&K (with a legislature) and Ladakh (without one). This was the first conversion of a State into a Union Territory. ▤ Key Facts — The Supreme Court Verdict & the Present Set-up In Re: Article 370 (11 December 2023): a five-judge Constitution Bench upheld the abrogation. It held that Article 370 was a temporary provision, that J&K retained no internal sovereignty after accession, and that the President’s power under Article 370(3) survived the dissolution of the State’s Constituent Assembly. A nuance: the Court found that using Article 367 to amend Article 370 was impermissible, but upheld the outcome as within the President’s power to apply the Constitution in full. Left open: the Court upheld the creation of Ladakh as a UT but did not decide whether converting a State into a UT was valid, relying on the Union’s assurance that statehood would be restored. It directed Assembly elections by 30 September 2024 and restoration of statehood “at the earliest”. Assembly: after the 2022 delimitation, 90 elected seats (Jammu 43, Kashmir 47; 9 ST, 7 SC); 24 seats for Pakistan-occupied areas remain vacant. The Lieutenant Governor may nominate up to five members. Powers under UT status: police and public order rest with the Lieutenant Governor. July 2024 amendments to the Transaction of Business Rules widened the LG’s role over police, All India Services and prosecution sanctions. Precedents (UT → State): Himachal Pradesh (1971), Manipur and Tripura (1972), Goa, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh (1987). Why Statehood Is a Distinct Question Statehood ≠ special status: restoring statehood means a full-fledged State under Articles 3 and 4. Reviving Article 370 is legally foreclosed by the 2023 verdict — which is why the amendments on Articles 370 and 35A were withdrawn. Procedure: Parliament would need to amend the J&K Reorganisation Act, 2019 by ordinary law under Articles 3 and 4. This is not a constitutional amendment under Article 368. Democratic accountability: in the present dyarchy, the elected government lacks control over police, while the Lieutenant Governor is not answerable to the legislature. The Critical View Federal precedent: reducing a State to a UT without its legislature’s consent raises concerns under cooperative federalism. The Court left this question open. Security considerations: the Union cites a sensitive border and militancy as reasons for caution on timing. No timeline: “at the earliest” is not enforceable, and the absence of a time-bound roadmap sustains political uncertainty. Integration and alienation: administrative integration is complete, but trust-building and representative governance remain unfinished. ✎ Mains Practice Question The conversion of a State into a Union Territory raises questions of federalism that the Supreme Court’s 2023 verdict on Article 370 left unanswered. Discuss in the context of the demand for restoration of statehood to Jammu and Kashmir. 15 marks · 250 words 02 Supreme Court Flags Steep Trade Mark-ups on Essential Medicines; Asks Why the 16% Retail Margin Cannot Apply Uniformly ImportantGS-II · Governance — Health, Regulatory BodiesGS-III · Economy — Pricing & RegulationPrelims + MainsThe Hindu Hearing public interest petitions on the affordability of medicines, a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court described steep mark-ups on essential medicines, particularly cancer drugs, as a burden on patients and taxpayers. It asked the Centre why the 16% retailer margin under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 2013 should not apply uniformly. ◈ From the Basics — How Drug Prices Are Regulated in India Access to affordable medicines flows from Article 21 (the right to health, recognised in Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity, 1996) and Article 47 (the State’s duty to improve public health). Legal basis: drugs are declared essential commodities, and DPCOs are issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Successive orders were issued in 1970, 1979, 1987, 1995 and 2013. Regulator: the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA), set up in 1997 under the Department of Pharmaceuticals (Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers), fixes ceiling prices and monitors compliance. Scheduled formulations: medicines in the National List of Essential Medicines (NLEM) — 384 medicines in NLEM 2022. Their ceiling price = simple average of all brands with at least 1% market share + a 16% retailer margin, revised annually in line with the WPI. Non-scheduled formulations: not price-capped; manufacturers may raise the MRP by up to 10% a year. Extraordinary powers (Para 19): used to cap prices of coronary stents and knee implants (2017). In 2019, the NPPA capped trade margins at 30% for 42 non-scheduled anti-cancer drugs (Trade Margin Rationalisation). Key terms: PTR (price to retailer) and MRP. Trade margin = MRP − PTR. Figure 2 — The Mark-ups Flagged by the Court A cancer drug with a PTR of about ₹3,000 retailed at about ₹27,000 — a nine-fold mark-up. A non-scheduled statin cost more than its price-controlled combination with aspirin. Image courtesy The Hindu; reproduced with credit for educational use. What the Court Highlighted Disproportionate margins: about ₹24,000 of a single pack’s price was absorbed in the distribution chain, not in manufacturing cost. Regulatory anomaly: Rosuvastatin (non-scheduled) cost about ₹240 per strip, while its combination with aspirin — a scheduled formulation — cost about ₹70. The combination was cheaper only because it falls under price control. The Centre’s response: the Solicitor General acknowledged the concern and said a way forward would need to balance equities among patients, industry and distributors. Why Mark-ups Persist Narrow coverage: price control applies only to NLEM formulations; a large part of the market is non-scheduled. Trade-margin incentives: high MRPs allow large discounts to retailers and stockists. Branded and “trade” generics compete on margins offered to the trade rather than on price to patients. Weak prescriber discipline: the Uniform Code for Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices (UCPMP), 2024 restricts inducements, but enforcement remains a concern. Information asymmetry: patients, especially cancer patients, cannot compare prices or delay purchase. The Critical View & Way Forward The caution: a uniform 16% cap could affect the viability of distribution in low-volume rural markets and discourage new launches. Price caps have occasionally led to supply withdrawals. Extend trade margin rationalisation to more high-value therapeutic groups, beyond anti-cancer drugs. Transparency: mandatory disclosure of PTR alongside MRP and a public price database. Public alternatives: scale up Jan Aushadhi Kendras (PMBJP) and procurement for public hospitals, since medicines form a major part of out-of-pocket health spending. ✎ Mains Practice Question Examine the regulatory gaps that allow steep trade margins on essential medicines in India. Suggest measures to improve affordability without compromising the availability of drugs. 15 marks · 250 words International RelationsGeneral Studies Paper II 03 Japan Seeks Deletion of the UN Charter’s ‘Enemy State’ Clauses; China Objects ImportantGS-II · IR — UN Structure, Reform; India & East AsiaPrelims + MainsThe Indian Express · The Diplomat Addressing the 81st UN General Assembly, Japan’s Prime Minister called for removing the “enemy state” references from the UN Charter and for expanding both permanent and non-permanent seats on the Security Council. China responded that the clauses remain relevant as safeguards against militarism. ◈ From the Basics — What Are the ‘Enemy State’ Clauses? The UN Charter was drafted by the Allied Powers as World War II ended. Article 53(2) defines an “enemy state” as any state that, during the war, was an enemy of any signatory — generally understood to cover Japan, Germany and other Axis-aligned states. Article 53(1): regional enforcement action normally needs Security Council authorisation, but measures against a renewal of aggressive policy by an enemy state were exempted. Article 77(1)(b): territories detached from enemy states could be placed under the Trusteeship System. Article 107: nothing in the Charter invalidates action taken as a result of the war by the responsible governments against an enemy state. Membership: Italy joined the UN in 1955, Japan on 18 December 1956, and both German states in 1973. This made the clauses anachronistic. Japan’s constitution: Article 9 (1947) renounces war. 2015 legislation allowed limited collective self-defence, and the 2022 security strategy aims for defence spending of 2% of GDP by FY2027. Attempts at Deletion GA Resolution 50/52 (1995): adopted 155–0–3 (China voting in favour), declaring the intention to begin the Article 108 amendment procedure to delete the clauses. 2005 World Summit Outcome: adopted without a vote, it decided that references to “enemy states” in Articles 53, 77 and 107 should be deleted. Outcome: no amendment was ever ratified. Most international lawyers regard the clauses as obsolete, but they remain in the text. Figure 3 — Why Deletion Has Stalled: The Charter Amendment Procedure (Article 108) 1 · ProposalAmendment texttabled in the GA2 · GA adoptionTwo-thirds ofall members3 · RatificationTwo-thirds of membersincl. ALL five P54 · In forceBinding onall membersCharter amended only thrice: 1965 (Arts 23, 27, 61) · 1968 (Art. 109) · 1973 (Art. 61)Enemy-state clauses (Arts 53, 77, 107): deletion pledged in 1995 and 2005, never ratified —any P5 member, including China or Russia, can block the change at Step 3 The P5 ratification requirement in Step 3 is the same hurdle facing Security Council reform, which explains Japan’s linking of the two issues. Two Readings of the Post-War Order Japan’s view: after eight decades of peaceful conduct and major contributions to UN peacekeeping and development assistance, the clauses are an outdated reminder of defeat. Removing them would recognise Japan as a “normal” member state. China’s view: the clauses reflect historical memory of wartime aggression in Asia. China argues that Japan’s conduct and defence build-up matter more than its words. Wider context: deteriorating Sino-Japanese ties and tensions with Russia have revived a largely symbolic legal issue. Significance for India G4 partner: Japan and India, along with Brazil and Germany, seek permanent seats. The enemy-state debate shows that the Charter’s 1945 architecture is the core obstacle to reform. Reformed multilateralism: India’s position that the Security Council should reflect present realities rests on the same argument. Indo-Pacific balance: a more assertive Japan fits India’s interest in a multipolar Asia, though India avoids taking sides on history disputes. ✎ Mains Practice Question The survival of the ‘enemy state’ clauses in the UN Charter illustrates how the post-1945 order resists adaptation. Discuss with reference to the Charter amendment procedure and the demand for UN reform. 10 marks · 150 words Environment, Ecology & Disaster ManagementGeneral Studies Paper III 04 Drought Declared in 265 of Maharashtra’s 358 Talukas: How India Declares and Manages Drought Core TopicGS-III · Disaster Management; Agriculture — Crop Losses, InsuranceGS-I · Geography — Monsoon, Rain-shadow RegionsPrelims + MainsDown To Earth After a deficient and erratic monsoon, Maharashtra has declared drought in 265 of its 358 talukas (about 74%), mostly in Marathwada and Vidarbha. It is the second State to do so this year, after Karnataka (177 of 240 taluks). ◈ From the Basics — What Is Drought? Drought is a slow-onset disaster caused by a prolonged shortfall of water relative to normal. Unlike floods or cyclones, its onset and end are hard to pinpoint, which makes timely declaration difficult. Four types: meteorological (rainfall deficiency), hydrological (depletion of surface and groundwater), agricultural (soil-moisture and crop stress) and socio-economic (effects on livelihoods and markets). IMD benchmarks: meteorological drought when seasonal rainfall is below 75% of normal — moderate for a 26–50% deficit and severe above 50%. An all-India drought year is one with a deficit above 10% of the LPA and over 20% of the area under drought. The monsoon LPA is 87 cm (1971–2020). Vulnerability: about two-thirds of India’s cropped area is drought-prone, and most of it is rain-fed. Why Marathwada: it lies in the rain-shadow (leeward side) of the Western Ghats, with semi-arid conditions and rain-fed soybean and cotton on black (regur) soils. Marathwada has 8 districts; Vidarbha has 11. Nodal ministry: unlike most disasters (handled by the MHA), drought falls under the Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare. 265 / 358Maharashtra talukas 177 / 240Karnataka taluks 51.2%India area dry/drought 84.1%Maharashtra area The Present Situation Declaration: a Government Resolution dated 25 September identified talukas using rainfall deficits and other drought indicators since June. Yavatmal has the most talukas (16), followed by Jalgaon (15) and Nanded, Amravati and Nagpur (14 each). Rainfall: several Marathwada districts received only about half to a little over half of normal rainfall. Long dry spells depleted soil moisture at critical crop stages. Crops hit: soybean, maize, cotton and onion, particularly in Latur, Dharashiv and Solapur. National picture: the India Drought Monitor (IIT-Gandhinagar) showed 51.2% of India’s land area under dry or drought conditions as of 23 September, and 84.1% in Maharashtra. Relief so far: crop-loan restructuring, electricity-bill concessions and expanded employment-guarantee works. Crop-loss compensation awaits field surveys — panchnamas, photographs and GPS-tagged records. Climate driver: a strengthening El Niño (see Also in News). Figure 4 — How Drought Is Declared: The Manual for Drought Management (2016, updated 2020) 1 · TRIGGERMandatory indicators:rainfall deviationand dry spells2 · IMPACT INDICATORSVegetation indices (NDVI),sown area, soil moisture,reservoirs, groundwater3 · GROUND TRUTHINGField surveys, cropassessment, panchnamas,GPS-tagged photographs4 · STATE DECLARES DROUGHTGraded as moderate or severe;notified by the State Government5 · RELIEFSDRF first; for severe drought, a memoto the Centre → IMCT visit → NDRF aidMaharashtra, September 2026: drought declared on indicator data; crop-damage surveys under wayCompensation (Step 5) will follow the field assessment The Manual makes declaration evidence-based by combining remote-sensing indices with field verification. This improves accuracy but adds time between a failed monsoon and compensation reaching farmers. ▤ Institutional & Financial Framework Disaster Management Act, 2005: drought is a notified disaster eligible for the State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF) — shared 75:25 by Centre and State (90:10 for North-Eastern and Himalayan States) — and the National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF). Crop-loss relief: an input subsidy is paid when crop loss is 33% or more. Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India (2016): the Supreme Court directed the Centre to update the Drought Manual, cautioned against delays in declaration, and called for a National Disaster Mitigation Fund. PMFBY (2016): farmers pay premiums of 2% (kharif), 1.5% (rabi) and 5% (commercial/horticultural crops). It covers prevented sowing and mid-season adversity. Mitigation lineage: Drought Prone Areas Programme (1973–74) → Desert Development Programme (1977–78) → IWMP (2009) → watershed component of PMKSY (2015). The Critical View Relief over resilience: response is still dominated by post-facto relief rather than reducing risk before the monsoon fails. Delays: surveys, memoranda and central team visits can take months, and insurance claim settlement is often slow. Water-intensive cropping: sugarcane in a drought-prone region and groundwater over-extraction deepen hydrological drought. Climate risk: longer dry spells within a season can cause crop failure even when total rainfall is near normal. Cumulative rainfall alone is therefore a poor guide. Way Forward Early warning: integrate forecasts, soil-moisture data and drought monitors so that contingency crop plans are triggered early. Water security: watershed development, farm ponds, micro-irrigation (Per Drop More Crop) and groundwater regulation. Crop diversification towards millets and pulses in rain-shadow regions. Faster compensation using technology-based yield estimation and direct benefit transfer. ✎ Mains Practice Question India’s drought management remains largely reactive, focused on relief rather than risk reduction. Critically examine this statement in the light of recent drought declarations, and suggest measures to build drought resilience in rain-fed regions. 15 marks · 250 words 05 IWC-70 in Hobart: India Reaffirms Science-based Conservation of Whales and Other Cetaceans Core TopicGS-III · Environment — Biodiversity, Conservation, ConventionsPrelims + MainsPIB · Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change At the 70th meeting of the International Whaling Commission (IWC-70) in Hobart, Australia (28 September–2 October 2026), India called for science-based conservation, cooperation among range countries, and practical local measures against threats to cetaceans. The meeting marks the 80th anniversary of the whaling convention. ◈ From the Basics — What Are Cetaceans? Cetaceans — whales, dolphins and porpoises — are fully aquatic mammals. They breathe air through blowholes, give live birth and suckle their young. Mysticeti (baleen whales): filter-feed on krill and plankton using baleen plates and have two blowholes. Examples: blue whale (the largest animal ever), humpback and Bryde’s whales. Odontoceti (toothed cetaceans): have teeth, a single blowhole and use echolocation. Examples: sperm whale, orca, and all dolphins and porpoises. Prelims trap: dugongs and manatees are not cetaceans — they belong to the order Sirenia. Figure 5 — Types of Cetaceans Taxonomically there are two parvorders — Mysticeti and Odontoceti. Dolphins and porpoises are toothed cetaceans, grouped separately here for ease of comparison. Reference infographic; reproduced for educational use. ▤ The International Whaling Regime at a Glance Convention: International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW), signed in Washington DC on 2 December 1946. It established the IWC, headquartered at Impington, Cambridge (UK). Members: 89 governments. India has been a member since 1981. The Commission meets every two years. Moratorium on commercial whaling: adopted in 1982, effective from the 1985–86 season. Three categories of whaling: commercial (under moratorium), aboriginal subsistence (quotas permitted) and special-permit “scientific” whaling under Article VIII, authorised by member governments. Sanctuaries: Indian Ocean Sanctuary (1979) and Southern Ocean Sanctuary (1994). ICJ, Whaling in the Antarctic (2014): in Australia v. Japan (New Zealand intervening), the Court held that Japan’s JARPA II programme was not for scientific research. Exits and exceptions: Japan left the IWC in 2019 and resumed commercial whaling in its own waters. Norway (under objection) and Iceland (under reservation) continue commercial whaling. Figure 6 — Eight Decades of the Whaling Regime 1946ICRW signedWashington DC1979Indian OceanSanctuary1981India joins IWCConservation stance1982MoratoriumEffective 1985–861994Southern OceanSanctuary2014ICJ rulingAustralia v. Japan2019Japan exits IWCWhales in own EEZ2026IWC-70, HobartICRW at 80 The IWC has shifted from managing whale harvests to conserving whales. India has supported the conservation side throughout. India’s Cetacean Conservation Framework Legal protection: cetaceans in Indian waters are listed in Schedule I of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, the highest level of protection. Project Dolphin (announced 2020): a holistic programme for riverine and marine cetaceans and their habitats. The first range-wide estimate (2025) counted about 6,327 river dolphins. Gangetic river dolphin: National Aquatic Animal (2009); National Dolphin Day is on 5 October. The Indus river dolphin, found in the Beas, is Punjab’s State aquatic animal. Chilika Lake has an important Irrawaddy dolphin population. Arabian Sea humpback whale: a genetically isolated, non-migratory population — unlike other humpbacks, which migrate between polar and tropical waters. It is Endangered on the IUCN Red List and among India’s 25 species identified for focused conservation. Marine Protected Areas: e.g., Gulf of Mannar and Gulf of Kachchh Marine National Parks, and India’s first Dugong Conservation Reserve in Palk Bay (2022). Threats & the Critical View Main threats: bycatch and entanglement in fishing gear, ship strikes, underwater noise from shipping and seismic surveys, plastics and pollution, and climate change. River dolphins also face dams and barrages, low flows and sand mining. Weak enforcement: the IWC has no enforcement power. Objections and reservations allow members to opt out of binding decisions. Polarisation: the split between whaling and anti-whaling blocs has led to exits (Japan, 2019) and weakened consensus. India’s gaps: limited population data for marine species, weak stranding-response networks, and poor monitoring of bycatch in gillnet fisheries. ✎ Mains Practice Question From regulating whaling to conserving whales, the evolution of the International Whaling Commission mirrors the changing global approach to marine biodiversity. Discuss, highlighting India’s efforts for cetacean conservation. 15 marks · 250 words Internal Security & SocietyGeneral Studies Paper III 06 AFSPA Extended for Six More Months in Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh Core TopicGS-III · Internal Security — Security Forces & Mandates, NE InsurgencyGS-II · Polity — Fundamental Rights, Centre–State RelationsPrelims + MainsThe Hindu The Union Ministry of Home Affairs has extended the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 in parts of Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh for six months from 1 October 2026. In Manipur, the whole State is now a “disturbed area” except 13 police stations in five Valley districts. ◈ From the Basics — What AFSPA Is AFSPA gives the armed forces special powers in areas declared “disturbed” because of insurgency or serious internal disorder. Its roots lie in a colonial ordinance of 1942 issued to suppress the Quit India Movement. Origin: enacted in 1958 as the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur) Special Powers Act to deal with the Naga Hills insurgency. It was later extended across the North-East and renamed. Section 3 — who declares: the Governor (or UT Administrator) or the Central Government. The Centre received this concurrent power through a 1972 amendment. Section 4 — powers: after due warning, use force, “even to the causing of death”, against persons violating prohibitory orders; arrest without warrant; enter and search without warrant; destroy arms dumps. Section 5: arrested persons must be handed to the nearest police station with the least possible delay. Section 6 — protection: no prosecution or suit without the prior sanction of the Central Government. Separate statutes: J&K AFSPA, 1990. The Punjab and Chandigarh Act (1983) is no longer in force. ▤ Current Coverage (from 1 October 2026) Manipur: the entire State, except areas under 13 police stations in five Valley districts. Nagaland: nine districts, plus areas under 21 police stations in five other districts. Arunachal Pradesh: Tirap, Changlang and Longding districts, plus areas under Namsai, Mahadevpur and Chowkham police stations in Namsai district, which borders Assam. Assam: disturbed-area notifications are issued by the State Government. Withdrawn earlier: Tripura (2015) and Meghalaya (2018). Figure 7 — AFSPA in Manipur: Contraction and Return 1958AFSPA enactedNaga Hills unrest1972AmendmentCentre can declare1980sStatewide coverState notifies2004Imphal municipalarea withdrawn2022–23Valley rollbackAll Valley PS freedMay 2023Ethnic conflictTrend reversesNov 2024MHA reimposesSix PS areasOct 2026Extended 6 monthsAll but 13 PS AFSPA’s footprint in Manipur was shrinking until May 2023. Since the ethnic conflict, the MHA rather than the State has driven its return. PS = police station. Centre–State Dimension Shift in who notifies: for decades, Manipur’s own government issued the disturbed-area notifications. After the May 2023 violence, the MHA took over. Disagreement: when the MHA reimposed AFSPA in six police station areas on 14 November 2024, the State Cabinet recommended a review and withdrawal the very next day — an unusual Centre–State divergence. Nagaland: continuation is linked to armed groups and the unresolved Naga political issue — talks with the NSCN-IM (Framework Agreement, 2015) and the Naga National Political Groups. Arunachal: concentrated in districts affected by insurgent movement and areas adjoining Assam and Myanmar. Judicial & Committee Scrutiny Naga People’s Movement of Human Rights v. Union of India (1997): a Constitution Bench upheld AFSPA, but held that a declaration must be for a limited period with review every six months, and that the Army’s Do’s and Don’ts are binding. EEVFAM v. Union of India (2016): no absolute immunity. Excessive or retaliatory force is not permitted even in disturbed areas, and every such death must be inquired into. Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee (2005): recommended repeal, with necessary provisions moved into the UAPA; endorsed by the Second ARC (Fifth Report, 2007). Justice Santosh Hegde Commission (2013) examined alleged fake encounters in Manipur. The Justice Verma Committee (2013) recommended that sexual offences by security personnel be tried under ordinary criminal law. The Critical View The security case: the Army is not a police force and needs legal cover for counter-insurgency. Manipur’s armed ethnic groups, looted weapons and the porous India–Myanmar border sustain the threat. The rights case: prosecution sanction is rarely granted. Incidents such as the killing of civilians at Oting (Nagaland, 2021) have deepened alienation. Governance deficit: prolonged reliance on AFSPA reflects a failure of civil administration and political settlement. Way forward: genuine six-monthly reviews, a transparent sanction process, independent inquiries, and political dialogue alongside security operations. ✎ Mains Practice Question AFSPA is often described as a necessary evil. In the light of its recent extension in parts of the North-East, critically examine the balance between the imperatives of national security and the protection of human rights. 15 marks · 250 words 07 Cyber Fraud in India: Who Is Targeted, Who Loses, and Why Victims Resort to Bribes and Contacts Core TopicGS-III · Internal Security — Cyber Security, Financial FraudGS-II · Governance — Police Reforms, AccountabilityPrelims + MainsThe Hindu · Lokniti-CSDS & Common Cause (SPIR 2026) Cybercrime cases rose 17.9% to 1,01,928 in 2024, even as overall registered crime fell by 6% (NCRB). The Status of Policing in India Report (SPIR) 2026, based on a survey of 8,306 citizens in 16 States, shows who is targeted and how victims seek redress. ◈ From the Basics — The Legal & Institutional Framework “Police” and “public order” are State subjects (Entries 1 and 2, List II), so investigating cybercrime is primarily the States’ responsibility. The Centre supports them through coordination, platforms and capacity-building. Laws: the IT Act, 2000 — Section 66C (identity theft) and 66D (cheating by personation using a computer resource). The BNS, 2023 — Section 318 (cheating) and Section 111 (organised crime, which includes cyber-crimes). Institutions: the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C), under the MHA (2020); the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (cybercrime.gov.in, 2019); the 1930 helpline; and the Citizen Financial Cyber Fraud Reporting and Management System (2021), which helps freeze money in transit. Telecom and banking tools: the Sanchar Saathi portal (2023) and its Chakshu facility (2024) for reporting suspected fraud calls; the RBI’s MuleHunter.AI for detecting mule accounts. Customer liability (RBI, 2017): zero liability for unauthorised electronic transactions caused by a third-party breach if reported within three working days. FIR registration: Lalita Kumari (2013) made FIR registration mandatory for cognizable offences. Section 173 of the BNSS, 2023 provides for e-FIR and Zero FIR, but allows a preliminary enquiry for offences punishable with 3–7 years. Scale of Exposure Common scams: calls about undelivered parcels (33%), high-return investments (31%), fake bank officials (27%), a phone “linked to illegal activity” (23%), “friends” urgently needing money (23%), and fake police or authority figures (20%). Roughly half to three-fifths of respondents had never received such calls. Connectivity and risk: among heavy internet users, 46% reported moderate or high scam exposure, against 19% of non-users. Methods: fraudsters rely less on technical skill than on exploiting trust — in e-commerce, banks and relationships — and fear of authority, as in “digital arrest” scams. Figure 8 — Fraud Attempts and Online Exposure (Tables 1–2) The more time people spend online, the more often they are targeted. Image courtesy The Hindu (data: Lokniti-CSDS & Common Cause, SPIR 2026); reproduced with credit for educational use. Who Becomes a Victim Victimisation: 13% of respondents were direct victims in the past two to three years. Of these, 54% faced financial fraud, 13% device hacking, 11% data theft, 7% cyberbullying and 4% online sexual harassment. An unexpected profile: financial fraud rises with wealth and education — 57% among the rich against 47% among the poor, and 59% among graduates against 40% among the non-literate. Losses: over eight in ten victims lost money, and 23% lost more than ₹20,000. Takeaway: fraud now tracks digital participation and resources. It works less as a penalty on carelessness than as a cost of being connected. Figure 9 — Nature of Crimes, Victim Profile and Losses (Tables 3–5) Better-off and more educated respondents report more financial fraud — reflecting greater exposure, not less awareness. Image courtesy The Hindu (data: Lokniti-CSDS & Common Cause, SPIR 2026); reproduced with credit for educational use. Seeking Redress: Bribes and Contacts Reporting: 49% of victims complained to the police, 9% approached them but did not follow up, and 39% did not complain at all. Paying to be heard: 27% of complainants paid the police. The share was higher among women (35%) than men (22%), in rural areas (36%) than urban (24%), and among the poor (51%) than the affluent (12%). Using contacts: 37% approached senior officials or local leaders. The share was highest among the poor (55%). Informal routes “worked”: full recovery was 41% for those who paid against 12% for those who did not; and 32% for those who used contacts against 13% for those who did not. Figure 10 — Paying to Be Heard: Bribes, Contacts and Recovery (%) Paid a bribe to police (% of complainants)352236245112WomenMenRuralUrbanPoorAffluentGenderLocationClassRecovered the full amount lost (%)41123213YesNoYesNoPaid a bribe?Used contacts?Survey of 8,306 citizens across 16 States · Lokniti-CSDS & Common Cause, SPIR 2026 A poor victim was more than four times as likely to pay a bribe as an affluent one. Informal routes roughly tripled the chance of full recovery — an indicator of how weak formal procedure is. Chart recreated from figures in the article. The Critical View A two-tier justice system: those with the fewest formal options — women, the rural population and the poor — are pushed most often into informal channels. Correlation, not causation: the recovery data are self-reported and may reflect case characteristics, such as early reporting. They still point to discretion in police response. Structural gaps: under-reporting, reluctance to register FIRs, weak bank–police coordination within the “golden hour”, inter-State jurisdiction problems, and shortages of trained cyber personnel. Police accountability: the Prakash Singh (2006) directions, including Police Complaints Authorities, remain unevenly implemented. Way Forward Enforceable procedure: time-bound, mandatory FIR/e-FIR registration for cyber fraud, with an audit trail for each complaint. Standard bank–police protocol for freezing and returning money, with timelines and public reporting on recovery. Upstream prevention: action against mule accounts, stricter SIM verification, and platform liability for scam advertisements. Capacity and awareness: dedicated cyber police stations, trained investigators, and targeted awareness for high-exposure users — not only the digitally inexperienced. ✎ Mains Practice Question “Cyber fraud in India has become less a penalty on carelessness than a cost of connectivity.” Examine the pattern of vulnerability to cyber fraud and the institutional gaps in redressal, and suggest reforms. 15 marks · 250 words