Content
IMF gives ‘C’ grade for India’s national accounts statistics
Are the labour codes labour-friendly?
Why India struggles to clear its air
India’s food colouring woes and steps being taken to combat recurring issue
International Astronomical Union approves seven new Indian names for Martian features
Doppler Weather Radar: Enhancing India’s weather forecasting network
IMF gives ‘C’ grade for India’s national accounts statistics
WHY IS THIS IN NEWS?
IMF’s Article IV Consultation (2025) assessed India’s national accounts and gave a Grade ‘C’ for the quality of GDP data.
Grade ‘C’ = “shortcomings that hamper surveillance” → second-lowest level.
IMF highlighted:
Periodic sizeable discrepancies between production and expenditure GDP estimates.
Use of an outdated base year (2011–12).
Over-reliance on Wholesale Price Index (WPI) for deflating nominal values.
Need to expand expenditure-side data and informal sector coverage.
Assessment is significant because India is expected to release Q2 FY2025–26 GDP numbers, and concerns affect global investor confidence.
Relevance
GS3 – Economy / Growth Measurement
• Quality of GDP estimation under MOSPI/NSO scrutiny.
• Discrepancies between production vs expenditure GDP.
• Outdated base year (2011–12) and need for rebasing.
• Deflator issues (WPI–CPI divergence).
• Statistical system reforms: MCA-21 data, GSTN integration.
GS2 – Governance / Institutions
• Role of IMF’s Article IV surveillance.
• Credibility of official statistics as a governance issue.
• Transparency norms and reforms in data architecture.
• Centre–State coordination for data collection (industries, services, informal sector).
• Strengthening statistical autonomy & capacity.
HOW GDP IS MEASURED ?
Three Approaches
Production Approach (GVA method)
Sum of value added by agriculture, industry, and services.
Income Approach
Sum of wages, profits, rents, and mixed income.
Expenditure Approach
GDP = C + I + G + (X – M).
Should converge with production-side figures.
Ideal Condition
All three approaches should produce near-identical results.
Persistent divergence = data quality problem, structural inconsistencies.
WHAT EXACTLY IMF FLAGGED ?
A. “Sizeable Discrepancies” Between GDP Approaches
Large, recurrent differences between:
Production-side GDP (GVA-based)
Expenditure-side GDP (C+I+G+X−M)
Economists flagged this over the past 5 years:
Private consumption growth often inconsistent with household survey indicators.
Investment (GFCF) estimates occasionally contradict credit data & corporate filings.
IMF classifies this as a methodological weakness affecting reliability.
B. Base Year Too Old (2011–12)
Structural shifts in 13 years:
Digitisation, GST rollout, UPI-led formalisation.
E-commerce, gig economy, platform work.
Deflation of manufacturing due to global price changes.
Outdated base year → wrong weights → distorted GDP.
C. Over-Reliance on Wholesale Price Indices
WPI used to deflate:
Manufacturing GVA,
Nominal capital formation,
Some components of GFCF and inventories.
Issues:
WPI excludes services (57% of GDP).
Highly sensitive to commodities, making real GDP volatile and inaccurate.
CPI-based deflators are more reflective of consumer reality.
D. Limited Expenditure-Side Data
India primarily uses Income Approach for GDP.
Expenditure estimates (C, I, G, NX) rely on:
Sparse household surveys,
Small-sample enterprise surveys,
Rough extrapolations.
IMF wants expenditure-side to be strengthened and independently robust.
E. Informal Sector Under-Coverage
Informal sector = ~45–50% of employment (varies by survey).
GDP estimation largely model-based:
Uses outdated NSS data.
Limited real-time surveys post-2011–12.
IMF says this reduces reliability and timeliness.
IMF’s GRADING SYSTEM
Grade
Meaning
A
High-quality data; internationally comparable
B
Broadly adequate; minor weaknesses
C
Shortcomings hamper surveillance (India gets this for National Accounts)
D
Severe deficiencies
India’s Overall Score
Overall: Grade B (across all data categories)
National Accounts: Grade C → primary area of weakness.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE ‘C’ GRADE
A. Policy-Making Impact
If GDP reliability is weak:
Monetary policy signals (RBI) become less precise.
Fiscal policy targeting becomes less credible.
B. Investor Confidence
Foreign investors use GDP data for:
Valuation of Indian markets,
Assessment of macro stability,
Pre-investment risk modelling.
‘C’ grade may raise caution, particularly among sovereign funds.
C. International Comparability Issues
Difficulty comparing India with:
OECD economies,
Asian peers (Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines),
China (despite opacity).
D. Domestic Credibility
Economists have long critiqued:
Back-series revisions,
Post-2017 manufacturing volatility,
Divergence between GDP and ground-level indicators (PLFS, ASI, credit data).
GOVERNMENT’S POSITION
India argues:
GVA-based method is robust and widely used.
Discrepancies normal in developing economies with large informal sectors.
Revised base year planned after new household surveys (2022–23, 2023–24).
Transition to supply-use tables (SUTs) is ongoing.
STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF GDP DISCREPANCIES
A. Informal Sector Dominance
Difficult to track productivity and incomes in real time.
B. Data Gaps
Large gaps in:
Household consumption,
Unincorporated enterprises,
Self-employment earnings,
Small manufacturing units.
C. Outdated Surveys
Key datasets:
NSS 2011–12 consumption survey,
Unincorporated enterprise surveys,
ASI and IIP with limited representativeness.
D. Weak Price Deflation Mechanism
Correct deflation = accurate real GDP.
WPI-based deflation induces errors.
REFORMS IMF EXPECTS
Update base year to 2017–18 or 2020–21 (debate ongoing).
Increase frequency of:
Household consumption surveys,
Enterprise surveys,
Service sector surveys.
Expand use of:
GST data,
Corporate filings (MCA-21),
Digital payments data.
Strengthen expenditure-side GDP with more granular monthly/quarterly data.
Are the labour codes labour-friendly?
Why is this in news?
21 November: Union Labour Ministry announced the implementation of all four labour codes — Wages (2019), Industrial Relations (2020), Social Security (2020), OSHWC (2020).
Trade unions across the spectrum (CTUs, sectoral federations) have opposed the notification, demanding withdrawal.
The opposition centres on hire-and-fire, dilution of collective bargaining, weakening of social security, and higher thresholds that exclude workers.
Relevance
GS2 – Governance
• Major governance reform: consolidation of 29+ labour laws into 4 unified Codes.
• Centre–State friction: centralisation of powers (floor wage, licensing thresholds).
• Weak tripartism: minimal consultation with trade unions; no Indian Labour Conference since 2015.
• Regulatory overhaul: single registration, digital compliance, inspector-cum-facilitator model.
• Collective bargaining diluted: restrictive strike provisions, unclear union recognition.
GS2 – Social Justice
• Impact on 93% informal workforce due to raised thresholds in OSHWC.
• Limited social security expansion; current coverage only ~7%.
• First statutory recognition of gig/platform workers but thin protections.
• Precarity from fixed-term employment; women’s night-shift permissions with safety concerns.
What are the Four Labour Codes?
Code on Wages, 2019: Merges 4 laws (Minimum Wages Act, Payment of Wages Act, Bonus Act, Equal Remuneration Act).
Industrial Relations Code, 2020: Combines Industrial Disputes Act, Trade Unions Act, Industrial Employment (SO) Act.
Code on Social Security, 2020: Merges 9 social security laws (EPF, ESI, Maternity Benefit Act etc.).
OSHWC Code, 2020: Combines 13 safety & working condition laws.
Why did the Government Propose Codification?
Argument by R. Mukundan (industry perspective)
Fragmentation of 40+ central laws, 100+ State laws → compliance burden, duplication.
Outdated legislation dating to 1940s–50s; workforce structure transformed (gig/platform, logistics, e-commerce).
Need for uniformity: definitions, thresholds, inspection systems.
Objective: Job creation, ease of doing business, attracting global supply chains (comparison with Vietnam, S. Korea).
Simplification + digitisation of compliance = predictability and reduction in disputes.
Formalisation push: extending minimum wages + social security to new categories (gig/platform workers).
Labour market flexibility (fixed-term employment, higher retrenchment threshold, women in all shifts) aligned with global trends.
Why Are Trade Unions Opposed?
Labour Union perspective
Loss of historical rights gained through workers’ struggles (hours, wages, safety, collective bargaining).
Centralisation of powers: States lose authority; Centre can fix floor wages and override minimum wage structure.
Fixed-term employment → legalised hire & fire; weakens job security and unionisation.
Higher thresholds in OSHWC Code:
Factory license threshold increased from 10→20 workers with power, 20→40 without power → excludes many MSME workers.
Social security dilution:
Only ~7% of workforce currently covered (EPFO/ESIC).
Codes won’t realistically cover 93% informal workforce, only selectively gig/platform.
Lack of consultation:
PM assured in 2015 Indian Labour Conference that no labour law would be amended without unions.
Codes passed in Parliament without full debate or union participation.
Collective bargaining diluted:
Stricter strike notice, recognition of unions unresolved, and bargaining councils absent.
Fear of industrial unrest due to unilateral reforms.
Core Contestations
A. Minimum Wages and Floor Wage
Industry view :
Principle agreed; issue is methodology and implementation, not the idea.
Wages must reflect regional cost of living, sectoral differences, inflation adjustment, productivity link.
Union view :
Floor wage fixed by Centre may become ceiling for States → dilution of States’ power.
Codes weaken the concept of living wage (ILO upheld).
By increasing thresholds, millions fall outside minimum wage protection.
B. Social Security Expansion
Industry view :
Codes aim to cover 40 crore workers, including informal, gig/platform, fixed-term employees.
Organised sector prepared; MSMEs need handholding.
Union view :
Ambitious but unrealistic:
Current coverage ≈ 7%; infrastructure cannot handle a dramatic jump.
Gig/platform workers are only a small subset of informal workers.
Existing EPF/ESI/Maternity Benefit frameworks being dumped into new structure without clarity.
No universal social protection architecture; budgetary support absent.
C. Industrial Relations, Strikes, and Hiring/Firing
Industry view :
Reforms necessary for competitiveness; industries undergoing tech disruption (AI, automation).
Enhancements in:
Notice period
Retrenchment compensation
Reskilling fund for displaced workers.
Union view :
Hire & fire legitimised:
Retrenchment threshold raised from 100 → 300 workers (State can even increase further).
Right to strike restricted:
60-day notice, 14-day pre-strike period; wider essential services interpretation.
Recognition of trade unions unclear → weak collective bargaining.
D. Occupational Safety and Working Conditions
Industry view:
Harmonised standards + modernised safety norms + women in all shifts = modern workforce policies.
Union view:
Higher thresholds → millions excluded from OSH, health checks, crèche facilities.
Informal workers remain unprotected.
E. Investment Attraction
Industry view:
Predictability + uniformity → positive signal to investors.
Global competition demands flexible labour systems.
Labour reforms only one part of larger investment ecosystem (infrastructure, taxation).
Union view:
Unrest + weakened worker protections diminish productivity and stability.
FDI did not significantly rise even after liberalisation of insurance, defence, etc.
Risk of neo-colonial dependency via investment-driven negotiations (India–US bilateral treaty concerns).
Structural Assessment: Are the Labour Codes Labour-Friendly?
Strengths
Simplification of 40+ laws → improved clarity.
Digital compliance, fewer inspections → reduces harassment.
Formalisation intent: inclusion of gig/platform workers for first time.
Women’s labour force participation may benefit (night shift permissions with safeguards).
Potential ease of doing business → job creation argument (contested).
Weaknesses
Exclusion of large workforce through raised thresholds.
Weak collective bargaining → industrial harmony claim questionable.
Fixed-term employment → precarious work; high turnover; unionisation decline.
Floor wage may become de facto maximum.
Universal social security goal remains largely aspirational without fiscal commitment.
Democratic deficit in drafting: no Indian Labour Conference since 2015.
Evaluation
Labour-friendly elements
Extends formal recognition to gig/platform workers.
Aims to reduce compliance burden → possible employment growth.
Harmonisation across States → clarity for firms + workers.
Safety code modernises standards (though coverage limited).
Not labour-friendly elements
Threshold increases exclude millions from protection.
Hire & fire flexibility without strong social security backup = risk of insecurity.
Dilution of right to strike and collective bargaining.
Limited coverage expansion, despite claims of 40 crore; administrative machinery inadequate.
Minimal consultation undermines tripartism (key ILO principle).
Final Verdict
The codes are employer-friendly in structure but worker-friendly in stated intention.
They aim for flexibility-first, protection-second, whereas global best models (Nordic, EU) rely on protection-first, flexibility-with-security.
Without:
universal minimum wage enforcement
budget-backed social security
strong unions/collective bargaining
the reforms risk creating a dual labour market — formal sector flexibility without adequate safety nets.
Why India struggles to clear its air
Why Is It in News?
Delhi’s annual winter pollution cycle has returned, with air quality dropping to ‘Severe’, triggering cloud seeding, smog towers, sprinkling, odd-even rules, and festival crackdowns.
A pattern of repetitive, ineffective measures dominates, while deeper governance breakdowns persist.
Recent public protests near India Gate (Nov 24) against air pollution led to police detentions despite peaceful demonstrations.
Raises questions on air-quality governance, institutional design, regulatory authority, and political incentives.
Relevance
GS3 – Environment / Pollution
• National air pollution control architecture: CAQM, CPCB, SPCBs.
• Sectoral sources: biomass, transport, industry, construction dust.
• Meteorology–inversion dynamics in Indo-Gangetic Plain.
• Failure of “end-of-pipe” measures; need for structural interventions.
• Health impacts → DALY burden, economic productivity losses.
GS2 – Governance / Federal Issues
• Inter-state coordination failures (Punjab–Haryana–Delhi).
• Institutional fragmentation → weak compliance.
• Judiciary’s role vs executive capacity (EPCA to CAQM shift).
• Behavioural governance: household fuels, micro-enterprise emissions.
• Urban governance deficits in monitoring, enforcement, and waste systems.
Understanding the Pollution Crisis
Winter inversion + local emissions trap pollutants:
Construction dust
Tailpipe emissions
Industrial pollution
Biomass burning
Waste burning
Regional agricultural burning
Delhi’s geography aggravates stagnation, but policy failures drive the persistence.
Core Diagnosis: India’s Structural Governance Flaw
1. Fragmented Responsibility
Pollution management divided across:
MoEFCC
CPCB + SPCBs
CAQM
Delhi Pollution Control Committee
Municipal bodies (MCD, NDMC)
State departments (transport, agriculture, industries)
Agencies like NHAI, PWD, DISCOMs
No single institution has full mandate + accountability.
2. Uneven Enforcement
State-wise variation in compliance.
Weak inter-state coordination within NCR.
Contradictions between court orders, Union directives, and local decisions.
3. Judicial Pressure → Short-termism
Courts demand immediate action, pushing governments toward high-visibility, low-impact solutions.
Why Short-Term Measures Dominate
Governance Incentives
Quick fixes:
Show rapid action
Avoid confronting powerful sectors: construction, transport, agriculture
Fit within annual budgets
Minimise political risk
Hence, return every year:
Cloud seeding
Smog towers
Anti-smog guns
Odd-even
Crackdowns on festivals
Political Logic
Provide visibility, not results.
Keep attention cycles short.
Manage headlines rather than emissions.
Two Strategic Pitfalls Weakening India’s Response
A. Intellectual Trap
Overreliance on expert/think-tank solutions assuming:
High administrative capacity
Reliable enforcement
Strong record-keeping
Continuity across institutions
Policies designed in elite spaces cannot be implemented by overstretched municipal systems.
B. Western Trap
Importing global “best practices” without adaptation:
Assumes strong public transport
Assumes low informal activity
Assumes coherent regulatory systems
Assumes predictable coordination
European/East Asian models fail when transplanted without redesign.
Result
Ideas that travel well but land poorly.
Pilot projects fade within months.
Strategies produce documents, not transformation.
Indian Constraints That Must Shape Policy
Uneven municipal capacity
Informal construction and labour markets
Diesel-heavy freight systems
Fragmented land markets
Economic vulnerabilities of farmers, transporters, small industries
Multiple veto points: courts, Union, States, municipal bodies
Local political cycles and shifting priorities
Policies ignoring these constraints fail during implementation.
What India Needs (Institutional Redesign)
1. Clear Leadership & Mandates
Define who leads air-quality governance across national–state–city levels.
A modern Clean Air Law with explicit institutional roles.
2. Coordinating, Not Dominating, Institutions
A trusted body to align:
Policies
Data
Enforcement
Inter-state NCR coordination
Avoid creating yet another regulator; build coherence.
3. Multi-year Funding
Move away from annual-budget firefighting.
Stable funds needed for:
Monitoring networks
Fleet modernisation
Industrial compliance
Waste systems
4. Enforcement + Transparency
Real-time, public access to compliance data.
Predictable penalties to make rules credible.
5. Professional Science Managers
Experts who can:
Translate science into governance
Work across ministries
Anticipate political limits
Adapt global ideas to Indian conditions
Bridge technical analysis with administrative realism.
Underlying Challenge
India suffers not due to lack of ideas but due to misalignment:
Between ambition and actual capacity
Between expert design and municipal execution
Between global models and Indian realities
Until institutions match the complexity of Indian cities, pollution cycles will continue unchanged.
Auramine O in Indian Food
Why Is It in News?
Recent inspections by State food-safety departments, academic studies, and everyday market checks have once again detected auramine O, a banned industrial dye, in Indian foods.
Widely found in sweets, savouries, street foods, and spice powders, especially around festivals.
Highlights failures in enforcement, chemical-market regulation, and consumer/vendor awareness.
Relevance
GS2 – Health / Regulation
• Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 enforcement gaps.
• FSSAI’s regulatory architecture: labs, surveillance, penalties.
• Informal food sector compliance deficits.
• Public health risk: hepatotoxicity, carcinogenicity.
• Consumer safety → right to safe food (Article 21).
GS3 – Science / Technology / Economy
• Need for rapid detection technologies.
• Chemical supply-chain regulation and monitoring.
• Economic incentives driving adulteration in low-margin sectors.
• Formalisation and traceability in food processing.
• Strengthening quality infrastructure (NABL labs, state capacity).
What Is Auramine O?
Synthetic bright yellow dye, industrial-grade.
Major uses: textiles, leather, paper, printing inks, microbiological staining.
Not permitted under Indian food-safety regulations.
Health effects (evidence-based):
Liver + kidney toxicity
Splenomegaly
Mutagenic effects
Possible carcinogenicity (IARC: possibly carcinogenic to humans)
Banned because it can mimic permitted colours (tartrazine) or natural colour sources (saffron, turmeric).
Why It Persists in the Food Chain
1. Economic Drivers
Extremely cheap, more vibrant than permitted food colours.
Easy availability in informal chemical markets.
2. Supply-chain Weakness
Informal sale of unlabelled dye packets.
Lack of source-tracking mechanisms for industrial-grade chemicals.
3. Vendor Behaviour
Small-scale sweet makers, halwais, street vendors use it due to:
Low knowledge of regulations
Desire for bright visual appeal
Minimal fear of enforcement
4. Governance Constraints
Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 is strong on paper, but:
Enforcement varies across States
Laboratory capacity is uneven
Surveillance is episodic (often festive-season driven)
Staffing shortages delay routine inspections
Current Government Response
1. Surveillance Drives
FSSAI conducts festival-season crackdowns and random sampling.
States seize illegal colourants, prosecute violators, and destroy consignment stock.
2. Awareness Campaigns
Target small manufacturers, sweet-makers, and street vendors.
Focus on risks of synthetic dyes and permitted alternatives.
3. Strengthening Infrastructure
Investment in food-testing laboratories.
Push for rapid testing kits for on-field detection of industrial dyes.
Deeper Structural Problems (Systemic Diagnosis)
1. Fragmented Enforcement
State food-safety departments are unevenly staffed.
Local-level sampling dependent on district officer discretion.
Surveillance often begins only when media pressure rises.
2. Light Regulation of Chemical Markets
Industrial dyes sold openly in wholesale markets.
No licensing requirement for sales to food businesses.
Poor record-keeping makes traceability almost impossible.
3. Informal Food Economy
India’s enormous informal food sector:
Sweets, snacks, street food
Unregulated micro units
Compliance expectations exceed their capacity.
4. Limited Consumer Power
Consumers often prioritise colour appeal over safety.
Awareness about synthetic dye toxicity remains very low.
What India Needs (Reform Blueprint)
A. Chemical-Market Regulation
Mandate registration of dye sellers.
Ban informal sale of unlabelled colourant powders.
Create a digital record-keeping system for industrial dye transactions.
B. Enforcement Reforms
State-level standardisation of sampling frequency.
Dedicated food-safety field units at district level.
Predictable penalties for repeat offenders.
C. Technology + Labs
Scale rapid-detection kits for markets and street vendors.
Expand accredited laboratories in Tier-2/3 cities.
D. Vendor-Level Behaviour Change
Community-level campaigns in sweet clusters, halwai unions, and small eateries.
Incentivise use of permitted colours through subsidies or bulk procurement support.
E. Consumer Education
Public messaging highlighting health impacts of bright, unnaturally colourful foods.
Information campaigns in schools, markets, community kitchens.
Why the Problem Repeats Every Year
Similar to other food-adulteration cycles (like spurious ghee, milk adulteration).
A mix of regulatory weaknesses, informal markets, and demand for visibly appealing food.
Seasonal spikes around Diwali, Holi, harvest festivals.
Enforcement intensity collapses once festival season ends
International Astronomical Union approves seven new Indian names for Martian features
WHY IN NEWS?
International Astronomical Union (IAU) has approved seven new Indian names for geological features on Mars.
These include names inspired by Kerala’s Periyar river, Varkala beach, Bekal fort, Vallamala, Thumba, and a crater named after geologist M.S. Krishnan.
Announcement made by IAU’s Working Group for Planetary System Nomenclature (Nov 24).
Reflects India’s growing scientific footprint in planetary science and ISRO-linked heritage sites getting global recognition.
Relevance
GS3 – Space / Science & Technology
• Planetary nomenclature standards set by IAU.
• India’s scientific contributions through ISRO and planetary missions.
• Strengthening planetary geology databases and mission planning.
• Recognition of Indian scientists and heritage sites.
• Space diplomacy and global scientific integration.
GS2 – Governance / International Institutions
• India’s role in multilateral scientific bodies.
• Soft power through scientific naming.
• Institutional cooperation for planetary mapping.
• Enhancing India’s credibility in global space governance.
• Implications for future India–IAU collaboration.
BASICS
What is IAU?
Global authority that approves names for celestial bodies and planetary features.
Ensures standardization across scientific databases (USGS Gazetteer being the key one).
Names require proposals with imagery, coordinates, scientific justification.
Nomenclature Rules for Mars
Large craters (≥50 km): Named after deceased scientists.
Small craters: Named after towns/villages with population <1 lakh.
Other features (plains, valleys, ridges): Named after relevant themes (e.g., river names for valleys).
DETAILS OF NEW INDIAN NAMES ON MARS
1. Krishnan Crater
Diameter: 77 km
Named after M.S. Krishnan, eminent Indian geologist; headed Geological Survey of India in 1951.
Crater lies SE of another crater named Kircher; part of the planet’s ancient surface (~3 billion years old).
2. Krishnan Palus (Plain)
~50 km wide plain associated with the crater.
Recognizes Krishnan’s contribution to Indian geology.
3. Periyar Vallis
A valley-like feature (~50 km long), named after Kerala’s Periyar river.
Follows the IAU’s convention of naming valleys after terrestrial rivers.
4. Varkala
Geological feature named after Varkala beach/town in Kerala.
5. Bekal
Named after Bekal Fort region, Kerala.
6. Thumba
Named after Thumba, the birthplace of ISRO’s space programme (TERLS inaugurated in 1963).
Symbolically important for India’s space heritage.
7. Vallamala
Named after Vallamala, a Kerala locality, fitting the <1 lakh population rule for small features.
HOW NAMES GET APPROVED ?
Scientists submit a ‘Call for Proposal’ to IAU with:
Scientific maps & images
Coordinate data (latitude/longitude)
Description of the feature
Annotated / unannotated figures
Proposals undergo committee-level technical scrutiny.
Final approval by IAU after deliberation.
SIGNIFICANCE
1. International Recognition of Indian Science
Places Indian toponyms & scientists on the global planetary map.
Highlights Indian geologists’ contributions to Mars research and nomenclature efforts.
2. Cultural Representation in Space Science
Names from Kerala—Periyar, Varkala, Bekal, Vallamala—reflect India’s cultural geography on another planet.
3. Strengthens ISRO’s Global Standing
Thumba’s inclusion underlines India’s pioneering role in launching its space programme (TERLS, sounding rockets).
4. Knowledge of Mars’ Ancient Terrain
Krishnan crater (~3 billion years old) adds to understanding of Mars’ early geologic history.
Doppler Weather Radar: Enhancing India’s weather forecasting network
Definition: A Doppler Weather Radar is a specialized radar system that uses the Doppler effect to measure the velocity of precipitation (rain, snow, hail) in the atmosphere.
Function: Detects rainfall intensity, storm motion, wind direction, and speed, which helps in real-time weather monitoring.
Components:
Transmitter and receiver
Antenna
Signal processor
Output: Provides radar images showing precipitation patterns and movement, aiding in forecasting severe weather events.
Relevance
GS3 – Disaster Management / Environment
• Early-warning systems for cyclones, thunderstorms, extreme rainfall.
• IMD’s radar network expansion under modernisation drive.
• Improved nowcasting accuracy through Doppler velocity data.
• Reducing disaster losses under Sendai Framework.
• Climate change–linked extreme weather monitoring.
GS3 – Science & Technology
• Working principle: Doppler shift for precipitation and wind velocity.
• Integration with satellites (INSAT-3D/3DR), AWS, and mesoscale models.
• Filling coverage gaps in Himalayas and coastal belts.
• Data-driven forecast improvements for aviation, agriculture, and fisheries.
• Upgrading computational capacity for high-resolution models.
Significance of Doppler Radar in India
India faces seasonal extreme weather events: cyclones, heavy rainfall, thunderstorms, hailstorms, lightning.
Operational Network:
India already has Doppler radars in major cities like Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, Kolkata, Bhubaneswar, Goa, Thiruvananthapuram.
Karnataka and Chhattisgarh joining strengthens regional forecasting capacity.
Coverage:
Mangalore radar: Coastal Karnataka and nearby regions.
Raipur radar: Chhattisgarh and surrounding central India.
Benefits:
Improved early warning systems for floods, cyclones, and thunderstorms.
Enhanced precision in local forecasts for agriculture, aviation, and disaster management.
Faster dissemination of real-time alerts to citizens and authorities.
Why It’s in the News ?
New Infrastructure: First Doppler radars in these states, filling gaps in India’s meteorological coverage.
Disaster Preparedness:
Early detection reduces human and economic losses during extreme weather events.
Supports Ministry of Earth Sciences’ initiative to strengthen climate and weather forecasting.
Regional Impact:
Karnataka: Coastal regions prone to heavy rainfall and cyclones from Arabian Sea.
Chhattisgarh: Central India prone to thunderstorms, hail, and lightning during monsoon.
Government Focus: Aligns with India’s modernization of meteorological infrastructure to improve climate resilience.
Takeaway
The operationalization of Doppler radars in Mangalore and Raipur marks a strategic upgrade in India’s weather monitoring network, particularly for regions previously underserved.
It strengthens real-time monitoring and early warning, reducing vulnerability to extreme weather events.
It reflects India’s larger focus on science-driven disaster management and regional climate resilience