Current Affairs 03 December 2025
Content DoT Order to Pre-Install Sanchar Saathi App Why There Is No Peace in Ukraine Why the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) Needs Complete Digitisation Only 20% of Candidates Accepted PM Internship Scheme Offers WHO Issues First Global Guidelines on GLP-1 Weight-Loss Drugs How the River Kosi’s Shifting Course Exposes the Perils of Embankments DoT Order to Pre-Install Sanchar Saathi App Why Is It in the News? DoT issued a mandatory order directing all smartphone manufacturers to pre-install the Sanchar Saathi app on every device sold in India. Triggered political backlash (Opposition leaders calling it unilateral, undemocratic). Digital rights activists raised concerns over privacy, informed consent, and surveillance. Experts warned that pre-installed, non-removable apps can access OS-level permissions, creating potential pathways for malware/spying. Relevance GS-II: Governance Executive overreach vs citizen rights; informed consent; digital governance ethics. Accountability gaps: absence of statutory backing for mandatory apps. Public consultation deficits in tech regulation. GS-II: Polity (Fundamental Rights) Right to Privacy (Puttaswamy test: legality–necessity–proportionality). Surveillance concerns, metadata collection, state intrusion. GS-III: Cybersecurity Risk of system apps with OS-level permissions. Threat surface expansion; malware vector risks; IMEI–identity linking. What is Sanchar Saathi? Launched by DoT in 2023 as a web portal, later upgraded to a mobile app. Objective: Counter telecom fraud, enable blocking of stolen devices, verify IMEI authenticity. Key functions: Report fraudulent calls/number misuse. Check IMEI genuineness via CEIR. Request blocking/unblocking of stolen/ lost phones. Monitor numbers linked to a single identity (TAFCOP component). What Does the New DoT Mandate Require? Pre-installation on all new smartphones sold in India. Likely non-removable, as most pre-loaded system apps are integrated into OEM firmware. No public consultation before mandating. Not backed by a specific Act of Parliament. Why Did Government Push It? (Official Rationale) Sharp rise in online fraud, “digital arrest” scams, impersonation and cross-border cybercrime. Increase in IMEI spoofing, sale of fake devices. App-based services like WhatsApp/Telegram can function even when SIM credentials change → traceability gap. Aim: strengthen device-SIM-identity link and support real-time cybercrime response. Concerns Raised (Governance, Legal, Technical) A. Governance Concerns Absence of consultation with industry/citizens. Mandatory installation contradicts the principle of informed consent. Risks of normalising state-pushed software on personal devices. B. Legal and Constitutional Concerns Must pass Puttaswamy (2017) tests: Legality: no explicit law authorising such surveillance-enabling installations. Necessity: alternatives available (portal/SMS verification). Proportionality: intrusive, continuous access to device metadata possible. Could blur lines between regulation and surveillance. C. Technical & Cybersecurity Concerns Pre-installed apps often gain OS-level privileges (system apps). Users often cannot uninstall them → persistent capability. As cybersecurity expert Anand Venkatanarayanan noted: Once an app has system-level access, an over-the-air update can give it deeper permissions. Creates a potential single point of failure if app is compromised. Government becomes a potential malware vector—a major red flag. D. Risks of Abuse Potential for continuous digital supervision (CPI-M MP John Brittas). Could enable mass metadata collection across millions of devices. History of spyware allegations (Pegasus) intensifies distrust. Manufacturer pushback: compromises secure OS architecture (Apple’s protest expected). Broader Implications Expands executive authority without legislative scrutiny. Sets precedent: government apps may be forced on all devices in future. Could impact India’s reputation on digital rights and data protection. Could weaken India’s cybersecurity posture if exploited by threat actors. International Practices Democratic countries rarely mandate pre-installed government apps. Exceptions: South Korea’s disaster alert apps (voluntary install, not system apps). Covid apps globally were voluntary (UK, EU, Japan). India’s approach resembles state-led firmware intervention, not standard global regulation. Critical Overview Strengths (Limited but Relevant) Helps combat rising telecom fraud. Facilitates faster IMEI tracking. Streamlines reporting of stolen devices. Major Weaknesses Disproportionate → security benefits achievable without deep device intrusion. Undermines autonomy and informed consent. High systemic cybersecurity risk. Weak accountability → no statutory oversight. Diminishes trust in government technology. Way Forward Shift from mandatory to opt-in installation. Run Sanchar Saathi as a service layer, not firmware layer. Enact a statutory framework defining digital surveillance limits. Conduct third-party security audits, open-source app code. Keep IMEI–SIM linkage at the telecom backend, not user device. Launch transparent public consultation with industry, civil society. Conclusion The DoT’s move stems from a genuine rise in cybercrime but adopts a legally weak, technologically intrusive, and governance-deficient route. Mandatory pre-installation transforms a user’s smartphone into a potential instrument of persistent digital oversight. The policy must be redesigned along principles of proportionality, transparency, and privacy-by-design. Why is there no peace in Ukraine? Why Is It in the News? New U.S. (Trump administration)–led peace plan for the Russia–Ukraine war has been circulated to stakeholders. The plan is far less favourable to Ukraine than the 2022 Istanbul framework. Comes amid Ukrainian battlefield setbacks (Pokrovsk, Kupiansk), Western fatigue, domestic corruption scandals, and Trump’s shift in U.S. policy. Marks a major turning point: Ukraine is weaker, Russia stronger, and Western alignment fractured. Relevance GS-II: International Relations Power shifts in Russia–Ukraine conflict; failure of 2022 Istanbul process. Changing US foreign policy under Trump; “Reverse Kissinger” realignment attempt. Europe’s strategic autonomy gaps & NATO credibility questions. GS-I/World History Territorial annexation, violation of post-1945 norms; coercive peace frameworks. GS-II: Global Governance Erosion of international law due to legitimising territorial conquest. UN diplomacy limitations; great-power politics shaping peace frameworks. Timeline of Peace Attempts (2022–2025) A. Early 2022: Belarus → Turkey Talks Days after Russia invaded (Feb 2022), both sides opened negotiations in Belarus. Russian troops pushed towards Kharkiv and Kherson, aiming for a quick victory. B. March 2022 Istanbul Talks Mediated by Turkey; first serious diplomatic breakthrough. Ukraine indicated willingness to: Renounce NATO membership, Recognise Russian as an official language, Accept neutrality under multilateral security guarantees. Russia signalled readiness to: Withdraw to pre-Feb 24, 2022 lines, keeping Crimea and parts of Donetsk/Luhansk. Fiona Hill & Angela Stent (Foreign Affairs, 2022): Both sides reached a tentative interim settlement outline. C. Collapse of the Istanbul Process Western powers hesitant to offer hard security guarantees to Ukraine. Boris Johnson reportedly urged Kyiv to continue fighting. Zelenskyy grew confident after Russia withdrew from Kyiv–Chernihiv. Result: Ukraine resumed war → later expelled Russian forces from Kharkiv and Kherson (late 2022). Russia retaliated by: Annexing four more regions (Sept 2022), Launching partial mobilisation, Settling into a long-war strategy. Shift in Strategic Landscape (2023–2025) A. Military 2023 Ukrainian counter-offensive failed decisively → military option closed. Russia adapted to sanctions, stabilised economy, and improved defence lines. By 2024–25: Russia regained initiative → capture of Pokrovsk marks major advance. B. Political Zelenskyy extended term under martial law; recent corruption scandals eroded legitimacy. U.S. under Biden: “support as long as it takes”. U.S. under Trump: Views war as lost, Shifts burden to Europe, Seeks potential reset with Russia, including a “Reverse Kissinger” (tilting Russia away from China). Trump’s 28-Point Peace Plan: Key Features A. Territorial Settlement (Favors Russia) Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk recognised as “de facto Russian”. Ukraine must withdraw from Donetsk (Russia currently controls ~80%). Contact lines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia frozen → Russia keeps captured areas. Other seized territories outside annexed oblasts returned by Russia. B. Military Terms Ukraine must cap military strength at 600,000 personnel. Demilitarised buffer areas likely around the frontline. C. NATO Issue (Core Russian Demand) Ukraine must constitutionally renounce NATO membership. NATO must legally commit that Ukraine will never be admitted. Ukraine can join the EU. D. Security Guarantees Separate 3-point draft proposes NATO-style assurances for 10 years, renewable. Significant Russian attack treated as threat to transatlantic security. E. Sanctions & Russia’s Reintegration Russia to be reintegrated into global economy. Sanctions can be lifted; Russia could rejoin G8. Long-term U.S.–Russia economic cooperation (conditional). Russia to enact legal non-aggression commitments. Why Is the Plan Considered Pro-Russia? Ukraine loses ~20% of its pre-2014 territory permanently. NATO door shut irreversibly. Russia’s gains legitimised; its losses not fully reversed. Security guarantees for Ukraine remain vague. Russia receives economic reintegration even without full withdrawal. U.S. role shifts from active military supporter to mediator with Russia. Zelenskyy’s Dilemma If he accepts: Effectively admits Russian victory. Major political blow at home → backlash from military, nationalist groups. Legitimacy crisis given expired term + corruption scandals. Loss of territory becomes permanent. If he rejects: U.S. may withdraw support, further isolating Ukraine. Risk of losing more territory in prolonged war. Europe alone cannot sustain Ukraine financially/militarily. Europe’s Position Germany, France, U.K. vow continued support but lack U.S.-scale capability. European unity under strain due to energy, defence readiness, budget fatigue. Europe fears Trump’s plan may entrench Russian strategic advantages. Ground Reality (Dec 2025) A. Russia Controls: All of Crimea, All of Luhansk, ~80% of Donetsk, Significant parts of Kherson & Zaporizhzhia, Slowly advancing in Kharkiv region. War economy stabilised; military industrial production revived. B. Ukraine Facing power outages due to strikes on grid. Economic collapse prevented only through Western aid. Morale eroding; no feasible path to offensive victory. Why Istanbul Moment Cannot Return ? 2022: Russia was on back foot → willing for concessions. 2025: Russia has battlefield momentum + geopolitical leverage. Ukraine now negotiating from weakness, not parity. Trump plan reflects changed power balance, not diplomatic creativity. Implications for Global Politics A. U.S.–Russia–China Triangle Trump may pursue Reverse Kissinger: Draw Russia away from China to weaken Beijing. Success uncertain due to deep Russia-China alignment. B. NATO Credibility Forcing Ukraine to give up NATO path may weaken NATO’s moral authority. Sets precedent that military pressure can force Western concessions. C. International Law Legitimising territorial conquest undermines post-1945 rules. Conclusion Peace efforts collapsed in 2022 due to Western hesitation and Ukrainian optimism. Strategic balance shifted sharply in Russia’s favour over 2023–25. Trump plan formalises Ukraine’s territorial losses and neutrality. Ukraine in 2025 faces its toughest moment: military setbacks + political crisis + U.S. pressure. The new plan is a coercive peace, not a negotiated settlement. Why the SIR needs to be completely digitised What is Special Intensive Revision (SIR)? Periodic exercise by the Election Commission to update, correct, and verify electoral rolls. Traditionally meant to remove dead/shifted voters, include new voters, and correct errors. Requires accurate foundational records for reliability. Relevance GS-II: Governance Electoral roll integrity; administrative capacity; citizen–state interaction. Digital governance failures due to legacy datasets. GS-II: Polity – Elections Role of Election Commission; BLO functioning; voter rights protection. Challenges to free, fair, and inclusive elections due to faulty rolls. GS-III: Technology in Governance Need for structured, searchable databases; Aadhaar/PAN integration with safeguards. Digital workflow vs paper-based systems; reducing human error. Why This Issue Is in News? SIR 2.0 depends on legacy voter rolls (2002–04) created manually on paper. India’s advanced digital systems (ECINet, Aadhaar-based verification, online EF system) are not fully used. Result: widespread errors, non-searchable data, mass deletions, voter panic, and operational delays. Core Problem: Weak Foundation “Garbage in, garbage out” rule: flawed base data = flawed electoral rolls, no matter the procedure. 2002–04 rolls have: Manual entries, handwritten, high spelling variation. No standardised metadata or searchable fields. Missing EPICs, house numbers, surnames, gender/age inconsistencies. Zero digitisation quality control. Evidence of Failure in Legacy Rolls Random audits reveal anomalies: Entries implying polygamy (two wives with same husband name). Incomplete names like “Rakesh”, “Vir”, “Sahgal/Sangal” mismatched spellings. Missing EPIC numbers, addresses, and house numbers. Author (IIT/DRDO/IITK professor) scanned thousands of entries and couldn’t find his own record despite voting for decades. Non-searchable PDFs make identification practically impossible. Systemic Regression: Why SIR 2.0 Fails Falls back to paper-era workflow: BLOs collect paper forms → later digitised manually → verified again → digitally uploaded. Massive delays: Over 50% of Uttar Pradesh’s EFs undigitised (EC statement, Nov 27). Low digital skills among BLOs: errors, delays, inconsistent formats. Voters forced to: Bring paper photos. Submit duplicate proofs. Make multiple visits. ECINet vs Legacy SIR: Stark Underutilisation ECINet Capabilities (Modern System) One-billion–record searchable database. Searchable by name, mobile, EPIC, DOB, address, relatives. Duplicate detection, Aadhaar linking, auto-verification. Online EF filing, constituency locator, grievance tracking. Legacy SIR Reality Non-searchable PDFs. Manual forms, manual corrections. Broken search interface → “error” or “no details found”. EC disclaims ownership: “rolls published exactly as received from CEOs”. Key Administrative Issues EC expects voters to remember where they voted in 2002–04, unrealistic after 20 years. EPIC cards from those years not archived; voters relied on scrap slips. BLOs often demand unnecessary documents (birth certificate, extra address proof) contrary to EC guidelines. For voters deleted from rolls: Online Form 6 forces them to declare as first-time voters, introducing further distortions. Approval requirements for minor corrections via Form 8 are restrictive and slow. Consequences Millions cannot locate or verify their names. Errors propagate through the system because the foundational dataset is unverified. Panic among citizens, overload on BLOs, political tensions during elections. Months-long disruption instead of a clean-up. What Should Have Been Done ? Digital-only workflow, eliminating paper forms entirely. Deploy mobile kiosks with trained personnel for citizens lacking digital skills. Build searchable databases for legacy rolls before initiating SIR. Integrate Aadhaar (with safeguards), PAN, local body records via API checks. Uniform standards for names, addresses, metadata. Transformation Blueprint: Fully Digital SIR 2026 a) Complete Digitisation Convert all State/UT rolls (2002–04 included) into English-searchable structured datasets. Regional scripts kept as display only, not for search logic. b) Data Integration Merge legacy data with reliable datasets: Aadhaar Income Tax/PAN Driving licence Local body property records Automated consistency checks. c) Voter Classification Stable-address voters. Frequent movers. Citizenship/immigration ambiguity cases. d) Online EF Submission 100% online workflows (mobile + web). Kiosks for rural/elderly users. Dedicated trained digital staff. e) Digitise All Post-Submission Steps Document verification, approval, objections, final roll publication – all within ECINet. Real-time tracking of corrections/deletions. Benefits of a Fully Digital System Eliminates legacy errors permanently. Single national database → consistent, verifiable, auditable. Faster approvals, real-time grievance handling. Massive reduction in human errors and BLO overload. Ensures transparency, trust, and electoral integrity. The Way Ahead Digital SIR is not optional — essential for a credible democratic process. Most reforms are immediately implementable; only deep integration may extend beyond SIR 2.0. Once digitised, future revisions become simple annual updates, not massive crisis-driven exercises. SIR 2026 must become a technology-led trust revolution, not a paper-driven crisis. Only 20% of candidates accepted PM Internship Scheme offers: data What is the PM Internship Scheme? A national-scale internship programme announced in Union Budget 2024. Objective: Provide 1 crore internships in five years in top Indian companies. Designed to bridge: industry–academia gap, employability skills, and early career exposure for youth. Implemented via Ministry of Corporate Affairs; companies post internships on a central portal. Relevance GS-II: Governance Scheme design flaws; weak policy feedback loops; centre–industry coordination gaps. Budget utilisation issues; outcome vs output mismatch. GS-III: Economy Labour market dynamics; employability and skilling ecosystem. Youth job-preparedness and industry-academia mismatch. GS-II: Social Sector Development Youth aspirations; access barriers; regional disparities. Internship quality norms; role clarity; stipend adequacy. Why is it in News? Data presented in Parliament shows low acceptance and high dropout rates. Despite exceeding target of 1.25 lakh internship offers for the pilot, only 20% of candidates accepted across two rounds. Nearly 20% of those who accepted quit mid-way, raising concerns about scheme design, workplace quality, and alignment with youth expectations. Pilot Scale & Targets Pilot launched in October 2024, target: 1.25 lakh internships in one year. Total internships posted (Round 1 + Round 2): 2.45 lakh+ opportunities. Key Numbers (Two Rounds Combined) 1.65 lakh offers made by companies. 33,300 offers accepted → Acceptance rate: 20.2%. 6,618 candidates left prematurely → Dropout rate: 19.9% among accepted candidates. Round-wise Performance Round 1 Opportunities posted: 1.27 lakh. Applications: 6.21 lakh. Offers made: 82,000. Accepted: 8,700 (10.6% acceptance). Dropouts: 4,565 → More than 50% of interns quit mid-way. Round 2 (January onwards) Opportunities posted: 1.18 lakh. Applications: 4.55 lakh. Offers made: 83,000+. Accepted: 24,600 (30% acceptance). Dropouts: 2,053 → 8.3% quit rate. Youth Response: Why Only 20% Acceptance? Data indicates candidates declined offers due to: Location mismatch (internships far from home; low stipends insufficient to support relocation). Unsuitable roles (low-skilled tasks, perceived lack of value). Long durations incompatible with academic calendars/exams. Many internships may not align with career aspirations or sector preferences. High Dropout Rates: Key Reasons Poor role clarity and limited learning outcomes. Inadequate mentorship, long work hours, or project irrelevance. Stipend-quality mismatch: opportunity cost remains high for many students. Mismatch between expectations (skill-building) and reality (routine administrative tasks). Better opportunities elsewhere (private platforms/placements). Utilisation of Funds Original pilot budget: ₹840 crore. Revised allocation (FY 2024–25): ₹380 crore. Actual utilisation so far: ₹73.72 crore. Low utilisation reflects low participation and operational delays. Structural Challenges in PMIS Geographical concentration of opportunities in large metros; rural/remote candidates unable to relocate. Sector skew: many roles posted in sales, operations, basic admin; fewer in high-skill domains. Insufficient company participation from top-tier firms. Lack of flexibility in internship timings and duration. Portal-based recruitment lacks personalised matching, career guidance, or screening support. Implications Indicates a misalignment between scheme design and youth aspirations. Calls into question feasibility of reaching the target of 1 crore internships. Poor internship experience could undermine employability goals. High dropout → signals issues in internship quality, company readiness, or monitoring. Low acceptance → reflects need for stronger incentives for both companies and interns. Required Reforms Stipend rationalisation based on city tiers and living cost. Remote/hybrid internship options to expand reach. Sector diversification: tech, digital, green economy, EV, logistics, AI, MSMEs. Academic integration: credit-linked internships through universities. Quality assurance framework: standardised projects, mentorship norms, feedback loop. Improved matching algorithm on the portal to align skills–roles–location. Performance-based incentives for companies ensuring high-quality mentorship. Conclusion The pilot achieved numbers in terms of offers, not uptake. The bottleneck is not supply but acceptance and retention. For the scheme to succeed at national scale: Roles must be meaningful. Stipends must be realistic. Duration must be flexible. Companies must be accountable. Without addressing these structural issues, scaling to 1 crore internships in 5 years is unlikely. GLP-1 drugs Why is it in News? On 1 December 2025, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued its first global guidelines on the use of GLP-1 (Glucagon-Like Peptide-1) weight-loss drugs for treating adult obesity. WHO formally recognised GLP-1 therapies as effective, but issued conditional recommendations due to limited long-term data, high costs, and global inequity in access. The decision has major implications for public health, global obesity economics, and equitable access to new metabolic drugs. Relevance GS-II: Health WHO’s first global obesity-drug guidelines; global obesity governance. Integration of pharmacotherapy with behavioural interventions. GS-III: Science & Tech GLP-1 mechanism; metabolic diseases; long-term safety questions. Supply-demand imbalance; counterfeit risks. GS-II: Equity & Public Policy High cost; insurance gaps; unequal access in LMICs. Role of generics, price caps, regulated distribution. What Are GLP-1 Drugs? GLP-1 = Glucagon-Like Peptide-1, a hormone produced in the gut. Functions: Stimulates insulin secretion. Slows gastric emptying. Reduces appetite and cravings. Improves metabolic markers (glucose, lipids). Designed originally for type-2 diabetes → later found to cause significant weight loss. Examples of GLP-1 Drugs Semaglutide (Ozempic, Wegovy) Liraglutide (Saxenda) Tirzepatide (Mounjaro; dual GLP-1/GIP agonist, highly effective) Why GLP-1 Matters Globally Obesity ≠ lifestyle problem; it is a chronic metabolic disease. GLP-1 drugs represent the first major breakthrough since bariatric surgery. Impact Weight loss: ~15–22% depending on drug. Reduced risk of: Type-2 diabetes Cardiovascular events Certain cancers Severe infectious disease outcomes Economic angle: Obesity may cost $3 trillion annually by 2030. GLP-1 drugs could reduce this burden if made accessible. Key Elements of WHO’s New Guidelines Conditional Recommendation Use GLP-1 drugs for adults with obesity, except pregnant women. Conditional because: Limited long-term safety data. Unknown effects after drug discontinuation. Extremely high cost and equity barriers. Must Accompany Behavioural Interventions Drugs cannot be used alone. Diet modification + physical activity + counselling remain essential. GLP-1 → only when lifestyle interventions fail or when obesity is severe. Equity as Central Principle WHO stresses: Tax-funded or insurance-backed programmes. Avoiding two-tier systems where only the rich can access treatments. Need for affordable generics in developing countries. Why WHO Issued Guidelines Now ? Rapid worldwide adoption of drugs like Ozempic/Wegovy. Sharp rise of off-label use and medical tourism. Multiple countries witnessing shortages due to demand. Need for global standards on: Who should use the drugs. How to integrate them into national obesity programmes. Ensuring safe and monitored usage. Concerns Acknowledged by WHO High Cost GLP-1 drugs cost ₹20,000–₹30,000/month in India (imported brands). Remains unaffordable for most low-middle-income populations. Insurance coverage extremely limited. Limited Long-Term Data Weight regain after stopping is common. Safety beyond 5–10 years still unclear. Issues of gastrointestinal side effects (nausea, vomiting, inflammation). Supply-Demand Problems High demand has led to shortages even in countries like US & UK. Could divert supply away from diabetics who need them clinically. India-Specific Issues Cost Barrier Experts say affordability is the biggest obstacle. Need for: Generic manufacturing Government price caps Wider insurance coverage Misuse Risks Rising trend of: Off-label use for cosmetic weight loss Unmonitored consumption Counterfeit injectables Guidance by Indian Experts Anoop Mishra: Need insurance coverage + generics for real impact. V. Mohan: GLP-1 is not a magic injection; diet + exercise remain primary. Why GLP-1 Is a Global Public Health Turning Point ? Obesity now affects 1 in 8 people worldwide. Conventional lifestyle treatment works only for 10–15% long-term. GLP-1 therapies offer: Clinically significant weight reduction Improvements in metabolic syndrome Reduced long-term healthcare expenditure GLP-1 + Equity: Core Challenge Without systemic action: Rich countries and wealthy individuals dominate access. LMICs (like India) face supply and affordability barriers. WHO stresses that GLP-1 must not become a luxury therapy. Policies Needed Globally Public insurance coverage Regulation of prices Support for local manufacturing Integration into national obesity guidelines Continued investment in prevention and lifestyle interventions Conclusion WHO’s recognition is a major milestone in global obesity management. GLP-1 drugs are effective and transformative but: Not a standalone solution Not universally accessible Not yet proven long-term The guidelines emphasise: Safety Equity Integrated care For India and other LMICs, affordability and insurance coverage will determine real-world impact. How the river Kosi’s shifting course exposes the perils of embankments Why is it in News? Recent analysis highlights repeated breaches of Kosi embankments (latest in 2024), reviving debate on whether embankments worsen floods instead of preventing them. New studies and expert committees point to 120 km westward shift of the Kosi in 250 years due to sedimentation and engineering interventions. NDA’s “Flood to Fortune” promise and the Kosi-Mechi river-linking project have brought embankment policy back into political and ecological focus. Relevance GS-I: Geography River morphology; meandering rivers; sediment load; avulsion dynamics. Himalayan rivers’ hydrology and shifting channels. GS-III: Disaster Management Embankment breaches increasing flood intensity; risk amplification. Structural vs non-structural flood mitigation approaches. GS-III: Environment Human interventions altering natural river behaviour. Siltation, upstream catchment changes, climate variability impacts. Understanding the Kosi River Origin: Tibet & Nepal; joins Ganga in Bihar. Called Sapta Kosi due to seven tributaries. Highly dynamic, one of world’s most sediment-loaded rivers. Known as “River of Sorrow” due to catastrophic floods and course shifts. Has shifted course ~120 km west over the last 250 years (People’s Commission on Kosi Basin). Why Kosi Causes Extreme Flood Vulnerability ? High sediment load → riverbed aggradation. Dynamic course → frequent channel shifts. Low-gradient plains → sluggish flow, high inundation. Monsoon-fed system → sudden surge in discharge. Flood peaks: ~6 lakh cusecs (2024 flood). Embankments: Intended Role Artificial levees to contain floodwaters. Aim: protect settlements, stabilize agriculture, allow development. Built extensively since 1950s in Bihar and Assam. Issues with Embankments Increased Siltation Embankments trap silt inside the confined channel → riverbed rises continually. Over time, river flows at a higher elevation than surrounding land, making breaches catastrophic. G.R. Garg Committee (1951) warned embankments are risky for silt-heavy rivers. Frequent Breaches Kosi breached embankments in 1963, 1968, 1971, 1980, 1984, 1987, 1991, 2008, 2024. Breaches create sudden, unpredictable inundation over vast areas. Water Logging Outside Embankments Poor drainage → stagnant water in villages trapped between embankments. Creates chronic flooding even without major river spillage. Loss of Ecological Function Rivers lose: natural drainage roles floodplain recharge sediment redistribution wetland replenishment Leads to biodiversity loss and groundwater decline. Short-term protection, long-term vulnerability Embankments need continuous raising as silt accumulates. High maintenance costs; frequent failures. “False sense of security” leads to unsafe development in floodplains. Impact on Agriculture Deposition of coarse silt/sand during breaches (seen in Assam & Kosi belt). Loss of fertile topsoil → agrarian distress. Himalayan Context: Why East is More Vulnerable Eastern Himalayan rivers (Kosi, Brahmaputra): affluent rivers precipitation increases downstream high sediment → higher breach probability geologically weak terrain → landslides, river shifts Western Himalayan rivers: influent rivers rainfall decreases downstream more stable → embankments relatively safer Key Expert Views E. Somanathan: Embankments initially help but later turn dangerous due to rising riverbed; recommends floodplain-based resilience and removal where feasible. Rahul Yaduka: Embankments serve development aims but cause waterlogging; suggests improving palaeochannels for natural water distribution. Bindhy W. Pandey: Embankments unsuitable for eastern Himalayan rivers; require strict monitoring & rehabilitation if used. Mahendra Yadav (Kosi Nav Nirman Manch): Advocates “living with floods” + rehabilitating people outside embankments. Case Study: 2008 Kosi Catastrophe Breach at Kusaha (Nepal). Deaths: 400+ People affected: 33 lakh Caused by silt accumulation, embankment ageing, and altered flow due to barrage. Kosi–Mechi River-Linking Debate Government’s Argument Provide irrigation to Mahananda basin. Promote fisheries and agriculture. NDA’s “Flood to Fortune” political pitch. Expert Counterpoints Kosi peak flow: ~6 lakh cusecs Diversion through project: 5,247 cusecs → negligible impact on flood moderation. Linking won’t reduce flood peaks; may worsen siltation and cross-basin flooding. Economic Concerns Embankments require rising annual expenditure. Bihar’s embankment-related spending has increased multiple times since 1950s. High budget consumption with low resilience gain. Global Lessons United States Actively removing embankments in many basins. Allowing controlled flooding to restore: floodplains wetlands ecosystem integrity Result: milder floods, better ecological recovery. Alternatives & Way Forward 1. Living with Floods Restore natural floodplains. Zoned habitation. Seasonal cropping patterns aligned with flood cycles. 2. Reviving Palaeochannels Use abandoned channels to redistribute floodwaters. Reduce pressure on main embankment. 3. River Basin Governance Basin-wide planning Cross-border coordination with Nepal Sediment management strategy 4. Early Warning & Evacuation Training communities inside embankment belts. Improving forecasting systems. 5. Scientific Desiltation Targeted removal at critical nodes. Must be ecology-sensitive; avoid indiscriminate sand mining.